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ABSTRACT


A constant theme running throughout this book is that the principles of Soviet military instruction are fundamentally different from the principles of training in western military establishments. The overriding concern of this theme is that purposefulness and the Communist Party approach are the essence of the entire Soviet educational process. Prepared in accordance with the program of the military pedagogy course of higher military political schools, the book covers the pedagogic foundations and principles of combat and political training and the essence, principles, forms, and methods of the instruction and education of Soviet soldiers. Topics discussed could also be of use in non-Soviet military educational institutions. (SH)

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Military Pedagogy

A Soviet View



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
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Edited by
COL. A. M. DANCHENKO AND
COL. I. F. VYDRIN

Moscow 1973


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UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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За нашу Советскую Родину!

ВОЕННАЯ ПЕДАГОГИКА

*Учебное пособие
для высших
военно-политических
училищ*



Ордена Трудового Красного Знамени
ВОЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО
МИНИСТЕРСТВА ОБОРОНЫ СССР
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American Editor's Comment on Military Pedagogy

Military Pedagogy is the seventh in a series of recent Soviet military writings to be translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The original Russian edition of *Military Pedagogy* was sent to the printers on December 15, 1972, and published in early 1973 by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in 150,000 copies.

The term "military pedagogy" is defined in the 1966 Soviet "Officer's Library" *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* as "a field of pedagogical and military science investigating and developing the most efficient methods of communist teaching, military education and military training of armed force cadres in conjunction with problems facing the armed forces whether they be general or specific. It also relates to the methodology of teaching various separate military disciplines." Soviet military pedagogy has as its purpose the enhancement of "constant combat readiness." Political, combat and technical training comprise the foundation of the pedagogical process.

A constant theme running throughout this book is that the principles of Soviet military instruction are fundamentally different from the principles of training in western military establishments. The overriding concern of this theme is that purposefulness and the Communist Party approach are the essence of the entire Soviet educational process. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a spirit of implacability toward any manifestation of "bourgeois" ideology and morality are central to educational development programs throughout the Soviet armed forces.

According to the Soviet publishers this book "was prepared in accordance with the program of the military pedagogy course of higher military political schools. Covered in it are the pedagogic foundations and principles of combat and political training and the essence, principles, forms, and methods of the instruction and education of Soviet soldiers . . . This aid is intended for higher military political schools, but may also be used in other military educational institutions and among the troops."

This 1973 edition of *Military Pedagogy* was published in the USSR as a military text book. Of related interest is the fact that the earlier "Officer's Library" series contained a 1966 volume with the identical title and similar chapter headings. The 1973 edition is not identified

as being an updated version of the 1966 text but a comparison of the two books suggests this may be the case.

This book is listed as recommended reading in "The Soldier's Bookshelf" section of the 1974 *Calendar of a Soldier*.

*The translation and publication of **MILITARY PEDAGOGY** does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the inferences, findings and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange and stimulation of ideas.*

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Authorship

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Edited by Col **A. M. Danchenko**, Candidate of Pedagogic Sciences, and Col **I. F. Vydrin**, Candidate of Pedagogic Sciences.

Foreword to the Russian Edition

In carrying out the far-reaching tasks of Communist construction, the CPSU pays tremendous attention to strengthening the country's defensive capability, to further improving the military organization of our state, and to increasing the combat strength and readiness of the Armed Forces, which stand vigilant guard over the achievements of socialism.

It is stated in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress: "The Congress observes with satisfaction that the party and its central committee constantly hold at the focus of attention the problems of military construction and of increasing the strength and combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces. Increasing the defensive might of our Homeland in every way possible and instilling in the Soviet people a spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism should continue to remain one of the most important tasks of the party and nation."¹

Through the unflagging concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government our Armed Forces have now reached a level of development which enables them to rebuff an enemy attack at any time of the day or night, no matter whence it might originate, and to crush any aggressor. The Soviet Army and Navy are equipped with modern weapons and combat equipment of various designation which ensure the successful fulfillment of combat tasks on the land, in the air, and at sea. The Armed Forces have well-trained command, political, and engineering and technical personnel who are dedicated to the Communist cause and who are capable of carrying out the tasks of troop training and indoctrination at the level of current requirements and of maintaining troops in a state of constant combat readiness.

The direction of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party is the basic foundation of Soviet military construction and the source of combat strength of our army and navy. Among the most important tasks of military construction, the Party ascribes particular significance to Party political work—a powerful means of ensuring the strong moral spirit of the troops and their high combat capability and combat readiness, which are mandatory conditions for achieving victory over the enemy.

The introduction of the institution of political affairs officers in companies, batteries, squadrons, and subunits of equal stature was one effective measure toward further improving Party political work and the training and indoctrination of personnel.

As experience shows, a majority of subunit political affairs officers organize Party political work and the study and dissemination of materials of the 24th CPSU Congress in close collaboration with commanders and inform the soldiers in an effective manner of decisions of the Party and government and of our country's internal affairs and international position. Through the efforts of subunit political affairs officers, the study of feelings and spiritual needs of military personnel and the organization of their spare time and everyday life have been noticeably improved. The activities of company political workers are in large measure contributing to the rise in the level of political and military education in subunits and to the successful fulfillment of military duty by soldiers and seamen, sergeants and master sergeants, ensigns, warrants, and officers and exerts a positive influence on the fulfillment of the tasks of combat and political training.

Under the influence of the latest achievements of science and technology fundamental changes have taken place in all spheres of military affairs, especially in weaponry, the technical equipment of troops, and the methods and ways of conducting armed combat. Substantial changes in the process of combat and political training have been brought about by the reduction of the term of service for soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and master sergeants on the basis of the Compulsory Military Service Law. All this has greatly elevated the demands made of the training and indoctrination of army and navy personnel and has complicated the work of commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organizations.

Under current conditions the theoretical interpretation of new phenomena in the development of military affairs and in troop training, the in-depth penetration of our military cadres to the very essence of the process of training and indoctrination, awareness of their principles, and determination of the specific features and ways of managing these processes on a strictly scientific basis are assuming particular significance.

As the Armed Forces develop and troop training is improved, the educational activities of commanders, political workers, military engineers and technicians, and Party and Komsomol organizations become increasingly multifaceted, and the requirement for study of military pedagogic theory and for the summarization of the latest pedagogic practices becomes increasingly insistent.

In emphasizing the increased importance of psychological pedagogic knowledge in the activities of the officer corps, Marshal of the Soviet

Union A. A. Grechko, the USSR Minister of Defense, said at the All-Army Conference of Young Officers in 1969: "The Soviet officer is not simply an engineer or a technician, he is a military specialist in the narrow sense of this word. He is both pedagog and educator. And under current conditions this . . . is assuming particular urgency. On the one hand it has become easier to work with people, but on the other it is also becoming more difficult. It is easier because they learn more quickly and understand better that which is taught to them. It is more difficult because the range of their thought has become broader and the demands are more diverse.

"In order to set up the training and indoctrination of his subordinates more correctly, the young officer must not only be trained in a political and technical military regard, but must possess specific knowledge of pedagogy and psychology—pedagogic culture, as it were."²

These statements have direct bearing on political workers, whose activities are by content clearly pedagogic in character and require thorough knowledge in military pedagogy and psychology, of the creative application of theory in the educational process, development of the traits of teacher and instructor, and mastery of pedagogic skills.

In a political affairs officer, the traits of military instructor are clearly manifested in the direction of political educational work, in the training of all categories of instructors in the subunit, in teaching active Party and Komsomol members the practice of Party political work, in skillful organization of the education of all personnel, and in creating an harmonious and unified collective. In-depth knowledge of military pedagogy enables the political worker to define clearly the tasks of indoctrination and training with respect to each soldier and to the subunit as a whole, to plan correctly and utilize the most expedient means and methods, to assess objectively the results of educational work, and to plan ways of further improving the training of personnel for the fulfillment of educational and combat tasks.

In the activities of the political worker, the traits of teacher are coupled with the traits of Party activist, and above all with his communist conviction and high Party principles, with Leninist concern for people, and with the high moral appearance of a fervent implementer of the ideas of CPSU policy among the soldiers.

All this indicates that military pedagogic training of cadets in higher military political schools is an organic part of their professional training and of the mastery of those requirements which are placed on the political worker as a military pedagog.

Studying a course of Soviet military pedagogy in addition to other social disciplines furthers the formation in future political workers of

a scientific outlook, of noble moral traits, of high ideological motives for behavior and activity, and of an implacable approach toward bourgeois ideology. Together with the course on Party political work, military pedagogy is supposed to arm cadets with the ability to approach scientifically the selection, organization, and implementation of goal-directed measures, means, and methods of influencing soldiers. This enables them to instill in the soldiers as effectively as possible deep ideological convictions and high moral, political, psychological, and combat traits and to acquire the knowledge and skill necessary for the successful defense of the socialist Homeland, its state interests, and the achievements of socialism.

The study of a course on military pedagogy³ will help cadets assimilate the essence of psychological and pedagogic principles of training and indoctrination and the moral-political and psychological training of soldiers; understand the specifics of each of these processes, their unity, and the interdependence and differences among them; master the skill of implementing the principles of personnel instruction and education; and employ effective means of influencing subordinates in the course of combat and political training, service, combat duty, training exercises, flights, and naval voyages. The thorough mastery of the system of pedagogic military knowledge will enable cadets to learn correctly to analyze and summarize the experience of the instruction and education of soldiers and to apply it creatively in practice.

Moreover, study of a course in military pedagogy is aimed at forming in cadets psychological-pedagogic thought—that is, a type of thought, a system of concepts and methods of mental endeavor, which enables the officer to study subordinates comprehensively, to dissect pedagogic situations skillfully, and to select quickly the pedagogic means and methods necessary under specific conditions. Psychological-pedagogic thought is the foundation of methodological expertise and pedagogic tact and intuition—of everything that provides the political worker with a quick, well-founded, and correct solution to the problems which arise in the educational process in the sphere of interrelations with individual servicemen and military collectives. It constitutes the basis of the creative approach to fulfillment of educational tasks.

Finally, the study of a course in military pedagogy will contribute to the inculcation in cadets of a love of the profession of political worker, of work with subordinates, and to the formation of the need for self-improvement and the ability to acquire independently knowledge and skills both during instruction in military school and in practical work among troops.

The in-depth study of military pedagogic theory in turn requires great and persistent effort, and a creative approach to studies on the part of

the future political worker. Pedagogic knowledge is converted into stable concepts and a definite system only when the cadets systematically interpret educational material and thoroughly understand its practical import.

In the educational process future political workers should pay attention to developing in themselves the traits of teacher and educator and to applying practically their acquired knowledge on military pedagogy during their service among the troops and in political educational work at the school. This will enable them to prepare themselves successfully for fulfilling the complex duties of political affairs officer and will create the necessary base for further improvement of pedagogic knowledge and skills.

The present educational aid, *Military Pedagogy*, consists of four sections.

Considered in the first section—"General Problems of Soviet Military Pedagogy"—are the subject and tasks of military pedagogy, the historical stages of its development, and specific features of the military pedagogic process under current conditions.

Presented in the second section—"Military Didactics"—are the problems of the theory and practice of personnel instruction: the essence and content of the process of instruction of Soviet soldiers, and the principles, forms, and methods of instruction.

Considered in the third section—"The Theory of Indoctrination"—are the following problems: the essence and content of the process of personnel indoctrination, the principles and methods of indoctrination, the military collective as an instructional environment, the pedagogic principles of instilling moral combat traits in the personnel of subunits, the self-improvement of soldiers, and the direction of self-education in the subunit.

Covered in the fourth section—"The Political Worker as Military Pedagog"—are the requirements placed on the pedagogic qualities of the political worker, ways of improving these qualities, problems of the supervision of the pedagogic activities of officers, ensigns, warrants, sergeants, master sergeants, and active Party and Komsomol members, and the methods of studying, summarizing, and disseminating advanced experience in the instruction and education of subunit personnel.

The book concludes with a chapter titled "Contemporary Bourgeois Military Pedagogy and Its Reactionary Essence."

The diligent and systematic study by cadets of the problems of military pedagogy and of the principles of the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is an important condition for the comprehensive preparation of future political officers for fruitful work among the troops.

Footnotes

1. *Materialy XXIV S"yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress), Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 205.
2. *Vysokoye prizvaniye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye molodykh ofitserov. Noyabr' 1969 g.* (A High Calling. The All-Army Conference of Young Officers. November 1969), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, p 19.
3. The concepts of "military pedagogy as a science" and "military pedagogy as an educational discipline" are not identical in essence or content. Depending on the volume of the training program and the goals and tasks of instruction, each specific course on studying the principles of military pedagogy may differ both in the volume and depth of coverage of various problems of the pedagogical military principles of the theory and practice of personnel training. For instance, Soviet military pedagogy as an educational discipline taught in higher political military schools considers the military educational process as the organized educational activities of commanders and political workers only at the level of the subunit. Other spheres of the military educational process which are difficult for military pedagogical science, for instance setting up this process in various services of the Armed Forces and in different types of military educational institutions, the training of various contingents of military specialists, and so on, are not covered in the present training course.

SECTION I. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF SOVIET MILITARY PEDAGOGY

Chapter 1. The Subject and Tasks of Soviet Military Pedagogy

1. The Subject of Soviet Military Pedagogy

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized in its decisions that one of the important factors for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of communist construction is the development of Soviet science and the fruitful advancement along the entire front of social sciences. Within the system of social sciences, which are destined to uncover the main principles governing communist construction in our country on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, a major role belongs to pedagogy—the science of Communist education. Soviet pedagogy, in researching the social phenomenon known as education, has the role of making a most important contribution to the fulfillment of one of the main tasks of communist construction—the development of a new man.

Military pedagogy—the science of communist education, training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and of the preparation of subunits and units (or ships) for successful operations under the conditions of modern warfare—is a branch of Soviet pedagogy.

The main goal of upbringing [vospitaniye] in Soviet society is to prepare comprehensively developed individuals who are active builders of communism and defenders of the Homeland. This purpose of education also forms the foundation for the training of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. It meets the objective requirements of a socialist society and reflects the vital interests of the entire Soviet nation.

Since its inception the Soviet Army has become not only a school for training armed defenders of the Homeland, but also a school for improving general education and cultural development. This is indicated by the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress, in which it was noted that the barracks should become “the focus not only of purely military training, but also of general education and political indoctrination.”¹

During service in the army the Soviet soldier is not separated from the life of his people, but is indoctrinated in a spirit of closeness with them as a patriot, skillful defender of the interests of the Homeland, and active participant in the construction of a communist society.

The inseparable tie between the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and the people stems from the nature and designation of the Soviet Army as a new type of army. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress the following was stated: "The Soviet Army is a part of our people, a part which lives a common life with them. . . . The Soviet people can be confident that at any time of day or night the glorious Armed Forces are prepared to rebuff an enemy attack, no matter whence it might originate."²

Soviet military pedagogy, as an organic part of general pedagogy, defines the goals, principles, and methods of communist indoctrination of soldiers. It has the function of studying the principles governing the comprehensive development of soldiers, the formation of high political and moral-combat traits in them, their acquisition of a system of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and of finding ways of solidifying military collectives and preparing personnel to conduct modern combat. Thus, through its own means, Soviet military pedagogy serves the cause of strengthening the Armed Forces of a developed socialist state.

Under current conditions the role of communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is constantly growing. This is due to the expansion of the range of tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the rise in the level of consciousness and creative activity of soldiers in strengthening the combat capabilities of the army and navy, to the complicated international situation, to the fundamental changes in military affairs brought about by the scientific and technical revolution, and to the character of modern warfare.

The subject of Soviet military pedagogy incorporates such integral components as the indoctrination, training, and education of soldiers. What is the essence of these concepts?

Indoctrination [vospitaniye] is the process of the planned and goal-directed influence on the consciousness, feelings, and will of soldiers in order to instill in them a scientific outlook and communist convictions, skills and habits of conduct in accordance with the requirements of communist morality, and to prepare them for selfless actions in the struggle against the enemies of the Homeland and for active participation in the building of communism in our country.

In the pedagogic literature the concept "upbringing" [vospitaniye] or "indoctrination" is used in broad and narrow senses. Upbringing in the broad sense incorporates the aggregate of actions taken not only in the process of educational work, but also in the entire framework of social life (the influence of the method of production, the forms of distribution, law, culture, daily life, and so on). It also includes training and education. Indoctrination in the narrow sense of the word is the purposeful process of instilling certain traits in a person—conviction, moral traits, behavioral

patterns, and skills. This process is the most important factor in the formation and comprehensive, harmonious development of an individual who combines in himself spiritual wealth, moral purity, and physical perfection. Here indoctrination is organically connected with training and education.

Training is the organized and goal-directed process of conveying to soldiers and having them assimilate scientific knowledge, skills, and abilities, and also equipping them with methods of cognitive action.

Education presupposes a certain level of preparedness for participation in some sphere of endeavor, a result of the assimilation of systematized knowledge, skills, and abilities. Education may be general or special. General education gives knowledge of the principles of the sciences of nature, society, and thought which each person needs regardless of his future specialty. Special education provides knowledge, skills, and abilities which make it possible to engage in a certain type of activity at some level of qualification.

The military education received in military schools and academies is a type of special education. Depending on the nature of the activity it is subdivided into general military, technical military, and political military; by skill level it is subdivided into intermediate and higher.

The indoctrination, training, and education of soldiers transpires as a unified, inseparable military pedagogic process. Not only cognitive, but also indoctrinational tasks are fulfilled in the course of training. The accumulation of political, military, and technical knowledge forms in soldiers a scientific concept of the laws of social development and armed conflict, of the trends in the development of military affairs, and of the state of contemporary science and technology which are the foundations of a scientific outlook. In the process of assimilating knowledge, skills, and abilities, soldiers naturally encounter various difficulties, the surmounting of which contributes to the tempering of will and improvement of character and physical skills. The goals of education are also realized in the process of training.

Military pedagogy, as the science which studies the problems of training the personnel of the Armed Forces, is a class science. In the class society the army was and remains an implement in the hands of the ruling class, with whose aid this class implements its policy. Therefore, the goals, tasks, and content of the training and indoctrination of army personnel are determined by the ruling class and are very closely linked to its interests and policy.

Military pedagogy in capitalist states is subordinate to the interests of the bourgeoisie and serves the goals of affirming and strengthening its power and of providing armed defense of its interests. In accordance with the aggressive aspirations of the ruling cliques it draws up recom-

mendations for training military personnel in such a way that they can wage predatory, plunderous wars, stifle the national liberation movement, and suppress the dissatisfaction of workers within their countries.

In orientation and content of given tasks, Soviet military pedagogy differs fundamentally from bourgeois military pedagogy. This difference is due to the fact that it is based on the scientific theory of communist indoctrination which reflects the needs of a fundamentally new economic and political order in society.

The birth of a truly scientific theory of indoctrination was connected with the appearance of Marxism, which established the restriction of indoctrination by the method of production and the political organization of society. The creation of new social relationships after the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution required the education of new people who would be capable of building a communist society and living therein.

V. I. Lenin further developed the Marxist theory of indoctrination, comprehensively worked out the program requirements of the Party on educational problems, and outlined a fundamental solution to the basic problems of communist indoctrination. He demanded that a class line be consistently implemented in indoctrination and that ideologically convinced and staunch champions of communism be trained.

In working out the basic problems of communist education, *V. I. Lenin* paid much attention to the problems of indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers. On the basis of the Leninist ideas and principles of the formation of a cadre army for the socialist state, a scientific system of troop indoctrination and training—Soviet military pedagogy—was worked out. From the start it was developed on truly scientific principles fundamentally different from all preceding theories of military pedagogy.

V. I. Lenin's doctrine on war and the army, on defense of the socialist homeland and the Leninist theses on the significance of the high political consciousness of soldiers in ensuring victory over the enemy, on the need for an unfailing rise in the combat readiness of troops and for strengthening discipline and high revolutionary vigilance, and on comprehensive mastery of military affairs are of particular importance to the development of Soviet military pedagogical thought.

Lenin's ideas on the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers have been further developed in the decisions of the Communist Party.

Of great importance to military pedagogy and to the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers are the decree of the CPSU CC dated 21 January 1967 and titled "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," the decree of the CPSU CC dated 14 August 1967 and titled "On Measures for Further Developing the Social Sciences and Elevating Their Role in Communist Construction,"

the theses of the CPSU CC "Fifty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the decree of the CPSU CC titled "On the 50th Anniversary of the Komsomol and the Tasks of the Communist Upbringing of Youth," the theses of the CPSU CC titled "On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," the materials and decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, the decree of the CPSU CC titled "On Improving the Economic Education of Workers," the decree of the CPSU CC titled "On Preparing for the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the decree of the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers titled "On Measures for Further Improving Higher Education in the Country," and other documents.

In solving the problems of military development, the CPSU determines the main tasks of communist indoctrination of army and navy personnel. In the decree of the CPSU CC dated 21 January 1967 and titled "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" it is stated that "soldiers should be taught in the spirit of high ideological conviction and selfless devotion to the socialist Homeland and in the cause of communism, proletarian internationalism, and combat cooperation with the armies of fraternal countries. The dissemination of the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Soviet people, Communist Party, and Armed Forces, and of our country's progress in communist construction should be intensified. Work toward unmasking bourgeois ideology and toward indoctrinating personnel in the spirit of high vigilance and class hatred of imperialists should be conducted more persistently."³

The leading role of the Party is the basic foundation of Soviet military development and the most important condition for the development and advancement of the theory of the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers. This is why the inseparable tie between the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers and CPSU policy and the requirements which the CPSU advances for the Armed Forces determines the *Party orientation* of Soviet military pedagogy.

The very close associates of V. I. Lenin, *M. I. Kalinin* and *M. V. Frunze*, prominent figures in the Communist Party and Soviet state, made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of training and indoctrination. A number of very important problems of the goals, tasks, content, forms, and methods of training and indoctrination and of the ways and means of instilling high political, moral, and combat traits in personnel were developed in their works.

Soviet military pedagogy did not discard, but critically examined, reviewed, and adopted the entire progressive military pedagogic heritage of the past and especially the best and most advanced things to be found in the military pedagogical thought of pre-revolutionary Russia.

The works of outstanding Russian and Soviet pedagogues and research on the problems of the training and upbringing of the adolescent generation, as well as the pedagogic experience accrued in our country on the training of youth for active participation in the building of communism are used extensively in working out the problems of military pedagogy.

By using the data of general pedagogy, Soviet military pedagogy takes into account the specific character of military activities and the specific features of the military pedagogical process engendered by them.

Soviet military pedagogy relies in its development on military regulations and manuals, and on orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Set forth in these documents are the requirements of Soviet military doctrine on the training and indoctrination of personnel, the basic tasks of troop training during certain periods of activities, and the summarized experience of educational work in the Armed Forces.

The thorough study and generalization of the great experience of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations in educational activities are also an important factor in the development of military pedagogic theory. The theory of training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is a result of the vital creativity of many military pedagogues. Without a link to the practical know-how of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations in the field of the instruction and education of soldiers, there can be no truly scientific military pedagogical theory capable of shedding light on the path to military pedagogical practice.

Marxist-Leninist philosophy—dialectical and historical materialism—is the *methodological foundation* of Soviet military pedagogy. Marxist-Leninist philosophy, by uncovering the most general laws of the development of nature, society, and human thought, helps in learning the principles of training and indoctrination of soldiers. Only from the standpoints of dialectical and historical materialism can one penetrate to the essence of the educational process, comprehend the complicated and diverse relations of military pedagogic phenomena, understand the dynamics of their development, scientifically substantiate the methods of educational influence, and correctly determine the ways and means of equipping soldiers with knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Soviet military science, whose main positions determine the character of military pedagogical research in the interests of preparing personnel for active combat operations under the conditions of contemporary warfare, is the *theoretical military foundation* of military pedagogy.

Thus, Soviet military science, by investigating the essence and character of modern warfare and ascertaining the conditions and methods for conducting combat operations, finds that extreme exertion of moral, mental, and physical effort and high combat skills will be required on the part of personnel of the army and navy to achieve victory over the enemy.

This theoretical thesis of Soviet military science directs military pedagogical research toward seeking ways and methods of indoctrinating and training soldiers in accordance with the requirements of modern war. Soviet military science, as the theoretical military foundation of military pedagogy, gives practical orientation to research in the field of troop training and indoctrination.

The doctrine of I. M. Sechenov and I. P. Pavlov on the higher nervous activity of man comprises the natural scientific foundation of military pedagogy. It assists military pedagogy in substantiating the essence of physiological processes and, on this basis, in solving a number of problems connected with the indoctrination and training of soldiers. I. P. Pavlov's doctrine of conditioned reflexes reveals the physiological nature of the accumulation of knowledge and the formation of skills and abilities, and enables the officer to improve the methods of educational work with personnel.

The theoretical principles on the primary and secondary signal systems, the dynamic stereotype, and the types of nervous systems are of great importance to military pedagogy.

For instance, the principle of dynamic stereotype serves as the scientific basis for working out an optimal regimen in the process of instilling in soldiers the skills, abilities, and habits of disciplined behavior which would correspond to the conditions of military activities.

The doctrine of the types of nervous systems (the types of higher nervous activity) finds extensive application in educational work with personnel. It reveals the physiological nature of the individual distinctions of people, without knowledge and consideration of which any kind of significant progress in the indoctrination and training of soldiers would be inconceivable.

Military pedagogy relies on the data and conclusions of *general and military psychology*. Military psychology helps to understand the complicated and diverse spiritual world of the soldier and thus contributes to the selection of the most effective ways, methods, and means of influencing him.

Military pedagogy is very closely connected with Party political work. This relation is two-sided in character. On the one hand, the principles of the training and indoctrination of soldiers which are revealed by

military pedagogy serve as the pedagogical basis for the organization and conduct of Party political work with army and navy personnel. On the other, the successful fulfillment of the tasks of working out the problems of the training and indoctrination of soldiers, of improving discipline and order, and of increasing the combat readiness of troops depends largely on the level of the theoretical development of the problems of Party political work which enriches pedagogy with practical experience.

The close connection between military pedagogy and Party political work helps to raise the level of combat and political training, to effect the moral-political and psychological preparation of soldiers for battle, to strengthen military collectives, and to improve the style and methods of troop leadership.

The methods of various educational subjects (political, technical, fire training, and others) interact with military pedagogy. To them military pedagogy is a theoretical foundation; in turn, the methods make specific and develop the conclusions and positions of pedagogy.

From year to year the relations between military pedagogy and cybernetics, mathematics, and logic are strengthened and developed. The introduction of programed instruction is further increasing and strengthening the ties among these sciences.

Thus, relying on CPSU policy Soviet military pedagogy is working out the theoretical principles of the indoctrination and training of army and navy personnel on the basis of the interests of armed defense of the socialist Homeland. The subject of military pedagogy is the military pedagogical process, which it investigates in close interaction with other sciences.

2. The Tasks and Methods of Research, and the Significance of Military Pedagogy

Soviet military pedagogy above all is supposed to investigate and determine the *essence and principles of the military pedagogic process*. In researching the military pedagogic process military pedagogy determines first of all its characteristic features and ascertains their influence on the organization of educational work with army and navy personnel.

In determining principles of the military pedagogic process military pedagogy works out *principles for the training and indoctrination* of Soviet soldiers—that is, theoretical principles and rules which reflect these regularities and act as the guiding foundation in setting up educational work.

Under current conditions, when qualitative transformations have taken place in military affairs and the terms of active service have been reduced,

the problems of the methods of indoctrinating and training soldiers and the problem of the forms of setting up the educational process assume great importance. Therefore, one important task of military pedagogy is to *improve the existing forms and methods and to work out new forms and methods of training and indoctrination based on the latest achievements of science.*

The inculcation in the Soviet people of a communist attitude toward labor is, as indicated in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, one of the most important tasks of molding a new man under current conditions.

Investigation of the ways and means of instilling a communist attitude toward selfless labor in Soviet soldiers and of bringing about the exemplary execution of their duty to the Homeland are pressing tasks for Soviet military pedagogy.

The requirements of modern warfare determine the important task of military pedagogy as *the comprehensive development of the ways and means of instilling in personnel high moral-combat traits and psychological stability* necessary for successful battle against a strong, technically equipped enemy.

The collective character of military labor and of the operation and maintenance of combat equipment and weapons now place particular requirements on the military collective. On this basis *military pedagogy must comprehensively investigate the ways of creating and strengthening military collectives and substantiate the conditions and factors which contribute to elevating their educational role.*

Military pedagogy comprehensively studies the activities of educators and of those being educated, and of their interrelationship in the educational process. This is why determining the role and place of the military instructor in the educational process, *ascertaining the conditions for successful management of the military pedagogic process*, and finding ways of improving the pedagogic traits and methods of studying, summarizing, and disseminating advanced experience in the instruction and education of soldiers are of great importance.

Soviet military pedagogy also must thoroughly, comprehensively, and in reasoned fashion *unmask the reactionary essence and anti-communist orientation of contemporary bourgeois military pedagogy* and of the training of the armies of imperialist states. This task stems from the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress which requires that Soviet soldiers be indoctrinated in the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance and constant combat readiness.

It can be seen from this far from complete list of the main tasks which are being studied and worked on by Soviet military pedagogy

that it is of great theoretical and practical importance in the training of army and navy personnel for combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare and for solving the problems of ensuring constant combat readiness of troops.

In studying the principles of training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and in carrying out its complex tasks, military pedagogy employs the *methods of investigation* inherent to it. By methods of investigation are meant the methods of comprehending pedagogic processes and phenomena. The main methods of investigation employed by Soviet military pedagogy are: observation, interview, and pedagogic experimentation.

Observation consists in the purposeful and planned perception and comprehension by the military pedagogue of transpiring phenomena and events. The results of observations of the actions and deeds of soldiers, of the dynamics of their development, of the techniques of employing various pedagogic means, and of their results enable the pedagogue to study the specific features of the formation of various traits in soldiers and the effectiveness of various educational methods and means.

Observation as a method of pedagogic research, in contrast to everyday, chance observation, presupposes the fulfillment of the following requirements: clear definition of the goal of observation, compilation of an observation program depending on the goal, and detailed and thorough recording of observation data.

For instance, upon defining the goal of observation—to determine how a political activity's group leader utilizes the methods of activating the assimilation of educational material in the course of independent work—the investigator develops an observation program. This program may include the following points:

- 1) Does the site of the activity contribute to the student's independent work?
- 2) How well are the soldiers (sergeants) supplied with training aids and notebooks and do they take notes of the presented material?
- 3) The recommendations of the group leader for studying literature on the specific topics;
- 4) Monitoring the independent work of students; is individual aid extended to poor students?
- 5) How do the group leader and his assistant use visual aids for better assimilation of the training materials?
- 6) How skillfully does the leader clarify the most complicated problems of the subject to his students during independent work?

A list of activities on which all actions of the leader and students are recorded is kept for more accurate depiction of the phenomena under study. This makes it possible to trace the sequentiality and character of various means and methods of instruction and to study their efficacy. Systematized notes facilitate the accumulation of factual material on whose basis conclusions are drawn for improving the methods of independent work in political studies. Of course, in order to draw correct conclusions it is necessary to make several observations.

Observation is carried out in a similar manner in the study of educational phenomena.

Interview as a method of research differs from any other conversation in its goal-directedness. It is conducted by means of posing specific questions to specific people in order to study the aspects of training and indoctrination which are of interest to the investigator. The value of this method lies in the establishment of personal contact with the people who are the objects of the investigation. It makes it possible to elucidate necessary data and to refine and pose on an operational basis additional questions which arise during the interview.

Such an interview requires careful preparation and well-planned primary questions. For instance, one investigator, preparing for an interview with young officers on their ability to convey knowledge to subordinates and to develop skills in them, developed the following questions:

- 1) How does the officer develop the ability to present the content of a given topic in an interesting and consistent way?
- 2) How does he achieve systematization and summarization of the material and a logical approach in presenting ideas?
- 3) How does he manifest his ability to discern between the essential and the secondary, and to concentrate the students' attention on mastering the main portion of a given topic?
- 4) How does the officer develop and improve his speech?
- 5) What difficulties are encountered in mastering the methods of instruction?
- 6) What methods are employed to shape skills and abilities in subordinates?

Interviews are conducted with various categories of servicemen: commanders, political workers, and soldiers.

Success depends largely on the tact of the person conducting the interview. It is important to create a relaxed situation and to give the interview the tone of a mutual exchange of opinion. It is useful to record such conversations.

A pedagogic interview is inseparably connected with observation and often precedes it.

The pedagogic experiment is the most complex method of investigation. The essence of the experiment lies in the planned creation of specific conditions in the pedagogic process in order to study its progression and the active influence exerted upon it. The experiment presupposes an experimental statement or the testing of a problem under study on the basis of a task or working hypothesis which is posed in advance—this should be a principle whose correctness is to be checked. In advancing the hypothesis the investigator plans in advance conditions for testing it which might confirm the accuracy and correctness of the problem under study. In the course of the experiment factual material which is carefully analyzed is amassed. Analysis of the data obtained is the basis for a conclusion of confirmation or refutation of the hypothesis.

Distinction is made between natural and laboratory experiments.

The natural experiment, which is conducted under the daily conditions of educational work, is most widespread. Experimentation in the form of introductory tasks is the simplest method. Its essence lies in the oral or written statement of various problems and in the introduction (unbeknownst to the subject) of deviations in the operation of materiel, followed by observation of the soldier's actions. Introductory tasks may be used for the purpose of investigating all activities of combat and political training, and all forms of educational work. They make it possible to determine the specifics of a soldier's actions in various pedagogic situations and certain aspects of his behavior.

Within a unit it is possible to conduct a laboratory-type experiment in order to investigate the quality or methods of instruction. Various trainers, devices (optical or screen), weapons and equipment, movie and slide projectors, sound recordings, and others may be employed.

The main methods of research—observation, interview, and experimentation—should be combined with a number of other methods which contribute to the study of diverse phenomena of the educational process. Among these methods are: analysis of results of soldiers' practical activities on the basis of their attitude toward service, military duty, and labor; analysis of various documents (personal file, ratings, identification card, and so on); questionnaire (on the basis of a previously compiled form for the purpose of determining the opinions of a certain category of people); the method of independent rating; and so on.

All methods of investigating the military pedagogic process are interconnected and employed in conjunction with each other in practical work. The correct combination of these methods enriches military pedagogy with new scientific theories and contributes to its further development.

What is the significance of military pedagogy to the activities of officers?

The study of military pedagogy equips command, political, and engineering and technical personnel with knowledge of the principles of the military pedagogic process and of the principles and methods of training and indoctrinating personnel. This knowledge ensures the correct management of the educational process and creates a foundation for the formation and development of the officer's pedagogic traits. Without this knowledge one cannot become a true pedagogue.

Military pedagogy helps to establish a unity of opinions among military personnel with respect to the process of combat and political training, and helps in establishing continuity in training and indoctrination.

In-depth knowledge of military pedagogy is of particular importance to the political officer—the teacher and educator of Soviet soldiers who must become a true engineer of the human soul.

The study of military pedagogy provides the officer corps with the opportunity of constantly relying in training and indoctrination on science and advanced know-how, discarding from practice all that is outmoded.

At the same time military pedagogy does not provide ready-made prescriptions for all of life's events. The practice of educational work is so diverse and so complex, and the specific pedagogic situations so numerous and so distinctive that they cannot all be foreseen. But the conclusions and recommendations of military pedagogy enable commanders and political workers to assess correctly various phenomena of the educational process and to select creatively the most rational ways and means of attaining the set goals.

Cadets of higher military political schools, in mastering knowledge of the principles of the military pedagogic process, should pay particular attention to developing the traits of a military pedagogue and the practical skills of a training and indoctrination supervisor, and should learn to combine theory with practice. This approach to the study of military pedagogy will make it possible to prepare successfully for fulfilling the complex and honorable duties of a subunit political worker.

Footnotes

1. *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the CC), Vol. 2, eighth edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 63.
2. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 24th Congress), p. 81.
3. *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917–1968* (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents from the Period 1917–1968), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1969, p. 416.

Chapter 2. The Development of Progressive Military Pedagogic Thought in Pre-revolutionary Russia

V. I. Lenin pointed out that the scientific approach to the phenomena of social affairs requires that "the main historical relation not be forgotten, that each question be considered from the standpoint of how this phenomenon arose in history, what main stages this phenomenon passed through in its development, and from the standpoint of its development to see how the given subject has changed."¹

A Leninist attitude toward the heritage of the past requires a *class historical approach*. One should judge the generals, naval commanders, and pedagogues of the past with consideration for the class they served and for what new and progressive things they introduced into pedagogic science, and the theory and practice of military training and indoctrination. "Historical merits," said V. I. Lenin, "are judged not by what historical figures did not give in comparison with current requirements, but by what *new things they gave* in comparison with their predecessors."²

In the process of developing the theory and practice of the indoctrination and training of military personnel a vast amount of material and a great deal of military pedagogic experience, much of which retains its significance even now, has been accrued. It is known that during the Civil War and foreign military intervention the *Knizhka krasnoarmeytsa* (Red Soldier's Booklet), approved by V. I. Lenin, was introduced. In addition to other documents it included military rules from *Nauka pobezhdat'* (The Science of Winning) by A. V. Suvorov.

The outstanding state figure M. I. Kalinin, and M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and other Soviet military leaders constantly turned to the military pedagogic heritage of Russian generals and naval commanders. The progressive heritage of the past was utilized extensively in the field of military education during the Great Patriotic War. In this period were written many articles and booklets on military art, military pedagogic views, and training and indoctrination systems of outstanding Russian generals and naval commanders: Peter I, P. A. Rum-

yantsev, A. V. Suvorov, F. F. Ushakov, M. I. Kutuzov, P. S. Nakhimov, S. O. Makarov, and others. In the postwar period, collections of materials, orders, and works belonging to generals and naval commanders were published.

The study of progressive military pedagogic heritage is of inestimable cognitive and educational significance. It is one of the sources of the formation of the pedagogic expertise of commanders and political workers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The birth and development of military pedagogic thought in Russia were closely connected with the struggle of the peoples of our Homeland against numerous foreign invaders, with the creation and strengthening of its Armed Forces, and with the class struggle within the country and in the army and navy.

At first the summarization of the experience of military instruction and education was spontaneous in character. The acquired experience of armed conflict and the rules of military training and indoctrination were transmitted from generation to generation orally or by practical demonstration and were recorded in proverbs, tales, songs, and historical military legends. With the appearance of writing, military pedagogic practice and thought began to be reflected in chronicles, state laws, precepts, and testaments, and later in military regulations, orders, manuals, instructions, and works on military problems. The term "military pedagogy" began to be used in Russia only in the second half of the 19th Century.

Military pedagogic thought in Russia began to develop in a particularly noticeable way in the period when regular troops—the army and navy—were created. Let us now consider the main stages of its development.

1. Military Training and Indoctrination in the Period of Creation and Establishment of the Regular Army and Navy

The socio-economic position of Russia in the 18th Century was characterized by the rapid development of manufacturing industries, the metallurgical industry, trade, the growth of capitalist elements, and the increased international influence of the Russian state. V. I. Lenin defined the 18th Century as a special historical stage of the development of absolute monarchy with the inherent "bureaucracy, subservient estates, and individual periods of 'enlightened absolutism'"³

In the interests of strengthening the state of noblemen and the independence of Russia, and in order to return its age-old lands and provide an outlet to the seas, a regular army and navy were established. A recruiting system that was new and progressive for its time was introduced to build the army and navy up to strength. In comparison with the mercenary system of the armies of Western European countries it possessed a

number of advantages, since it ensured the Russian army and navy of a homogeneous national composition of soldiers and seamen and made it possible purposefully to train and indoctrinate them.

In order to ensure clear order, organization, discipline, and a unified system of training and indoctrination in the army and navy, military regulations and instructions were gradually developed and introduced.⁴ All this concluded with the creation of the Military Regulations of 1716 and the Naval Regulations of 1720.

The entire system of military training was aimed at preparing troops for a victorious war. It was noted in the instructions "Preparing for Battle" that a soldier "must unflaggingly learn how to act in battle."⁵ Drill, fire, and tactical training comprised the foundation of instruction. Regulations and instructions required that soldiers be taught "correct and not hasty fire," "good aiming," bayonet methods, hand-to-hand combat, and the ability to attack, to conduct defensive battle, to maneuver, and to "anticipate and overrun the foe."

Consistency and systematization were introduced into training, which was divided into individual and joint training. The regulations required that old soldiers be taught separately from the young.

In this period tactical field exercises and two-party maneuvers in which a situation which required the troops to act "as if in fact"—that is, as if in battle—were created and began to be conducted for the first time in the history of military training.

The training of naval personnel was carried out on continual voyages. Seamen were taught resolutely to encounter the enemy, to fire accurately, to wage boarding battles, and to carry out landings.

The education of soldiers, seamen, and officers was based on the concepts of defending the homeland and state interests, on the concepts of military duty and honor, and on faithfulness to the banner. These concepts were reflected in a number of documents, including the military oath and the address of Peter I to the troops before the Battle of Poltava.⁶ With banner unfurled the soldiers, seamen, and officers gave their solemn promise to serve conscientiously and "to act always as an honest, faithful, obedient, brave . . . soldier."⁷

Particular attention was paid to maintaining order and discipline among the troops. Soldiers and seamen were required to be obedient and responsive, not to take unauthorized absence from their units, and always to maintain ammunition and weapons in good condition.

The procedure of reading military articles to all personnel of the regiment on a weekly basis and sometimes more often "so that no one could plead ignorance" was established for the purpose of helping the

troops master the requirements of regulations, rules of conduct, and duties.

Incentives were used in the army and navy for educational purposes: promotions in rank and position, the awarding of medals and orders, and monetary bonuses.

The regulations required officers to be demanding and to punish strictly violators of established procedures and military discipline.

The system of punishments was severe, and execution and corporal punishment were often employed. For instance, the so-called "cat-o-nine-tails"—four-tailed lashes with knots at the ends—and whips—pieces of rope with knots—were used to punish seamen. Soldiers were subject to punishment with rods and canes. Regulations required that lesser punishment be defined for the misdeeds of young soldiers and seamen than for senior personnel, because of the fact that they still had only poor knowledge of service.

Military regulations required commanders to manifest concern for subordinates in addition to high exactingness.

The sound training of troops, *ensured by the* system of indoctrinating and training personnel and other measures (improved weapons and supply, strengthening the army and navy with national officer corps, the establishment of military educational institutions, the advancement of tactics), enabled the Russian army and navy to triumph in the Northern War over such strong enemies as the Swedish army and navy at the time.

The military pedagogic system drawn up under Peter I was progressive in comparison with the systems that existed in Western armies. It laid the foundations for the further improvement of training and indoctrination in the army and navy. For all the progressiveness of this system, however, one cannot help seeing its serf-like character which was due to the class nature of the nobleman-merchant monarchy. The entire educational system was aimed at isolating the army and navy from the people and at making them a closed organization obedient to the ruling class. The inculcation of a sense of military honor in soldiers was accompanied by comparison of them to "simple rabble." For rank-and-file personnel, service in the army and navy was for life and was a heavy burden. Progressive regulations calling for respect of the soldier were generally ignored as a rule by the officers, who were noblemen and foreigners.

2. Military Pedagogic Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the 18th and First Half of the 19th Centuries

Soon after the death of Peter I, important posts in the state apparatus, and army and navy were seized by the reactionary segment of the nobility.

The ascendancy of the "favorites" (Münlich, Biron*) ensued. The Prussian system of drill and parade, blind obedience, mechanical execution, and a soulless regard for attitude began to be sown in the army. The elements of consciousness, initiative, confidence in the soldier and individual training were eliminated from the system of training and indoctrination. Among the means of ensuring discipline were sticks and canes. The officer was no longer viewed as an educator of subordinates. The privileges of the nobility grew in the army.

In the 1740's-1760's attempts were made to restore Peter's traditions among the troops. The decrees of the Military Collegium required that military training be conducted as it had been under Peter, "without any countermanding, and not in the Prussian manner."

New regulations were issued in 1755: for the infantry there was the "Description of Infantry Regimental Formations" and for the cavalry "Drills and the Establishment of Orders and of All Ceremonies of the Regular Cavalry." All these measures, however, could not carry out the task of restoring the progressive traditions created under Peter I. The new regulations continued to ignore the instruction of bayonet combat, individual training was not separated from joint training, and the organization of field and garrison service—an effective means of instilling high combat traits in soldiers—was not defined in the infantry regulations. The military charter of 1716 was not reissued for a long time, and could scarcely be found among the troops. Many officers who believed in the Prussian system remained among the troops.

The infantry regulations introduced a large number of various types of formations regulated by a mass of petty rules which increased drills, pedantry, parading, and foppery. In rifle drill the requirement that soldiers "slap their pouch," "hit the rifle solidly," and "advance firmly on foot" was made for external effect and simultaneity of action. The soldiers were beaten with sticks and canes for the slightest mistake. All this made them downtrodden, intimidated, and lacking in initiative.

The most progressive segment of the officers and generals could not come to terms with the drop in the combat quality of the Russian army. The outstanding generals and naval commanders of the second half of the 18th Century—P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov, F. F. Ushakov, M. I. Kutuzov, and others—while fighting against routine, stagnation, and the Prussian approach in the army and navy, continued diligently to improve personnel training and indoctrination.

The first significant steps in advancing the content and methods of training and indoctrination for soldiers of the Russian army was made by P. A. Rumyantsev (1725-1796), whom A. V. Suvorov called his teacher.⁸ Russian military pedagogic thought reached a particularly high

* Ernest Johann Biron, Duke of Courland; Field Marshal Burkhard Christoph von Münlich.

level in the system of troop training and indoctrination created and repeatedly tested in battle by A. V. Suvorov (1730–1800). This system received a classic presentation in his remarkable *The Science of Winning*.

In addition to specific individual features in the military pedagogic views of progressive Russian generals and naval commanders, there were many common features. The main thing that united them was a national approach to the undertaking, an understanding that the army and navy serve not for reviews and parades but in order to conduct combat operations. In their opinion, people who possess high moral-combat traits and discipline and who have complete mastery of weapons and of the knowledge of the “secrets of defeating the enemy” are the decisive force in war.

This idea was expressed very clearly by Adm P. S. Nakhimov (1802–1855). “The seaman is the main engine on a military ship, and we are only the springs which act on it,” he said. “The seaman controls the sails, it is he too who aims the weapon at the enemy; the seaman carries out boarding operations if need be; the seaman does everything. . . .”⁹

In considering soldiers as defenders of the homeland, progressive military pedagogic thought paid much attention to their moral-military indoctrination. This included instilling patriotism, a sense of military duty and military honor, discipline, diligence, a care of weapons, camaraderie and mutual assistance, love of regiment (or ship), pride in its combat deeds, and a respectful attitude toward the peaceful populace. Progressive Russian military pedagogic thought accorded the officer the main role in training and indoctrination. Reactionary officers scorned their pedagogic duties, considering them unworthy of a nobleman. The outstanding generals and naval commanders viewed this differently. They demanded that regimental, ship, and company commanders personally handle the training and indoctrination of subordinates, not assigning this important matter to others and not allowing it to run of its own momentum.

For instance, the “Regimental Establishment” of A. V. Suvorov required that company commanders set up the training and indoctrination of soldiers in such a way that at any time the company would be ready not only for inspection “but also to fight any foe.”¹⁰

Training and indoctrination were supposed to be built on respect for the soldier’s personality and on consideration of his individual features. Thus, the regimental commander had the duty to know well the traits of all officers of the regiment “so that it is possible to use any [officer] successfully to the extent of his ability.”¹¹ A. V. Suvorov imposed on all officers and noncommissioned officers the duty of constantly studying the individual traits of subordinates, of being knowledgeable of the capabilities of each, of knowing what “distinguishes the most exemplary from the others,” and of taking into account the specifics of soldiers and noncom-

missioned officers, their level of knowledge and experience, and their diligence. The company commander must place under special personal observation those "who have gone wrong in something, grown lazy, let down, and slipped up," keeping in mind that without "ambition, obedience, and good conduct. . . there is no industrious soldier." ¹²

Progressive military pedagogy strove to substantiate theoretically the requirement for an individual approach. For instance, the *Instruktsiya rotnym komandiram* (Instructions to Company Commanders) (1774) explained that instructors should not grow angry at the soldiers if they do not immediately understand and assimilate, since not all "are born equally perceptive."

P. S. Nakhimov took a new step in uncovering the essence of the individual approach to subordinates. He observed that officers must know and take into consideration not only the individual traits of character and temperament, but also the typical features inherent to certain groups of soldiers. Emphasizing the importance of taking into account the individual and typical features of subordinates, he said to his officers: "It is not enough that we see the service in a different light, for it will acquire altogether different significance in service when we know how to act toward different people. We must not take uniformly identical steps against all and, under the guise of encouragement, beat everyone without distinction, with words and canes. Such uniformity in the actions of a commander shows that he has nothing in common with his subordinates and that he has no understanding at all of his countrymen. And this is very important." ¹³

Progressive Russian thought paid particular attention to taking into account the specific traits of young soldiers. The entire process of their training should be based on strict sequentiality and a gradual transition from simple to complex. For the indoctrination and training of young soldiers it was recommended to appoint the best trained, most experienced, and most humane noncommissioned officers.

The company commander was given the duty of familiarizing himself with each new recruit by means of individual interview, and then of learning his abilities and habits in service. A senior was assigned to each young soldier. The assignment of old soldiers ("uncles") to train and indoctrinate young soldiers ("nephews") became a tradition in the Russian army. From the first days of the arrival of a new group it was recommended for officers "to instill a love and attachment to the regiment in soldiers," and to establish in their minds the conviction that the regiment's honor and combat glory are shared by every soldier. Therefore, the honor and glory of the regiment should be cherished and enhanced. Officers were required to set up the systematic study of the regiment's history and to conduct discussions on the achievements of its soldiers

and officers, and on awards received by the regiment. Exceptional attention was paid to the problems of instilling discipline and heightening order and organization. Military discipline, obedience, industriousness, mutual respect between commanders and subordinates, and the discipline that reigned among the troops were called the spirit of service. Suvorov said that discipline is the mother of victory, and subordination and obedience the mother of discipline.

In teaching discipline a significant place was allotted to the study of regulations, instructions, and orders and to explaining the essence of their requirements.

In contrast to reactionary officers, who strove to enforce discipline through severe punishment which gave rise to a sense of fear and the mechanical, blind execution of the orders of commanders by soldiers, progressive military commanders founded discipline on the development in subordinates of moral stimuli and a sense of military honor. The *Instructions to Company Commanders* pointed out that ambition "alone may provide incentive for surmounting difficulties and dangers and may move one to all kinds of glorious feats. A zealous soldier does all out of ambition, and hence does better." A. V. Suvorov developed in his soldiers a sense of national military pride. A humanistic attitude toward the civilian population was instilled in the soldiers. For instance, P. A. Rumyantsev invariably demanded in his orders to the troops that no "coercion or misdeed" be committed against a peaceful populace, that they be treated "with all humility, and not with cruelty," that no plundering be allowed, and so on. Rumyantsev was proud that his troops treated the peaceful populace in precisely this way, thus acquiring "their love and confidence" ¹⁴

Instilling in his soldiers a sense of military dignity and humaneness toward the civilian population and prisoners of war, A. V. Suvorov wrote: "Don't harm the citizen: he gives us food and drink; the soldier is not a marauder." ¹⁵

It was recommended for officers and noncommissioned officers to take steps against soldiers who had committed misdeeds primarily "by kind supervision, counsel, and exhortation" and to "subdue with punishment" only gross offenders. A. V. Suvorov wrote in his "Regimental Establishment" that a company commander, in coping with the vices of a subordinate, should strive to "turn him away from this with exhortations, and then with moderate punishment. Moderate military punishment, coupled with a clear and brief interpretation of the sin, moves a conscientious soldier more than severity, which leads to despair." ¹⁶ Progressive military pedagogy taught officers to be demanding, moderately strict, sensitive, and concerned commanders and not to allow severity and petty carping in the treatment of subordinates. A. V. Suvorov emphasized that "with severity kindness is needed, or else severity is tyranny. I am strict in

maintaining the health (of the soldiers) and a true sense of good conduct; kind soldierly strictness, and then general brotherhood. To me strictness by whim would be tyranny." ¹⁷

It was emphasized in the "Regulations for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" (1812) that soldiers never take offense at a commander's strictness if it is justified. The strictest officer, if he is fair, is attentive toward his subordinates and "can easily earn the title of *friend of the soldier*, which is the most respected title for a military man." ¹⁸ Only an officer who loves the soldiers and respects their human dignity can manifest strict but fair exactingness. To the question wherein lay the secret of his success Suvorov replied: "Love the soldier, and he will love you. That is the secret." Progressive generals, naval commanders, and officers manifested their love of soldiers and seamen in their fatherly concern for satisfying their needs and requirements. They constantly paid attention to the diet, clothing, footwear, and health of subordinates, to ensuring normal everyday and hygienic conditions at bivouac sites, for the relaxation and spare time of personnel, and for the timely encouragement of those who have excelled.

It should be taken into account that it was not easy to manifest concern for soldiers and seamen in a Russia under serfdom. Embezzlement and robbery of soldiers and seamen flourished in the army and navy, and servicemen were fated to a half-starved life and often fell ill and died. The lists of dead were kept secret and reactionary officers misappropriated the pay and allowances of the dead men.

A. V. Suvorov, in fighting this evil, appointed special commissions to study the cases of robbery of soldiers and the causes of the high death rate and placed the guilty parties on trial. In defending interests of the soldiers Suvorov was not afraid to make enemies among highly-placed government officials. "... no matter whom I bring upon myself," he said, "the soldier is more dear to me than myself. . . ." ¹⁹

The order of Adm P. S. Nakhimov which was issued during the defense of Sevastopol' and which set forth the need to protect personnel during shellings serves as an example of concern for subordinates. "The concerned officer," the order reads, "taking advantage of the situation will always seek a means of economizing on manpower and thus reducing the number of people exposed to danger." ²⁰

Progressive military pedagogic thought placed a high value on military training as a means of moral-military and physical development of soldiers. P. A. Rumyantsev observed in his work *Mysl'* (Thought) that the high combat readiness of troops and their "physical and moral . . . readiness" are achieved through continual efforts and "various training exercises." ²¹ He taught his officers to cherish every minute of training time in order to raise the skills of subordinates "to the highest possible

degree of perfection," and to achieve in this regard superiority over the enemy and defeat him. Sharing the ideas of his mentor, A. V. Suvorov wrote: "It should not be thought that blind bravery assures triumph over the enemy, only military art combined with it can do this."²² He required that officers regularly conduct combat training and persistently form in subordinates the traits necessary for the successful conduct of combat operations. He stated the significance of combat training in several aphorisms: "to study is light, not to study is darkness," "the cause fears the master," "one trained man is worth three untrained men," "win with ability, not with numbers," "relying on one's self is the foundation of bravery."

Characteristic of progressive military pedagogues was the desire to base the training of soldiers and seamen on an understanding of that which they were taught. Everything that soldiers must do should be "a fine example in a comprehensible and explicable way, so that occasionally because of their simple understanding or insufficient proof, the necessary and useful does not seem to them to be a vain burden which is not at all pertinent or useful, and finally does not become vexatious or generate revulsion."²³ It should be explained to soldiers that the thorough mastery of weapons gives them a direct advantage over the enemy.

The rules for training chasseurs called for the inculcation in soldiers of independence and initiative and for the ability to load rifles quickly, to fire accurately, to run with celerity, to crawl up to the enemy in secret, to utilize the terrain skillfully in battle, to employ cunning, and in winter to ski with full pack.

P. A. Rumyantsev wanted combat training among the troops to be carried out continually throughout the year, so the troops were led to camps during the summer.

The combat training system devised by A. V. Suvorov was distinguished by a particularly high degree of perfection. Striving for comprehension in military training, he formulated the rule: "Every soldier must understand his actions." Suvorov introduced into combat training discussions ("verbal instruction"), whose function was to explain to soldiers in their studies, in simple and clear language, the requirements of regulations and combat and tactical methods.

In order to develop in his soldiers keenness and resourcefulness, Suvorov made extensive use of the elements of surprise and of abrupt changes in the situation during instruction and posed unexpected questions. He organized combat training in accordance with the main principles of offensive military art, which he expressed in a brief formula: estimation by sight, quickness, charge.

These principles could be implemented in the life and combat practice

of the troops only if the soldiers had mastered to perfection cold steel: the bayonet, and the sabre. In those times firearms had not been perfected. They slowed down the actions of troops, since they consumed much time in their preparation for battle and reloading after firing, which inevitably led to a loss of the element of surprise, quickness, and onslaught. Therefore, Suvorov placed at the fore the mastery of bayonet and sabre, ascribing an auxiliary role to the bullet and aimed fire. The bullet was for reserve and more so for defense. Suvorov raised the art of the bayonet to perfection. He observed that the most frightening thing to an enemy is "our bayonet, which our soldier handles better than any one else on earth," that the "bayonet, quickness, and the element of surprise are the leaders of the Russians. . . ."

All activities, training exercises, and maneuvers which Suvorov conducted were distinguished by their highly dynamic nature, which contributed to the instilling in soldiers of rapidity of action, endurance, agility, and a readiness to join battle on the march. Soldiers and officers were regularly taught to ford rivers, to make long and fast marches both in the daytime and at night and in any weather, to rise quickly at the sounding of the alarm, to maneuver over broken terrain in order to deliver surprise, rapid, and resolute strikes against an enemy in war, and to fall upon the enemy "like snow on the head."

For the purpose of bringing training closer to a combat situation and in order to instill an offensive spirit, Suvorov introduced into combat training two-party exercises, which concluded with a direct attack. He ordered that fortifications be constructed according to all rules, placed the artillery and infantry there, and taught the troops to take them by storm in daytime and at night, exercising his soldiers in quickness, resoluteness, boldness, and mutual aid. Then the general implemented the principle: "Hard in training—easy on the march, easy in training—hard on a march."

Suvorov demanded that an interest in training be developed in his soldiers. He observed that a soldier loves training only if it is taught meaningfully and not to the point of exhaustion.

In order to instill in his troops faith in victory over the enemy, Suvorov often reminded his soldiers of past glorious victories, and in his speeches used such expressions as "You are wondermen," "You are champions," "Russian eagles! The enemy shakes before you," "Work quickly, rapidly, bravely, like Russians," "We are Russians—we will triumph," and others. The entire Suvorovian system of training and indoctrination was imbued with the idea of unfailing victory. Suvorov instilled in his soldiers the spirit of combat friendship, camaraderie, and mutual aid according to the rule: "Die if need be, but help your comrade."

In military-moral indoctrination, progressive military pedagogy allotted

a large role to the personal example of commanders. Pedagogic aphorisms such as "like commander, like subordinate," "like officers, like troops," "to give orders, learn to obey," and others were quite widespread among the officers of progressive orientation.

Suvorov formulated a number of advisory statements which concerned the exemplary behavior of officers. He said: be a good soldier, if you wish to be a good field marshal; carefully train your subordinates and set an example for them; without virtue there is neither glory nor honor; preserve in your memory the names of great men and on marches and during operations follow their example with good sense; take as an example a hero of ancient times, observe him, follow him forward, become his equal, and overtake him; competition is the surging of a noble spirit which wants to prove the superiority which is being challenged.

On the eve of battle the general would personally visit the regiments in order to remind his soldiers and officers of their glorious combat traditions and of the past victories of Russian troops. In some battles, to lift the spirit of the troops Suvorov ordered that the unit banners be unfurled in the combat formations of attacking troops and employed a playing orchestra and the beating of drums. At critical moments he personally rushed into battle, inspiring and leading his troops. The officers whom he trained did the same.

Suvorov himself was always an example to his subordinates, leading a spartan life and working indefatigably both in peacetime and in combat situations. Together and on a par with his soldiers he endured the hardships of combat life on the march. To his officers he set an example of high education, continual activity, and improvement of his knowledge and moral and combat traits. Kutuzov, addressing the soldiers, said: "Let everyone remember Suvorov: he taught us to endure both hunger and cold when the victory and glory of the Russian people were at stake."²⁴

At the same time it should be noted that A. V. Suvorov defended the interests of the serfdom state and his views were, from a class standpoint, limited and imbued of monarchistic and religious ideas.

Having thoroughly adopted the Suvorovian system of training and indoctrination, *M. I. Kutuzov* (1745–1813) developed and improved it. He paid particularly great attention to the training of the officer corps, on whose quality the results of combat training and the discipline, organization, and combat spirit of the troops depended. Kutuzov, who for several years was the director of the Infantry Gentry Cadet Corps, introduced tactics and military history into the curriculum. The study of history had the goal of developing in cadets patriotic sentiments, of training them in combat traditions for "glorious service to Russia," and the study of tactics was supposed to ensure the development of tactical thinking and other combat traits.

Kutuzov demanded of the officers that they be examples of discipline, morality, and combat valor to their subordinates and that they strive to become masters of the training and indoctrination of personnel. He said that by the skill and number of excellent marksmen in a company "one can glean the fitness of a company commander." In his opinion, cavalrymen should be indoctrinated and trained so that each of them "even alone is fearsome to the enemy."

In training, M. I. Kutuzov esteemed simplicity, expediency, consistency, strength, closeness to a combat atmosphere, and economy of the time and efforts of servicemen.

M. I. Kutuzov's pedagogic talents were especially manifested during the Patriotic War of 1812. He drew up the program and methods for the accelerated training of troops under wartime conditions and proffered much advice on the specific features of training home guardsmen. They must be taught the most important thing: how to carry correctly the rifle on their shoulder, to load and fire, and to handle a bayonet. In teaching formations and marching, one should not seek beauty but development of tactical methods, maneuvering, and various means of armed combat.

M. I. Kutuzov placed at the foundation of the military and moral education of troops the idea of liberating the Homeland from foreign aggressors, development of a sense of patriotism and hatred of the enemy, the traditions of the combat valor of Russian soldiers, and the idea of the unity between the army and the people in the struggle against foreign enslavers. In an order on pursuing the enemy he called on soldiers to increase their blows against the foe, to pursue him more resolutely, and then "the Russian land which he dreamed of enslaving will be strewn with his bones." Appealing to the best traits of his soldiers and to their sense of national pride, Kutuzov wrote: "We will pursue tirelessly. Let winter, blizzards, and the cold come. Will you fear them, children of the north? Your iron breast fears neither the severity of weather nor the malice of enemies. It is the reliable wall of the homeland, against which all collapses."²⁵

When Napoleon's army was driven from our Homeland, Kutuzov called on his troops not to rest on what they had achieved but to go farther, forward, to complete "defeat of the enemy on his own fields." In that period he paid much attention to indoctrinating soldiers in the lofty ideas of the liberation mission of the Russian army, pointing out that the defeat of Napoleon's army would liberate "not only the Russian people, but all peoples of Europe as well." The understanding of the soldiers and officers that each of them "is a savior of the homeland," a liberator of other peoples, that the entire Russian nation was proud of the feats of the Russian army, uplifted their combat spirit and served as a source for the development of high moral and combat traits.

In the navy the progressive orientation in military pedagogy was developed in the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries in the activities of Admirals F. F. Ushakov and D. N. Senyavin, and of Admiral M. P. Lazarev and his students—the heroes of the defense of Sevastopol': V. A. Kornilov, V. I. Istomin, and P. S. Nakhimov.

Using all means they taught their seamen faithfulness to the combat traditions of the Russian navy, bravery, mutual aid, and discipline. They required that their officers respect the personal dignity of seamen, constantly pay attention to them, and satisfy their needs and requirements. By strengthening discipline they strove to shield seamen from the use of lashes, canes, and the birch, which officers of the serfdom era considered ordinary punishment.

Admiral *D. N. Senyavin* (1763–1831) pointed out that officers not only should command their men, but also should “enter into their private lives,” “know each of them, constantly communicate with subordinates, encourage a competition among them for diligent service by commending the outstanding.” He implemented the idea of canceling corporal punishment, and took strict sanctions against those officers who insulted and beat seamen. *F. F. Ushakov* (1744–1817) required that seamen be taught in such a way that each knew his position and place and improved his actions to perfection by the method of regular exercises. In the training of artillerymen he paid particular attention to precision of fire, speed, and composure in action.

P. S. Nakhimov, the hero of Sinop and of the defense of Sevastopol', enjoyed particular popularity among the seamen. Holding the conviction that “a seaman is the main engine on the ship,” he required his officers to study well the individual traits of seamen in order “to know how to act with different people,” to exalt and teach them, and to stimulate boldness and heroism in them. Nakhimov fought against cramming and rote learning and worked to ensure that training was conducted in a language within the seamen's reach, and also required his officers to teach them grammar. He considered the main thing in inculcating naval qualities to be naval voyages: “You are at home at sea.”

Thus, in the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, through the efforts of talented Russian generals and naval commanders and of the officers and generals in the Russian army and navy whom they trained, progressive military pedagogic ideas, in which the troops that they led were trained and indoctrinated, became widespread. This comprised the most important foundation for the victories of the Russian army and navy.

The progressive system of troop indoctrination and training based on the principle of teaching the troops what is necessary in war, on a humanistic attitude toward the soldier, and on the development in him

of a sense of patriotism, military duty, initiative, understanding of that which he was taught, and closeness to his commanders and subordinates, was in contradiction, however, with the ruling ideology of serfdom. The officers and generals of the reactionary wing constantly waged battle against the progressive principles and methods of troop training and indoctrination. This effort became particularly acute during the reign of Paul I, when advocates of Prussian methods of troop training seized the leading posts in the army. In that period many progressive officers and generals were discharged, and some were arrested and exiled. A. V. Suvorov, the creator of the advanced system of training and indoctrination of soldiers, was also subjected to repressions.

Despite this, progressive military pedagogic ideas and better combat traditions continued to exist and develop in the army and navy.

Thus, the outstanding generals and naval commanders of Russia were not only experts on strategy and tactics, but also major military pedagogues and psychologists. They knew "the road to the heart of their soldiers and their army. They were masters of high troop spirit and knew how to instill in a soldier's spirit strong confidence in himself."²⁶ Thanks to them progressive military pedagogic thought in Russia moved ahead of European military pedagogy.

In evaluating the military pedagogic views of talented generals and naval commanders during the period of serfdom, it should be kept in mind that their views were limited with respect to class and imbued with ideas of monarchism and a religious, idealistic outlook. Through their talent, great knowledge, progressive military pedagogic views, the system of military indoctrination and training, advanced military skills, and military victories over the enemy, however, they raised the combat characteristics and authority of the Russian armed forces.

In the first half of the 19th Century a new, revolutionary-nobiliary orientation arose in the Russian army and navy.

Revolutionaries of the nobility raised military pedagogic thought to a new level, giving it a revolutionary orientation. The Decembrists strove to solve military pedagogic problems on the basis of socio-political transformations in the country. They set as their goal the destruction of feudal-serfdom relations, the establishment of a republican order, the introduction of compulsory military service, reduction of the term of service, the extension of civil rights to soldiers on a par with all other members of society, and improvement of the material lot of soldiers.

The Decembrists set forth their military pedagogic views in their sociopolitical, philosophical, journalistic, theoretical military, and other works.²⁷

The Decembrists allotted the leading place in the educational system

to moral education, based on the principle of humaneness, respect for the individual soldier, and concern for his material and spiritual requirements. They came out in defense of the human dignity of the Russian soldier and unleashed a campaign against corporal punishment and other types of punishment which belittled the dignity of man. Decembrist officers were the first to eliminate corporal punishment of soldiers of the units in which they served. Showing concern for the mental development of soldiers, the Decembrists furthered literacy among them.

The Decembrists have the honor of being first to organize political agitation among soldiers and sailors. They conducted political discussions with soldiers and sailors and passed out political leaflets. A political orientation was given to studies involving soldiers in literacy schools. As far as the inculcation of combat traits of soldiers was concerned, the Decembrists believed that this could be best done on the basis of the principles and methods developed by P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov, and M. I. Kutuzov.

The revolutionary-nobiliary orientation gave rise to a new historical stage which V. I. Lenin called the nobiliary period of the revolutionary movement in Russia (1825–1861).²⁸ In this period a new, revolutionary direction in the development of Russian military pedagogic thought was born.

After the suppression of the Decembrist uprising a wave of reaction set in within the country and army. Command posts among the troops were given only to the Arakcheyevites—the most reactionary and cruel officers who established serf-like discipline in the army. In this period arbitrariness and humiliation of soldiers, seamen, and progressive officers flourished and everywhere lashes, canes, and rods whistled through the air. Carts with sticks and canes for punishment often followed soldiers on their way to training exercises.

V. I. Lenin, describing the serf system in the Russian army in that period, wrote that in the time of Nicholas I “joining the army was a natural punishment. . . . The peasant was conscripted as if for a longterm prison where he was awaited by the inhuman tortures of the ‘green street’ and so on.”²⁹ Conscription was practiced as one form of judicial punishment, especially with respect to the politically suspect. For instance, by court decision the Ukrainian popular poet and revolutionary democrat T. G. Shevchenko was exiled into the army.

All these measures, however, could not bring to a halt the growth of anti-serfdom sentiments among the soldiers and the progressive officers. Although the Czarist army was isolated from the people, the process of the growth of class contradictions, and anti-serfdom and revolutionary democratic feelings gradually penetrated even there.

A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogarev, with their journals *Kolokol* (The Bell) and *Polyarnaya zvezda* (The North Star) exerted a great revolutionizing influence on progressive officers of the Russian army and navy in the 1850's and the 1860's. They murderously criticized the serfdom arrangements in the Russian army and navy, cane discipline, drill, and the hard-labor conditions of military service, exposed cases of cruel treatment of soldiers and sailors, disseminated revolutionary ideas, and called on officers and soldiers to join the revolutionary struggle against serfdom. One of the proclamations published in *The Bell* read: "Officers! Behind you are great traditions—behind you is 14 December 1825! The great shadows of Pestel', Murav'yev, and Bestuzhev call you to avenge them!"

A new period connected with bourgeois reforms and the development of capitalism commenced in the history of Russian military pedagogic thought.

3. Military Pedagogic Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the 19th Century and at the Start of the 20th Century (Before the Great October Socialist Revolution)

A new stage in the development of military pedagogic thought in Russia begins in the second half of the 19th Century. It was brought about by the socio-economic changes that transpired in the country.

The Crimean War (1853–1856) demonstrated with particular graphicness the outmoded nature and rottenness of the serf order, which retarded the development of industry and capitalist relations in Russia and the provision of new equipment and weapons for the army and navy.

Of economic necessity and under the threat of the expanding anti-serfdom movement of the peasants, the Czarist Government was forced, in the atmosphere of the revolutionary situation, to proclaim emancipation in 1861. In the 1860's and 1870's a number of reforms were carried out in the country, reforms which created the conditions for more rapid development of capitalism and capitalist relations in the country.

Industrial development led to the creation of new, more advanced weapons and to the replacement of smooth-bore weapons with rifled weapons and of the sail-powered fleet with a steam-powered fleet. In connection with this, the forms and methods of combat changed substantially and troops switched to the tactics of extended formations. The era of capitalism gave rise to mass armies assembled on the basis of compulsory military service (from January, 1874, in Russia). All this required top-notch human material. The new methods of combat operations required less drilling and parade precision but more speed, intensity of force, imagination, initiative, independence, and so on.

Events showed that the methods of training and indoctrination which prevailed in the army did not correspond to the new requirements. They were severely criticized by the progressive segment of the officer corps.

In the field of socio-pedagogic and military pedagogic thought three main directions were clearly drawn up: serfdom, the bourgeois-liberal, and the revolutionary democratic orientations, which reflected the balance of class forces in Russia after the Emancipation.

The representatives of serfdom orientation, defending the interests of their class, resisted the dissemination of enlightenment among the people, including the army, and demanded that reactionary principles be introduced into education: these included orthodoxy (religiousness), autocracy, and popular rule (enslavement), and they were supporters of corporal punishment and drill.

The pedagogy of serfdom was severely and consistently criticized by the revolutionary democrats *V. G. Belinskiy*, *A. I. Herzen*, *N. A. Dobrolyubov*, and *N. G. Chernyshevskiy*.

The revolutionary democrats set as the goal of pedagogy the education of a revolutionary warrior devoted to the working masses, of an ardent patriot—educated, comprehensively developed, resolute, brave, and capable of self-sacrifice in the name of the interests of oppressed people. They demanded universal public education, seeing therein a means of fighting for freedom. At the same time they emphasized that the people could obtain freedom if they would destroy serfdom by revolutionary means. With respect to the army they set the task of converting it from an obedient implement of Czarism into a force capable of defending the workers' interests and of according them aid in the revolutionary struggle.

Upon becoming editor of the journal *Military Anthology*, *N. G. Chernyshevskiy* surrounded himself with the progressive segment of Russian officers and unleashed his campaign against routine, stagnation, and the serflike procedures that reigned in the army. The journal came out in defense of the Russian soldier, demanding a humane attitude toward him and respect for his personal dignity, and severely criticized officers who advocated serfdom and claimed that the Russian soldier needed the cane since he did not understand kind words. It was emphasized in a number of articles that one should see in the Russian soldier above all a human being and respect his bravery, keenness, mind, strength of will, and high moral traits. The journal demanded that soldiers be made literate—a mandatory condition for mental and moral development and for the formation of the conscientious fulfillment of their civil duty to the people.

N. G. Chernyshevskiy wrote that the main condition for a strong

military is its morale, which depends on the nature of the social order, on the relation between the army and the people, on weapons, the level of combat training, and discipline. Serfdom gives rise to drill, cane discipline, and lashings "to train soldiers for mechanical execution of command orders." In the opinion of N. G. Chernyshevskiy, a military based on mechanical learning "will always be defeated by an enemy whose soldiers are not inanimate machines but living organisms."³⁰

An officer, asserted N. G. Chernyshevskiy, should above all be a citizen, a patriot of his nation, and must possess basic general education and military training.

The revolutionary democrats considered the revolutionary transformation of society, destruction of the exploitative order, and emancipation to be the most important conditions for the fulfillment of all these tasks. Revolutionary democratic pedagogy was the direct predecessor of Marxist-Leninist pedagogy.

The bourgeois orientation, which was divided into two branches (the bourgeois liberal and the bourgeois democratic), held a significant place in socio-political affairs in reformed Russia.³¹

The most prominent representatives of the bourgeois liberal orientation in the Russian army and navy were D. A. Milyutin, M. I. Dragomirov, and G. I. Butakov.

D. A. Milyutin (1816–1912), as an ideologist of the liberal-monarchistic bourgeoisie, headed the military ministry in the period 1861–1881. He was the main instigator of military reform. In military pedagogy Milyutin developed ideas of the need for the mental, moral, and physical development of soldiers, for the spread of literacy among the troops, and for the introduction of the principle of teaching what is necessary in war. Under his leadership universal military service was introduced, reorganization of administration was implemented, military districts were established, new regulations were developed for the infantry, artillery, and cavalry, Disciplinary Regulations were introduced, and a reform of military educational institutions was carried out.³²

On the whole, as a bearer of the ideas of the monarchistic bourgeoisie, Milyutin subordinated all his activities to serving the ruling classes and the monarch. Because of this, it is natural that his military pedagogic views bore the impression of class limitation, although with respect to the previous period of history they were somewhat progressive.

General *M. I. Dragomirov* (1830–1905) made a great contribution to military pedagogy of reformed Russia. In political views he was a bourgeois liberal-monarchist. By introducing new principles of organizing the troops and new methods of military indoctrination and training,

Dragomirov attempted to overcome the defects of the Russian army and thus to strengthen the positions of Czarism.

The military pedagogic system which he proposed was worked out with consideration for the changes that had taken place among the troops in connection with the appearance of rifled weapons, new tactics (enlarged formations), and the new ways of organizing and means of assembling troops on the basis of universal military obligation. The new training and indoctrinational system should, in his opinion, have given rise to a Suvorovian spirit in the Russian army.

In training soldiers for combat, Dragomirov ascribed primary significance to indoctrination, placing it above professional military education. Indoctrination should develop the following qualities: devotion to the Homeland to the point of selflessness; discipline raised to the level of "I shall perish more quickly but I shall execute the order"; belief in the inviolability (sacredness) of an order, the ability to display initiative; bravery (resoluteness, fearlessness); readiness to endure the difficulties and hardships of army life without complaints; aspiration toward mutual aid; and pride in belonging to a given military unit.

Dragomirov imbued the tasks of indoctrination with the idea of monarchism, thus expressing the interest of the ruling class. At the same time he emphasized that the indoctrination of a drafted peasant should be carried out in such a way that while developing the traits of a soldier one does not destroy the human being in him. He considered the correct methods of indoctrination to be those which develop in soldiers the ability to think, feel, manifest will, act out of habit, and so forth.

Discipline, according to Dragomirov, should be enforced not with strict punishment but with "continual persistence in requirements that are made just once, fairness, strict legality, concern for the soldier, and an honest attitude toward his contentment."³³

In order to indoctrinate and train subordinates successfully, officers must be comprehensively trained, have sound knowledge of the theory and practice of military training and indoctrination, possess true devotion and love of their work, be attentive to the needs of subordinates, share the burdens of service with the soldier, and develop in themselves a correct attitude toward orders.

Dragomirov included in the contents of professional military education: the study of regulations, weapons training, training with cold steel, gymnastics, fencing, drill, tactics, and trench warfare. Underlying education should be the principle: "The troops should study in peacetime only that which they must do in wartime."³⁴

Dragomirov strove to introduce into military training strict sequentiality, and worked to ensure that soldiers did not mechanically memorize

material but understood what they were studying and knew how to apply this knowledge in practice. In training, in his opinion, expediency, a systematic approach, graphicness, simplicity, durability, and other factors should be strictly observed.

M. I. Dragomirov paid much attention to the methods of instruction, the "manner of conducting activities." He recommended that attention always be paid to having methods of instruction correspond to the character of the subjects and to the qualities of the Russian soldier. The methods of instruction proposed by Dragomirov basically reduced to demonstration, explanation, and exercise. He repeatedly emphasized that in instruction one should be guided "by the pedagogic principle," which reflects one of the main laws of pedagogy, to wit: "above all always give the subject, and then its symbol," since in practical instruction that which "reaches the consciousness through the eye" is assimilated more deeply and more soundly.

Dragomirov recommended that in the process of training and indoctrination a readiness to make self-sacrifices be formed in officers and soldiers: "In battle only he who does not fear to die will triumph. . . ." ³⁵

In taking note of the progressive character of the very important provisions of M. I. Dragomirov's military pedagogic system, we should not overlook its negative aspects, which resulted from the class limitation of his outlook and interests. In constructing his training and indoctrinational system he proceeded from the idealistic concept of the eternal, invariable qualities of soldiers and overestimated the importance of literacy among them. In organizing personnel training with consideration for the changes that had taken place as a result of the introduction of new weapons and tactics, Dragomirov was not wholly consistent. For instance, he long overestimated the role of bayonet training and fought against the "fire-worshippers" and those who advocated the construction of defensive structures, believing that all this contributes to the development in soldiers of the self-preservation instinct, of a sense of fear, while the bayonet instills bravery, resoluteness, and contempt of death. Dragomirov, fearing the revolutionary nature of the working class, demanded that the army be comprised solely of peasants, and supported monarchistic and religious education in every way possible.

Admiral S. O. Makarov (1848–1904) was a prominent representative of military pedagogic thought in the Russian navy in the second half of the 19th Century and at the start of the 20th Century. In political views he was a bourgeois democrat. Makarov set forth his military pedagogic views in the work *Rassuzhdeniya po voprosam morskoy taktiki* (Reflections on the Problems of Naval Tactics), the motto of which he made: "Remember war."

Using the term "naval pedagogy" for the first time, S. O. Makarov

voiced the opinion that its main goal is to prepare naval personnel for the triumphant conduct of war. He believed that a sailor will be able to act successfully in naval battle if he possesses such traits as health and endurance, accustomization to discipline and the sea, boldness, and knowledge.

Makarov considered the voyage to be the most important means of instilling naval and combat traits in naval personnel. In his opinion, the training of sailors should be conducted on the basis of Suvorovian principles. For this purpose he recommended that no pattern exercises be allowed, that an effort be made to diversify activities as much as possible, and that sailors be taught to repair holes and to correct malfunctions in a complicated situation. He advanced the idea of creating a special training "watership" in order to train sailors in peacetime for actions under dangerous conditions. Makarov drew up the requirement "replace one with another," which heralded the extensive introduction into personnel training of the principle of interchangeability, even among officers.

S. O. Makarov's pedagogic ideas are imbued with humanism. He required that the sailor be treated attentively and that concern be shown for his health, diet, and rest. He recommended that the principle of the individual approach be adhered to in training and indoctrination.

Makarov ascribed great significance to the training of officers. He devoted one of the chapters of his work *Reflections on the Problems of Naval Tactics* to the problem of the self-education and self-nurturing of officers. Makarov truly loved the Russian people and was close to his sailors. In his military pedagogic views, however, he did not go beyond those of a bourgeois democrat. The problems of indoctrination he solved without consideration for those socio-political conditions in which the indoctrination was given, and without consideration for the political goals of the army and navy. Makarov could not help noticing the rise of revolutionary sentiments among soldiers and officers or the aggravation of class contradictions in the army and navy. He did not comment, however, on these pressing problems which played a significant role in the development of awareness in sailors and in their practical activities.

The military pedagogic views of M. I. Dragomirov and S. O. Makarov exerted a considerable influence on training officers and military journalists. Such works of M. I. Dragomirov as the textbooks *Taktika* (Tactics), *Podgotovka voysk v mirnoye vremya* (Troop Training in Peacetime), and *Opyt rukovodstva dlya podgotovki chastey k boyu* (Leadership Experience for Preparing Units for Battle), and S. O. Makarov's works *Rassuzhdeniya po voprosam morskoy taktiki* and *Bez parusov* (Without Sails) enjoyed great popularity among the officers. It should be noted, however, that Czarism hindered in every way possible the dissemination of progressive military pedagogic views. Reactionary

ideas and procedures prevailed in the army and navy, and drill and crudeness flourished.

The start of the 20th Century was heralded in Russia by major political events: the revolutionary outbreaks of the working class and peasantry and the creation of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party], which led the revolutionary struggle in the country.

The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and the large-scale revolutionary outbursts of soldiers and sailors in the years 1905–1907 bore witness not only to the crisis of autocracy and to the deep class contradictions that shook it, but also to the putridity of military organization and to the crisis in the training and indoctrinational system of army and navy personnel. V. I. Lenin graphically illustrated this in his article: "The Fall of Port Arthur."

In this period the Bolsheviks initiated a great deal of revolutionary agitational work among the troops. It had tremendous success among the soldiers and sailors. The army and navy began more and more to emerge from under the influence of the nobiliary-bourgeois officer corps. Interrelationships between the officer corps and the common soldiers and sailors assumed an acute class, antagonistic character. The class self-consciousness of soldiers and sailors increased noticeably.

V. I. Lenin, comparing the movement in the army in 1825 and 1905, wrote: "Then the leadership of the political movement belonged almost exclusively to the officers, and namely the nobiliary officers; they had been infected by contact with the democratic ideas of Europe. . . . The majority of soldiers, who had come from the serfs, remained passive.

"The history of 1905 gives us quite the reverse picture. The officers, with few exceptions, were then of bourgeois-liberal, reformist, or even openly counterrevolutionary mind. The workers and peasants in military uniform were the spirit of the uprisings; the movement had become popular."³⁶

The ruling classes, striving to retain the army and navy in their hands, increased repression against the revolutionary segment of military personnel and increased the ideological indoctrination of soldiers and sailors. At the same time attention was paid to the search for ways to increase the combat capability of the army and navy.

A discussion on the problem of the "reasons for the fall and ways of restoring the morale of the army and navy" arose on the pages of military newspapers and journals. Among the nobiliary-bourgeois officers corps two orientations clearly stood out: the bourgeois-liberal and the nobiliary-serf. The liberal officers considered the main reason for the defeat of the Russian army and navy in the Russo-Japanese war to be the failure of the officer corps to fulfill its function, as shown in their perfunctory atti-

tude toward service, in their poor knowledge of the principles of military pedagogy, and in their harsh handling of soldiers and sailors. They proposed first of all to improve the qualitative composition of the officer corps, to equip them with knowledge of military pedagogy and psychology, and to increase the ideological indoctrination of the "lower ranks."

The extremely reactionary pro-serfdom officers considered the pedagogic advice of the liberals useless, claiming that between the officers and the masses of soldiers and sailors "there exists a precipice from birth, a precipice that is hard to cross from either side." To cross this precipice they proposed that the noncommissioned officer corps be bought by raising its wage rates and subordinating soldiers and sailors to the officers through the NCO's. If this did not help, then the "mutual guarantee" principle should be employed, placing on trial all personnel of the unit or ship upon detection of cases of revolutionary propaganda. Fearing to accord soldiers and sailors independence and desiring to destroy the slightest manifestations of their class self-consciousness, the Czarist Government continued to maintain serf-like regulations in the army, converting military duty into punishment, into a school of arbitrariness and coercion. The ruling classes were unable, however, to bring to a halt the turbulent revolutionary process in the army and navy.

Under the conditions of the profound crisis of Czarism and the growth of the revolutionary consciousness of soldiers and sailors, bourgeois military pedagogy proved to be ineffective. It ran up a cul-de-sac and weathered the crisis. The active work of the Bolsheviks in the army and navy increasingly developed the political, proletarian class consciousness of the soldiers and sailors, winning them over to the side of the proletariat and the revolutionary movement.

The Great October Socialist Revolution, after destroying the capitalist order and its armed forces, created a new socialist society and a new type of armed forces where training and indoctrination began to be implemented for the first time in the interests of the people and on a truly scientific basis.

Soviet military pedagogy did not discard the progressive military pedagogic heritage of the past. It proceeds from the fact that the Russian army and navy always had a layer of true patriots—talented officers, generals, and naval commanders who were the bearers of progressive views in troop indoctrination and training, who worked against reactionary officers, and who, pressure from above notwithstanding, improved the quality of the Russian army and navy.

A humanistic attitude toward the soldier and sailor, the struggle against drill and mechanical discipline, an implacable attitude toward triteness in training, the development of initiative and independence in personnel,

and the implementation of combat training according to the principle that troops should be taught what is necessary in war—Soviet military pedagogy not only critically accepted these and other features of progressive pre-revolutionary military pedagogy, but developed and improved them and incorporated a new, socialist content.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.* (Complete Collected Works), Vol 39, p. 67.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol 2, p. 178.
3. *Ibid.*, Vol 17, p. 346.
4. *Itroyevoye polozheniye* (Military Regulations) (1699), *Kratkoye obyknovennoye ucheniye* (Short-term Regular Training), *Voinskiye stat'i* (Military Articles), *Rotnyye pekhotnyye chiny* (Company Infantry Ranks) (1700), *Uchrezhdeniye k boyu* (Preparing for Battle) (1708), *Artikul korabel'nyy* (Ship Regulations) (1706), *Instruktsiya i artikuly voyennyye, nadlezhashchiye k roziyskomu flotu* (Military Instructions and Articles Applying to the Russian Navy) (1710), *Voinskiye artikuly* (Military Articles) (1714), and others.
5. *Voyennyye ustavy Petra Velikogo. Sbornik dokumentov* (The Military Regulations of Peter the Great. A Collection of Documents), Moscow, 1946, p. 60.
6. See *Khrestomatiya po russkoy voyennoy istorii* (Reader on Russian Military History), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1947, p. 138.
7. T. Shvorina, *Voinskiye artikuly Petra I* (The Military Articles of Peter I), Moscow, 1940, p. 22.
8. The military pedagogic views and pedagogic practice of P. A. Rumyantsev were reflected in his works *Obryad sluzhby* (The Rite of Service) and *Mysl'* (Thought) and in his orders, dispatches, instructions, letters, and reports. Many guiding pedagogic documents were drawn up at his order and with his direct participation, including *Instruktsiya pekhotnogo polku polkovniku* (Instructions for the Colonel of an Infantry Company), *Pravila dlya obucheniya yegerey* (Rules for Instructing Jaegers), *Nastavleniye vsem gospodam batareynym komandiram* (Manual for All Battery Commanders), and *Instruktsiya rotnym komandiram Vorontsova* (Instructions for All Company Commanders of Vorontsov).
9. P. S. Nakhimov, *Dokumenty i materialy* (Documents and Materials), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1954, p. 613.
10. A. V. Suvofov, *Dokumenty* (Documents), Vol 1, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1949, p. 151.
11. *Instruktsiya pekhotnogo polku polkovniku* (1764). See *Khrestomatiya po russkoy voyennoy istorii*, p. 211.
12. A. V. Suvorov, *Dokumenty*, Vol 1, pp. 99, 124, 143, 365.
13. P. S. Nakhimov, *Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 602.
14. Fieldmarshal Rumyantsev, *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (A Collection of Documents and Materials), Moscow, OGIz, 1947, pp. 34–35, 86, 201–202.
15. A. V. Suvorov, *Dokumenty*, Vol 3, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1952, p. 505.
16. *Ibid.*, Vol 1, p. 99.
17. *Ibid.*, Vol 3, p. 575.
18. *Khrestomatiya po russkoy voyennoy istorii*, p. 398.
19. A. V. Suvorov, *Dokumenty*, Vol 3, p. 212.
20. P. S. Nakhimov, *Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 469.
21. Fieldmarshal Rumyantsev, *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, p. 77.
22. A. V. Suvorov, *Dokumenty*, Vol 1, p. 151.
23. Fieldmarshal Rumyantsev, *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, p. 77.

24. M. I. Kutuzov, *Sbornik dokumentov* (A Collection of Documents), Vol 4, Part 2, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1955, p. 239.
25. *Ibid.* Vol 4, Part 2, p. 239.
26. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voynskom dolge* (On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty) Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p. 418.
27. Among such works are: *Russkaya pravda* (Russian Truth) and *Zapiski o manevrakh* (Notes on Maneuvers) by P. I. Pestel'; *O soldate* (On the Soldier) by V. F. Rayevskiy; and the orders of M. F. Orlov.
28. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 25, p. 93.
29. *Ibid.* Vol 4, p. 393. The "green street" is a type of corporal punishment. The convicted was bound to his rifle and led through a formation of soldiers facing each other, who at the commander's order birched their comrade.
30. N. G. Chernyshevskiy, *Soch.*, Vol 6, Moscow, Goslitizdat, 1949, p. 316.
31. The interests of bourgeois liberals in scholastic pedagogy were expressed by such pedagogues as N. I. Pirogov, N. A. Korf, and V. Ya. Stoyunin. The liberals, while advancing progressive pedagogic ideas, were inconsistent in the campaign to implement them.
The bourgeois-democratic branch in the socio-pedagogic movement was headed by the classic of Russian pedagogy K. D. Ushinskiy (1824-1870), the author of the work *Chelovek kak predmet vospitaniya* (Man as the Subject of Education) and many others. K. D. Ushinskiy's works were permeated with the ideas of patriotism, populism, and humanism.
32. The reform of military educational institutions was expressed in the elimination of the cadet corps. In their place military gymnasiums and military schools were set up. Additionally, cadet schools and military pro-gymnasiums which trained students for them were organized. In the same period the military academy was reformed and new military academies (artillery, engineering, naval, and law academies) were created.
33. M. I. Dragomirov, *Izbrannyye trudy* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1956, p. 385.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 624.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
36. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 30, pp. 318-319.

Chapter 3. The Main Stages of Development of Soviet Military Pedagogy

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution initiated a fundamental transformation in the country's social affairs, including the organization of the Armed Forces and the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers.

The development of a new, socialist system of military indoctrination essentially started in the first days after the formation of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. In the course of this work the vast experience of the Bolshevik Party was utilized in political education of the masses and the military training and indoctrination of combat detachments of the working class, as were the experience of revolutionary agitation work in the army and navy of the old regimes (monarchic and bourgeois) and the experience in the training and indoctrination of the Red Guard.

Even before the issuance of decrees on the organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army and Worker-Peasant Red Navy, indoctrinational work of a socialist character was initiated in the old army and navy, which had to be kept at the front and placed in the service of the socialist revolution until a new army and navy could be established.

The socialist indoctrination of servicemen of the old army and navy was carried out in the course of their democratization (the according of equal rights to all servicemen, the elimination of previous ranks and titles, the establishment of a selection process for command personnel, and the transfer of power in units and on ships to elected troop and ship committees).

The new period in the development of the socialist system of military indoctrination was determined by the issuance of decrees on the formation of the Red Army and Navy. The start of the creation of a socialist system of military training and indoctrination and the start of the development of Soviet military pedagogy are usually linked to that time.

Soviet military pedagogy and the socialist system of indoctrination and training traversed in its development a complicated and difficult path

which was organically connected with the history of the Soviet nation and its Armed Forces.

Several stages which correspond to the historical periods of the Soviet Armed Forces can be traced in the development of Soviet military pedagogy:

1) The creation and development of a system of indoctrination and training for Soviet soldiers (1918–1920);

2) The development of Soviet military pedagogy and of a system of military indoctrination and education during the period of peaceful socialist construction (1921–1941);

3) The development of the theory and practice of the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945);

4) The development of Soviet military pedagogy and of the system of military training and indoctrination in the postwar period (1945–1972).

Each of these stages resulted from the specific socioeconomic conditions in the development of our country and the Soviet Army and Navy.

1. The Creation and Development of the System of Training and Indoctrination for Soviet Soldiers. The Start of the Development of Soviet Military Pedagogy

The organization of the Red Army and Navy, which were supposed to defend the achievements of the October Revolution, required the establishment of bodies which dealt with the training and indoctrination of soldiers and the working out of goals, tasks, principles, and methods of indoctrination and training. These problems were solved in the course of military development under the unfavorable conditions of the Civil War and foreign military intervention.

V. I. Lenin made a tremendous contribution to the development of the theory of the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers. As director and organizer of the armed defense of the Soviet Republic, the leader of our Party and nation covered the most important problems of the building of the Soviet Armed Forces in his works and speeches during the period of foreign military intervention and during the Civil War, and thoroughly revealed the character of socialist indoctrination and the requirements placed on the training of Soviet soldiers. The most important methodological problems of Soviet military pedagogy were reflected in the works of V. I. Lenin.

V. I. Lenin uncovered the fundamental contrast between the indoctrination of servicemen in bourgeois and socialist armies. In bourgeois armies all indoctrination is built on obfuscating the class self-consciousness of the

common soldier in order to stimulate him to move blindly into battle, obeying the orders of imperialist governments. In contrast to this, in a socialist army, indoctrination is subordinate to the development of the consciousness of soldiers, for a socialist state is strong through the consciousness of the masses. "It is strong when the masses know all, can assess all, and take all steps consciously." ¹

V. I. Lenin emphasized that the consciousness of soldiers assumes particularly great importance during wartime. The decisive factor here is the conviction of the righteousness of the war and of the need to endure all the hardships of the combat situation, to shed one's own blood, and to sacrifice one's own life in the name of the triumph of justice and socialism. "This mass awareness of the goals and causes of war," said V. I. Lenin, "is of tremendous importance and ensures victory." ²

V. I. Lenin constantly pointed out that in the army one should find very strict, iron discipline which ensures a unity of will and action, subordination, and industriousness, without which victory over the enemy cannot be won. In contrast to bourgeois armies where discipline is built on deceit, bribery, and coercion, the Soviet Army creates "unprecedentedly strong discipline not with the cane, but on the basis of consciousness, dedication, and the selflessness of the workers and peasants themselves." ³

The main method in education, taught V. I. Lenin, should be the method of conviction carried out through active, purposeful political and cultural-indoctrinational work, propaganda, and agitation which reach every soldier in their influence. At the same time he demonstrated the importance of the ability to combine conviction with constraint, which should be directed against violators of discipline or Soviet laws. Constraint must necessarily rely on conviction and on the support of conscientious soldiers. Therefore, V. I. Lenin said: "No matter what, we must first of all convince, and then constrain." ⁴

For conducting political work, agitation, and propaganda among the troops V. I. Lenin required that sound, solid, energetic people be chosen, people capable of "educating, uniting, and disciplining Soviet troops," people who knew how "to approach the most backward, most underdeveloped Red Army members in order to explain the situation in the most comprehensible language . . . , to help them at difficult times, to eliminate any hesitation, and to teach them to fight. . . ." ⁵

V. I. Lenin taught that war and the appraisal of the enemy should be treated seriously, emphasizing that imperialists utilize all achievements of science and technology in war. One must know how to fight such an enemy. Speaking at the Seventh Party Congress he said: "We should have one slogan—to truly learn military affairs. . . ." ⁶

Guided by Lenin's statements, the Communist Party carried out a tremendous amount of work to indoctrinate and train Soviet soldiers.

In the indoctrinational work special attention was paid to the in-depth explanation to members of the Red Army and Navy of the historical role of the socialist army, of the goals and tasks of the just war against the White Guards and interventionists, and in the essence of the new military discipline.

The training of riflemen, machine-gunners, and artillerymen was initiated on a broad scale. Underlying the instruction was the rule: "Practice above all." The first methodological aids played an important role in the establishment of the training system. One of them was called: "What Must a Red Army Man Know To Train New Recruits."

The changeover from the principle of voluntary service in forming the army and navy to the principle of compulsory military service and to the creation of a regular army with centralized administration and strict military discipline contributed to the development of the indoctrinational and training system.

On April 8, 1918, the institution of military commissar was introduced in all units in the army and navy. The All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (VBVK) was set up to supervise the activities of the military commissars.⁷ It exercised leadership of political indoctrination, cultural-educational work and Party work among the troops. The creation of Party cells, and then of political organs, commenced in units and on board ships.

On May 29, 1918, the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] adopted a decree on the compulsory drafting of workers into the Red Army. The command personnel appointment system was introduced. The solemn promise of soldiers of the Red Army (the military oath) was approved.

At the end of 1918 the "Booklet of the Red Army Man" signed by Chairman of the VTsIK Ya. M. Sverdlov and Chairman of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] V. I. Lenin was published. The materials that it contained explained in popular fashion the goals and tasks of the Red Army and the requirements placed on the morals and behavior of soldiers, and gave a clear idea of the Soviet state and of its laws and of the leading role of the Party in the state and the Armed Forces. It was of great assistance to commanders and political workers as a guide which gave answers to many questions of military indoctrination and training. There is good reason to consider it the first Soviet military political textbook.

The new regulations—the Internal Service Charter of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] (November 1918) and the Dis-

ciplinary Charter of the RKKA (January 1919)—largely contributed to the strengthening of military discipline.

It was stated in the regulations that in a socialist army, in an army of workers, there should be no "place for the negligent, the depraved, or parasites. All personnel guilty of failure to fulfill their revolutionary communist duty are subject to immediate punishment." Discipline in the Red Army is maintained not through fear of punishment or through the desire to win awards, but through communist consciousness, through the confidence of subordinates in their chief and through the confidence of the chief in his subordinates. A disciplined soldier conscientiously executes all laws of the socialist republic, his official duties, and orders of superiors.

The most important condition for maintaining conscious discipline among the troops is the establishment of correct interrelations between commanders and subordinates. Regulations required commanders to conduct themselves in such a way as to win the confidence and respect of subordinates and to clearly draw a distinction between official and unofficial relations.

The regulations defined the methods for employing incentives and penalties. It was stated in the Disciplinary Charter that incentives serve "to award the most outstanding upon fulfillment of official duties and to stimulate among them necessary competition in the interests of the military cause." The charter defined the types of penalties and the procedure for employing them and required commanders and commissars (their role especially was emphasized) to hold responsible all servicemen who had committed a misdeed without malicious intent and who had not caused serious damage (there was also judicial responsibility).

The Disciplinary Charter included a section titled: "On Company Courts of Peers." As early as June 1918 a special regulation on company courts of peers, which was included in the "Booklet of the Red Army Man," was developed. The courts of peers played a large role in the inculcation of discipline among Red Army men. The decisions of courts of peers expressed the public opinion of the military collective and had a high degree of authority and educational influence on servicemen.

Misdeeds of an everyday, moral, and worldly character were subject to hearing by company courts of peers: insulting a comrade during off-duty hours, intoxication, gambling, undignified behavior outside of formation, and other misdeeds which did not cause harm to the state. A court of peers was empowered to impose a sentence on a guilty person before an assembly of company personnel, filing or not filing an order to the regiment, to impose monetary penalties, to sentence the party to mandatory extra-duty work within the unit, and so on.

The decisions of the Eighth RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress held in March 1919 exerted a tremendous influence on the development and improvement of training-educational work in the Red Army and Navy. The Congress directed that training and indoctrination in the Red Army should be carried out on the basis of class solidarity and socialist enlightenment.

The system of military training and indoctrination was constructed in such a way as to ensure comprehensive development, eliminate illiteracy, raise the general cultural level, achieve the conscious assimilation of political and military knowledge, skills, and abilities, and ensure physical development.

Primary attention was paid to *eliminating illiteracy* among members of the Red Army. As a rule, as many as 40–50 percent of all soldiers in each unit were illiterate. Together with the near-literate they comprised over 70 percent of all enlisted personnel.

In September 1919 the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic issued an order which established a six-month deadline to eliminate illiteracy. A regulation was drawn up on houses of education, clubs in the Red Army, and Red Army schools of literacy. The schools of literacy were divided into three degrees: the first for the illiterate, the second for the near-literate, and the third for the literate. Programs in the native language, mathematics, history, geography, natural science, and the history of the revolutionary movement were developed for these schools and schools of political literacy.

In the methods of instructing servicemen, attention was paid to take into account the specific features of each person, to couple instruction with life, to eliminate mechanical learning, to make extensive use of graphic aids and of examples familiar and comprehensible to the students.

Political indoctrination was the leading factor in the process of the education of Soviet soldiers. The military commissars, Party cells, political officers, and agitators played the decisive role in setting up and implementing political indoctrination. Many of the commissars displayed the outstanding abilities of military pedagogues, brilliant orators, and mass organizers. They also made a decisive contribution to the work toward summarizing the experience of educational activities and developing military pedagogic theory. The exchange of opinion was carried out at congresses and conferences of commissars, political officers [politruk], and cultural and educational instructors. The reasons for shortcomings in education were ascertained, and specific measures for eliminating them were designed.

The pedagogic functions of the military commissars were reflected in the instructions for military commissars and in military regulations.

Bearing responsibility for the political and moral state of units and ships and for their combat capability and readiness, the commissars were supposed to participate personally in indoctrinational work and to direct the activity of Party cells, political officers, cultural and educational commissions, and clubs.

The instructions required commissars to win authority among members of the Red Army and Navy through their personal exemplary behavior, their ideological and moral purity, their devotion to the Soviet Government, their boldness, bravery, and readiness to self-sacrifice, and their unflagging will to win. Authority was considered a mandatory condition for ensuring success in work with the masses and in affecting them. The commissars had to be in constant and close contact with the masses of soldiers and with communists. It was emphasized in the instructions that the post of commissar was one of the most difficult and crucial in the Soviet Republic. More work fell on the commissars than on anyone else, as did more responsibility.⁸

Political officers were the first assistant commissars in the political and military indoctrination of personnel and in the organization of cultural and educational work in subunits. The institution of political officer was introduced for the daily and planned conducting of activities with Red Army men on political problems. The political officer was responsible to the commissar for the political indoctrination, and political and moral state of soldiers in the subunit. It was his duty to organize meetings with Red Army men on political topics and group readings of newspapers and books, to participate actively in the affairs of the cultural and educational commission, and to superintend the subunit library.

Political instructors were not endowed with disciplinary authority. Their main means of influencing the Red Army masses were the Bolshevik word and personal example. They were required to work systematically to improve their own political, military, and general education, to be closely connected with rank-and-file soldiers, and to serve as a model of behavior.

As a result of the introduction of the institution of political officer and the creation of Party cells, the subunit (company, battery, and so on) became the center of indoctrinational work.

The introduction of universal compulsory training for workers and the birth of a large-scale regular army required the establishment of a military training system which corresponded to the nature of the socialist republic. This work was carried out in the following directions: the rewriting of regulations and manuals of the old army in accordance with the goals and tasks of the Red Army and its accrued combat experience, and the drafting of military training programs, instructions, methodologi-

cal aids, and memoranda.⁹ Set forth in them were the principles, rules, methods, and forms of individual training and of the training of sub-units and units, various pedagogic advice was given, and the experience in military training and indoctrination accumulated in Red Army units was covered.

In order to develop the regular Red Army successfully and indoctrinate and train personnel, it was necessary to train numerous *new command personnel*.

In February 1918 the Council of People's Commissars approved the "Basic Regulations on Accelerated Courses for the Training of Command Personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army." On this basis an order was issued calling for the opening of 13 accelerated command personnel training courses. The number of courses constantly grew. Thus, the GUVUZ [Main Administration of Military Educational Institutions] had 63 in January 1919, 105 in January 1920, and 151 in January 1921. Moreover, commander training courses were opened under the headquarters of fronts and armies. Additionally, there existed a system of courses for the training of political workers. In November 1920 there were over 200 political courses and schools at the rear and at the front. Higher educational institutions were established to train high-level personnel.¹⁰

The developed system of military educational institutions brought about the need for the training of instructors. For this purpose the military pedagogic courses of the RKKA were opened in Moscow at the start of 1919.¹¹ Instructors in military, general educational, and socio-political disciplines were trained in these courses. The task of scientifically working on the problems of military indoctrination and training was also assigned to the courses. For this purpose a chair of pedagogy and a pedagogic section of the military scientific society were set up. Such problems as the role of military pedagogy in the life and development of the Red Army, the relation between pedagogy and politics, the relation between general and military pedagogy, and others were discussed at sessions of the section and chair.

Soviet military pedagogic thought developed in the struggle against the outmoded ideas of old military pedagogues, which were remote from life.

Thus, in the period 1918–1920 a socialist system for the indoctrination and training of soldiers and for the training of command, political, and pedagogic personnel took shape in the Red Army and Navy. Imbued with Bolshevik Party spirit, it was aimed at the formation in personnel of political consciousness and a scientific outlook, at comprehensive development of the soldier, and at the inculcation of conscious discipline and high moral and combat traits.

2. The Development of Soviet Military Pedagogy During the Period of Peaceful Socialist Construction (1921–1941)

Having triumphantly concluded the Civil War, the Red Army and Navy changed over to peacetime status. The Communist Party undertook extensive measures toward demobilizing the army and sharply curtailing the number of personnel.

Defining the military policy of the Soviet State under the new conditions, V. I. Lenin said that in undertaking economic construction “no matter what happens we must maintain our Red Army in full combat readiness and increase its combat capability.”¹²

By the start of 1924 the stage connected with demobilization, curtailment of the army, and partial reorganization had been completed. At the same time the turnover of temporary personnel which hindered the proper establishment of planned studies was eliminated.

Military reform began to be carried out in 1924. Its essence consisted in changing and adapting the organizational structure of the army and navy and of administrative bodies to the conditions of peaceful construction and to the changes which had transpired in the command, political, and rank-and-file personnel of the army and navy. The principle of unity of command was introduced, new regulations, manuals, and combat and political training programs were drawn up; instead of short-term courses, a system of secondary military and political military schools, advanced training courses, and higher military educational institutions and military academies was set up, and new training aids and textbooks were prepared.

The 1920's were marked by the further development of Soviet military pedagogic thought and the improvement of the entire system of indoctrination and training for soldiers.

Particular attention was paid to the problems of political indoctrination. As a result of the demobilization of senior age groups and the drafting of new contingents, army and navy personnel had grown younger. Youth who were mainly peasants were drafted each year into the army and navy. They had neither revolutionary experience nor political tempering, and to a large extent were illiterate or near-literate. On the basis of the fact that youth are extremely susceptible to any type of influence, the Communist Party set the task of “converting the barracks into a parallel branch of Party schools.”¹³ It was necessary to develop the political indoctrination of members of the Red Army and Navy in such a way that they not only mastered the ideology and policy of the Communist Party, but were also capable, after demobilization, of leading definite sections of socialist construction in rural and urban areas.

A systematic course of political discussions with soldiers, which was called the *political hour*, was introduced at the end of 1920 for the pur-

pose of improving political indoctrination, and later, in 1925, a transition was made to *political studies* according to special programs (of 2 years for the Red Army and of 4 years for the Red Navy). These forms were supposed to ensure the explanation to servicemen of the role and function of the Red Army and Navy, of the requirements of the military oath and regulations, and of the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, and to inculcate in the soldiers a sense of the inseparable bond between the army and the working masses, a sense of international solidarity with the working class of other countries, and an understanding of Leninist national policy.

Political activity groups began to be set up in platoons, and the best trained platoon leaders were appointed group leaders.

The supervision of group leaders, the according of assistance in ideological and methodological growth, and monitoring of the quality of the activities were assigned to political officers. The political officer personally conducted political activities with a group of junior company commanders.

At the initiative of the political bodies, the movement for the mastery of psychological-pedagogic knowledge and a raising of the methodological level was initiated among the political officers in the period 1922-1925. The task of studying the specific features of the Red Army audience and of taking into account the psychology of soldiers, their interests, their level of mental development, the specific features of perception and attention, and national attributes were set in the courses of educational and training work for political instructors.

In a number of districts competitions were conducted for the best political hour and political study, and for the compilation of methodological aids for conducting political studies.

Political textbooks and readers helped improve the quality of political indoctrination.¹⁴ At the end of the 1920's methodological aids on political studies, which equipped group leaders with definite psychological-pedagogic and methodological knowledge, were published.

Such forms of work as political games and dramatizations, question and answer evenings, collective readings of newspapers and literary works, amateur artistic groups, Red Army theaters, agitation courts, and so on were extensively employed in political indoctrination, in addition to political studies.

Organized political studies were introduced for all command personnel in 1924.

The works of the outstanding Soviet general *M. V. Frunze* were of great importance to the resolution of the most important problems of

indoctrination and training. He emphasized that the primary condition for successful work in the indoctrination and training of soldiers is the unity of views of commanders and political workers. This is accomplished on the basis of the ideology and policy of the Communist Party, military doctrine, and Marxist-Leninist analysis of the nature of future war. "This is why," indicated M. V. Frunze, "the study of Leninism . . . should play such a major role in the cause . . . of military indoctrination."¹⁵

M. V. Frunze paid particular attention to working out ways of increasing the political consciousness of personnel, strengthening military discipline, forming moral-combat traits, and achieving the unity of training and indoctrination. In revealing the essence and significance of Soviet military discipline, he observed that the strength of the army lies in discipline, in the resolution to fulfill precisely and unflinchingly the instructions and orders of superiors. Our discipline is based not on fear of punishment and open constraint, but on voluntary, conscious execution by each of official duties.

Emphasizing the role of the political worker in strengthening discipline, M. V. Frunze said that our political worker "as a representative of the Communist Party should always be a carrier of the idea of order and discipline, which is most inherent in the Communist Party. The political worker should be the element which best, most reliably, and most firmly contributes to the strengthening of discipline and the strengthening of internal and external order."¹⁶

M. V. Frunze and M. N. Tukhachevskiy were also responsible for founding the principles of the awareness and activeness of students and of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war and in working out the command and political personnel training system.

By the end of the 1920's Soviet military pedagogy had attained significant progress in its development. In this period articles and individual works in which pedagogic theory was set forth in a more systematized form began to appear. This was reflected in the articles and speeches of K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. E. Yakir, and other military commanders, and in the works *Metodika obucheniya krasnoarmeytsa voyennomu delu* (The Methods of Teaching Military Affairs to a Red Army Man) (1927) and *Metodika boyevoy podgotovki boytsa i chasti v pekhote* (The Methods of Combat Training of the Infantry Soldier and Unit) (1929).

New training programs were worked out on the basis of military pedagogic theory, and an intensified search for new methods of instruction was under way. These problems were discussed at meetings and conferences of military cadres. In the development of the programs a turn was taken toward reflecting completely in them the experience of World War I and the Civil War and the latest achievements of military science,

and at orienting the personnel of our army toward in-depth study of available equipment and the problems of the interaction and dynamics in battle. In the methods of combat training much attention was paid to the realization of the requirements of the principle of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war.

Exceptionally animated debates took place in the army and navy in the 1920's with respect to the methods of training personnel. In the course of the discussion of this problem important conclusions were drawn. They reduced to the fact that the best methods of instruction are those which ensure first the activity and independence of the trainees, second the training of the soldier and the solidification of subunits, and third the transfer of the center of gravity of instruction to the field, to a situation close to the combat situation. The discussions further revolved around the essence, effectiveness, and possibilities of the methods of instruction in the combat and political training of soldiers. Here proposals were voiced for extensively utilizing the demonstration, imitative, active labor, laboratory, research, and group methods. All this was positively reflected in the combat and political training of the troops. In the course of instruction the requirements of the principle of *awareness and activity* in the mastery of military affairs found further theoretical substantiation and practical application.

Soviet military pedagogy, guided by Lenin's ideas of the conscious mastery of knowledge, waged a resolute struggle against rote learning, cramming, and drill in combat training, which had penetrated into the training of Soviet soldiers through old specialists.

The task of motivating trainees to the fullest, of stimulating them by all methods and means to work, and of teaching them to acquire knowledge independently was posed. The ideas of active instruction in military educational institutions, where creative pedagogic thought was in full swing, became particularly widespread. This led to the introduction of the so-called *laboratory method* into the educational process.

By a laboratory was meant a class, field, club, or excursion site — that is, a situation which gave room for the trainees to manifest independence and activity in their studies.

The introduction of the laboratory method replaced the conventional system of lesson and lectures defined by a strict schedule, which presupposed mandatory attendance. Under the laboratory method the student himself planned his study of program material. At his own selection he determined what subjects and hence in what laboratory (and classroom) and for how long he would study and when he would take his examinations.

Advocates of the laboratory method believed that it was most appro-

appropriate for a military school, since it makes it possible to develop in a future commander independence and the ability to think, create, and display initiative and develops will. Recognition of the laboratory method as a universal method led to a sharp reduction in the educational role of the instructor and to curtailment of the methods of oral presentation of material (the story or lecture). The excessive expansion of the independent work of students inevitably entailed an increase in the working day and hence overloading and fatigue. The lifting of mandatory class attendance had a negative effect on student discipline. Other shortcomings of the laboratory method also turned up. Therefore, as early as the 1926/27 school year the framework of the laboratory method was limited at military educational institutions. It justified itself only in combination with other methods of instruction as an integral component of a system.

In the 1920's the *comprehensive method of instruction* became quite widespread, especially among the troops. The idea of the integral study of natural and social phenomena was connected with the comprehensive method in pedagogy. In the Red Army the material was collated by major subjects (cores). For instance, political literacy was the core of the complex of a group of courses on political and general educational training (the Russian language, arithmetic, geography). Under the comprehensive method the study of certain elements of the Russian language, literature, arithmetic, and geography which were closely connected with a given topic were introduced into each topic of political studies.

In the study of military subjects complexes were compiled on the basis of tactics. In the course of studies in tactics a program of drill training, physical training, topography, engineering, and so on was worked out.

The assembly of complexes had both advantages and shortcomings. For instance, the assembly of complexes for the Russian language, arithmetic, and geography together with political training raised the ideological level of general educational training and coupled knowledge to the life and policy of the Communist Party and Soviet State. At the same time the formation of complexes as a system created many difficulties both for the study leaders and for the trainees. Studying the Russian language, arithmetic, geography, and political problems in one political exercise led to violation of the principles of a systematic approach, sequentiality, and sound mastery of knowledge. Attraction to some element (say arithmetic or grammar) diverted attention from political problems, leading to a reduction of the ideological content of political studies. Therefore, the start of the 1930's, when the general educational training of draftees was uplifted, the complex as a system

was rejected. General educational training was eliminated from the content of political studies.

A new period in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, a period which exerted a substantial influence on the advancement of the theory and practice of indoctrination and training, commenced in 1929. On the basis of the successful fulfillment of the Leninist plan for national industrialization, agricultural collectivization, and the implementation of the cultural revolution fundamental changes took place in the army and navy.

Socialist heavy industry made it possible to technically reequip the army and navy, to equip them with new small arms, to create new types of artillery, armored and tank troops, and aviation, and to build new ships for the navy.

Qualitative changes also took place among the personnel in connection with which universal elementary and then incomplete secondary (7-year) education were carried out in the country.

At the direction of the Party Central Committee, combat and political training was reorganized in accordance with the changes that had taken place. The main slogans of the new period became: "Turn toward technology," "Personnel who have mastered equipment solve all."

On 5 June 1931 the Party CC adopted the decree titled "On the Command and Political Personnel of the RKKA," in which it directed that under the conditions of the technical rearmament of the Red Army the main task was resolutely to improve the technical military knowledge of command personnel and for them to master to perfection combat equipment and the complex forms of modern combat. In command training special attention was paid to the study of combat equipment, to the organization and management of general combat, and to the interaction of branches of service. The military training of political workers was also stepped up.

In the period 1930-1937 the RKP(b) CC adopted a number of decrees aimed at fundamentally improving the educational process in elementary, secondary, and higher schools. On this basis the educational process was significantly reorganized in regimental schools, naval training detachments, and military educational institutions. The principles of Party spirit, graphicness, systematic approach, and sequentiality were realized more consistently in the programs and in the instruction of each subject.

The dissemination of the ideas of the outstanding Soviet pedagogues *N. K. Krupskaya* and *A. S. Makarenko* had a great influence on improving the quality of educational work in the army and navy.

N. K. Krupskaya did much to disseminate Lenin's theoretical heritage in the Soviet Army. She advised that the works of V. I. Lenin be studied in such a way that "his ideas serve as guidance to action."¹⁷ She turned particular attention to mastering Lenin's doctrine of socialist discipline in the army, of comradely interrelations between soldiers and command personnel, and of the ability to work with the common soldier, to know and take into consideration his psychology and interests, to accord him assistance, and to raise his awareness and cultural level, making extensive use of works of art, literature, the cinema, and museums. N. K. Krupskaya posed with particular acuity the question of mastering the methods of independent work with books and the ability to save one's own efforts and the efforts of others and to work according to plan, systematically and diligently accomplishing thorough mastery of the material covered.

A. S. Makarenko was an innovative pedagog, theoretician, and practitioner who highly esteemed the experience of education in the Soviet Army and created and tested in practice the system of principles and methods of communist education. A. S. Makarenko ascribed much importance to the educator's ability to define clearly and precisely the goal of education and to work persistently and unflaggingly for its realization. In defining the goal of education he placed at the fore the political position of the educator and his understanding of the requirements that a socialist society places on individual qualities, and his understanding of the goals of our struggle.¹⁸

A. S. Makarenko made a great contribution to the theory of education in and through the collective. He demonstrated in practice that real education of a member of a socialist society is possible only in a collective where each trainee is converted from the object of education into the subject of education, into an active figure and a champion of the interests of society as a whole. The collective possesses rich educational possibilities and means. These are organization, discipline, joint labor, competition, traditions, the mutual dependence and mutual exactingness of the members of the collective, criticism and self-criticism, and public opinion.¹⁹

Makarenko viewed the principle "place the highest possible demands on a person and give him as much respect as possible" as being identical with the principle of education in, for, and through the collective. The development of the exactingness which forms the individual is possible only in a good collective and in the collective's movement and aspiration toward the attainment of high goals.

A. S. Makarenko substantiated a very important position which has great significance in the education of soldiers, to wit: "A manly person cannot be taught if he is not placed in conditions under which he can manifest his manliness. . . ." ²⁰

Makarenko highly esteemed the expertise of the educator, which in his opinion does not require particular talent. Any normal person can learn this if he studies.

In the process of combat troop training a search was under way for more advanced methods of instruction. Extensive use was made of technical exercises, various training devices for specialists, and training films.

The introduction into combat training of the methods of the TsIT²¹ (Order of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council No. 149, dated 20 July 1930) was started. The TsIT methods contained a system of principles and methods of practical instruction, primarily for operations that involved motion. Its essence was that the whole operation was divided, on the basis of detailed study, into the simplest small movements which, when carried out in the most economical manner, became automatic through training. This method made it possible to achieve some progress in the training of specialists in the army, air force, and navy: training time was reduced and the quality of training was improved. It was not suitable, however, for the training of subunits, detachments, teams, crews, or platoons or for the theoretical study of other problems of combat training, and therefore, found limited application.

The combat training of troops was carried out by conducting unilateral and bilateral exercises and maneuvers. Especially large were the Kiev and Belorussian maneuvers in 1935 and 1937. In addition to the infantry and artillery, tanks, mechanized brigade and paratroop units also took part in these maneuvers.

Technical study groups, discussions, technical displays and "battles," 10-day inspections of combat equipment, and other forms became widely used in addition to planned activities involving the study of combat equipment.

The socialist competition, which assumed mass scale after the 16th All-Union Party Conference (in April 1929), had substantial influence toward improving the quality of combat and political training in the army and navy. It encompassed special, small-arms, tactical, physical, and political training and was aimed at excellence in fulfillment of combat training plans and a surpassing of standard indexes.

Changes took place in the contents and methods of political and military indoctrination. Beginning in 1932 the Marxist-Leninist training of command personnel began to be carried out during the hours of planned studies. In connection with the elevation of the general educational level of soldiers from the 1931/32 school year, political exercises began to be conducted in 2-hour sessions twice a week. Statements by the group leader, group or independent reading of the textbook, and an oral test

on the subject assumed a permanent position in the methods employed. Much attention was paid to instilling in the soldiers the habits of reading newspapers on a daily basis.

In 1931 political information was introduced for the purpose of regularly explaining to personnel the most important decisions of the Party and government, events within the country and abroad, and the tasks set for the army and navy. The presentation of this information was assigned to political officers.

In military indoctrination much attention was paid to the inculcation of discipline and to the in-depth explanation of the requirements of the Disciplinary Charter of the Red Army and the Disciplinary Charter of the Navy, approved in 1940. The new text of the military oath and the swearing-in ritual were approved (1939).

Despite considerable advances in the development of the system of training and indoctrination for soldiers, it should be noted that in the second half of the 1930's there was an underevaluation of military pedagogic theory. Articles on the theory of indoctrination and training seldom appeared in newspapers and journals and there were no major works on military pedagogy and psychology. In a number of manuals and instructions on training a hackneyed approach could be found.

In 1939-1940 attention to military pedagogic problems once again began to heighten. In September 1940, M. I. Kalinin wrote that all political workers should master the art of indoctrination. "For this purpose it is necessary to critically rework and master the entire heritage of classical pedagogy as applicable to adults and to create a special course on Soviet military-political pedagogy."²²

Analysis of the combat operations of the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish conflict revealed a number of shortcomings in personnel training. In order to eliminate them and increase the combat capability of troops, reorganization of the educational process was carried out. Particular attention was concentrated on the realization of the principle of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war. Exercises were shifted to the field and carried out under all-weather conditions, and the troops were taken to fall-winter camps. During the training period the infantry and tanks learned to follow a rolling artillery barrage. Commanders mastered the skills of managing battle under complex conditions.

Work toward reorganizing and improving troop training and indoctrination in accordance with the new requirements contributed largely to the increased combat capability of the army and navy. There was not enough time, however, to complete this process and to elevate it to the desired level. The perfidious attack on the USSR by fascist Germany interrupted the process of the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers under peaceful conditions.

3. The Theory and Practice of the Indoctrination and Training of Soviet Soldiers During the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945)

The Great Patriotic War was a comprehensive test of the strength of the Soviet social and state order, of the moral spirit of our people, and of the combat capability of their Armed Forces. Soviet military science and the troop training and indoctrinational system also underwent a severe trial.

The entire burden of mobilizing the people and their Armed Forces for the struggle against the fascist invaders rested on the shoulders of the Communist Party, which converted the country into a military camp and subordinated all the efforts of the people, army, and navy to one goal—crushing the enemy.

The troop training and indoctrinational system was reorganized in accordance with the requirements of the war and was supposed to ensure:

- 1) In-depth explanation to soldiers of the lofty and noble goals of the Great Patriotic War;
- 2) Mobilization of all forces of the army and navy to defeat Hitler's invaders; strengthening of iron military discipline and organization;
- 3) The training of reserves for the front as quickly as possible and the skillful mastery of weapons and combat equipment;
- 4) The inculcation in soldiers of deep love of the socialist Homeland and burning hatred of the enemy;
- 5) The development in personnel of fearlessness, staunchness, bravery, resoluteness, combat solidarity, and willingness to make any sacrifice in order to defeat the enemy.

The content and methods of indoctrination and training during the war were constantly improved and made more specific in accordance with the character of the military and political situation and of combat missions, and with the specific features of personnel, who were continually being replaced.

In political and military indoctrination the main efforts were directed at developing in Soviet soldiers communist consciousness, patriotism and internationalism, hatred of the enemy, vigilance, bravery, and valor. Only those methods and forms of indoctrination which could be used flexibly and operationally, which could be applied under any conditions, and through which the goal could be reached in a limited time justified themselves. Among these were individual and group discussions, meetings, brief assemblies, political information sessions, and readings of newspapers, summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau, orders of the Supreme High Commander, appeals, leaflets, and memoranda.

Taking note of the specifics of the conduct of indoctrinational work in the combat situation, M. I. Kalinin wrote in his article "Military Commissars" that what was needed was the "ability to make use of the situation that has taken shape, the ability to unite one's own combat unit and to mobilize it to fulfill the military missions facing it, the ability to instill in soldiers complete confidence in their operations," and that "at the present time the instruction of Marxism-Leninism in the army should be practical, not academic."²³

The force of an oral statement by a commander or political worker was determined by the ideological content of the statement and the unity of word and deed. "If company commanders or political officers demonstrate in practice that they know how to make intelligent use of all their weapons and to deliver blows against the enemy skillfully and adroitly, each word which they utter as a call to battle will find a very vital response. *Successful combat work is the kingpin of successful agitation,*"²⁴ wrote M. I. Kalinin.

The conditions of the war demanded that political indoctrination in the form of political studies be canceled. Primary stress was placed on the comprehensive development of mass agitation work.

Examples of heroism, staunchness, faithfulness to military duty, and self-sacrifice in the name of the Homeland were extensively utilized in instilling high moral-combat traits. In the initial period of the war particular attention was paid to surmounting the soldiers' fear of tanks and airplanes and to the struggle against cowardice and panic. For these purposes examples of successful fights against tanks and aircraft and meetings with the best tank killers were widely propagandized. Leaflets, brochures, and memoranda telling of the ways of fighting enemy equipment and weapons were spread among the troops.

The extensive dissemination of advanced combat know-how, the awarding of orders and honorary banners to units and ships, and the awarding of the title of guard unit or ship, the naming of units and ships in honor of the cities which they liberated, and salutes in honor of outstanding victories was of great importance in instilling in soldiers high moral-combat traits, inspiration on the offense, and staunchness on the defense.

The dissemination of the combat traditions and heroic past of our people and the awarding of the Suvorov, Kutuzov, Aleksandr Nevskiy, Ushakov, Nakhimov, and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy orders played an important role.

Patriotic songs, music, the cinema, and literature exerted a tremendous influence on the inculcation of love and devotion to the Homeland in soldiers. There were extensive visits by theatres and concert brigades to the field forces. Song and dance ensembles were set up under the

political organs of the army and navy. Soldiers' and sailors' collectives for self-initiated activities operated widely.

Such an important pedagogic problem as the study and consideration of the specifics of the psychology of various categories of soldiers occupied a significant place in education. The war had made major changes in personnel. People of the most diverse ages who differed substantially from each other in their life experience, educational level, cultural level, level of development, and psychological makeup were drafted into the army.

Much attention was paid to the indoctrination and training of soldiers of non-Russian nationality. On 17 September 1942 the Main Political Directorate of the RKKA issued a directive titled "On Indoctrinational Work With Red Army Men and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality." The methods of educating soldiers of non-Russian nationality called for their instruction in the Russian language, and for knowledge and consideration of their national traditions and customs. One of the conditions for successful indoctrination of such soldiers was addressing them in their native language, making use of political agitation of facts from the history of the republic from which the soldiers came, propagandizing examples of the heroism of their countrymen, and disseminating literature, newspapers, and magazines in their native language.

Purposeful indoctrinational work in the army and navy which was aimed at achieving victory over the vile enemy was the most important factor in forming high political and moral-combat traits and mass heroism in Soviet soldiers.

Military training was carried out in close coordination with indoctrination. The system of instruction, in addition to combat training in the units of the field forces and in military educational institutions, also included the training of personnel in reserve units and instruction in military affairs through Vsevobuch [universal military training],²⁵ Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Construction of the USSR], and in general educational schools.

Personnel of the officer corps were trained in various courses and at military schools and academies which operated according to curricula and wartime programs. Here the situation at the front often dictated corrections and changes in the plans and programs with respect both to time and to content. Thus, in 1941 the period of instruction was reduced to 6-12 months in military academies, 4-8 months in military schools, and 3-4 months for courses. It was only in the second half of 1943 that the periods of training were increased.

The periods of training for soldiers in reserve units were estab-

lished in a similar manner. In 1941-1942 they ran from 3 weeks to 2 months and were increased in subsequent years.

The briefness of the periods determined the content and methods of military instruction. The instruction of theoretical material was curtailed. The emphasis was shifted to practical training and demonstration with brief explanation. Training activities, and exercises assumed the dominant role in methodology. That which would be required at the front, in combat, was taught.

The training day was lengthened to 12 hours. Attention was paid to the most economical and efficient use of training time. In the process of instruction the principles of sequentiality and sound instruction were adhered to; activities were conducted mainly in the field.

The new regulations which came out during the war years—the Combat Regulations for Infantry of the Red Army (BUP-42) and the Ship Regulations of the Navy (KU-43)—as well as training manuals for specialists and for certain types of troop training exerted a great influence on the content and methodology of personnel training.

Instruction was also actively carried out in the field forces. For this purpose periods of preparations for battles and breaks during combat operations were utilized. Instruction was set up especially well in second echelon troops and in units withdrawn to provide rest and to bring them to full strength. The handling of offensive operations began to be practiced extensively among the troops. In an area where characteristic features of the enemy defense were reproduced, the troops worked out in practice all combat missions and problems of interaction among branches of arms, including the artillery and aviation.

Extracurricular forms of work were also employed during combat training: meetings with outstanding soldiers, commanders, political workers, and snipers; tactical small-arms conferences, competitions in the knowledge of combat equipment, and so on. Awards for mastering military affairs were established to stimulate improvement in combat skills of soldiers: "Sniper," "Excellent Machinegunner," "Excellent Artilleryman," "Excellent Tank Crew Member," "Excellent Torpedo Man," and others.

Consequently, during the war years training was adopted to the needs of the front and the requirements of combat activities and made subordinate to the interests of achieving victory over the enemy. The methodology of practical and comprehensive training of troops under field conditions attained a particularly high degree of perfection.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military pedagogic thought was raised to a new level. The system of indoctrination and train-

ing had endured a severe trial in the fire of the war and had made a worthy contribution to victory over the enemy.

4. The Development of Soviet Military Pedagogy in the Postwar Period (1945-1972)

After World War II the imperialists set a course toward preparing for a new world war, directing their aggressive efforts against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They began to step up military preparations and to feverishly form aggressive blocs.

In the complex and strained international atmosphere, increasing the combat strength and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces acquired very great importance to the preservation of peace, the successful restoration of the national economy, the further upsurge of the national economy, and improvement of workers' well-being. Therefore, the reorganization of the army and navy concluded in 1948 was carried out with consideration for strengthening the combat capability of the Armed Forces. The system of training and indoctrination for Soviet soldiers was developed and improved on this basis in the postwar period.

Commanders and political workers were given *the task of mastering the skills of troop indoctrination and training, of consistently implementing in combat practice the principle of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war, and of studying, summarizing, and incorporating in the educational process the experience of the Great Patriotic War.*

The educational process in military educational institutions was reorganized in accordance with the experience of the war and with consideration for new requirements. The periods of instruction were increased. In a number of military educational institutions a course on military pedagogy and psychology was introduced.

The experience in training and indoctrination which was accumulated during the Great Patriotic War and the need for creative application of this experience under the new conditions determined the further development of military pedagogic theory. In educational institutes such as the M. I. Kalinin Higher Military Pedagogic Institute, the Military Pedagogic Institute of the Soviet Army,²⁸ and the V. I. Lenin Red Banner Institute of Physical Culture and Sports, personnel specializing in pedagogy and psychology made a great contribution to the development of military pedagogy. In these institutes personnel specializing in military pedagogy and psychology were trained through the military graduate studies system, and training aids and monographs on the most important problems of the theory and practice of the indoctrination and training of soldiers and of the educational process in the military school were written.

A scientific conference on the problems of Soviet military pedagogy, at which results of the development of military pedagogic thought in the postwar period were summed up, was held in March 1950 in Leningrad. In 1952–1954 a discussion of the subject and tasks of military pedagogy, in which generals, regular officers, and specialists in military pedagogy took part, was initiated on the pages of the journal *Military Thought*.

The conference and discussion demonstrated that in addition to positive aspects there were also significant shortcomings in the development of military pedagogic theory, in particular somewhat of a gap between the theory and practice of training and indoctrination among the troops and at military schools, and poor coordination of research and of the exchange of experience.

The qualitative changes in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces which took place under the influence of the scientific-technical revolution required further development of military pedagogic thought. The equipping of the army and navy with entirely new weapons and combat equipment (nuclear warheads and their delivery systems—missiles, automated control systems for weapons and combat equipment, atomic power plants on submarines, radar equipment, and others) led to fundamental transformations in the armament of the army and navy, to changes in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, and in the views on the methods and forms of conducting combat operations and on the methods of personnel training and indoctrination.

In connection with the revolution in military affairs, such problems as the need for the thorough mastery of modern combat equipment and weapons, the study of the specific features of combat operations when new weapons are employed, the improvement of the organization of military labor, and others acquired particular significance.

All this led to a *significantly more complex educational process* in the army and navy, increased the requirements made of the training of specialists, especially in the officer corps, and brought about elevation of the role of moral-political and psychological training of troops. Reduction of the term of active military service for rank-and-file personnel and noncommissioned officers under the Compulsory Military Service Law posed a number of new tasks in personnel training and indoctrination.

The system of training and indoctrination for servicemen was reorganized with consideration for the changes that had taken place in the Armed Forces. Troops began to study the conduct of combat operations under conditions when modern weapons and combat equipment were employed. The combat training process was made subordinate to the requirements of constant combat readiness. New curricula were drafted, in which the organic unity of combat instruction and military education

was reflected. The training of officers in schools and academies was set up with consideration for the fact that the relative proportion of engineers and technicians had greatly increased among the troops. A majority of secondary military educational institutions were converted into higher institutions, and higher military political schools for service branches were set up. Much attention was devoted to improving the methods of instruction. New technical aids, such as the cinema, television, radio, training devices, and programmed and automated devices, began to be introduced intensively into the educational process. Programmed instruction was developed.

The decisions of the 22d, 23d, and 24th CPSU Congresses and the requirements of the Party for increasing the communist education of workers and forming the new man—the active and conscious builder of communism and the valiant defender of the Homeland—became the foundation for indoctrinational work in the Armed Forces. The Party jubilee documents, decrees of the Party and government on further development of the social sciences, and the increase of their role in communist construction, on improvement of the economic education of workers, and on improvement of higher education in the country, and others are of great significance.

The decree of the CPSU CC dated 21 January 1967 and titled "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" played an important role in raising the level of indoctrinational work.

The introduction of the institution of subunit deputy commander for political affairs made it possible to improve the quality of the ideological and political indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and to extend aid to subunit commanders in improving the educational process, strengthening military discipline, and increasing the amount of attention paid to the material, everyday, and cultural needs of personnel.

The complexities of the program material of political studies and the rise in the general educational level and political requirements of soldiers brought about the lecture-seminar method of conducting political exercises, which greatly increased their efficacy.

The reorganization of the educational process required *a rise in the level of military pedagogic training of the officer corps and developmental work on the new problems of the theory of training and indoctrination*. These pressing problems began to be handled with particular success at the start of the 1960's.

The chair of military pedagogy and psychology which was set up in 1959 at the Lenin Military Political Academy made a great contribution to the development of Soviet military pedagogy. Somewhat later a military pedagogic department and courses for the advanced training of

instructors in military pedagogy and psychology were opened at the academy. The chair's military graduate studies program was able to train in a comparatively brief period a large number of scientific pedagogic personnel, and many candidate's and doctoral dissertations on military pedagogy and psychology were defended.

Much work toward the study and dissemination of military pedagogic knowledge was conducted and is being carried out at other military educational institutions, and also among the troops. A course in military psychology and pedagogy has been introduced in all military schools. Military pedagogy and psychology have been incorporated in the curricula of evening universities of Marxism-Leninism. At a number of academies courses for the retraining of teachers, in which the problems of pedagogy in the higher military schools are studied, have been set up. Pressing problems of military psychology and pedagogy have been reflected in the command training plans in units and on ships.

Lecture series and schools of military pedagogy and psychology are being established for sergeants and senior NCO's. The students of training subunits learn in the system of political studies the psychological-pedagogic foundations of the training and indoctrination of soldiers.

Works on military pedagogy, such as training aids, monographs, collections of articles, and booklets, are regularly published. The problems of Soviet military pedagogy are extensively covered in military newspapers and journals.

Not only specialists in military pedagogy and psychology, but also a broad range of commanders and political workers who have a tremendous amount of experience in educational work are participating in working out the problems of training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers.

Much attention is paid to improving the military pedagogic training of young officers. At the All-Army Conference of Young Officers held in November 1969 the problems of the rise in the role of the Soviet Officer as teacher and educator of his soldiers and the improvement of his military pedagogic attributes were extensively reviewed.

Work toward summarizing and incorporating the very latest methods of training and indoctrination in the army and navy has been greatly improved.

The activities of commanders, political workers, and Party and Kom-somol organizations which were connected with the preparations for such jubilee dates as the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, the 100th birthday of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, and the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR were of great importance for raising the ideologi-

cal, theoretical, and scientific level of the military pedagogic process and for improving the quality of the training and indoctrination of soldiers.

The Dnepr, Dvina, Okean, and other training exercises and maneuvers, the largest in the history of the Armed Forces, were conducted in this period. They were a noteworthy school for the training and indoctrination of army and navy personnel and a considerable test of the combat skills, physical endurance, and moral and psychological tempering of Soviet soldiers.

The requirements placed on Soviet military pedagogy have increased in connection with the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress. Under the conditions of the complex international situation, the danger of military adventures on the part of imperialists, and the aggravation of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, improvement of the methods of instilling in Soviet soldiers a Marxist-Leninist outlook, communist conviction, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, hatred of imperialists, vigilance, and combat readiness is assuming particular importance. Also pressing are such problems as the moral-political and psychological training of personnel for actions in modern combat, the sound mastery of new combat equipment and weapons, and improvement of the entire process of military training.

Military affairs are not standing still. Each year the effect of scientific and technical progress on them increases. Combat equipment and weapons and the methods and means of conducting military operations are undergoing continual improvement. The educational process is growing more complicated and intensive. All this places higher demands on the pedagogic expertise of commanders and political workers and on the further development of military pedagogic theory.

Soviet military pedagogy is directing its efforts toward the successful fulfillment of the tasks of training and indoctrinating personnel of the Armed Forces under current conditions.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 35, p. 21.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol 41, p. 121.
3. *Ibid.*, Vol. 38, p. 240.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol 43, p. 54.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol 39, p. 246.
6. *Ibid.*, Vol 36, p. 26.
7. The VBVK existed until April 1919. By decision of the Eighth Party Congress it was dissolved and a political division, later the Political Directorate of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, was formed.
8. See *Partiynno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii (mart 1919-1920 gg.). Dokumenty* (Party Political Work in the Red Army [March 1919-1920]. Documents), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, p. 172.
9. In 1918 the following were published: "What Must the Soldier and Citizen Know in Order to Fight Well With a Bayonet," "Memo for the Red Army Instructor,"

- and "Memo on the Duties of Detachment Leaders, Platoon Leaders, and Company Commanders in the Infantry." In 1919-1920: "Instructions for Command Course Cadets in All Branches of the Armed Forces," "Instructions for Conducting Activities With Instructors and Command Personnel," "Instructing a Company-Level Soldier in Operations With Riflemen in Extended Fire Positions," and others.
10. During 1918 and 1919 the following were opened: the Military Engineering Academy, the Artillery Academy, the Military Administrative Academy, and the General Staff Academy, as well as the following higher military schools: the Higher Infantry School ("Vystrel"), the Higher Military Chemical School, the Higher School of Military Camouflage, the Teachers' Institute of the Red Army, and military pedagogic courses.
 11. The pedagogic courses were renamed the Military Pedagogic Academy of the RKKA and later the Military Pedagogic Institute.
 12. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 42, p. 130.
 13. *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1968*, p. 189.
 14. *Uchebnik politgramoty dlya krasnoarmeytsa* (Textbook in Political Literacy for the Red Army Man), Izd. Voen. tipografii, 1927; *Krasnoarmeyskoye chteniye. Khrestomatiya* (Red Army Readings. An Anthology), Izd. Voennoy vestnik, Moscow, 1927-1928; and *Krasnoarmeyets* (The Red Army Man), a primer, Moscow, 1928.
 15. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Vol 2, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, pp. 176-177.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
 17. N. K. Krupskaya, "A Leninist's Training," *Ped. soch.* (Pedagogic Works), Vol 5, Moscow, Izd-vo APN RSFSR [RSFSR Academy of Pedagogic Sciences Press], 1959, p. 112.
 18. See A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, Moscow, Izd-vo APN RSFSR, 1958, pp. 114, 285-287, 423.
 19. *Ibid.*, Vol 5, pp. 231, 233, 352-356, 398.
 20. *Ibid.*, Vol 5, p. 424.
 21. The Central Institute of Labor was founded in 1920. On 24 August 1921 the STO [Council of Labor and Defense], headed by V. I. Lenin, adopted a decree calling for the conversion of TsIT into the central institution in the Republic working on, demonstrating, and disseminating the principles of the scientific organization of labor and uniting the activities of all other institutions in the country which study labor. TsIT existed until 1940. In 1931 the Military Division was set up under TsIT by order of the USSR RVS. RKKA commanders were instructed in courses under TsIT.
 22. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voinskoy dolge*, p. 413.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 471.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 528.
 25. The decree "On Universal Compulsory Military Training for Citizens of the USSR" was adopted by the State Committee for Defense on 17 September 1941. All men between the ages of 16 and 50 were required to take military training. Instruction was conducted according to a 110-hour program with no production leave.
 26. The M. I. Kalinin Higher Military Pedagogic Institute was founded in July 1940 for training officer-instructors with advanced skills in socio-economic disciplines for military schools. The Military Pedagogic Institute of the Soviet Army was established in April 1945 for the purpose of training instructors in tactics, firearms, and topography for military schools and educators for Suvorov schools.

Chapter 4. Specific Features of the Military Pedagogic Process

1. The Essence and Specific Features of the Military Pedagogic Process

The military pedagogic process represents a complex social phenomenon. Its essence lies in *the goal-directed organizational and educational activities of commanders, political organs, and staffs toward preparing military specialists, subunits, and units for the successful conduct of combat operations under conditions of modern warfare.*

The military pedagogic process is the bilateral active endeavor of commanders (chiefs) and subordinates, in whose course the formation in soldiers of high moral combat traits and of the readiness to conduct combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare is carried out, and the solidification of subunits as integral combat organisms takes place.

Political, combat, and technical training, which may be viewed as one of the forms of labor, comprise the foundation of the military pedagogic process. The products of this labor (the knowledge, skills, and abilities of soldiers) are of tremendous social import.

The orientation and content of the military pedagogic process as a social process depend on a number of factors.

First of all this process is a function of *the character of the social order, ideology, and politics of the ruling class.*

The entire process of the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is imbued with the spirit of the communist ideological approach, of Soviet patriotism, and proletarian internationalism, with the spirit of the high responsibility of each for fulfillment of his duty to the Homeland. This process is carried out under the direct guidance of our Communist Party.

The dependence of the military pedagogic process on the policy of the CPSU determines the Party character of the indoctrination and training of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is reflected in such principles of the military pedagogic process as *the unity of indoctrination and training and the educational character of training*, and necessitates

the manifestation of the principles of Communist Party spirit and scientific approach in training, and of the communist purposefulness and Party spirit of indoctrination.

The content of the military pedagogic process depends on *the level of development of productive forces*. The national economy is the material foundation for the strength of our Armed Forces. Thanks to the efforts and concern of the Party and people we are able to outfit the Armed Forces with the latest types of combat equipment and weapons and to provide the army and navy with everything necessary to decisively crush any aggressor.

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the importance of strengthening the material and technical base of the army and navy and of improving their technical equipment. "On the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology," said A. N. Kosygin in his report on the directives of the congress on the Five-Year Plan for the national economic development of the USSR in the period 1971-1975, "many new types of modern weapons have been developed and are in production, and the combat and technical specifications of weapons have been improved. . . . The Soviet Armed Forces are outfitted with the latest combat equipment of the highest caliber."¹

The content, forms, and methods of training and indoctrination are changing under the influence of the technical military factor. The military pedagogic process has become more intensive and more technically equipped.

The military pedagogic process also has its own definite *structure*. As a rule, two stages may be singled out: the individual training of the soldier (or sailor) and the training of units or subunits, although both stages are interconnected and interdependent.

Depending on the nature of the tasks carried out, the training process is divided into two periods—winter and summer. At the end of each training period the results of the combat training and combat readiness of both the serviceman and of the subunit or unit as a whole are summed up.

In addition to planned studies, the military pedagogic process also includes problems of the organization of troop services and an extensive system of political educational measures which are carried out together with personnel by commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organization.

Thus, the military pedagogic process is an exceedingly complex, dynamic phenomenon which has its own specifics. It is called on to fulfill specific tasks in the training of soldiers, subunits, and units, to defend our Homeland and to successfully conduct combat operations in modern warfare. The growing combat skills of Soviet soldiers and their

constant readiness to defeat any aggressor are results of intensive labor activities which have a military orientation. The military orientation and specific conditions of labor and everyday life of the soldiers have a decisive influence on the content and methods of organizing and conducting the military pedagogic process and determine its characteristic features. What is the essence of these features?

First of all *military labor and the mastery of military skills are the official duty of every serviceman*. This obligation is legally set forth in the USSR Constitution (Article 132), the Compulsory Military Service Law, the military oath, and military regulations.

In accordance with the requirement of the military oath and regulations a soldier bears legal responsibility for the quality of his work. An unconscientious attitude toward the mastery of his military specialty or toward his duties may be construed as a deviation from the fulfillment of his duty to the Homeland. The obligation of military labor and its moral and legal character are important conditions which contribute to the conscientious attitude of servicemen toward the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities in their specialties and toward the fulfillment of all official duties.

The fact that the system of knowledge, skills, and abilities which soldiers must possess is found not only in the form of theoretical concepts, categories, and rules, as is true of school instruction, but also as the foundation for official activities, is a significant feature of the military pedagogic process and a result of its labor character. In other words, *the military pedagogic process is conducted in inseparable unity with the official activities of soldiers and is of clearly expressed practical character*. The knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired in the process of training are immediately applied during combat duty, the fulfillment of regular work, and so on. On the one hand this requires high permanence of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of soldiers, and on the other contributes to the reinforcement and maintenance in soldiers of constant mobilized readiness.

The direct tie between the military pedagogic process and official activities requires that the combat and political training of personnel be organized in such a way that the combat readiness of subunits and units not be disrupted. Hence, *the military pedagogic process is carried out under conditions of constant combat readiness of troops and is aimed at ensuring such readiness*. It is exceptionally important to take this feature into account when organizing the training of specialists within subunits.

In order to ensure constant combat readiness, it is necessary to place the young soldier in formation as quickly as possible—that is, to give him the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities which will ensure

competent execution of his functional duties in his specialty. This means that the educational process cannot be uniformly spread out over 2 years (a soldier's term of service). In order to ensure constant combat readiness the combat training of soldiers is organized in such a way that the young soldier can be trained as a specialist in a comparatively short period, and in the process of his subsequent service he can advance his knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Hence, the educational process in the army and navy is clearly concentric in character, and the material studied at one stage is repeated at subsequent stages of instruction. Here it is important to organize the educational process in such a way that a repetition of material is mandatorily combined with the new elements; otherwise the soldiers will lose their interest in the activities.

The direct relation between the educational process and service, and the subordination of this process to the task of ensuring constant combat readiness require that soldiers master complex combat equipment and weapons in short periods of time. All this greatly increases the expenditure of intellectual, emotional, and physical efforts of soldiers in the process of mastering their military specialties.

The high intensiveness of combat training activities is one of the most important features of the military pedagogic process. This is due, on the one hand, to the reduction of the term of service in the army and navy, and on the other, to the ever growing volume of program material. The mental load per unit of training time has sharply increased.

The rise in labor inputs in the mastery of the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to operate and maintain modern combat equipment and weapons also attests to the intensiveness of the educational process.

For instance, in the execution of various types of exercises with combat equipment, the number of individual operations and actions per unit of time performed by soldiers has increased many times over. Combat training of troops shows that work quotas have risen an average of 60 percent in comparison with the pre-war period, and severalfold for some specialties. For instance, whereas in 1945 a gun crew performed 10-12 operations to fire a round, the firing team of a missile unit performs about 150.

At the same time the physical and mental strain on soldiers during work has substantially increased. For instance, time studies on actions of personnel in motorized infantry, tank, and artillery subunits during multi-day training exercises have demonstrated a significant increase in the expenditure of the physical and neuro-mental energy of soldiers during long marches and the conduct of combat training exercises. At the same time, conditions for renewing soldiers' physical and mental strength have grown extremely complicated.

The trend in the development of military affairs is such that there will be an increase in the number of servicemen whose activities are connected with the fulfillment of professional duties under especially difficult conditions. Here we have in mind the activities of soldiers during prolonged duty while operating equipment, devices, and mechanisms, during prolonged stays in the cabins of aircraft, or ships, in tanks, and in shelters, and during the movement of troops by various transportation facilities. Reduced motor activity on the part of soldiers, and in a number of cases prolonged stays in unchanging positions, the monotony of actions, vibration, limited spatial environments, and so on are most typical of activities under especially complex conditions.

Heavy work loads during studies and during the maintenance and operation of combat equipment and weapons cause fatigue in personnel, leading to a reduction of productivity, especially in young soldiers who have not yet fallen into the rhythm of army life. Therefore, now as never before, scientifically substantiated distribution of loads and the correct organization of the process of incorporating young soldiers into the rhythm of army service are necessary.

The tasks not only of training each specialist separately, but also of consolidating units and subunits as integral combat organisms are carried out in the process of the training and indoctrination of soldiers. Here it should be kept in mind that modern weapons and combat equipment consist of a large number of extremely complicated, interconnected components, each of which in turn comprises no less complex assemblies, mechanisms, and units. A person can ensure the most reliable operation of such equipment only when he knows it to perfection. This is achieved as a result of increasingly narrow specialization. Therefore, the specialization of military labor has sharply heightened under current conditions. Whereas there were 15-20 military specialties during World War I and their number reached 160 during World War II, now there are over 1,000 technical specialties alone.

All military specialties which now exist may be divided into three main groups. The first (and largest) includes specialties connected with the control of machinery and the monitoring of various types of instruments and indicators. These are the operator specialties (drivers of various machines, radar operators, pilots, and so on). The second combines specialties connected with the maintenance, adjustment, and repair of equipment. These are the specialties of technicians and mechanics. The third group consists of specialties which combine the functions of operators and mechanics (technicians). Therefore, one of the requirements of the training process is to *ensure the comprehensive theoretical and practical training of all specialists*, so that they are capable of utilizing combat equipment competently and effectively under the conditions of war. The attainment of this goal depends largely on the ability to take

into consideration in the educational process the psychological peculiarities of the labor of soldiers who are technical specialists, and above all the specific features of their cognitive activities.

In a number of cases the presence of a large number of various specialists in subunits makes it impossible to employ direct methods of instruction. As a result of this, a distinctive feature of the military pedagogic process is its *multifaceted, step-by-step character*.

The commander and political officer of a subunit must deal in the course of personnel instruction not only with soldiers of various specialties, but also with various levels of professional training and combat skills (some are just beginning to master their specialty, others are already working to raise their rating). At the same time, the directors of the military pedagogic process constantly fulfill the task of the combat consolidation of the subunit and of creating a friendly, unified military collective, and work to achieve interchangeability, complete mutual understanding, and friendly unity among the soldiers of the collective. In personnel training, great importance is ascribed to the timely training of a capable replacement for each man who goes into the reserve, and to ensuring continuity in training—that is, to conducting training without any regard to season, slumps, or disruptions during the transition from one training year to the next.

The multifaceted character of the military pedagogic process is also due to the fact that the activities of soldiers take place in diverse situations and put them in the most disparate situations. Exercises are conducted on variegated terrain, at any time of day or year, under unfavorable conditions, in complicated operational and tactical situations, and in various groupings. Therefore, a soldier needs not only durable knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also psychological readiness to take action under diverse conditions and in unexpected and dangerous situations.

An essential feature of the military pedagogic process is the fact that it is *permeated with a orderly system of Party political work* which is conducted by commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. Party political work extends its influence to the entire military pedagogic process, expands its bounds, directs its development, and exerts a constant influence on the attainment of high results in educational work.

Another specific feature of the military pedagogic process is the fact that the instruction of soldiers in a given specialty in a subunit must proceed even though they have different levels of general educational training (soldiers who have higher, incomplete higher, secondary, and sometimes incomplete secondary educations are trained under the same program).

The differences in the level of general education requires maximum individualization of the instructional process, which can be accomplished basically in two directions: the incorporation of the methods of programmed instruction into the educational process, and the instruction of personnel according to individual plans.

Such are the main and most general features of the military pedagogic process, features which should be taken into account in setting up the combat and political training of subunit personnel. These features graphically demonstrate that the military pedagogic process is much broader, more multifaceted, and more complex than the ordinary pedagogic process. An entire body of educational and training tasks is carried out in it in order to prepare soldiers for conducting modern combat.

2. Scientific-Technical Progress in Military Affairs and Its Influence on the Military Pedagogic Process

In addition to the general, firmly established features, inherent to the military pedagogic process is its own dynamics of development and its own internal changes which are connected with the development and improvement of the Armed Forces as a whole.

The current stage of military development is characterized by the tremendous scope of the introduction of the results of scientific-technical progress into the military. In recent years this has led to a significant increase in the technical equipment, power equipment, and combat capabilities of the troops, and to the complication of combat equipment and weapons; it has also brought about the need for a change in the methods of conducting combat operations and for improvement of the structure of organization, and command and control of troops. In turn all this has exerted a decisive influence on the process of the training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and on the content of principles, methods, and forms of training and indoctrination, and has required the immediate solution of a number of important educational problems.

For instance, the increasing complexity of new combat equipment and weapons has led to *a sharp increase in the role and significance of the theoretical knowledge of specialists* and hence to significant reorganization of the entire system for theoretical training of personnel. Under current conditions it is not enough to know the design of new equipment well and to acquire practical skills in operating it in order to master new equipment and weapons thoroughly and comprehensively; for this purpose it is also necessary to master the scientific and theoretical principles of its design and operation.

In the past, theoretical training—that is, study of scientific principles of

the processes and phenomena transpiring during the operation of a system—played a sort of subordinate, ancillary role in the process of mastering equipment. It was not the main component in forming the skills and abilities needed for technically competent control and maintenance of a model of equipment under study, but contributed mainly to better mastery of its design features and to some extent of the specifics of the operation of individual systems. Under current conditions, however, knowledge of the physical principles of the design and operation of basic systems and instruments is even more necessary in order to operate and maintain equipment correctly and competently. In connection with this, dependence of the maximum utilization of the combat capabilities of new equipment on the mastery of the scientific principles of its design and operation is becoming a guiding principle.

Theoretical training is now the main foundation for the conscious mastery of skills needed to control and operate new equipment. Experience shows that all acquired skills now have an intellectual orientation. A majority of the actions and operations carried out by some specialists toward maintaining and operating equipment requires careful theoretical consideration. In other words, theoretical knowledge is an integral component in the activity of soldiers.

For instance, the volume of information which must be reported to a tank driver, aviation mechanic, or any junior specialist of a rocket complex during combat preparations is now 2–3 times greater than the volume of the pre-war period and 5–7 times greater for some categories. The intellectual orientation of military labor has sharply increased in this connection.

As has been shown by a special study, when various specialists of several aviation and air defense units were in the process of mastering new equipment, about half of the equipment breakdowns and errors committed during its operation occurred, not because of poor knowledge of the equipment design, but because of insufficient depth of understanding of the basic physical elements of the processes occurring during its operation, or because of incomplete understanding of the effects caused by these or other factors.

Therefore, under current conditions a number of problems require resolution in the organization and conduct of the training process. These include increasing training time for theoretical training of technical and other specialists; organizing a system for the retraining and advanced training of specialists among the troops (for this purpose an extensive network of universities of technical knowledge and technical lecture series is being organized in units, the time spent on technical training is being increased, and technical information is being improved); increasing the amount of attention paid by commanders and political workers

to problems of basically reconstructing the attitude of personnel toward theoretical training and instilling in soldiers a permanent inclination to advance their knowledge; and making substantial corrections in the methods of forming skills and abilities in the maintenance and combat employment of modern equipment and weapons. This is connected with the fact that *the very concept of combat skills acquires a number of essentially new features* under the influence of basic changes in combat equipment, weapons, and the methods of waging battle. Prior to the appearance of missile-borne nuclear weapons and complicated technical systems, this concept was defined mainly in terms of the high level of motor skills and the development of physical strength, agility, and skill. Now the level of development of the soldier's technical and tactical thought is also inseparably bound to the concept of combat skills. Current requirements on combat skills are also characterized by a sharp reduction of the amount of time allotted for carrying out individual actions and operations connected with the control of combat equipment and weapons which are accompanied by an increase in the precision of their execution. The great complexity of the control processes requires the ability simultaneously to perceive the readings of many instruments, to reflect upon incoming signals, and to make decisions.

This fact sets before the methods of training the task of ensuring not only that actions are developed to the point of automatism, as before, but also that *absolute training is developed in soldiers*, training which differs qualitatively from the simple automatism in its higher labor productivity. This productivity should be achieved not so much by intensifying the physical activity of soldiers, as by raising the relative share of their creative cognitive operations.

If previously the development of actions to the point of automatism was reached through prolonged training, the development of a state of absolute training under the conditions of reduced training time requires methods which above all ensure the activation of the trainee's cognition on the one hand and intensification—or a sharp increase in the productivity of training sessions—on the other.

Under current conditions the problem of improving combat skills is becoming increasingly coupled to the psychological capabilities of the individual. For instance, it is common knowledge that the maximum attention span of a human is expressed in the ability simultaneously to grasp five to nine isolated objects; and unburdened arm can perform approximately 5.2 motions in a second, the forearm 8, the wrist 11.4; the minimum reaction time to rapid processes is 0.25 seconds, and the maximum interval between signals at which a correct reaction is possible is 0.5 seconds; thought proceeds at a rate of no more than 20–30 operations a second.

In other words, there is a limit to the natural psychological and physiological capabilities of man. In order to cross this limit, a person should utilize his capabilities to compensate for the limited capabilities of his own sense organs and motor reactions. This can be achieved by means of appropriate exercises, as a result of which the absolute and relative sensitivity of sense organs is increased, the rapidity of reaction rises, and the physical stability of the body grows, which in turn reduces the negative influence of fatigue.

In connection with this, the task of not only ensuring mastery of technical knowledge by soldiers in the shortest possible time but also of contributing to the development of their sense organs by using special psychological exercises arose in the course of instruction.

As indicated above, the outfitting of the Armed Forces with modern combat equipment and weapons has led to a sharp increase in the number of technical specialties. It is typical that the relative share of engineering and technical personnel in our Armed Forces has increased several fold since 1945 and continues to grow. This elevates the problem of *training technical specialists* to one of the most important places in the combat training system in the Army and Navy.

The constant replacement and modification of combat equipment and weapons have acutely raised the problem of improving and expanding *the system for retraining military specialists directly among the troops*. This is a complex and crucial problem. In some cases the process of rearming units with new equipment occupies a considerable amount of time, and it is more difficult to organize it well when constant combat readiness must be maintained. The very process of retraining requires the drafting of special methods and programs for the theoretical and practical stages of putting the new equipment to use.

The constant reduction of the amounts of time allotted for the modernization and incorporation of new combat equipment and weapons in a unit creates the acute need for improvement of the system of training technical personnel at military educational institutions. The fact of the matter is that the curricula in higher educational institutions sometimes lag behind practical requirements because of a certain inertia on the part of the educational process and the complexity of reorganizing it. At the same time detailed study of complex modern combat equipment and weapons under the traditional system of instruction often overloads the trainee's memory and pushes it to the threshold of his cognitive capabilities; the main thing is that to some extent this system complicates the training of specialists for rapid and competent mastery of successive new models of equipment.

All this indicates that under current conditions the need has matured

for extensive introduction of *the principle of "polytechnization of instruction."*

The requirements of this principle are, first, that the process of technical instruction be founded on the study not only of specific models of equipment, but also of generalized diagrams of the latest technical achievements. Second, this process should orient the students more toward the development of technical thinking, independent study of technology, and more efficient mastery of prospective models.

The current scientific-technical revolution has greatly heightened the collective character of the maintenance and combat application of equipment and weapons, and this has immeasurably increased the responsibility of each soldier and his role in the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the entire subunit. For instance, in order to destroy a modern aircraft with missile fire, skillful and coordinated actions are needed on the part of radar operators, control specialists, fire teams, and so on. The imprecise actions of any one of these may reduce to naught the work of the entire subunit.

" . . . The role of technical competence of each soldier, detachment, team, and crew," says Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, "has risen immeasurably. Given the colossal power of many modern types of weapons they will participate directly, in contrast to the past, in the fulfillment of operational and strategic missions. Therefore, the impeccable training of all soldiers without exception, training which ensures precision, quickness, accuracy, and smoothness of their actions within their subunits, is required. Even one poorly trained person, by committing a mistake in the handling of complicated units, assemblies, or systems of combat equipment, may hold up or cause the failure of a crucial combat mission."² Therefore, it has become necessary to develop in soldiers the skills of collective actions in crews, teams, and other operational groups in addition to individual skills.

The special planning, organization, and conduct of *the collective training of soldiers* in the course of their daily combat and political training, in their combat alert duty, and at exercises and maneuvers are the foundation for the development of collectivism and the improvement of the skills of joint action in the maintenance and combat application of equipment. Here an important role is played by the analysis and evaluation of the collective activity of servicemen, their familiarization with the principles of interaction in combat, the study of related specialties, the observation of the activities of crews and teams, the exchange of experience, and the organization of socialist competition.

The supervision of collective educational work requires that commanders have knowledge of the psychology of a military collective, the

ability to take into consideration common and individual opinion, feelings, and requirements, and the ability to vitalize the general cognitive and practical activities of trainees. Among the means and systematized methods that may be utilized to this end, an important position is occupied by the posing of collective training missions, the discussion and selection of the best decisions, conclusions, and proposals, comradely criticism and self-criticism, discussions on the most important problems, the organization of collective observation of the actions of experienced crews and teams, and by service on teams and crews with which the servicemen will have to interact during the maintenance and control of combat equipment and weapons.

By consolidating the collective, relying on it during training, and taking into account the individual features of each subordinate, commanders and political workers thus help the soldiers determine the shortest path to the mastery of the combat and political training program and develop in them the technical, tactical thought and other attributes necessary for the successful fulfillment of their military duty. Here a large role is also played by work aimed at instilling in personnel love of, and faith in, the reliability of equipment and weapons and belief in its superiority over enemy combat equipment.

The complexity of new equipment and the rapid and collective character of the specialists who operate it acutely raise now as never before the problem of psychological compatibility among the members of crews, teams, and small subunits. By psychological compatibility is meant the correspondence of a person's mental traits to the level of those requirements which are necessary for normal operation of the system.

Lack of correspondence or excessive divergence or deviation with respect to one of the main components in a person's mental makeup (incompatible character, temperament, deviations in the sphere of emotions and will, non-correspondence of the level of mental education, and so on) may be responsible for psychological incompatibility among several specialists in the control of combat equipment.

The following are necessary conditions for the establishment of positive relations in a military collective and for preventing psychological incompatibility in micro-collectives: clear understanding by each member of the collective of the tasks which the crew, team, or subunit must carry out; creation of a spirit of confidence and mutual comradely respect and regard among the soldiers; maintenance and development of positive traditions in the collective; well-conceived planning of measures and training tasks for developing and improving the skills of complex joint actions; and the rational selection of interacting specialists with consideration for their combat efficiency, morale and psychological attributes.

The expanding revolution in military affairs, more powerful weapons,

and complicated equipment have had a great influence on the change in the methods of armed combat.

The fierce, dynamic character of modern war, which involves the use of missile-borne nuclear weapons and various types of combat complexes, places the individual in extremely complicated conditions and will have strong moral, psychological, and physical effects on soldiers. All this necessitates the formation in them of high political, moral-combat, and psychological traits. Hence derives *the increased role of moral-political and psychological training* of personnel to conduct combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare. Moral-political and psychological training is a unified, continual process in which the moral-political tempering of soldiers is the definitive and main factor.

Moral-political training calls for the purposeful inculcation in army and navy personnel of a Marxist-Leninist outlook, communist ideals, convictions, and moral principles of behavior, and a thorough understanding of Party and governmental policy, the country's state interests, and the character and goals of a war to defend the socialist Homeland.

Psychological preparation, which is closely connected with the entire process of training and indoctrination, is called on to ensure the formation of psychological stability in soldiers—that is, the formation of mental traits which increase their ability to perform combat missions and to act in the strained and dangerous situations of a modern war in full accordance with communist convictions and moral principles of behavior. The most important of these traits are bravery, valor, internal willingness to make self-sacrifices, and the ability to endure the most severe trials of war, to manifest self-control and staunchness at trying and critical moments, and to act selflessly, resolutely, and firmly in battle."

Finally, in connection with the rise in technical equipment, power-worker ratio, and combat capabilities of troops, and with the complication of the methods of combat operations, the specific features of combat, special, and technical training of personnel in all branches and services of the Armed Forces have begun to stand out more.

Under current conditions these specifics are so significant that they require the drafting of special programs and the training of leading specialists among the troops. Integrated means, methods, and forms of instruction are used in the activities based on these programs. The need to conduct measures for the purpose of developing in soldiers moral-combat and psychological traits with consideration for the specifics of their duties in a given service of the Armed Forces has also appeared in educational work. For instance, the training of missilemen in the Strategic Missile Forces, of flight personnel in the Air Force, and of various specialists for service on submarines and surface vessels in the

Navy, the parachute training of personnel of the airborne forces, and the training of many specialists in the Ground Forces are now conducted according to special programs which differ fundamentally both in content and in methods of study. The process of improving and developing particular methods is so intensive that the question of singling them out as independent branches of military pedagogy is already being raised.

These specifics naturally cannot help being taken into account in the activities of subunit political workers in each service of the Armed Forces. Above all they affect the selection of the main directions and tasks in work involving personnel. For instance, the main orientations of the activities of subunit political workers in the Strategic Missile Forces and National Air Defense Forces are: motivating personnel to maintain missile sites and launchers in full repair and constant combat readiness, in-depth study of missile weapons and special equipment, and impeccable service while on combat alert duty. The political worker of the company level in the Ground Forces focuses his attention mainly on raising the level of field skills and carrying out the tasks of fire and tactical training of subunit personnel. Utilizing all means of Party political work, personal influence, and influence on the military collective and active Party and Komsomol members of the subunit, he works to increase the effectiveness of each exercise in the field or the classroom. Relying on the Party and Komsomol organization, he motivates personnel to excellently fulfill the tasks of exercises, marches, combat firings, and so on.

Improving the combat skills of personnel, maintaining aviation equipment in constant readiness, and ensuring flights without in-flight accidents, or the factors that cause them, are the main and decisive link in the activities of the deputy commander of an air squadron in the Air Force and National Air Defense Forces.

Similar basic trends in the activities of subunit political workers can also be singled out in the other branches and services of the Armed Forces.

Such are the most general characteristic features of the military pedagogic process which are due to the achievements of scientific-technical progress in military affairs. In-depth knowledge of and consideration for them in the combat and political training of troops help commanders and political workers to determine and utilize more effectively the diverse methods and forms of pedagogic influence, and purposefully to bring about an increase in the effectiveness of all educational work involving personnel of subunits and units.

3. Main Factors in Assuring Effectiveness of the Military Pedagogic Process

The effectiveness of the military pedagogic process depends above all on *the level of general and professional training and on the pedagogic*

skills of commanders and political workers—the immediate directors and organizers of the process.

In recent years the ideological and political level, general competence, and professional skills of officers have risen greatly. The number of officers having higher military and special education has doubled in the last 5 years, and engineers and technicians now hold as many as 45 percent of the officer positions in the army and navy.

"Officers," states Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, "possess the ability to train and educate personnel on a scientific basis and to run subunits, units, and ships, and are masters of all methods and forms of conducting modern warfare."⁴

At the present time constant concern is being manifested in the Armed Forces for raising the ideological and theoretical level, improving the professional military training of the officer corps, and increasing their methodological skills. An extensive network of courses for the retraining of various categories of command, political, and engineering personnel from all services of the Armed Forces has been formed on the basis of military educational institutions. Persistent work toward advancing the knowledge and skills of the officer corps is being carried out in units and on ships of the army and navy.

Increasing the effectiveness of the military pedagogic process depends largely on the efforts of young officers—the most numerous segment of the officer corps. Therefore, it is no coincidence that such a great amount of attention is paid to their development as commanders and educators. Among the young officers more than 85 percent are Communists and Komsomol members; over 50 percent have a higher education. The All-Army Conference of Young Officers held in Moscow in November 1969 is a manifestation of the attention and concern for young officers.

The effectiveness of the military pedagogic process is closely connected with *the quality of personnel drafted into the army*. The high general educational level, sociopolitical activity, and comprehensive physical development of drafted youth are the main qualitative indicators on which the effectiveness of the assimilation of knowledge and the acquisition of the skills and abilities needed for impeccable fulfillment of the duty of an armed defender of the Soviet Homeland, depend.

Whereas in 1939 about 12 percent of army personnel had higher and secondary education, 27.5 percent had incomplete secondary education, and 60.5 percent had elementary education, the number of soldiers with higher and secondary education is now over 47 percent, with incomplete secondary education about 53 percent, and with elementary education less than 1 percent.

Here it would be appropriate to make a figurative comparison of

current draftees with the draftees who entered the Army in the first decade of Soviet rule. Here is how *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* described the draftees of the 1920's. There were "many taciturn fat-cheeked peasant lads who were frightened by the contact of a cold weapon against their temples. These lads were sullen, closed, like iron-bound trunks. . . . The lads were near-literate or illiterate. The lads wore cloth foot wrappings of birchen whiteness. There was much sweat and many firings and political hours which were as difficult as first birth." We would add to this description the fact that in 1922, 8 percent of the men in the Red Army were totally illiterate and a majority of the rest were scarcely able to read and write.

Here is testimony from the present-day: "Before the draft commission is a strong, bold youth with an intelligent, strong-willed face. One senses that his physical perfection is combined with a strong intellect. This is Komsomol member Yuriy Chagayev, a shock worker of communist labor. He won first place in the recent regional competitions for milling-machine operators. While training for military service, Yuriy mastered the specialty of radar operator. . . . Here is a youth from the village—tractor driver Yuriy Nikiporchuk. He has a secondary education. This lad has thoroughly mastered the specialties of electrician, driver, and fitter. He has ratings in auto sports and light athletics." Such cases are now encountered all the time. The number of youth who have sports ratings and the number of youth who have received training in DOSAAF organizations in various military specialties grows each year among draftees.

All this creates the prerequisites for sharp improvement of the quality of the combat and political training of Soviet soldiers, accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of training time. But at the same time the improved general and special education of the contingent entering the army and the initial military training which they have received in schools and through DOSAAF organizations requires further improvement of the methods of military training. By this we mean that a high degree of activeness should be manifested in all exercises by soldiers, and their cognitive capabilities should be utilized and expanded.

Thus, youth drafted into the army are capable, with respect to their qualitative indicators, of mastering knowledge in a short period of time and of acquiring the practical skills and abilities of operating and maintaining modern combat equipment.

The introduction of new means, forms, and methods into military training is an important factor for increasing the effectiveness of the military pedagogic process. As the results of research conducted in various military districts show, the quality of specialist training in subunits

is greatly improved when the men are instructed according to individual plans rather than according to group methods of training.

Training according to individual plans represents the aggregate of organizational measures which ensure the construction of the educational process with consideration for the individual features and capabilities of each soldier. Underlying training based on individual plans is the independent work of soldiers on training material under the guidance of officers who provide regular supervision of their subordinates. Cross-training is becoming widespread in studies on the basis of mutual assistance. It opens up a great deal of room for the manifestation of personal initiative of soldiers and provides the possibility of organizing skilled mutual aid among personnel.

An important element in training according to individual plans is individual assignments, which are set for the soldiers depending on their level of training and degree of mastery of a given topic of the training plan.

Training according to individual plans presupposes the presence of a permanent contingent of instructors to help the leaders of exercises, who are trained from among senior soldiers who are standouts in their studies and from among class specialists.

Programmed instruction is one of the new trends which makes it possible to increase productivity of the educational process. It arose as a natural result of the development of the theory and practice of training on the basis of a combination of the achievements of pedagogy and psychology on the one hand, and of cybernetics on the other. Programmed instruction represents a qualitatively new system of pedagogic measures, means, and methods which encompass the content, planning, organization, and methods of implementation of the educational process.

Technical training facilities such as radio, movies, television, film strips, sound recordings, and others have a positive influence on increasing the productivity of the educational process. Technical facilities make training material more accessible, graphic, and more easily assimilable. They increase the soldiers' interest in studies, place the studies in a favorable psychological atmosphere, and reduce the fatigue factor on the men.

An important means of enhancing the effectiveness of instruction is the increasingly great dissemination of such a progressive form of training as *controlled instruction*—that is, the introduction of modern training equipment and the use of the recommendations of military engineering psychology to select and train people in the most complicated technical specialties.

The application of scientifically substantiated *combat training standards* (standards for the conduct of appropriate operations in equipment

maintenance, the execution of specific actions, and others) in the educational process has fully proven itself in practice. Combat training standards increase the soldiers' sense of responsibility for fulfilling their military duty and develop a spirit of creativity, competition, and collectivism. The men graphically see the results of their labor and accept the evaluation of this labor more objectively.

Of great significance in increasing productivity of the educational process are the *improvement of the structure of studies and efficient use of training time*.

As research shows, in field activities over 24 percent of the training time is expended unproductively. In effect this means that 24 minutes of each 2-hour activity are lost. More efficient utilization of training time presupposes:

- a) Refusal to make a special time allotment to repeat previously covered material during an exercise; repetition of old material is combined with presentation of new (in this case the time allowed for presenting new material and for exercises is increased by approximately 12-13 percent);
- b) testing of the readiness of the materiel and graphic aids should not be carried out at the expense of training time, but on the eve of training activities (this provides the possibility of reducing nonproductive outputs by 7 percent);
- c) eliminating from the structure of the exercises elements which are not directly connected with the process of instruction, allowing a 3 percent increase in the productivity of training time;
- d) reducing to a minimum, unplanned movements during exercises in special and technical training.

Such changes in the composition of activities are equivalent to adding at least 20 training days to the training year.

The efficient use of various forms of extracurricular work aimed at increasing the technical knowledge and combat skills of soldiers contributes to the increased effectiveness of the military pedagogic process.

Technical discussion groups, contests, competitions for the best specialist, technical "battles," and other measures which help soldiers to master more thoroughly the theoretical principles of their specialties and to improve their skills and abilities, which develop in them an interest in more complete study of combat equipment and weapons and the desire to expand their general technical outlook, play a large role in improving the combat skills of personnel. The efficacy of these measures depends largely on the methods used to implement them.

For instance, high effectiveness is achieved in activities in technical discussion groups when they are conducted by means of discussing the reports of individual soldiers on their experience in the operation and maintenance of combat equipment. Analysis of specific cases in practice and the ascertainment of the causes of mistakes and failures helps soldiers to master more quickly the "secrets" of technical expertise. In technical discussion groups there is the possibility of making extensive use of lectures, seminars, and laboratory projects.

The competitive forms (technical contests, "battles," KVN) enjoy great popularity among personnel. They are distinguished by a high degree of interest and have a clearly expressed emotional coloration.

A distinctive feature of these forms is that outwardly they bear the appearance of leisure and diversion to some extent. Here the studied material is offered and accepted without constraint, which generates considerable interest in the soldiers and contributes to better memorization.

In recent years schools of advanced know-how have become increasingly widespread among the troops. They are generally organized on the unit level, and sometimes branches are set up in subunits. Such schools are supervised by councils comprised of the best trained specialists, experienced methodologists, commanders, political workers, staff officers, engineers, technicians, and directors of services. The council determines the subject matter of the exercises and the methods used to conduct them, and carries out work toward summarizing and disseminating advanced experience in combat and political training. There may be several sections in the council, for instance a general military section, a technical military section, and a section for military psychology and pedagogy.

Increasing the effectiveness of the military pedagogic process would be inconceivable without *sound planning and accounting*. Planning and accounting are essentially the starting point of any activity, especially any educational activity. They ensure the efficient use of time, correct assignment of efforts and facilities, the smooth work of all personnel, and goal-directed activity of all categories of military pedagogues.

Intelligent planning makes it possible to predict the course of the military pedagogic process and to know precisely what should be done today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and where and how to direct efforts in such a way as to achieve the best results. The network planning method is becoming increasingly widely used in units and military educational institutions to improve planning. This method makes it possible graphically to see the entire educational process in perspective, the order in which disciplines are studied, and their interdependence,

and to react on an operational basis to happenstances, finding an optimal solution in the process.

The extent of the influence of all the factors considered above on the effectiveness of the military pedagogic process depends largely on the ability of our military personnel to take a scientific approach to personnel instruction and education, to display intelligent initiative and creativity, not to be satisfied with what they have accomplished, and to look ahead more boldly, discarding all that is outmoded and obsolete. The constant improvement of pedagogic skills and of the means, methods, and forms of education and instruction would be inconceivable without the purposeful self-training and self-education of commanders and political workers. Also necessary are critical assessments of one's own results and the ability to eliminate shortcomings and boldly to introduce the new and the advanced into educational work.

Footnotes

1. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 135.
2. A. A. Grechko, *Na strazhe mira i stroitel'stva kommunizma* (On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, p. 72.
3. The problems of psychological training are examined in greater detail in the military psychology course.
4. A. A. Grechko, *Na strazhe mira i stroitel'stva kommunizma*, p 49.

Chapter 5. The Moral and Psychological Characteristics of Servicemen and How to Take Them into Account in The Educational Process

V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that in educational work with people it is necessary to take into account their age, vocation, and status in society. He demanded that particular attention be paid to youth, since there are many specific features to their spiritual composition and psychology. "It is often the case," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "that representatives of the middle-age and elderly generations *do not know how properly* to approach youth, who of necessity must converge on socialism *differently, not in the same way, not in the same form, not in the same circumstances* as their fathers."¹

Vladimir Il'ich called youth the combat reserve of the Party. "We are the party of the future, and the future belongs to youth," he wrote. "We are a party of innovators, and youth always follow innovators more willingly."² He considered the most important task of the Party to be the communist education of youth and the comprehensive training of youth as builders of communism.

Lenin's ideas on the role of youth in the building of a new society and on the specifics of work involving youth were further developed in the decisions of the CPSU. The following is stated in the theses of the CPSU CC titled "On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin": "The Party ascribes great significance to the conscious participation of youth in socio-political affairs and believes in their strength and capabilities. It believes the task set by Lenin for the communist education of youth, for the 'education of a generation capable of conclusively implementing communism,' to be the most important general Party and nationwide undertaking.

"Diligence, a thirst for knowledge, ideological conviction, patriotic selflessness, and internationalism—all traits of Soviet youth—are remarkable evidence that Soviet youth are sacredly fulfilling Lenin's behests and striving to work and live as the great Lenin taught."³

The 24th CPSU Congress highly esteemed the role of Soviet youth and its advance guard—the Leninist Komsomol—in the building of communism. “It would be difficult even to imagine a sector of economic and cultural construction where the energy, creativity, and daring of Komsomol members could not find application,” as was noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party Congress. “Shock Komsomol construction projects, group competitions in skill among young workers, student construction teams, youth production brigades, and summer labor and leisure camps are all concrete and very necessary undertakings of the Komsomol, the leader of Soviet youth.”⁴

While defining the tasks for the Leninist Komsomol under current conditions, at the same time the Congress pointed out the need for a creative approach to the fulfillment of these tasks and the education of youth, and in particular pointed out the importance of the ability of the Komsomol to work with various groups of Soviet youth and to take into account the specific features of each.

The requirements of V. I. Lenin and the Party for the communist upbringing of Soviet youth are the ideological and methodological foundation for the training and indoctrination of young soldiers and development of the qualities and skills which an armed defender of the Homeland needs.

As a result of the progress of socialist construction in our country and in the educational work of the Party, qualitative changes have taken place in the youth drafted by the Armed Forces. The general educational and cultural level and the social activity of youth have risen greatly, and their political perspective has been broadened. Such a cross-section of youth creates good prerequisites for fruitful educational work in the army and navy.

In solving problems of the indoctrination and training of soldiers Soviet military pedagogy works on the assumption that inherent in each period of life and each age are specific features of spiritual and physical development and of mental outlook.

To know a person's mental outlook means to ascertain the typical, common features which are a reflection of the psychology of his class and society as a whole, and also to determine his individual features.

In work involving soldiers one cannot count on success without knowing the interests and goals that army youth set for themselves, without knowing their aspirations and hopes, without knowing what they seek in life, of what they are confident and what they doubt. In other words, success in the training and indoctrination of soldiers is possible only if commanders and political workers comprehensively know and take into consideration the specific features of spiritual and physical development and mental outlook inherent in young people.

1. Typical Features of the Mental Outlook of Soldiers (Sailors) and Sergeants (Senior NCO's), and How To Take Them into Consideration

First-term servicemen are young people in the age group 18 to 20-21. This age occupies a special place in human life. The body of the young person is considered physically mature, and the structural formation of the entire nervous system and sense organs is complete. A surfeit of energy is characteristic of a young person.

At this age the functional physiological processes in the cerebral cortex are very intensive and the interaction of the processes of stimulation and inhibition is shaped into a definite individual system. All this accounts for the complex mental structure of a young individual, and especially for his active cognitive, emotional, and volitional activity.

At the same time, because of the intensity of the biochemical and physiological processes in the body and the insufficiency of life experience, the processes of stimulation still predominate over the processes of inhibition. I. P. Pavlov emphasized this aspect of the young psyche, stating that the upbringing of a person is above all the development in him of the process of inhibition and the inculcation of life inhibitors.

Moreover, the age 18 to 20-21 is characterized by the person's transition from youth to adulthood, to maturity, when traits of youth and traits of maturity are uniquely combined in the spiritual composition of the young person. Therefore, the mental outlook of people of this age is not only complex, but at times contradictory. This is manifested in the behavior of the young, who are not always consistent. Under some conditions a young person may display high political maturity and a model of restraint and discipline and accomplish some feat, but under other conditions he may act like a child and break elementary standards of behavior.

K. D. Ushinskiy said that this period of life is of decisive significance to the upbringing of the individual, to the development of positive traits, and to the elimination of all that is negative.

M. I. Kalinin, commenting on the specific features of youth, advised officers "to catch and utilize all these specifics, both physical and psychological."⁵

What are the typical features of the mental outlook of first-term soldiers?

Active anticipation of the future and the desire to be in the front ranks of the builders of a communist society and honestly to fulfill their duty to the Homeland are inherent in young people drafted into the Armed Forces. Belief in the future is clearly expressed in their outlook. This is indicated by the data of sociological research on the life plans of students graduating from secondary school. Of the 10,000 surveyed, only 0.9

percent were having difficulty in formulating their plan for the future. Here it was characteristic that the question of how to make service to the Homeland the main undertaking in life, of how to incorporate the ideals set by society in their personal life plans came to the fore.

The attitude of draft-age youth is mainly optimistic, and vacillations and confusion are alien to them. Confidence in the realization of their life plans is confirmed by data obtained in the process of a multiyear study of the problem of the life orientation of youth. For instance, only 9.2 percent of the young people up to 19 years old answered negatively the question "Are you confident of fulfilling your life plans?" To the question "What reinforces your confidence in the realization of life plans?" the answers were distributed in the following manner: confidence in their own abilities—88 percent; the opportunities which our society accords—73.7 percent; support of friends—44 percent; and support of relatives—42 percent.⁶

Thus, confidence in their own abilities and in the opportunities accorded by our society to each member of society is the basis for the optimism of our youth.

A sociological investigation conducted in a number of units of the Leningrad Military District on the question "What goal do you set for your period of service?" showed that over 95 percent of all soldiers set the goal of conscientiously fulfilling their military duty. Some soldiers (about 4 percent) also listed such personal goals as obtaining a driver's license, improving their education, and growing physically stronger. But even these goals may be considered as being not contradictory to the interests of the service, but as accompanying the fulfillment of the main task—carrying out their military duty.⁷

High social activeness is one of the typical features characterizing the spiritual world of army and navy youth. This feature has always distinguished youth, but it was only under the conditions of a socialist society that it became a personality trait.

In capitalist society the social activeness of youth is suppressed in every way possible. The very character of social relations and the entire way of life of the bourgeois order forms individualism and suppresses the desire to be necessary to other people.

The social activeness inherent in youth receives full manifestation only in socialist society, where life itself gives rise to the conscious desire to be necessary to people, forming in youth such traits as civil activeness ("everything is our concern") and civil responsibility ("we are responsible for everything").

The social activeness of Soviet youth is manifested above all in social

work, in which an overwhelming majority of youth take part out of the desire to help others.

The social activeness of our youth is expressed in the manifestation of interest in the problems of political affairs and in events within the country and abroad.

All this requires that commanders and political workers pay more attention to the development in youth of social activeness and interest in political affairs, and that they actively form communist conviction in soldiers on this basis.

Our Soviet youth are distinguished by *high moral traits*. Draft-age youth not only correctly recognize the requirements of communist morality, but also strive to affirm the standards of socialist intercourse in their practical deeds. Mass surveys conducted in recent years by Soviet sociologists demonstrate that youth esteem most of all such moral personality traits as dedication to the ideas of communism, love of the socialist Homeland, spiritual sensitivity and kindness, and diligence.

The high value orientations and moral purity of Soviet youth generate in them legitimate revulsion and contempt for such horrid phenomena as the lack of one's own convictions, servility, time-serving, and cowardice.

Unfortunately, however, individuals insufficiently educated in a moral regard are to be found among the draftees in the Armed Forces. A lack of discipline, contempt of work, a disrespectful attitude toward their comrades, and the use of alcoholic beverages are manifested in their behavior. These servicemen exert negative influence on other soldiers and require additional efforts on the part of commanders and political workers to reeducate them in the spirit of communist morality.

A sense of the new is a characteristic feature of Soviet youth. Young people are especially quick to perceive all that is bright, extraordinary, and new. A feel for the new stimulates youth to active work, to knowledge, and to self-improvement.

V. I. Lenin observed that youth "study most sincerely, fervently, and selflessly, rehash new impressions . . . , cast aside the shell of old . . . prejudices, and forge of themselves even firmer communists than the older generation."⁸

This feature of youth should be taken into account in the organization of activities in combat and political training and leisure time, in order constantly to enrich soldiers with new knowledge.

A sense of the new generates great curiosity and a broad range of interests in young people. Diverse interests are manifested in the desire of soldiers to master new combat equipment, to participate actively in mass

cultural and sports work, in the individual subscription to periodicals by soldiers and sergeants, in checking out literature to read, and so on.

In order to educate soldiers successfully, one must not only know their interests, but direct the development of their interests. Here it is important to take into account the fact that the ideologists of imperialism strive to disseminate among Soviet youth not only their own ideas, but also their own "ultramodern" standards of behavior, mores, clothing fads, and so on. Therefore, the desire of some young people to imitate such phenomena must be noticed and shattered in good time, and a campaign should be waged not only against inimical ideology, but also against mores and standards of behavior which are alien to us.

For instance, imperialist propaganda tries to utilize jazz music to its own ends, a music which a large number of young people enjoy. So-called Americanized or avant-garde jazz, with its sharp rhythms, catchy and effective instrumentation, and hypnotic repetition of the same melodic subjects, has been converted into a sort of aesthetic narcotic which has the function of diverting the masses from the pressing problems of life and destroying faith in noble ideals. This jazz not only blunts, but also injects the bacilli of disorderly conduct and individualistic, vulgar brutality. Such music, which lacks positive ideals, bears the mood of indifference to politics, anarchistic violence, and a nihilistic attitude toward the progressive art of socialist realism.

The feel for the new is inseparably connected with *romantic aspirations* in the dreams and deeds of young people.

Young people are full of valor and boldness, of the desire to achieve and make self-sacrifices. Difficulties and dangers attract rather than frighten youth, and summon them to heroic deeds.

Romantic aspirations and the related dreams of Soviet soldiers are extremely variegated. In educational work with servicemen one should combine their dreams with our Soviet reality, with the fulfillment of the tasks of increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, reveal the ideological foundations of heroism, valor, and bravery, and direct the burning energy and romanticism of personnel toward the achievement of progress in combat and political training.

The inclination toward friendship and camaraderie are one of the characteristic features of our youth. The growing significance of friendship is explained in large measure by the fact that youth are beginning to acquire some independence in life and manifest some autonomy with respect to their parents and seniors. Drafting represents the entry of a young person onto an independent life path. It should be taken into account, however, that he is still not confident of himself and only in a society of his peers does he feel his freedom and independence, for this

is a society of equals. Therefore, the knots of friendship are very quickly established among youth, they usually have no secrets among each other, and are bound not only by mutual understanding, but also by common emotional experiences. Youth always pay more attention to the opinion of comrades than to the opinion of educators and even of parents.

In army collectives the most favorable conditions for the establishment of friendly and comradely relations among soldiers are created on the basis of the joint fulfillment of assigned missions.

Commenting on the desire for friendship and camaraderie as a characteristic trait of youth, M. I. Kalinin said: "In his younger years a person is more disposed to friendship and the collective support of comrades. In a difficult situation a young person will seldom abandon a comrade. . . . These feelings are of exceptional importance in a combat situation. . . . These feelings unite and discipline soldiers." ⁹

The inclination of youth toward friendship and the desire to become one with a collective of comrades represents the favorable psychological base for instilling in soldiers the spirit of collectivism and comradely mutual aid and for forming united military collectives. Therefore, commanders and political workers should instill in their men a sense of collectivism and true camaraderie and work against mutual bootlicking and manifestations of individualism and egoism.

In working with soldiers and sergeants one should also take into account the fact that many of them have girl friends whom they knew before being drafted, some have fiancées, and others have wives. Some soldiers fraternize with women during their service.

As a rule soldiers experience the feeling of friendship and love very profoundly and acutely, and therefore, the most insignificant confusion in relations with a young woman may have a substantial influence on a soldier's behavior and attitude toward service.

When conflicts arise with any young woman, soldiers often turn to their commanders and political workers for advice. In this case spiritual sensitivity, tact, and attentiveness should be displayed, an attempt should be made to understand the cause of the conflict, and the advisor should take part in normalizing relations. Failure to pay attention to these problems, formalism, and spiritual callousness may lead to extremely undesirable consequences.

A majority of soldiers and sergeants consider love to be a great and lofty feeling which helps them to fulfill their military duty better and to endure the trials of service more successfully. Some youth, however, are insufficiently thoughtful and occasionally are frivolous with respect to the problems of love, marriage, and family life. Some behave toward a

woman in a unworthy manner, and are inconsistent and thoughtless in their relationships.

Therefore, commanders and political workers should correctly conduct the sex education of soldiers, thoroughly explain the moral and social aspect of love as a tremendous, bright, and joyous feeling which ennoble a man and reflects his true character, and should develop in their servicemen a serious regard of women and family life.

Clearly expressed directness in judgments is one of the specific features of the psychology of young people. Their statements are generally categorical, their opinions beyond appeal. They always express their ideas frankly. This trait in the young should be correctly evaluated, especially when dealing with erroneous views. Through specific cases drawn from life, one should calmly demonstrate delusions and refute incorrect judgments. In no circumstance should crude coercion or the pressure of authority be exercised. Youth require proof, not declamations, and above all they respect in their commander and educator knowledge and the ability to prove the truth convincingly.

In the mental makeup of a young person one can also find an inconsistency in evaluating the phenomena of reality and their own deeds. Because of the limited nature of his life experience, a young person cannot adequately recognize himself and objectively evaluate his own capabilities. It often happens that a soldier rates his personal capabilities not from the results of practical activity, but on the basis of theoretical knowledge of reality and his own capabilities. This contradiction in self-awareness is also manifested in the inconsistent evaluation of the phenomena of reality, his own deeds, and results of his work.

The desire for ideal experiences and the overestimation of his own capabilities and potential often hinder him in correctly understanding the phenomena of reality.

Upon joining the Armed Forces a young person dreams of feats and the romance of military service. But when he encounters reality, he does not immediately recognize this romance, does not see any room for the feat to which he aspired. At first service may seem boring to him, and daily duties may seem trivial and insignificant. He may experience dissatisfaction with his own position. This leads to improper understanding of the essence of his work and the significance of everyday military labor.

The conflict that arises between certain experiences of the soldier and the reality of army life, if not resolved, reduces the soldier's social activity. The main way to resolve this conflict is to explain to the soldiers the meaning of the requirements of military regulations and the social significance of so-called trifles of everyday army life. The Leninist position that true heroism is daily, intensive, everyday work in the interests of society should be driven home to every soldier.

Some of the features of physical development also have a certain influence on the mental makeup of soldiers. By the time a young person is drafted into the army, he has attained a level of physical development which makes it possible to bear comparatively large physical burdens. It should be kept in mind, however, that the physical development of young people is not yet fully complete, but continues. In 2 years of service, as indicated by the data of a survey, soldiers gain an average of 2 centimeters in height, 4 kilograms in weight, and 3 centimeters in chest girth. This should be taken into account when assigning physical tasks to soldiers, especially in the first months of their service when they are being drawn into army life.

Excessive physical overburdening may on the one hand inhibit subsequent physical development and on the other generate in a soldier's mind a doubt of his own physical capabilities and awareness of his physical limitation, which will have a negative effect on his mental state. An insufficient burden, however, harms the physical tempering of soldiers and the development of endurance, which may become a serious retardation in mastering his specialty and improving his combat skills.

Such is a general description of the typical features of the mental outlook of Soviet soldiers which are due to their age. The desire to be in the front ranks of the builders of communism and honestly to fulfill their military duty to the Homeland, high social activity, dedication to the ideas of communism, patriotism, a feel for the new, and other features of youth represent favorable preconditions for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of developing high moral combat traits in soldiers.

At the same time the age characteristics of young people complicate the educational process and require thoughtful, painstaking work on the part of the military pedagogue.

Taking into account the specifics of youth, V. I. Lenin pointed out that young people "must be helped in every way possible, and their mistakes should be treated as patiently as possible with an attempt to correct them gradually and preferably by means of *conviction*, not conflict."¹⁰ Hence, the mistakes of young people should be convincingly refuted, explained, and criticized, and they should be politically educated and develop a respect for seniors and a sense of responsibility.

In a conversation with K. Tsetkin, V. I. Lenin said: "Youth especially need a *joie de vivre*. They should have healthful sports—gymnastics, swimming, hikes, physical exercise of all sorts—a diverse set of spiritual interests, study, analysis, investigation—and when possible all of this together!"¹¹

2. Certain Distinctive Features of the Psychology of Soldiers During Various Periods of Service

The period of service in the army and navy falls into that age bracket of a young man when the intensive formation of his personality traits and especially of his character is underway.

The formation of character traits is carried out under the influence of the entire way of army life, the goal-directed educational work of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations, and by means of self-education. The conditions of army life and the process of training and indoctrination, however, do not have an identical effect on soldiers at various stages of service. Therefore, in working with personnel it is necessary to take into account specifics of the psychology of soldiers depending on the amount of time spent in military service.

From the standpoint of the influence of army service on the minds of soldiers, it may be divided into three periods (stages): the period of acclimatization to army life and mastery of a military specialty; the period of improving knowledge, abilities, and skills in their specialties and of mastering military skills; the final period of service.

The First Period (up to 6 months) is the most difficult for soldiers from a psychological standpoint. This is due to many factors. Chief among them is the abrupt change in living conditions. Whereas before a person is drafted new things have entered his life in the form of individual components which did not require abrupt re-arrangement of previously established habits, upon being drafted a young man encounters an entirely new way of life that is unfamiliar to him. The conditions of barracks life, the strictly prescribed daily routine, the unconditional nature of the fulfillment of all requirements of military regulations without exception, and the specific features of interrelations among servicemen constitute a far from complete list of the new elements which simultaneously—all at once—enter a soldier's life.

Before being drafted into military service a young man may not have fulfilled a number of requirements of a moral and ethical character which were not legally prescribed and hence not compulsory. For instance, he may have welcomed his superiors or seniors, or he may have pretended not to notice them without bearing any administrative responsibility. In the army, however, saluting commanders and seniors in rank is mandatory. Failure to fulfill this requirement entails disciplinary measures. The same can be said of many other requirements which are new or unfamiliar to the young soldier. Therefore, a certain amount of time is naturally needed to adapt to the new requirements.

The abrupt change in living conditions and the novelty of the situation require a fundamental break with previously established habits and

reorganization of the entire dynamic stereotype. But breaking the stereotype entails a tremendous expenditure of nervous energy and requires great mental strain. It often happens that a soldier tries to do the best he can, but things do not turn out right. Generally he takes failures hard. And if in this period sufficient sensitivity and concern for young soldiers are not displayed on the part of commanders and political workers, interest in military affairs begins to drop, confidence in their own capabilities is undermined, and the soldier more and more often turns to the idea: "Will I endure these hardships?"

Some commanders, especially sergeants, do not take into account the specific features of the mental states of soldiers in the early period of their army service and try, as they say, to drag them into army life. They act according to the rule: "Pound the nails harder," that means immediately place upon young soldiers the full requirements of military regulations, strictly punishing them for the slightest deviations and errors.

Such commanders replace painstaking educational work with brazen administration, and the method of conviction—with coercion. As a result of this, in the first 4-5 months of service many of their subordinates are penalized, to say nothing of the fact that this approach causes much damage to the cause of educating soldiers.

In speaking of the specific features of the psychology of soldiers in the initial period of military service, we must not fail to take into account the fact that they consider some elements of military order insignificant and therefore, are not particularly diligent in fulfilling them.

The experience of army life shows that nearly all soldiers have a positive attitude toward the requirements connected with the study, handling, and operation of combat equipment and weapons and with tactical exercises, live fire, and so on, and try to fulfill them impeccably. But such requirements as the uniform making of beds, strict observance of dress regulations, and the mandatory saluting of seniors in military rank generate in some young soldiers a negative internal attitude toward their fulfillment, and this is the main reason for violations. This is confirmed by analysis of the character of the infractions of military order and discipline by soldiers in the first months of their service. As special studies have established, in the first months of service over 60 percent of the misdeeds committed are such things as improper uniform, lateness to formation, unsatisfactory maintenance of lockers, and failure to salute.

Soldiers come to regard certain elements of military order as unimportant because they perceive these elements apart from the ultimate goal of the training of a soldier as a specialist in military affairs, as an armed defender of the Homeland. Some soldiers believe that making beds uniformly has no bearing whatever to the mastery of military skills,

and therefore, they construe this requirement as a caprice on the part of sergeants and the company first sergeant. But when the fact is explained to young soldiers that precise observation of army regulations, including the making of beds after the established model, develops exactness, that is, the quality so extremely necessary to soldiers for mastering modern equipment and acquiring combat skills, they begin to regard this requirement in quite a different way.

Consequently, in the early stages of service one should not only place requirements on soldiers, but explain their meaning and help young men adapt more quickly to army life and service.

Significant influence is exerted on the state of young soldiers by the fact that they are separated from their families and loved ones. A soldier has not yet had time to find new friends and his old ones are far away, therefore, at first some soldiers experience a feeling of loneliness.

This is why particular warmth, benevolence, courtesy, and sensitivity should be displayed toward soldiers during the initial period of their service in the army. The commander and political worker should remember the advice of M. V. Frunze: "A recruit who has been taken from the lathe and plow and has arrived at the barracks may become confused Restraint and a calm attitude on the part of command and political personnel are needed. Abrupt handling, unexpected penalties, and crude shouts will be incomprehensible to the young Red Army man, frighten him, and kill his interest in the military. The importance of discipline and of the barracks way of life should be explained calmly and persistently" ¹²

The Second Period (12-14 months). In the first 6-7 months of service a majority of soldiers have almost completely mastered the army conditions of life and established friendly relationships with each other. The soldiers are working on their military specialties and receive permission for independent work on equipment. An overwhelming majority are beginning to consider army service as a good school of life and recognize their own growth in technical military and political, and general cultural regards. Great confidence in their own strength and capability is appearing in their mental outlook.

By the end of the first year and at the start of the second year of service, changes take place in the soldiers' position in the subunit. Now they are no longer inexperienced soldiers, and new recruits have come to replace them. The altered situation leads to a significant reorganization of their consciousness. The soldiers begin to be aware of themselves as seniors, which greatly heightens their respect for mastering their specialties and military skills on the whole. They understand that the successful fulfillment of the complex tasks of combat and political training and of combat readiness depends largely on their persistence and efforts. Their leading role is manifested in tactical activities and exercises, live firings and missile

launches, combat alert duty, and so on. Great exactingness is applied toward them by commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations with respect to the state of affairs in the subunit.

In this period many soldiers make significant progress in their studies, become standouts and rated specialists, and are awarded emblems for military achievement. Their successes and experiences begin to be extensively disseminated within the subunit and unit.

The position of seniors elevates the role of their personal example to young soldiers in mastering a military specialty and obligates them to help those who have just joined the army. Seniors not only help young soldiers in mastering knowledge and skills, but begin to reprove them for errors in studies and service.

The reordering of the consciousness of senior soldiers is also manifested in the fact that they have an increased sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the collective, for attaining better scores in combat and political training and in strengthening military discipline. A majority of senior soldiers have a more self-critical attitude toward their actions and deeds and greatly improve their behavior and attitude toward service and the order of the day.

In this period an increase in the social activity of senior soldiers, a majority of whom take part in the activities of the Komsomol organization and in agitation, mass cultural, and sports work, is also characteristic. A large number of senior soldiers now belong to the aktiv* of the subunit and acquire skills and experience carrying out educational work as members of the Komsomol bureau, Komsomol group organizers, agitators, members of the editorial staff of the subunit wall newspaper, editors of combat pamphlets and so on. Activists develop collectivism, initiative, independence, maturity in solving complex problems, and other traits of a political battler.

Senior soldiers help the commander, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations in conducting various activities and in drawing young soldiers into social life.

In this period of service, which is the most favorable in a psychological regard, it is important for commanders and political workers to direct the increased activity of the soldiers toward further improvement of their combat skills and increased combat readiness, to give them an idea of the prospect for growth, and to develop personal interest in the affairs of the subunit on the part of each member. To this end a program for the further advancement of combat skills (the mastery of related specialties, higher rating, and so on) should be set for each soldier, senior soldiers should be more boldly drawn into participation in the discussion of the problems of improving the quality of combat and political training, the operation and handling of equipment and weapons,

*Aktiv—a group of the most active members of some organization.

and the initiation of mass sports and cultural-educational work. Maximum use should be made of their knowledge and experience to extend aid to young soldiers.

The Third Period (the last 4-6 months of service). In the final stage of army service a majority of soldiers and sergeants have generally mastered their primary and one or two related specialties. They become highly rated specialists and assume a leading position in the combat and political training of the subunit. By virtue of this, they develop the natural desire to hold a place in the collective which would correspond to their knowledge and know-how—that is, one way or another they try somehow to stand out among the rest of the personnel.

This desire should be employed to increase the responsibility of soldiers and sergeants for maintaining order and discipline in the subunit and for the state of combat readiness. Otherwise they may form a separate group and hold a privileged position with respect to the other personnel, and this would have a negative effect on interrelations between senior and young soldiers.

A high level of knowledge and practical skills gives rise in some senior soldiers to a sense of self-satisfaction and reduces their interest in activities, especially when they gain no new knowledge through them. Ultimately this may engender an indifferent attitude toward the fulfillment of official duties and lead to infractions of order and discipline. In order to avoid this commanders and political workers should think out the organization of the activities of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's at the final stage of their service in such a way that they do not lose interest in training. Some, for instance, could well be used as instructors to train young soldiers, while others could be recommended to take the examination for the ranks of sergeant, senior NCO's, or reserve officer or to continue their service as an ensign or warrant, while still others could be trained for admission to a military school, and so on. As far as the organization of daily training in the subunit is concerned, it should be done in such a way that each activity provides something new and interesting for senior soldiers.

It is useful to involve senior soldiers and sergeants in active social and mass cultural work and to place them in charge of organizing activities in technical military circles and of conducting reading conferences, reading of Lenin, question-and-answer evenings, amateur concerts, and so on.

In working with senior soldiers one should focus their maximum effort and energy in conveying their service experience and combat skills to young soldiers. The efforts of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations are directed at ensuring the exemplary behavior of senior soldiers and sergeants in training, in strengthening

order and military discipline, and at preventing cases of scornful treatment of young soldiers.

Many commanders and political workers pay much attention to systematic work with senior soldiers, directing their efforts primarily toward training reliable replacements for themselves. This provides the possibility of successfully solving the problems not only of combat training, but also of the establishment of proper interrelations between senior and young soldiers.

Any attempts on the part of senior soldiers to form a special group which holds a dominant role with respect to young soldiers, emphasis of their own superiority, and other phenomena which damage interrelations between young soldiers and senior soldiers should be immediately cut off by the commander, political worker, or Party or Komsomol organization of the subunit.

Sharing his experience in working with senior soldiers, Col N. Konochkin, a delegate to the 24th CPSU Congress, wrote: ". . . Under no circumstances should the unfavorable development of interrelations between young soldiers and senior soldiers be allowed. If one constantly works with experienced soldiers and gives them interesting assignments, no problem will arise. In particular, we have established a good tradition: every senior soldier should leave a good memory of himself, especially by training a reliable replacement for himself. And senior soldiers work hard, and because they are busy they have no time to stress their superiority over the newcomers and to boast of all sorts of accomplishments. That, of course, is not allowed: the Komsomol organization will immediately have something to say."¹³

Finally, in the last months of the service of soldiers and sergeants one should take into account the fact that they are beginning to think of their future life after being discharged into the reserve. Some think of selecting an occupation, others of a place to live, and others dream of entering higher educational institutions. Each of them needs advice and assistance from commanders and political workers. Concern for the future of soldiers will contribute to increasing their activeness and to the manifestation of greater conscientiousness in the execution of official duties.

In addition to the distinctive features due to age and the specifics of military service, the national, occupational, and other attributes of soldiers should also be taken into account in the practice of training and indoctrination.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 30, p 226.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol 14, p 163.

3. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (On the 100th Anniversary of V. I. Lenin's Birth. A Collection of Documents and Materials), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 85-86.
4. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 79.
5. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, p 36.
6. See V. Lisovskiy, *Eskiz k portretu* (Draft Portrait), Moscow, Izd-vo Molodaya gvardiya, 1969.
7. See V. V. Strezhnev, *S uchetom psikhologii kazhdogo* (With Consideration for the Psychology of the Individual), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1969, pp 13-14.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 39, p 51.
9. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, p 295.
10. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 30, p 226.
11. *Vospominaniya o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine* (Remembrances of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin), Part 2, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p 484.
12. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 19 April 1924.
13. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1971.

SECTION II. MILITARY DIDACTICS (THE TRAINING OF SERVICEMEN AND MILITARY COLLECTIVES)

Chapter 6. The Essence, Contents, and Specifics of the Process of Training Soviet Soldiers

1. General Description of the Training Process

Training is essentially a social process. Its development and improvement are carried out "in accordance with the requirements of economic, scientific, and cultural development and the scientific-technical revolution."¹ The training of Soviet soldiers as a social process is brought about, moreover, by the requirements of the state for military defense against encroachments by imperialist aggressors.

The contents, goals, and character of the training process in the army and navy are determined mainly by socioeconomic and technical military factors. Here the social origin holds the leading position. All changes which transpire under the influence of the technical military factor are transformed by socioeconomic conditions.

Training has always had and still has a class character. Soviet soldiers and the servicemen of the armies of imperialist states are trained to fulfill similar operations and actions involving combat equipment and weapons, but the methodological foundation, goals, and character of training cannot be identical in content. In social significance, orientation, and motivation, the labor of a civilian soldier, of a conscientious defender of the socialist Homeland, and the service of a soldier in an imperialist army, an executor of the will of aggressive forces, are basically different. This ultimately defines the fundamental difference between training in the Soviet Armed Forces and training in imperialist armies and leaves an impression on interrelations between the trainee and the trainer. These factors also necessitate continual active Party political work during the training of Soviet soldiers.

The training of Soviet soldiers is organized and carried out on the basis of established classic Marxist-Leninist writings and the Communist Party tenets on defense of the socialist Homeland. "The best army, the people most dedicated to the cause of the revolution will be immediately exterminated by the enemy," wrote V. I. Lenin, "if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food, and trained."² Following the behest of V. I.

Lenin, the Communist Party pays constant attention to increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, outfitting the army and navy with the latest type of combat equipment and weapons, and improving the combat skills of personnel.

The requirements of the Party and government which are placed on the training of Soviet soldiers are specifically set forth in the USSR Compulsory Military Service Law, the military oath, regulations, orders, and directives of the Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and in combat and political training programs.

The branch of military pedagogy known as didactics deals directly with the pedagogic problems of organizing and increasing the effectiveness of the training process in the Armed Forces.

Military didactics is a branch of military pedagogy which develops the theory of the training of servicemen and military collectives. It studies the regularities and principles of training, investigates the most effective methods and organizational forms for the combat and political training of soldiers and subunits, and demonstrates how the tasks of instilling and developing high political and moral combat traits in personnel are fulfilled in the course of training.

Each subject and each type of personnel training has its own characteristic features and requires special methods and organizational forms of training. *Particular methods* deal with these specific problems: the methods of conducting political activities, tactical, fire, physical, and special training, and so on. Military didactics considers training a type of pedagogic activity on the whole and ensures a unified approach to instruction in all subjects. In the process it employs the data of particular methods and is enriched by them.

The training of soldiers is the organized and goal-directed process of cognitive and official combat endeavor which encompasses the joint work of the trainers (commanders, political workers, instructors, and other officials) and the trainees (individual soldiers and military collectives) toward mastering the system of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and forming the moral combat traits necessary for the successful military defense of the interests of the socialist Homeland.

It is common practice to call the activities of the trainers in this process *instruction*, and the activities of the trainees *study*. Instruction and study are inseparably interconnected. Only through the joint conscious, creative, and active efforts of the trainers and the trainees can the tasks of combat and political training be successfully fulfilled. In any case, however, the leading role remains with the trainer.

Knowledge is the leading element in the content of the training process. Classified as knowledge are specific interconnected facts, systems of concepts and rules, theoretical generalizations, formulas, laws, scientific theories, and related terminology. The summarized experience of people, reflecting the objective world, is expressed in knowledge. The summarized historical experience of combat activities in the army and navy is summarized in technical military knowledge. On the basis of the study of historical experience and analysis of the fundamental changes which have transpired in military affairs under the influence of the scientific-technical revolution, it can be foreseen what knowledge personnel will require in modern war.

Soviet soldiers are armed primarily with political and technical military knowledge whose character and orientation are determined by the nature and tasks of the army and navy and by the requirements of modern combat.

The socioeconomic changes which are taking place in the world, the expansion of the range of tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the aggravation of the ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism have required on the part of every soldier in-depth understanding of the historic tasks of the Soviet Army and Navy and of the armies of the countries of the socialist community. As never before, the problem of mastering political knowledge and knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and of developing communist conviction has become quite acute. It is one of the main tasks of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations to make every soldier an ideologically tempered, conscious warrior by the process of instruction.

The change in the methods of armed combat and the outfitting of the army and navy with the latest types of combat equipment and weapons have led to the fact that the activities of soldiers have become more intellectual, requiring thorough knowledge of the scientific principles of modern combat, the design and operating principles of combat equipment and weapons, and the specifics of their combat application in various situations. The share of technical military knowledge has increased sharply in personnel training.

Skills and abilities are another inseparable component of the content of the training process. They may be called knowledge in action. Military activity is distinguished by a markedly practical orientation. To master military affairs means not only to assimilate a certain volume of knowledge, but also to learn to use it in practice. In order to utilize knowledge, one must master certain methods of activity which, when perfected, ensure maximum impact with a minimum input of time and effort in the fulfillment of practical and cognitive tasks. Skills and abilities are precisely the methods by which individual soldiers and subunits operate.

A *skill* is the automated component of a conscious action. Modern combat requires more celerity and precision than before in the accomplishment of various calculations (mental skill), in the observation of instrument readings (sensory skill), and in carrying out various actions with weapons and combat equipment (motor skill). No single military specialty can now be mastered without a certain amount of mental, sensory, and motor skills. An action which becomes a skill-habit is completed quickly, easily, purposefully, with minimal strain and maximum impact. Skills rid, as it were, the human consciousness and will of excessive dissipation and help in concentrating on the fulfillment of the main task in the complex atmosphere of battle. It was precisely this property of skill that Engels highly esteemed in military affairs. "A soldier who must dig in his memory or rack his brains to understand what an issued command requires of him," wrote Engels, "will cause . . . more harm than good."³

An *ability* is a method of acting which is based on high theoretical and practical training which makes it possible to creatively employ acquired knowledge and skills under various conditions of combat activities. Abilities are characterized by the degree of training of soldiers for the fulfillment of their duties, are the highest form of mastery of a method or action, and rely on skills already formed. In other words, *ability is the preparedness for conscious, creative, quick, and precise actions, while a skill is the automated link of this activity.*

The technical military revolution has greatly amplified the role of skills and abilities in personnel training. In order to ensure maximum efficacy of the application of combat equipment now more than before every soldier must master his specialty to perfection, be able to correct damage and malfunctions, possess the skills of working in a related specialty, and be ready to replace a comrade in his team, crew, or other unit. The collective character of modern weapons poses with exceeding acuity the problem of forming *collective habits*. Achieving coordination and unity in subunits should occupy one of the leading places in the training process.

Knowledge, skills, and abilities are very closely interconnected. Only in combination do they ensure training to the level of combat expertise. Knowledge plays the leading role in this combination. In schematic terms the relation among knowledge, skills, and abilities may be expressed in the following manner: Skills and abilities are formed and developed on the basis of knowledge; enrichment with knowledge and skills helps improve abilities; sound skills and abilities contribute to the acquisition of deeper knowledge. This does not mean, however, that every practical undertaking is preceded by theoretical knowledge. There are multiple relations among knowledge, skills, and abilities. In the interests of maintaining constant combat readiness it is sometimes wise in certain types

of training initially to teach a soldier the practical fulfillment of functional duties.

The mastery of a system of knowledge, skills, and abilities constitutes only the *educational part* of the tasks carried out in the training process. Another important part is *the indoctrination and development of soldiers*. While acquiring necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities, soldiers are also indoctrinated at the same time. Scientific knowledge is the foundation for the formation of a dialectical materialistic outlook. The ideology of society and one's own class are largely perceived through the content of instruction. Moral political and psychological training are conducted and high moral combat traits are formed primarily in combat and political training exercises. Training simultaneously indoctrinates soldiers and develops their mental and physical capabilities. The indexes of attention and memory are improved in the course of training.

There exists a stable relation among training, indoctrination, and development of personality. *The unity of development, training, and indoctrination is a pedagogic principle*. The sphere in which this principle acts is the entire military pedagogic process as a whole; both training and indoctrination.

Neither a commander nor a political worker fulfills his role as an instructor if he is limited solely to conveying various facts or events to personnel. It is important to develop in the soldiers a definite attitude toward what they have learned, to teach them to evaluate facts and events from class positions, and to act in the interest of strengthening our Homeland and developing the individual himself.

How can this important goal of the training process be attained?

First, through the ideological and political orientation of activities and the presentation of training material from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism and CPSU ideology and policy. The ideological and political orientation of activities is heightened through continual and goal-directed Party political work, in the course of which the decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, their requirements on the Armed Forces, and the tasks of the army and navy under current conditions are explained and the ideological reasoning behind the necessity for the persistent mastery of technical military and political knowledge is formed.

Second, through scientifically substantiated organization of the training process on the basis of didactic principles and methods, and with consideration for the requirements of modern combat and official and combat duties. By organizing the training process in an atmosphere as close to the combat situation as possible, by creating great mental and physical loads, and by moving soldiers to active operations, the commander creates optimal conditions for moral-political and psychological training and for the development of his subordinates.

Third, strict fulfillment of the requirements of military regulations and orders and the personal example of commanders and political workers in the fulfillment of official duties contribute to more successful fulfillment of the tasks of indoctrination in the training process.

Fourth, through a close relation between instruction and life and the missions carried out by the subunit or unit.

The specifics of the training process in the army and navy represent favorable conditions for simultaneous fulfillment of the tasks of training and indoctrination.

A commander who organizes the military pedagogic process has sole responsibility. He is at once teacher, educator, and leader of his subordinates, and is personally responsible for this.

The training and the entire service of soldiers and military collectives takes place under *the conditions of constant combat readiness*—that is, encompasses those types of activity which in themselves necessitate the formation of qualities necessary for the successful execution of combat missions. Constant combat readiness is the main goal of personnel training. At the same time the implementation of measures to maintain high combat readiness is the best school of combat skills and moral-psychological tempering of all categories of servicemen. The need to maintain constant combat readiness not only has decisive influence on the content, organization, and methods of training, but also formulates the position that the unleashing of a war by imperialist aggressors is possible, which is very important to any military man.

The training of soldiers and military collectives is *organically woven into all official and combat activities*, as a result of which its potential is greatly expanded. Combat alert duty, guard duty, and practical work with combat equipment and weapons are a good school for the formation of combat skills and for tempering will and character. Herein lies a great advantage of the military pedagogic process, in which a high degree of activity of the trainees is ensured and cognitive tasks are intertwined with practice. Daily service is itself a unique teacher and educator.

Field, aerial, and naval skills occupy a leading position in the training of subunits and units. A majority of training activities are conducted in the field, at sea, in the air, at ranges and firing grounds, airfields and tank parks, and at launch sites and fire positions. Various exercises, field firing and launching, the carrying out of missions in naval and air landing teams, and prolonged naval voyages and flights not only contribute to securing knowledge and improving individual and collective skills and abilities, but also form psychological stability and internal readiness for battle.

For all the diversity of the tasks carried out in the course of training, it is important always to remember the main thing. The end goal of personnel training is constant combat readiness for the military defense of the interests of the Homeland and the training of a soldier who is ideologically convinced, educated in political and technical military regards, and comprehensively developed. Hence all Party political work toward fulfilling the tasks of combat and political training should be made subordinate to the attainment of this goal.

2. The Methodological Principles and Patterns of Training

Laws and principles of various levels and orders are uniquely manifested in the process of training as a social phenomenon. In addition to the most general laws governing the development of nature, society, and thought, the principles of cognitive activity, of the development of military affairs, and of the formation and development of personality are reflected here. Pedagogic principles which are common to education and training act at full strength in the course of training.

The mastery of knowledge, skills and abilities is a specific cognitive activity whose essence Soviet pedagogy covers from the standpoint of dialectical materialism and the Marxist-Leninist theory of cognition, which are the methodological foundation of the training process. In light of this theory, training is a dialectically developing, internally contradictory process of the movement of thought from ignorance to knowledge, from inability to ability. Shedding light on the pathway of cognition, the theory defines the principles of the supervision of cognitive activity: unflaggingly follow the path of dialectical logic, develop dialectical thought in trainees; study objects and phenomena in their development, in their relations and implications and in their vital contradictions; penetrate to the essence of objects and phenomena; and saturate the cognitive process with elements of creativity.

As specific cognitive activity the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities was largely brought about by the principles of human perception of objective reality which were discovered by V. I. Lenin. V. I. Lenin's universal formula "from lively contemplation to abstract thought *and from there to practice . . .*"⁵ is of fundamental significance to the training of servicemen and military subunits.

In connection with the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs, the role of implied reflection is increasing, in addition to the illumination of specific cases and the direct reflection of objects and phenomena. V. I. Lenin taught that abstract thought reflects reality more deeply, more accurately, more fully. In the training of soldiers and sergeants, however, even today logical perception must necessarily be based on concrete ideas. Sensory and logical elements are intertwined in perception.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that a necessary stage in the cognitive process is practical application as a source and criterion of truth. The marked practical orientation of military activities places practice in a special position in personnel training. Without it combat skills cannot be mastered. Practice serves as the motive force of scientific military cognition and provides the factual material to be summarized and theoretically handled. The unity of theory and practice is of fundamental significance in military didactics and is its most important specific feature.

Hence, all stages of cognition take place in the process of training: sensory perception, abstract thought, and practical application. In the activities of the trainee, brisk contemplation, abstract thought, and practice act as one. The relation among them is determined in each specific case by the content of what is studied, by the level of development of the servicemen and their ability to study, by the presence of the material and technical base, and by the skills of the instructor. But in any case it is important that sensorially perceived material undergo logical processing, so that theoretical knowledge is embodied in practical affairs and the daily practice of soldiers is illuminated by theory.

As in the perception of the objective world, the attained level of mastery of military affairs, no matter how high it might be, is not the limit of what is possible. Therefore, it is very important not to rest on what has been attained, but to constantly set for each soldier and the subunit as a whole specific tasks which define the prospects for improving combat expertise.

Cognition and training cannot be fully equated to one another. The mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities is only one type of cognitive ability. In the process of instruction truths new to mankind are not discovered, but those already ascertained by science are assimilated. In the process of instruction cognition is accomplished under the supervision of the instructor, who avoids complicated inquiries which belong in the scientific perception of truth. The fixation of knowledge and the mastery of strong skills and abilities, which is not characteristic of scientific cognition, are mandatory to the process of instruction. Nevertheless, there is much in common between cognitive activity in the course of training and the process of scientific cognition. Here the differences are found not so much in the movement from ignorance to knowledge and from incomplete to a more complete knowledge as in the cognitive goals.

The process of the training of soldiers has its own specific laws. In connection with this, it is a two-sided active process of interrelated activity between the instructor and the trainee, and didactic laws express the essence of this interaction and the specifics of their joint endeavor. In addition to general pedagogic laws, among the most important laws of instruction are:

1) The correspondence of measures taken by the instructor to the cognitive potential of the trainees and the nature of their activity;

2) The modeling (re-creation) of the activities of instructor and trainees in accordance with the requirements of battle.

Expressed in these laws is the very essence of the process of instruction—the joint goal-directed activity of the commander and his subordinates. Knowledge of didactic laws helps commanders and political workers correctly to draw up the ways and means of training involving subordinates, to avoid a routine, hackneyed approach to work, and to carry out training and educational tasks successfully.

The internal contradictions inherent in the educational process are also manifested in the sphere where didactic laws act: between the efforts of the instructor (the organization and supervision of the cognitive activity of the trainees, the presentation of training material, and the monitoring of its assimilation) and the trainees' capabilities of mastering the program material; between the requirements of modern combat and the degree to which the activities of instructor and trainees are modeled in activities and exercises, etc. These contradictions are the motive forces of training. The instructor and the trainee resolve them through joint efforts, but later they arise once again on a new basis, are once again resolved, and continue as long as instruction is carried out.

The specific laws of the process of training Soviet soldiers in combination and interaction with each other and the more general laws of social development, laws of the development of military affairs, and general pedagogic laws form, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, a system which serves as the objective foundation for the scientific organization of training of soldiers and military collectives.

3. Directing the Cognitive Activity of Soldiers in the Subunit

The mastery of knowledge, abilities, and skills is accomplished in the course of organized, cognitive activity on the part of soldiers and military collectives. The organization and goal-directedness of instruction are ensured by continual direction of these processes on the part of commanders and political workers.

The commander of a company or equivalent subunits organizes combat and political training, draws up the training schedule, and personally conducts activities with his officers and sergeants, as well as the company platoons. He tests the knowledge of soldiers, sergeants, and officers of the company. The deputy company commander for political affairs who is in charge of political activities, also personally conducts activities in one of the groups, explains the tasks of combat and political training to sol-

diers, sergeants, and officers, carries out work to train standouts and to disseminate their experience, and motivates personnel to master and take exemplary care of combat equipment and weapons. Thus, a company commander and his deputy for political affairs belong to the category of officers who concentrate in their hands the organizational functions of the training process and the immediate training functions of personnel.

In fulfilling the functions of organizer and director of the training process, the commander and his deputy for political affairs proceed from the belief that at the present time, in connection with fundamental changes in military affairs and the reduction of the period of service, a large volume of complex knowledge, skills, and abilities must be mastered in a short period of time and that a state of constant combat readiness must be maintained in the process. The successful fulfillment of this task is possible if a number of conditions are met.

Stricter selection of training material and of the forms and methods of training are required. It is now especially important to subordinate training to the interests of military expediency and truly to teach that which is necessary in war, placing stress on ideological tempering, field skills, and professional and psychological training.

In organizing the training process it is important constantly *to proceed from the interests of combat readiness and the rapid training of specialists to replace soldiers who have finished their term of service.* It would be a mistake to be limited in the educational process solely to an external, formally planned approach and sequence (to proceed strictly from subject to subject, from paragraph to paragraph). There can be only one main criterion in assessing the effectiveness of the process of instruction and the fulfillment of the program: the level of the combat readiness and combat capability of individual soldiers and the subunit as a whole.

Success in fulfilling cognitive and educational tasks is ensured not only by the content of the activities, but also by their organization and the entire system of service and everyday life of soldiers. *Training acquires true validity only when there is firm military order and precise and strict fulfillment of regulations, orders, manuals, and instructions.* Only in such an atmosphere are military knowledge and knowledge of moral standards converted into appropriate behavior. Concern for the ideological content of activities and for the Party character of instruction is most important to a political worker. But he must not ignore how work is organized and conducted in the company, whether regulations are observed, and whether officers and sergeant precisely fulfill their official duties. The political worker in a subunit affects the educational process not only by means of Party political work, but also through his personal participation in its organization and conduct.

Concern for improving the training process and increasing its effec-

tiveness is an important integral part of the activities of commanders and political workers. The fulfillment of this task presupposes comprehensive activation of instruction. Even at the scale of the subunit a search for reserves for increasing the ideological, theoretical, and methodological level of activities, for effective methods and means of instruction, and for a more advanced material training base is necessary. Foremost commanders and political workers actively participate in creating well-equipped training classes, develop and introduce new (especially technical) visual aids, utilize the technical training facilities on hand in the unit, and carry out the psychological selection of soldiers and specialist sergeants within the framework of the subunit.

The organizational role of the company commander and his political affairs officer is manifested in the training process in *the direction of pedagogic activities of the officers, warrants, and sergeants of the company and in constant improvement of their methodological skills*. It is important that the latest achievements in the field of the theory and practice of training be known to company officers, warrants, and sergeants who are the direct teachers of the soldiers. The deputy company commander for political affairs should, of course, know how to conduct political activities in an exemplary manner, but he will not have fulfilled his role if he does not achieve a high ideological and methodological level in the conduct of political activities by all leaders and if he does not pay heed to the methodological skills of platoon leaders, sergeants, communists, and active Komsomol members.

Stimulating the cognitive activity of soldiers and military collectives is a mandatory element of the direction of the training process. The commander and political worker of a subunit have sufficient facilities to do this. Above all these would be the atmosphere of confidence and respect in interrelations between commanders and subordinates and faith in the cognitive capabilities of the soldier. Such an atmosphere creates the most favorable conditions for the creativity, initiative, and independence of the trainees.

The socialist competition among soldiers and subunits stimulates cognitive activity. For this purpose many political workers skillfully utilize the competition in standards and missions, the competition for the title of best specialist in the subunit or unit, the competition for the right to be first in marksmanship, and the competition to be the best driver of combat vehicles.

The increase in the activity of experienced soldiers is furthered by the gradual complication of the conditions under which combat training missions are carried out and by the increase in mental, physical, and psychological loads as they acquire experience and knowledge. Experienced commanders and political workers successfully utilize senior soldiers,

who have attained high combat expertise, as instructors in the training of young soldiers.

Constant monitoring of the progress of the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities, high exactingness in the training of soldiers and subunits, and objective rating of soldiers and subunits are effective means of stimulating cognitive activity. Control of the training process in itself presupposes the presence of feedback—that is, the receipt of data on the state of affairs in the combat and political training of the subunit, on the degree of assimilation of various subjects and branches, and on the level of preparedness of officers, sergeants, and all specialists.

Businesslike criticism and self-criticism is a tested means of increasing the activity of soldiers in mastering political and technical military knowledge, a means that is in the hands of the political worker and Party and Komsomol organizations.

Acting as the direct teachers of subordinates, officers, warrants, and sergeants work for the active perception and understanding of training material and the skillful application of acquired knowledge in practice. All these elements of the process of mastering knowledge are very closely interconnected.

The extensive application of all graphic means and of various methods of heightening attention, and the development of attentiveness and interest in the subject under study are of great importance in the perception of training material. A large part of training material is perceived in the process of practical activities. The employment of various types of visual aids and instruction by practice ensure the combined perception of training material: by means of observation and listening, and by means of direct action on and transformation of objects and phenomena.

Comprehension—that is, the establishment and elucidation of causal connections and relations among objects and phenomena—begins simultaneously with the perception of training material. This already becomes a more active and purposeful endeavor than perception. Here an essential role is played by the ability to divide the subject under study into components, to compare them with the whole, to single out the most significant, and to incorporate the new into the system of previously assimilated knowledge. Therefore, independent work holds an important place in comprehension.

In instruction it is important to reach not only the point of perception and comprehension, but also of the memorization and retention of training material. The greatest retention is achieved when there is logical, conceptual memorization. An indicator of intelligent memorization is a soldier's ability to present the material in his own words, to select new examples, and the ability to manipulate acquired knowledge in practice.

The application of knowledge in practice has a favorable influence on the entire process of the mastery of the training material. Practice contributes to better perception and comprehension and is the most reliable means of securing knowledge.

The development of skills, and then of abilities, commences with the assimilation of a rule or law and with their conscious application. But in any case instruction in some action begins with familiarizing soldiers and subunits with what should be done and why.

Before a complex technique is attempted on combat equipment, its elements, structure, and order of execution are explained thoroughly and in detail. When forming complex skills under a limited time schedule it is useful to begin with the explanation and establishment of causal relations between actions and operations.

In the search for new forms and methods of mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities, the center of gravity shifts from simple intensification of the activities of soldiers and military collectives to the comprehensive activation of mental processes. The task is to ensure that all exercises are made not only physically, but also intellectually strenuous. At the present time a majority of the officers, warrants, and sergeants in subunits know how to create great physical workloads during activities. Exercises with high mental challenge succeed less often. At the same time interest in individual activities among personnel may be low precisely because of lack of intellectual challenge. This also fully applies to the conduct of political activities.

The mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities is successful where the cognitive activity of soldiers is conscious and creative in character. To this end it is important to teach trainees the means and methods of independent acquisition of knowledge and abilities. In connection with the reduced periods of service and the increased cognitive capabilities of soldiers, the role of self-training and of various forms of extracurricular work aimed at more thorough study of combat equipment and weapons by soldiers is increasing. But to make use of these important additional reserves for increasing the effectiveness of combat and political training it is necessary to instill in personnel a sense of great responsibility for the defense of their socialist Homeland and interest in the process of acquiring political and technical military knowledge and mastering combat skills.

The role of Party political work grows immeasurably in the fulfillment of combat and political training tasks. Well-organized Party political work exerts a positive influence on the cognitive activity of soldiers and military collectives, on the quality of training activities, and on the productivity of the training process.

Footnotes

1. *Materiaty XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 206.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 35, p 408.
3. Marx and Engels, *Soch.*, Vol 15, p 280.
4. Here the original abilities which, on the basis of acquired knowledge, can ensure the accomplishment of elementary actions, are not taken into consideration.
5. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 29, pp 152-153.

Chapter 7. The Principles of Personnel Training in the Army and Navy

1. The Principles of Training—An Expression of the Established Patterns of the Educational Process

The principles of training comprise the most important part of the theory of training. *By the principles of training is commonly meant directive pedagogic tenets which reflect the established patterns governing the military pedagogic process and determine the instructor's activities toward providing trainees with knowledge, skills, and abilities.*

The principles of training, while reflecting regular relations which take shape among various elements of the military pedagogic process, are neither created arbitrarily nor are thought up by people. They can be derived from the very essence of the training process and from the requirements which modern warfare places on the training of army and navy personnel.

"... Principles," wrote Engels, "are not applied to nature and human history, but are abstracted from them; it is not the case that nature and mankind conform to principles, but rather that principles are valid only insofar as they correspond to nature and history."¹

Active contemplation—that is, the perception of specific facts and phenomena of objective reality—is, as is commonly known, the initial aspect in the mastery of knowledge. This is the established pattern of man's progression from ignorance to knowledge. The principle of using graphic examples in instruction is a reflection of this principle governing the process of the assimilation of knowledge.

The mastery of knowledge only begins with perception, but is not at all limited to it. Perceived material is reprocessed in the consciousness of the trainees and comprehended by them, for only comprehended knowledge can be utilized in practical activities. The regular dependence of the process of the assimilation of knowledge by trainees on the degree of comprehension of the training material is reflected in requirements that are based on the principle of the consciousness and activity of trainees.

Observance of a definite order in covering training material and the

establishment of a system and strict logical sequence in presenting knowledge to soldiers and in forming their skills and abilities have tremendous influence on the success of personnel training. The principle of the systematic approach and sequentiality is a reflection of this aspect of the training process.

The systematic approach and sequentiality in the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities are inseparably bound to the principle of accessibility of instruction, whose requirements orient trainees toward the conscious assimilation of training material at a certain level of strain on their mental and physical capabilities.

In the military, as in no other field of endeavor, constant readiness to apply knowledge under the conditions of a complicated combat situation is required. Here, in the course of combat operations a soldier cannot count on the possibility of employing any written material to recover forgotten knowledge. A soldier's knowledge must be in constant mobilized readiness. Therefore, the durability of knowledge, skills, and abilities is one of the most important principles of instruction.

Finally, in the process of personnel training one must not fail to take into account differences in the general educational level of soldiers, in their life and labor experience, in their capabilities, inclinations, and interests, and in their temperament and character traits. The principle of collectivism and of the individual approach expresses the necessity for taking into account the individual features of soldiers and the particulars of their collective activity in the process of instruction.

All the principles discussed above are called *didactic principles* in pedagogic science. They stem from the very essence of the process of training and reflect the ways in which it conforms to principle.

The principle of a Communist Party approach and a scientific approach in training and the principle of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war are also among the didactic principles in military pedagogy. These principles occupy a definitive position in the system of the principles of instruction used on Soviet soldiers and play a leading role with respect to other principles of instruction, determining their content.

The principles of instruction include *rules of instruction*—that is, pedagogic statements which reveal various aspects of each principle. For instance, the principle of a systematic approach and sequentiality in instruction includes the rules: relation between newly studied material and previously studied material, the study of training material by units, and so on.

The principles of the training of Soviet soldiers are fundamentally different from the principles of personnel training in the armies of capitalist states.

The character of our social and state order requires maximum development of consciousness in the process of mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities, and organic combination of instruction with the tasks of communist education. This education ensures the comprehensive, harmonious development of the personality of a soldier who combines in himself spiritual wealth, moral purity, and physical perfection.

The mental, moral, and physical development of the soldiers in the course of their acquisition of knowledge, skills, and abilities and the rise in their consciousness are ideas which run through all principles governing the instruction of Soviet soldiers.

For instance, realization of the principle of teaching the troops that which is necessary in war is, in our Armed Forces, directed at inculcating in soldiers in the process of combat and political training a conscious attitude toward the fulfillment of their duty to the Homeland, creative thought, initiative, activeness, independence, and high political and moral combat traits.

In capitalist countries, by contrast, implementation of the principle of teaching that which is necessary in war in the combat training of troops is aimed at suppressing the consciousness of personnel on the basis of mental and physical drill for the purpose of training oppressors and murderers.

Reflecting the class, antipopular character of the entire system of troop training, the principles of instruction in the armies of capitalist states cannot rely on the objective principles of the military pedagogic process. Contemporary bourgeois military pedagogy views the principles of training not as initial guiding statements, but as the aggregate of some rules and methods of instruction which are working implements for the instructor and which help train the soldier to fulfill necessary duties in the maintenance and operation of modern combat equipment and weapons.

The principles of instruction for Soviet soldiers depend on the objective principles of the military pedagogic process, reflecting the existing connections and relations among various elements of the combat and political training process. They are not created arbitrarily, but stem from the very essence of the training process.

Each of the principles reflects one definite regularity of the training process. Instruction as a social phenomenon, however, represents the aggregate of sociopolitical, ideological, and pedagogic relations. Therefore, successful fulfillment of the tasks of training Soviet soldiers is possible only on the basis of realization of the entire system of principles in close interconnection.

Hence, thorough understanding of the principles of instruction in

their interrelation by each officer and the practical fulfillment of their requirements are the most important conditions for successful military pedagogic activity.

2. The Main Principles of Training for Soviet Soldiers

Communist Party Spirit and the Scientific Approach. This principle expresses the regular connection between and dependence of the goals, tasks, and content of the instruction of Soviet soldiers on CPSU policy. It determines the political orientation of the process of combat training of soldiers of the army and navy and requires that every exercise be permeated with a spirit of ideological and Party approach and facilitate the development of a scientific Marxist-Leninist outlook in soldiers.

A communist outlook gives the key to understanding the complex phenomena of social affairs and the policy of the Party and government. It arms one with the scientific method of ascertaining principles of armed combat and trends of development of military affairs, thus helping to carry out the tasks of training and indoctrination of soldiers on a scientific basis.

* What does the close relation between the instruction of Soviet soldiers and the idea and policy of the Party mean? What is necessary to form a communist outlook in soldiers?

First, *the reporting of facts, events, and concepts of science to soldiers should be carried out from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism*, in accordance with the ideology and policy of the Communist Party.

Second, a close relation between training and CPSU ideology and policy means constant concern on the part of commanders and political workers to ensure that soldiers *thoroughly understand the significance of the acquired knowledge* which is to be converted into durable ideological convictions and to serve as guidance in their practical affairs.

Third, in the process of the instruction of soldiers it is necessary *comprehensively and thoroughly to reveal the superiority of the Soviet social and state order over the capitalist system*, the superiority of Soviet science and technology over bourgeois, and the progressive role of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are the reliable guard of both the Homeland and the achievements of socialism.

Fourth, *the process of military training should be constructed on a strictly scientific basis*. This means that the content, forms, and methods used to train army and navy personnel should be based on the latest achievements of science and technology with consideration for the revolutionary transformations that have transpired in military affairs.

The rapid development of military affairs has required the incorporation of a comparatively large range of knowledge in the problems of mathematics, nuclear physics, electrical engineering, radio engineering, and other disciplines of general scientific and general technical profiles in the combat training program for soldiers and sergeants. This places heightened demands on the scientific level of every activity involving soldiers and creates favorable conditions for the formation of a factual outlook in the process of presenting training material.

The requirement for a scientific approach in instruction applies in equal measure both to the selection of the contents of training material and to the organization of combat and political training. Revolutionary transformations in military affairs have led to changes not only in the contents, but also in the methods of training. In recent years much has been done among the troops to improve methods of personnel combat training. The summarization and incorporation of all that is new and advanced and the search for more effective ways and means of increasing the combat readiness of units and subunits are a concrete embodiment of the scientific approach in instruction.

Implementation of the principle of Communist Party spirit in instructional practice depends above all on the *level of the ideological tempering of officers*, who are the organizers of the combat and political training of personnel.

Therefore, concern for the ideological tempering of the officer corps and persistent mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory by military pedagogues is one of the important requirements of the principle of a Communist Party approach and the scientific approach in instruction. In the implementation of this principle, of great significance is the inculcation in officers of an implacable attitude toward shortcomings in combat and political training, high exactingness toward trainees, and objective assessment of the results of their studies.

Teach the Soldiers That Which Is Needed in War. This principle expresses the practical military orientation of combat and political training of army and navy personnel. It reflects the need for organizing and conducting the educational process in strict accordance with modern warfare in order to comprehensively train personnel to conduct successful combat operations.

The principle of teaching the troops that which is needed in war requires that the instruction of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces be carried out in close connection with the tasks of unswervingly increasing the combat readiness of troops in a situation as close as possible to actual combat.

V. I. Lenin's statement that the combat capability and combat

readiness of the Red Army must be unfailingly increased is especially pertinent in the current complicated and strained international situation. This requirement of Lenin was further developed in the materials of the 24th CPSU Congress. "All that the people have created must be reliably defended," as was stated in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the Party Congress. "Strengthening the Soviet State also means strengthening its *Armed Forces* and increasing the defense capability of our Homeland in every way possible. As long as we live in a restless world, this task remains one of the main ones!"²

The process of military training is directed toward ensuring constant combat readiness of the troops.

The principle of teaching the troops that which is needed in war is implemented in the course of daily activities, training exercises, and studies and ensures the comprehensive training of soldiers for successful operations in modern combat. In this regard favorable conditions are created in the field. Field exercises do not in themselves, however, ensure the necessary training of soldiers. They attain their goal only when they are conducted without oversimplification and indulgences in a dynamic, strained atmosphere in which the personnel experience significant physical, moral, and psychological burdens.

M. V. Frunze ascribed great importance to the organization of troop training under conditions as close as possible to actual combat. "... The main attention of instructors," he stated, "should be directed precisely toward work in the field on the most diverse terrain and under the most varied conditions."³

Field conditions, according to M. V. Frunze, make it possible to train army personnel as best possible for skillful operations in battle both in a tactical and a psychological regard. Therefore, the field skills of troops are inseparably linked to problems of the psychological training of personnel.

In a nuclear missile war, irritants of incomparably greater force than in previous wars will act upon the psyche, and hence their negative influence on a soldier's behavior and activities will be manifested to a much greater degree. In order to reduce as much as possible the negative influence of a combat situation on servicemen, the psyche of the soldiers should be adapted in peacetime to the stimuli which they will encounter in battle, and to this end training should be made as close as possible to actual combat.

In making training conditions close to a combat situation, one must not forget the presence of living inconveniences and deprivations which are uncommon to the men.

The principle of teaching troops that which is needed in war determines the need for *further elevating the level of technical military training of*

personnel. This is due to the fact that in modern combat diverse equipment and weapons will be used on a large scale. Only on the basis of in-depth technical knowledge can one master equipment and weapons to perfection and skillfully employ them in a combat situation.

The principle of teaching troops that which is needed in war requires study of the probable enemy and his equipment and tactics.

When becoming familiar with the organization, equipment, and tactics of the armies of imperialist states, Soviet soldiers not only learn how best to employ their own weapons and equipment and which methods and means of waging battle should be used to resist enemy operations, but also more concretely comprehend the reactionary essence of contemporary imperialism, the plunderous character of wars unleashed by imperialist states, and the anti-popular character of the missions which bourgeois armies are supposed to fulfill. In studying foreign armies one should objectively demonstrate their technical equipment and the strong and weak aspects of their organization, armament, methods of conducting combat operations, and methods of combat training.

The Consciousness and Activity of Trainees. In the training process the consciousness of soldiers is based above all on in-depth understanding of the importance of mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities, on an understanding of the essence of the studied facts, events, and phenomena, and on the explication of the causal relations and connections among objects and phenomena of reality. Consciousness is manifested in the active attitude of soldiers toward the assimilation of knowledge and the acquisition of skills and abilities.

The scientifically substantiated content of the principle of consciousness and activity is given in the works of V. I. Lenin. Speaking at the Third Session of the RKSM [Russian Young Communist League], V. I. Lenin demanded that cramming and drill be eliminated from training and that people be taught on the basis of their consciousness and activity.⁴ In working out the principles for the instruction and education of the soldiers of the new type of army, V. I. Lenin proceeded from the fact that modern warfare will inevitably require better human material.

In a combat situation a soldier may creatively apply his knowledge and show initiative only if he has thoroughly comprehended, critically analyzed, and consciously assimilated this knowledge. Therefore, the consciousness and activity of trainees have been one of the most important principles of combat and political training of Soviet soldiers since the first days of the new type of army.

On the basis of the Leninist requirement for consciousness and activity in training, M. V. Funze sharply opposed the mechanical assimilation of knowledge and drill in the combat training of Soviet soldiers. In his

work *Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army* he wrote: "... In the Red Army the element of drill should be placed in the very background. . . . There should not be even any talk of drill in the old sense of the word—that is, in the sense of purely mechanical influence and instruction accompanied by severe measures . . . , everything should be set up . . . by means of developing as much as possible the personal initiative and independence of each Red Army man." ⁵

Lenin's ideas on the development of a conscious attitude in Soviet youth toward the mastery of knowledge and on the training of comprehensively developed and active builders of communism from the growing generations were further developed in the Party program and decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress.

Commenting on the Party's tremendous successes in the field of education, L. I. Brezhnev stated in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress: "There has been done . . . much work toward renewing the content of the educational process itself in our schools and higher educational institutions. It is being placed in stricter accordance with the requirements of scientific-technical progress and the general level of modern scientific knowledge." ⁶

Soviet soldiers' understanding of the goals and tasks carried out by the Armed Forces and of the requirements of the Party which are placed on army and naval training, and their awareness of their service and training as fulfillment of a duty to the Homeland move them to regard their duties conscientiously and actively.

The significance of the consciousness and activity of trainees increases each year. This is due to the rise in educational and cultural level of youth who are drafted into the army and navy, and also to the outfitting of the Armed Forces with complex modern equipment. Taking these transformations into consideration is an important condition for improving the quality of military training.

The principle of the consciousness and activity of trainees requires first an understanding of the goals and tasks of training work and of every exercise by all soldiers; second, recognition of the practical significance of the knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired in exercises and the presence of an interest in training material among the soldiers; third, active mental effort on the part of soldiers during exercises, elimination of rote learning, and the ability to exercise self-control in the assimilation of knowledge; fourth, the creative application of knowledge in practice by soldiers, the mastery of effective methods of working to acquire knowledge, skills, and abilities, and critical evaluation of the results of their own training work.

The observance by each military pedagog of *certain conditions* for

increasing the consciousness and activity of trainees plays an important role in realizing these requirements.

Above all an instructor, in starting activities, should prepare the trainees to receive the training material. This means that every training session should begin with a brief explanation of the significance of the subject and a definition of the training goal, and also with a demonstration of the practical value of the material to be studied.

Consciousness and the assimilation of training material by soldiers also depends largely on how convincing and plausible is its presentation. This is ensured through a proper combination of theoretical and factual material and through skillful selection of facts drawn from life.

Soldiers can consciously assimilate and creatively apply knowledge in practice if they have learned to acquire and analyze it independently. Therefore, advanced officers, in conducting activities with the soldiers, not only transmit to them the necessary information, but also instill in them the skills of independent work and teach them to analyze facts, make generalizations and conclusions, and draw up a summary or abstract of the material covered.

In paying heed to the consciousness of the assimilation of knowledge by soldiers, one should develop in them the capability and skill of critically evaluating their own achievements and shortcomings in training and the desire continually to improve their military skills.

The organization of a *socialist competition* is an important means of stepping up the activities of soldiers in the course of training exercises. The spirit of competition develops the soldiers' desire to attain better results in training and moves them to a creative inquiry which ensures optimal fulfillment of training tasks. But competition moves a person to active conscious endeavor when it is organized according to concrete tasks and standards—that is, when a soldier knows precisely when and what results he must achieve and graphically sees his own movement toward the outlined goal.

Commanders and political workers make extensive use of *the influence of Party and Komsomol organizations* in increasing the consciousness and activity of trainees. They direct the work of active Party and Komsomol members toward disseminating the advanced know-how of training stand-outs, and support the initiative and creativity of activists in initiating a socialist competition to master related specialties, reduce the amount of time required to fulfill standards, and so on.

The consciousness and activity of trainees and their interest in training exercises are greatly increased if visual aids and technical training facilities are employed. They help to establish an organic relation between

living perception and word, between the concrete and the general. This interrelation is reflected in the principle of using graphic examples.

Graphic Examples in Training. In order to learn about some object, a person always tries to view it from different sides, to determine its smell, taste, color, and other properties. The study of an object always begins with the sense organs, through sensations and perceptions. Therefore, the presentation of training material should be set up in such a way that trainees master it on the basis of direct perception of real objects and phenomena or images thereof.

In speaking of the role of the use of visual aids in training, it should be kept in mind that the various analyzers of a person possess various handling capacity. Because of the high handling capacity of the visual analyzer we receive about 80 percent of the information on the world around us through our vision. Hence, the transmission of knowledge on the basis of the visual perceptions of trainees makes it possible at once to convey a larger volume of training material than when verbal transmission is employed. Therefore, an effort should be made to express training material in visual form.

It should be taken into account, however, that the use of visual aids in training presupposes not only the visual perception of reality, but also the participation of the largest possible number of sense organs in this process. "The more of our sense organs that participate in the perception of some impression or groups of impressions," wrote K. D. Ushinskiy, "the stronger these impressions are imposed in our . . . memory. We memorize foreign words more quickly and more durably if we set in gear not just one, but three or four of the organs of our nervous system: if we read these words with our eyes, pronounce them aloud with our vocal organ, if we hear how we ourselves pronounce them or how others do, and at the same time write them on a blackboard or notebook. . . ." ⁷

It is precisely the close interaction among various sense organs in the process of perception that gives man more complete knowledge of the properties of the objects and phenomena of the material world. Therefore, the use of visual aids in training is meant not only in the sense of the perception of the training material with the aid of vision, but also as reliance on all of the human sense organs.

In summarizing the data of sensations, perceptions, and impressions, a person penetrates into the essence of objects and phenomena—that is, comes to know internal relations and rises to abstract, logical thought.

"Not only the other senses, but also the activity of our thought," wrote Engels, "join our eye." ⁸

Under current conditions the role of the use of visual aids in the training process is increasing even more. This is due to the fact that the

study of the latest combat equipment and weapons requires that the essence of many physical phenomena and processes be thoroughly explicated and complex layouts, diagrams, mock-ups, and others be demonstrated.

Thus, the use of visual aids is one of the qualitative aspects of the educational process, an aspect manifested in the fact that the assimilation of knowledge and the development of skills and abilities are accomplished on the basis of specific images and concepts elicited in trainees by the influence of certain objects on their sense organs.

The very objects and phenomena under study, images of them, and verbal descriptions may serve as the source of images and concepts. On this basis the diverse graphic examples may be subdivided into three types:

- 1) *The use of real (objects) visual aids*—these would be real models of weapons, combat equipment, and apparatus;
- 2) *Depictive visual aids*—these would be graphic, textural, and digital diagrams, placards, pictures, photographs, mock-ups, models, filmstrips, training films, and various types of training aids;
- 3) *Verbal-figurative graphic examples*—these would be clear descriptions of events or of the feats of heroes, and the use of epithets, metaphors, and comparisons.

What requirements are imposed on graphic examples?

First, *graphic images and texts* in a diagram or placard should be as brief as possible and *express the most essential things*.

Second, *the effectiveness of visual aids depends largely on their size and layout*. If it is difficult to discern the text, numbers, or graphic images, the trainees may incorrectly perceive them. With respect to the size of the image, the aids should correspond to the dimensions of the classroom. For instance, the size of numbers and letters should be at least 2.6 centimeters for each 10 meters of distance from the aids, and the space between lines should be at least half the height of the letters (or numbers).

Third, in making visual aids *it is important* to take into account certain specific *features of the psychology of color perception*. For instance, the precision of perception is greatly enhanced if the colors of the object and the background have the following combinations: red-green, blue-yellow, black-white. For instance, a red object against a green background or the reverse is perceived more precisely and clearly than other combinations.

In employing various visual aids during training one should be guided by the following *main rules*:

- 1) Do not indulge in the use of a large number of visual aids. They

should be used mainly to clarify the most complicated problems of the subject;

2) It is not wise to hang up (or put in place) all visual aids at once, they should be used as the material is presented. Hanging up all diagrams, placards, and so on in advance diverts the attention of the trainees and lessens their interest in the aid;

3) During a demonstration of a visual aid it is useful to slow down the pace of explanation somewhat, in order to accord the trainees an opportunity to comprehend the content of the aid better;

4) One should work for active practical work on the part of the trainees with visual material, mock-ups, models of equipment, and so on;

5) The military pedagog should always think out in advance the order and methods of presentation;

6) One should supervise observation and summarize the observations for trainees;

7) In the course of each exercise one should combine various visual aids.

Slide shows and training films, whose use also conforms to certain didactic rules, are an important visual training aid.

A film intended for showing is viewed in advance by the director of the activities. During the viewing he determines the procedure for employing the film and decides when to give what explanation to the film and individual episodes and to which segments particular attention should be drawn.

After viewing the film the leader draws up a plan which reflects the content of his statement before the start of the film, the sequence of the course of the activities involving use of the film, explanations to be given during the showing, and questions for the trainees. Here, the verbal accompaniment of the film, which must be thought out to the finest detail so that it helps rather than hinders trainees in assimilating the contents of the film, is the most important and complicated aspect.

Just before the start of the showing it is wise to explain to the soldiers what problems and events are covered in it and to which episodes or frames particular attention should be paid, and to ask several questions which the trainees will have to answer after viewing the film.

After the showing of the film it is wise to hold a brief discussion on its contents.

Skillful realization of the requirements of the principle of the use of visual aids makes it possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of instruction and to reduce the amount of time required to take in the knowledge, skills, and abilities.

The Systematic Approach and Sequentiality in Training. The process of combat and political training is characterized by the fact that the assimilation of knowledge by soldiers and the development of skills and abilities take place as a regular transition of quantitative changes into qualitative changes, from a partial grasp of the concept, subject, or action to increasingly complete mastery of it.

Manifestation of this conformance to principle is expressed above all in the fact that each subject, educational problem, action, and so on consists of certain components, and at the same time they themselves are part of a larger structural whole. Mastery of the action, educational problem, or subject as a whole is possible only if the internal logic of its structure is observed.

Thus, underlying the principle of the systematic approach and sequentiality is the requirement that *strict logical relation be observed in the presentation of training material by years, training periods, and the individual training activity*. In the process the training material is presented in such a way that what is studied at one activity is based on previous material, helping to reinforce it, and prepares the trainees to assimilate the material to follow.

The main thing here is that the course of instruction in any subject ensure that the soldiers *master a streamlined system of knowledge, skills, and abilities with minimal input of time and effort*.

Violation of the systematic approach and sequentiality in training leads to the fact that the knowledge acquired by soldiers is chaotic, and "scrappy" in character and cannot be utilized in practical activities at the proper moment.

Emphasizing the role of sequentiality in the accumulation of scientific knowledge, I. P. Pavlov, addressing youth, wrote: "Sequentiality, sequentiality, and sequentiality. From the very start of your work teach yourself to observe strict sequentiality in the accumulation of knowledge. Study the ABC's of science before attempting to ascend to its heights. Never undertake what follows without mastering what preceded." ⁹

In training, observance of the principle of systematic approach and sequentiality begins with the planning of combat and political training. Planning should be carried out in such a way that all subjects studied by the soldiers ensure the complete assimilation of knowledge in the basic type of combat training.

It is common knowledge that tactical training is the main type of combat training in motorized infantry subunits. The planning of studies is also carried out in the interests of this subject. For instance, let us assume that the subject "a soldier's actions on the offensive" is to be

studied. In order to completely work out all problems at a given exercise the personnel should study before the start of the exercise: in small arms training, the methods and rules for firing with small arms and the rules of handgrenade throwing; in defense against weapons of mass destruction, the use of means of individual protection and the accomplishment of partial decontamination of weapons and personnel; in combat engineer training, intrenching on the battlefield; in drill, dashing and crawling. Only after all these problems have been studied can one plan a given activity in tactical training.

In planning it is also important to ensure the observance of strict sequentiality in covering each subject within the limits of the given area. For instance, in studying weapons and combat equipment it is best to ensure the following sequence:

- 1) Familiarizing the soldiers with the functions of a given model of weapons (or equipment);
- 2) Familiarizing them with the main assemblies and mechanisms;
- 3) Studying the main operating principles;
- 4) Studying the layout and operation of parts and mechanisms, the list of possible malfunctions, and the methods of detecting and correcting them.

This sequence enables trainees to have an idea of a given model of equipment or of the weapon as a whole, to master its function and tactical-technical specifications, and then more thoroughly to divide and assimilate the structure, operating principles, function of individual parts and mechanisms, their interaction, and so on.

The systematic approach and sequentiality of training are ensured not only by the planning of combat and political training, but also by the observance of a definite system in the presentation of training material during each activity.

What requirements are imposed on the presentation of training material at training exercises by the principle of systematic approach and sequentiality?

First, to present material in a definite system means skillfully to *connect newly studied facts, events, phenomena, and subjects with facts, events, phenomena, and subjects already known and previously studied; and to single out the most important and essential factors in the material under study* without overcomplicating it with excessive detail and particulars.

In practice one often has occasion to observe young officers, while conducting activities with their subordinates, experiencing great difficulties in determining the main and most essential things in the content of the training material. They sincerely desire to present as much material

as possible in one session, set forth in great detail the essence of the physical processes, and often employ complex mathematical computations. But the result is quite the opposite. The soldiers fail to assimilate not only the details, but also the main and essential things, since they are hindered by the excessive detail of the training material.

Second, *training material should be presented in sections*, but in such a way that each section has a definite conclusion and wholeness. Here attention should be paid to ensuring that the soldiers do not perceive the sections of the studied whole separately, independently of the interrelations among them.

Third, the systematic approach and sequentiality in the presentation of training material depends largely on *skillful arrangement and structural organization*. Skillful arrangement of training material is dependent on the officer's level of training and the degree of his creativity. For instance, in studying malfunctions which disrupt the rate of fire of an automatic weapon, and the methods of correcting them, the material may be presented by listing each malfunction, its causes, and the methods of correcting it. But the material may also be grouped differently, using as the main principle the sequence of the movement of the cartridge into the chamber and the extraction of the spent case. In this instance all malfunctions are broken down into three groups: malfunctions which occur as the cartridge passes from the magazine into the chamber; malfunctions which occur while the cartridge is in the chamber and when the shot is fired; and malfunctions during the extraction and ejection of the spent case. Such systematization of material ensures more facile memorization.

Finally, observance of the principle of the systematic approach and sequentiality in instruction presupposes the mandatory entirety and completeness of knowledge in each area and each studied problem. In training one should not leave for "later" all sorts of reservations and unexplained problems.

Thus, the principle of the systematic approach and sequentiality in training requires a strict scientific approach to the planning of combat training on the basis of coordination of all training subjects and observance of logical relation in the study of sections and subjects within each discipline, and also observance of strict sequence in presenting training material at each session.

Clarity of Instruction. In the course of instruction and under the given particular conditions a person can consciously master theoretical and practical material of only a certain difficulty and volume simply because of his experience, training, and level of general development. This axiom is reflected in the principle of clarity of instruction. The main requirement of this principle is that no instruction beyond the capabilities of a given category of serviceman be allowed, that instruc-

tion be conducted in such a way that the soldiers can consciously assimilate the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities with a certain amount of strain on their mental and physical strength.

Clear instruction is not, however, "easy" instruction which often engenders in a person a frivolous attitude toward studies, or laziness. "Studying is work," observed K. D. Ushinskiy, "and should remain work, but work full of thought. . . ." ¹⁰ Tasks which require mental efforts, strain, and the surmounting of difficulties are always posed for soldiers during training.

Violation of the requirements of the principle of clarity often leads to formal instruction and the fruitless expenditure of training time, undermines the soldiers' faith in their own strength and capabilities, and brings about a passive attitude toward training.

How may the principle of clarity be violated? First, instruction may not be understandable due to the depth of the material. This occurs most often when the training material is presented without consideration for the trainees' level of training. Second, instruction may not be understandable because of the volume of material, which does not correspond to the amount of training time allotted for the study of a given subject or section. Third, the lack of understanding of instruction may also be due to physical strain, when the physical capabilities of the soldiers and the degree of physical training are not taken into account. Physical overloads inevitably cause fatigue and often sharply reduce the perception and assimilation of knowledge and skills.

In order to eliminate all conditions which give rise to this lack of development of knowledge, skills, and abilities it is always necessary to take into account the level of education and the mental and physical development of the personnel of the subunit.

The clarity of instruction presupposes the necessity of observing the following *main rules*:

1) *From the known to the unknown*—the life experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities of the trainees should be used in training as *the starting point* in studying new theoretical material and reinforce it in practice;

2) *From the simple to the complex*—this defines the gradual transition in the presentation of training material from concrete facts and examples to generalizations and conclusions, and from simple generalizations and conclusions to more complex. The development of skills and abilities should be started with actions that are easily performed, and then one should proceed to the mastery of actions and methods which require more ability and skill;

3) *From the easy to the difficult*—this requires that the study of training material be started with that which the trainees can best assimilate without particular strain, and only then should the material be made more complicated and more difficult.

Skillful application of these rules largely contributes to the systematic deepening of knowledge and changes the boundaries of comprehension, which depend on the level of training of the servicemen, their experience, and their term of service. What was not understandable yesterday a soldier can now successfully master, but tomorrow he will be capable of handling more complex training missions and of increasing his degree of knowledge.

Observance of the requirements of the principle of clarity in instruction not only makes it possible successfully to master training material, but also exerts a great influence on the permanence of knowledge, skills, and abilities.

The Retention of Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities. The specifics of military training and the combat readiness of troops require that each soldier master firm and durable knowledge in his specialty and be able to carry out any assignment in the most complex situation. The retention of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of personnel represents one of the most important factors for ensuring the constant combat readiness of the unit or subunit.

The principle of the retention of knowledge, skills, and abilities requires that the training of soldiers be set up in such a way that the main material is assimilated firmly and for a prolonged period of time.

How is retention of knowledge, abilities, and skills achieved?

As the experience of combat and political training shows, the duration of the retention of studied material in the memory depends largely on *the trainees' understanding of its significance to practical affairs*. If there is no such understanding, the soldiers will not develop an interest in mastering the training material. And if there is no interest in acquiring knowledge, it cannot be retained. Therefore, it is important that in the conduct of training activities the officer thoroughly and comprehensively demonstrate the practical significance of the knowledge which the soldiers are acquiring.

Insistence on *the duration and the memorization* of studied material, and especially of the main items, has considerable influence on the completeness and retention of knowledge. It has been established through numerous experiments that if in the process of presenting training material an instructor points out the need for more complete or more prolonged memorization of various material by trainees—that is, if it gives them a definite guideline—then the result is much higher with respect to the amount of material and its retention than when such a guideline is not provided.

The systematic repetition of previously studied material is an important condition which ensures the retention of knowledge, skills, and abilities. The following should be taken into account when preparing for repetition:

1) One should have sound knowledge of which problems in the program were inadequately assimilated by subordinates, and then one should systematically monitor the quality of their knowledge;

2) One should know the individual differences in the trainees' level of training in order correctly to determine the character and scope of individual assignments and to extend necessary aid in a timely manner;

3) One should develop in trainees the desire and ability to exercise self-control so that each of them can independently detect gaps in his knowledge, skills, and abilities;

4) One should teach one's subordinates more effective methods and means of repetition and develop their independent work habits.

The retention of knowledge, skills, and abilities is also ensured by *the daily practical application of previously studied material*. Here it is important to organize the activities of trainees in such a way that they utilize the assimilated material in carrying out new tasks. For instance, in order that the soldiers might memorize more solidly standard topographical symbols they may be given the assignment of drawing these symbols in their notebooks. Naturally, the symbols are better memorized in the process of drawing than when, as is usually the case, they are gone over several times in a textbook of military topography. But they are memorized still better when the soldiers are given the assignment of learning to read certain sectors on a topographical map, sectors which are selected with consideration for the presence of all symbols necessary for memorization. Why is this so? The fact of the matter is that the memorization of symbols in the process of sketching in a notebook is uniform and comparatively monotonous work, which contributes to the development of inhibitive processes in the cerebral cortex and hence worsens the process of memorization. Upon reading a topographic map, however, the soldier learns to perceive real local objects and relief through the standard symbols. This work is new to him and is not so monotonous as in the first case. Moreover, here the standard symbols are perceived not in isolation from each other, as is the case when they are sketched in a notebook, but in combination with other symbols which depict definite sectors of terrain. All this contributes to more permanent memorization.

Encouraging the independent work of trainees, creativity, and curiosity in every way possible plays a considerable role in realizing the principle of the retention of knowledge, skills, and abilities. By encouraging the activities of soldiers in studies, the commander and political worker thus help reinforce their knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Collectivism and the Individual Approach to Training. Military activity is by character collective. The collectivism of training clearly reflects the unity of the will and actions of Soviet soldiers, their solidarity, their sense of mutual responsibility for the quality of their studies, and their readiness to help each other in a timely manner and to act according to the principle: "One for all, all for one."

Modern combat equipment and weapons have greatly increased the requirements of precision and coordination of personnel actions. Any carelessness, any lack of precision, and especially any error in the work of even one soldier may lead to the failure of the fulfillment of a combat mission not only by a team or crew, but also by a subunit or unit. Collectivism ensures smoothness, coordination, and precision of action and the interchangeability of all soldiers of detachments, teams, crews, and subunits.

The process of instruction in the Soviet Armed Forces is aimed at training a specialist capable of maintaining modern weapons and combat equipment. At the same time every soldier gains collectivist traits and habits—the ability to work in a collective in a friendly manner, to understand its goals and tasks, to cherish its honor, and to subordinate one's own actions and deeds to the collective interests. Commanders and political workers direct the efforts of their soldiers toward the successful fulfillment of tasks and form common interests, a spirit of helpful competition, an atmosphere of creative collectivity and enthusiasm, and comradely criticism and self-criticism.

At the same time collective training work would be inconceivable without comprehensive knowledge of and consideration for the individual features of the trainees. After all, success in the combat and political training of a detachment, team, crew, or subunit is possible only if conditions favorable to the maximum manifestation of the capabilities and creative initiative of each soldier have been created.

Hence, collectivism and the individual approach in instruction are organically interconnected and interrelated and constitute the unified principle in the training of Soviet soldiers. The essence of this principle is to create conditions favorable to *the successful, coordinated work of all soldiers of the subunit and at the same time to take an individual approach to each of them in the course of training.*

The individual approach in instruction obligates the military pedagogue to know the specific features of each soldier as an individual and, on this basis, to take a differentiated approach to the instruction of his subordinates.

In the training process the individual features of servicemen are manifested in the fact that some can assimilate material quickly and easily,

while others do so slowly and with difficulty; some try to penetrate to the depths of the studied material and to learn principles, while others are limited to superficial mastery of secondary facts and events. Differences also turn up in the soldiers' attitudes toward training: some are very serious about mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities, being aware of their personal responsibility to fulfill their official duties; others do not show any particular zeal in mastering their combat skills.

Nor should one fail to take into account the fact that the soldiers in a subunit generally have different levels of education, while the training program is identical for all in scope and content.

The implementation of the individual approach in training means *comprehensive knowledge of the spiritual and physical capabilities of each soldier and of the level of development of mental cognitive processes* (perception, memory, thought, speech) and *the mental personality traits* (orientation, temperament, character, and capabilities). This enables commanders and political workers correctly to determine the causes of successes and failures of subordinates and to select the necessary form of assistance and optimal means and methods of instruction.

It is especially important to establish the reasons for the lag of servicemen in training, reasons which may be extremely variegated. A soldier often experiences difficulties because he has inadequate general educational training or lacks the skills of independent work, various types of memory may be poorly developed or the attention span may not be very long, or a lack of confidence in his own capabilities may appear or he may lose interest in a given subject. Laziness, a lack of desire to master a given military specialty, loss of personal responsibility for combat training, and other factors may also be responsible for a low rate of progress.

Knowing the specific reasons for a soldier's lag in training, an education officer takes appropriate steps. For instance, if a soldier experiences difficulties in his studies because of an inadequately developed memory, he should be helped in the process of memorization in finding and singling out the most important and systematic factors, in systematically repeating the material by reproducing what has been covered, in teaching him correctly to apply theoretical knowledge to the fulfillment of practical tasks, and so on. If, however, a soldier shows poor progress because of laziness or a lack of desire to master a given military specialty, here disciplinary and social measures are required.

Soldiers who master the material more quickly than others may be used as assistant leaders at study activities for the repeated explanation of certain problems and for monitoring the actions of other servicemen as they work on practical methods. If several soldiers who master the program much more quickly than the others stand out in a subunit, they could well be placed in a separate group in order to accord them an

opportunity to master program material ahead of time and to allow them to move on to independent work with equipment.

Thus, an organic combination of collective and individual training work provides the possibility of properly directing the efforts of the collective and of each soldier toward successful fulfillment of the tasks of combat and political training.

Footnotes

1. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1967, p 30.
2. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 81.
3. M. V. Frunze, *Sobr. soch.* (Collected Works), Vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo, 1929, p 438.
4. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 306.
5. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, Vol 2, pp 20-21.
6. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 85.
7. K. D. Ushinskiy, *Sobr. soch.*, Vol. 8, Moscow-Leningrad, Izd-vo APN RSFSR, 1950, p 251.
8. Marx and Engels, *Soch.*, Vol 20, p 554.
9. I. P. Pavlov, *Izbrannyye trudy* (Selected Works), Moscow, Izd-vo APN RSFSR, 1951, p 35.
10. K. D. Ushinskiy, *Sobr. soch.*, Vol 5, p 27.

Chapter 8. The Methods of Instructing Personnel of Subunits

1. The Concept of Methods of Instruction

Many years of military pedagogic experience demonstrates that the success of the training of Soviet soldiers depends largely on the correct use of the methods of educational work—that is, on what ways the training material is conveyed to the trainees and on the methods the instructor employs so that they thoroughly master the contents of the topic (or subject).

The methods of instruction are the ways and means with whose aid the transmission and assimilation of knowledge, the formation of skills and abilities, and the inculcation of high morale and combat efficiency are achieved and the combat unity of subunits and units is ensured.

In the Soviet Armed Forces the methods of instruction are based on high consciousness and activity on the part of soldiers. These methods have the function of ensuring: maximum activation of the mental activity of trainees; reducing the periods required to master combat skills; and the formation of morale, combat efficiency and psychological traits necessary for successful operations in modern combat.

Each method consists of interconnected elements which are commonly called *the modes of instruction*. The same modes may be found in different methods. Moreover, in one case a given element may be a mode, in another a method of instruction. For instance, the demonstration by a commander of means and actions in preparing and setting up a radio station for operation is a mode in this particular activity (here the exercise is the method of instruction), and the demonstration of the combat characteristics of weapons and equipment to personnel when familiarizing them with a unit's weapons is a method of instruction. A given method of instruction is usually named after the leading mode employed in the given activity.

Various methods of instruction are employed in the training of Soviet soldiers. Chief among them are: oral presentation of material (narration,

explanation, lecture), discussion, demonstration, exercise, and independent work.

By what should one be guided in selecting a method? What requirements are placed on the methods of instruction?

It is common knowledge that three main didactic or general training goals may be set in any educational activity: giving the soldiers new knowledge and ensuring thorough assimilation; developing skills and abilities in trainees; and reinforcing knowledge and improving skills and abilities.

Attaining the first goal above all requires such methods as oral presentation, demonstration, and discussion; the second requires exercise, accompanied by brief explanation; and the third requires the independent reading of regulations, textbooks, and other printed sources and independent training activities.

The form of instruction—that is, the organization of the training process, the grouping of trainees, and the distribution of training material by instruction periods also has considerable influence on the selection of methods.

The forms used to organize the training process determine which source of knowledge, skills, and abilities should be the leading source in each link of the training process and which should be subordinate. For instance, lesson-type theoretical and practical activities (political training, the study of the physical portion of weapons and equipment) accord trainees the opportunity to master knowledge chiefly in the course of oral presentation and demonstration, while field activities presuppose practical action (exercises, above all).

The number of the trainees and their level of training, as well as the amount of time allotted for the activity, the presence and state of training equipment and visual aids, the site of the activities, and the level of methodological skills of the officer (or sergeant) have some influence on the choice of methods of instruction.

When there is little time neither the lecture nor even narration should be utilized. In this case demonstration and brief explanation are most appropriate. When there is a sufficient number of good visual aids, it is best to conduct the activity by means of direct study by the soldiers. If there are few such aids, the explanation method will predominate in the training session.

Not only differences, but also a close relationship exists among methods of instruction. It is expressed in the fact that the successful employment of one method necessarily presupposes its combination with others. The interconnection of methods of instruction is expressed primarily in

a specific grouping of methods defined by the commonality of didactic goals, the character of the training material, and the source of knowledge. In connection with this, the method of oral presentation, for instance, is most often combined with discussion and demonstration, while exercise is combined with demonstration, and demonstration with explanation.

In discussing conditions for the effectiveness of some method it should be noted that they depend not only on the degree to which it corresponds to the content of the training material and the form in which the training process is organized, but also on the observance of the requirements which stem from the principles of instruction.

Modern methods of instruction must ensure the training of soldiers in such a way that they are capable of withstanding much greater physical and psychological strain than before, and that they are capable of showing initiative and imagination, that they possess the ability to analyze thoroughly a situation that has taken shape, to make bold decisions quickly, and to implement them persistently.

One of the most important requirements placed on the methods of instruction is that they must be appropriate to *the highest degree for the existing type of relationship between man and combat equipment.*

The complete mechanization (and in a number of cases automation) of military labor is characteristic of our times. It has led to the appearance of a new type of interrelationship between man and combat equipment. The employment of weapons and combat equipment is now wholly or largely accomplished through controls and actuators.

In a majority of cases man now assumes the role of an operator who controls various processes which transpire in complex technical systems. His labor is connected with monitoring the operation of machines, coordinating the activities of individual links of mechanized systems, collating and processing a tremendous amount of information, regulating and adjusting technical devices, and resolving problems for them. Here the labor of soldiers is characterized by sharp simplification of extramotor, executive acts and at the same time by an increase in the relative share of sensory (that is, connected with the perception of information) and mental skills. Major power motions now break down into smaller, so-called "dosed" or micromotions, which are accomplished with individual fingers and require very complex analytical and synthetic activity on the part of the brain.

In connection with this it is becoming objectively necessary to have a system of personnel training methods which would ensure the maximum effectiveness of each soldier as a link in the control of the machine system, a link capable of perceiving and processing a continually growing

flow of information and of making correct decisions in an atmosphere of superintensive mental strain.

This requires further alteration of the methods of instruction and an increase in the relative share of those methods which are aimed at forming mental skills and developing mental abilities. As a result of this such methods as the lecture, independent work with training aids, and activities in various types of trainers are assuming much greater importance than before. At the same time the new conditions have not at all reduced the role of such classical methods as demonstration and exercise. This is quite natural, for by liberating the soldier from a number of simple and fatiguingly monotonous actions, modern combat equipment has demanded on his part exceptional inventiveness, presence of mind, quickness, agility, endurance, and the ability to change abruptly the type of activity.

2. The Characteristics of the Main Methods of Instruction

Oral Presentation of Training Material. The word has always held an important place in the training process. It is not only a conveyor of thought, but also an important means of education and of influencing soldiers' feelings. It is in the process of oral presentation of material that great opportunities open up for exerting an ideological influence on subordinates and inculcating high moral and political feelings in them.

Speech contains not only conceptual, but also emotional information (in the form of intonation, meaningful stresses, the rise and fall of loudness and voice timbre). The volume of this information is on the average 75 percent of conceptual information. In other words, the amount of information about a given event, phenomenon, or fact may be 75 percent greater in oral transmission than in written transmission. And the greater the amount of information, the greater the probability that a soldier will understand the training material more deeply and more accurately and will assimilate knowledge more permanently. Moreover, oral presentation makes it possible to convey to soldiers the latest information which has not yet been reflected in printed sources.

Explanation, narration, and the training lecture are the main varieties of oral presentation.

Explanation. Here the main modes are demonstration and reasoning. To explain something means to answer the questions: "What is it?" "Why?" "How so?" "What similarity or difference exists among these phenomena?" and so on. Explanation is employed in political exercises, in exercises in technical and special, tactical, and physical training, in drill, and in the study of regulations. Most often explanation is combined with the demonstration of methods and actions, weapons and com-

bat equipment, rules for their use, and various types of visual aids and with exercise by the trainees.

Narration represents the descriptive presentation of training material by the leader of the exercise for the purpose of conveying facts and conclusions and describing events and phenomena. It is usually employed in activities in which historical events, phenomena of social affairs, and the processes and principles underlying the operation of combat equipment and weapons are studied. In the course of narration such modes as oration (sequential, logically related presentation), description (the verbal conveyance of the external appearance and layout of combat equipment or of the course of events), and reasoning (a logically consistent progression of thoughts, arguments, and conclusions).

The duration of narration depends on the character of the material under study, the site of the activity, and the types of trainees, and lasts no more than 20-30 minutes. Narration is usually combined with explanation and the demonstration of various types of visual aids.

The Training Lecture. This is an extended oral presentation of a number of interconnected problems on a specific subject of the program. The lecture accords the possibility of thoroughly covering the most complicated concepts, principles, and ideas. Closely combined in it are elements of oration and description, analysis of facts and examples, explanations and proof, and generalizations and conclusions.

The training lecture is the most complicated variety of the method of oral presentation. Combining both narration and explanation, the lecture at once requires that trainees have well-developed abstract thought and that the speaker possess the ability actively to guide the thought processes of his audience. This is accomplished primarily through a clear, logical plan for presentation and through unhurried, smooth, clear, and precise speech.

Questions may be posed to the audience and answers to the questions may be taken during the lecture in order to heighten the attention and thought of the trainees and to reinforce the presented material.

What are the main requirements placed on the oral presentation of training material?

In speaking of the skills of the propagandist and agitator, V. I. Lenin observed that their art "also lies in how best to influence a given audience, making a known truth as convincing as possible, as easily assimilable as possible, as graphic as possible, and as firmly impressionable as possible."¹ This statement by Lenin, which reveals the most important conditions for the successful use of the living word, also has direct bearing on the methods of the oral presentation of training material. *The convincingness of the presentation, ease of assimilation, the use of visual aids,*

and permanence of memorization are the most important methodological requirements whose observance is a mandatory condition for the correct use of the oral presentation of training material in all its varieties on any subject of combat and political training.

How are these requirements met?

The convincingness of oral presentation—that is, its proof and degree of substantiation—is ensured primarily by thorough *knowledge of the material* on the part of the study group leader, by the reliability of the offered knowledge, and by the high communist ideological character of this information. Reference to the statements of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, outstanding Party and state figures, military leaders, and scientists is of great importance in the conclusiveness of the material.

In order for the material under study to be convincing, it must be founded on facts and examples. Therefore, *the selection, systematization, and didactic processing of factual material* are primary conditions for achieving convincingness in oral presentation.

The correct use of factual material requires a great deal of methodological expertise on the part of the study group leader. This is not so simple as it may seem at first glance. A fact or an example should be attractive not only in its novelty and freshness. From a pedagogic standpoint it is also important that they include precisely the idea which is needed at a given exercise for the assimilation of the particular material. Nothing damages an oral presentation so much as the random assemblage of factual material and a lack of planning from a standpoint of its influence on the thoughts and feelings of the trainees.

Combat examples play an exceptionally great role in achieving convincingness in an oral presentation of training material. When well-selected and properly presented, they serve not only as a source of new knowledge for the soldiers but also as a means of moral-political and psychological training, of developing patriotic feelings and military camaraderie, and of creating an awareness of their military duty. A good combat example is the best means of instilling deep convictions in soldiers, of acquainting them with the glorious traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, and of moving them to achieve high marks in combat and political training.

The logical nature and interesting manner of presenting training material, and the simplicity and clarity of speech are important conditions for making an oral presentation convincing. After all, as the leader of the activity speaks, the soldiers cannot return to material already presented if difficulties arise, and cannot listen to it once again. Therefore, the lack of concreteness, precision, smoothness, and logical presentation have a negative effect on trainees. This may be “lubricated” by the

wealth of factual material, the depth of thought, and vividness of speech. Conversely, when a leader of an activity presents the material in such a way that thoughts logically follow one another, without repetitions, without jumping from one subject to another, the main things stand out and are emphasized and what is seemingly not very interesting material leaves a strong impression on the trainees.

In working to achieve consistency in the presentation and thorough assimilation of training material, experienced methodologists acquaint the trainees with the scheme of their narration or explanation and, if the session is being conducted in a classroom, write it out on the blackboard. This ensures coordination in the mental work of the leader of the activity and of the trainees and teaches the latter to develop their own thoughts logically.

The clarity and accessibility of an oral presentation depend largely on mastery of the *techniques of utilizing the spoken word*. In order for speech to convey to the audience that which the commander or political worker wishes to convey, it must be literarily correct and consist of short sentences pronounced precisely, clearly, and in a voice commensurate to the number of students and the size of the room.

An explanation, narration, or lecture which is profound in content often is difficult to understand because it is overloaded with various types of special terms, acronyms, part or assembly designators, and so on.

Experienced methodologists ascribe very great importance to the correct use of terms and concepts. They always remember that what is commonplace and self-evident to the specialist necessarily requires explanation when a person encounters it for the first time.

A correct *pace of speech* is also important. For oral presentation a speech rate of 70–80 words a minute—that is, about 33–50 percent slower than ordinary conversation—is best. Beginning speakers most often allow their rate of speech to speed up, especially when they are unable to break away from their outline. As a result they wind up with free reading rather than oral presentation and this blunts the attention of the students and causes a loss of contact with the audience.

The instructor's *behavior during the activity* and his ability to see how the soldiers are taking in the training material are of extremely great importance to the successful application of the method of oral presentation.

A leader of an activity who is insufficiently experienced or who does not attach any particular significance to these problems seemingly knows the material well and presents it in a lively, engaging manner, but one senses that he is interested mainly in speech, that he has but one thought: to say everything correctly.

During a narration another leader may walk about, shake his hands, or wave a pencil, ruler, or chalk. This is fine if the narration or explanation is interesting. If not, the trainees' attention is involuntarily shifted to his walking.

A third instructor may look out the window, at the ceiling, at the table, or above the head of the trainees. He may speak so dully, so indifferently that it seems that in another two or three phrases he will frankly admit that it is boring for him to conduct the training.

Experienced methodologists conduct themselves differently during training sessions. While presenting training material they carefully observe how the trainees receive the explanation, narration, or lecture. They can unfailingly determine from the expression of the eyes and faces, from involuntary motions, and even from breathing patterns that either this is comprehensible, or that here they should explain once again and that a different method might be needed.

The use of the graphic approach in oral presentation is accomplished first through the specificness of the contents of the presented material and by the expression in the speech of the leader of the activity (which was already discussed above), and second by correct selection and use of various visual aids and well-planned combination with words.

During the explanation, narration, or training lecture extensive use may be made of real models of weapons and combat equipment and of various forms and types of visual aids: graphic (diagrams, charts, geographic maps, pictures), screen (film strips, photographs, movies), photographs, sound recordings (tape recorders or record players), and three-dimensional aids (mockups, models, operating circuits).

During the oral presentation of material advanced methodologists quite often use as a visual aid the class blackboard, on which they draw diagrams, plans, figures, and notes in colored chalk. The merit of this extremely simple and accessible method of illustration lies in the fact that it affords the opportunity to heighten the trainees' attention and to demonstrate the entire process of the rise and development of the diagram, graph, or plan. By sketching or writing something on the blackboard and at the same time explaining it, the instructor creates visual reference points for the trainees, points which lead the soldiers' thought in the necessary direction and help them to understand and memorize more thoroughly the essence of complex processes and phenomena.

The use of visual aids in oral presentation also presupposes the extensive employment of diverse numerical material, but it must be used skillfully. One should not saturate a narration with figures. It is desirable to use figures which best reflect the essence of the subject of the activity or

characterize the main tactical capabilities of weapons and combat equipment. Observations show that it is more useful in political activities, for instance, to have a poster on which five to nine sets of the most important numerical data are written: such a number of digits can almost always be memorized.

When possible it is extremely useful to involve the audience in practical computation of some numerical material. For instance, in discussing the growth of public consumption funds the leader of a political session may give the students the assignment of calculating how much of these funds their families receive.

Comparison is an extremely widespread didactic mode which ensures a graphic approach in *oral presentation*. By establishing similarities and differences and comparing and contrasting new statements and concepts, facts, phenomena, and events assume the form of specific concepts and acquire a lively imagery for the soldiers.

Comparison has the goal of giving the remote and unknown the appearance of the ordinary, the close, and the customary, and therefore, of the comprehensible. It accords the opportunity to recognize something known in an object the trainee has never seen, and of comparing the new with something that he has already seen many times.

Discussion is a way of presenting and securing training material by means of dialogue or question and answer. It contributes not only to the systematization and deepening of previously studied knowledge, but also to the formation of new concepts and ideas. During a discussion the assimilation of training material is tested and checked out.

Discussion may be employed in activities on any subject of combat and political training. In some cases it is used for the purpose of conveying new knowledge to the soldiers, in other cases for the purpose of systematizing, deepening, and reinforcing acquired knowledge, and in still other cases for testing the degree of assimilation of material by the soldiers.

Depending on didactic purpose, discussion is subdivided into the following types: guided (heuristic), expanded, and testing discussion.

Guided (heuristic) discussion (from the Greek word "eureka"—"I have found it," "I have discovered it") is constructed in such a way that the leader of the activity, by posing questions to the trainees, forces them to seek explanations and answers. This type of discussion is very complex and requires high pedagogic training and methodological expertise on the part of the leader.

Expanded discussion represents the lively exchange of soldiers'

opinions on problems raised by the leader of the activity. In the course of this discussion one must work for the active participation of all soldiers in the discussion of the problems and create an atmosphere of free expression of different points of view, thus ensuring the in-depth and comprehensive consideration of the questions raised for discussion.

Testing discussion has the goal of checking the degrees of assimilation of the covered training material by the soldiers. This type of discussion is employed directly in the activities for the purpose of current testing of the soldiers' knowledge, and also in examinations and tests.

What requirements are placed on the preparation and conduct of activities by the discussion method?

A discussion can yield positive results only when the *trainees already have a certain minimum knowledge*. Just as a building cannot be constructed without building material, it is impossible to set up a discussion if the soldiers are not prepared for it and do not have a base for discussion.

In order to ensure the successful progress of the discussion, *questions should be posed and resolved in strict logical sequence* and the interrelations among them should be ensured. When problems represent links of a single chain, the discussion assumes the form of the natural, logical development of thoughts of events, phenomena, and facts and proceeds without constraint and in proper sequence. Soldiers captivated by its internal logic display active interest and the desire to express their own judgments and to share their own knowledge and observations.

The correct definition of the character of the questions in accordance with the task posed at the session is an important condition for the successful application of discussion.

During a guided discussion, questions which require the trainees to name some fact, to describe an event, employ a certain method, cite examples, formulate the studied rule or concept, and so on are extensively used. Questions of this type usually contain some specific task and require a brief answer on the part of the soldiers.

A discussion for the purpose of reinforcing knowledge presupposes the posing of questions which require the trainees to prove some phenomenon, to explain a fact and event, and to demonstrate the interrelation between them. These questions presuppose expanded answers on the part of the soldiers and the substantiation of conclusions and generalizations.

The main questions should be prepared well ahead of time, with consideration for the tasks and contents of the discussion and the level of the soldiers' knowledge. This contributes to the more productive utilization of training time and excludes all sorts of random questions which

divert the discussion. Any question raised during the discussion should as much as possible ensure the active functioning of the soldiers' thought and help develop initiative and independence in them. To this end the questions should be formulated in such a way that they are not overly difficult, do not suggest the answer, and do not allow a person to limit himself to a monosyllabic "yes" or "no."

Sometimes a question may not be immediately understood by some trainees. In such cases the leader should quickly and surely establish why the difficulty has arisen and what obstacle the soldier has encountered. Depending on the reason the question should either be repeated or altered.

One often finds the following type of situation in educational practice. The leader poses a question and a soldier says that he understands everything and he knows how to answer but he cannot express his knowledge ("I can't find the words"). Excluding cases of inadequate knowledge of the Russian language, almost always we can say that the main reason for this in such a situation is a lack of understanding of the essence of the subject. "... The only time when people don't know what to say," as V. G. Belinskiy rightly said, "is when they express something which they themselves do not understand very well. A person clearly expresses himself when a thought masters him, but even more clearly when he masters the thought."²

It is wise to construct a discussion in such a way that *complex problems alternate with easy problems*. This helps to maintain the proper attention of the trainees throughout the entire activity.

So that all trainees prepare for the answer, *a question is usually posed to the entire group*, and then a brief pause is made and one of the soldiers or sergeants is called. This procedure may well be combined with voluntary answers, contributing to the development of the trainees' initiative.

One of the most widely encountered shortcomings in the organization of discussions is the inability of a leader of an activity to achieve the active participation of all trainees in answering posed questions. It often happens that during a discussion the same soldiers and sergeants speak out while the others at best repeat what their better trained and more experienced comrades would say. "But what can we do," say some officers, "if you can't get more than two or three phrases from some trainee no matter how you try? Let him repeat what the others say and perhaps he will learn it."

This is an incorrect opinion. This method may lead to a situation whereby from session to session some soldier or sergeant will become increasingly convinced that "nothing will come of it anyway," will lose interest in the subject, and will long remain among the laggards.

Experienced methodologists believe that in order to involve inade-

quately prepared soldiers or those who have poor knowledge of the Russian language into a discussion, above all one must instill in them confidence in their own capabilities and help them to overcome timidity, constraint, and the fear of making a mistake. In such cases they try to pose leading questions, begin the discussion as if from afar, from aside, or else animate the situation with some joke or anecdote and draw the audience into the discussion.

Hastiness on the part of the leader, a lack of sufficient time for thinking out an answer, pressure, and the inability of the leader to hear out his trainees calmly and patiently have a harmful effect on the course of a discussion. This shortcoming is occasionally caused by incorrect calculation of time or overloading of the session with training questions or failure to remember that in instruction one should proceed not from the knowledge of the leader of the activity, but from the soldiers' level of training. Therefore the officer should strive not to interrupt a statement by a trainee and not rebuff him until he has completely presented his idea. If he makes a mistake or digresses from the subject, by means of additional questions one should help him to understand his mistake and set him on the proper path. This can be done with the aid of the other soldiers. But one should not rush to answer himself or to suggest the answer.

In order to enliven a discussion some officers tell the soldiers to *prove their thought and to try to refute the opposite point of view, and endeavor to initiate polemics*. This method is worthy of dissemination.

Analysis of the trainees' statements during the conversation plays an important role in training soldiers and sergeants to think logically and to give thorough and well-founded answers. Analysis should clearly and accurately show a soldier what was correct in his answer and what was erroneous, and why something was missing for complete coverage of the question.

During a discussion servicemen may form their own questions. The leader should encourage in every way possible the posing of questions, for they further the development of the thought, initiative, and independence of the soldiers. Here he should keep in mind that there are various types of questions. Some may arise as a result of insufficiently clear explanation of the training material, others attest to the particular interest of the soldiers and sergeants in what they have heard and to their desire to learn more.

Sometimes soldiers have questions in the form of an objection to the leader of the activity, whose explanations may have seemed insufficiently convincing. It may occur that an officer or soldier cannot refute the student's objection. In such a situation one should not pretend that the question is trifling, nor should one attempt to brush it aside or (still

worse) somehow try to cut off a subordinate. " . . . Don't worry if you cannot answer some question, " said M. I. Kalinin. "Openly say: 'I don't know, but I will look for an answer in the books; if I find it I will tell you.' " ³

Each session presupposes a *summation of the results* of the discussion. Here the leader must have the ability not only to give an objective evaluation of answers, but also to analyze the main mistakes, to establish the reasons underlying them, to correct erroneous reasoning, and to set precisely and clearly the tasks for preparing for the next session. The training time must be correctly computed if the analysis is to be instructive. The analysis may not be carried out at the expense of the break time between sessions.

Illustration is the most economical way of teaching actions to soldiers. The illustrative method represents the aggregate of the modes and actions by means of which a visual image of the studied subject is created in the soldiers and specific ideas of the layout of weapons and combat equipment are formed.

Illustration is employed in the study of drill methods, physical exercises, actions involving weapons, the layout and methods of controlling combat equipment, the rules for carrying out tactical and other missions, the procedure for serving combat duty, internal, garrison, and guard duty, and so on.

Demonstration by using various means of depictive, graphic, and three-dimensional aids in the course of oral presentation, and the demonstration of experiments (in the study of the laws of mechanics, ballistics, electronics, and so on) is one of the varieties of the illustrative method. Most often demonstration is not an independent method, but a methodological mode which is part of an explanation, narration, or lecture.

Depending on the goals and content of the activities, illustration may be carried out in various forms: personal illustration of the methods and actions of the instructor; illustration with the aid of specially trained soldiers (standouts in training, rated specialists); illustration activities (the actions of detachments, teams, crews, or subunits); and illustration by means of training films.

Personal illustration conducted by the commander or political worker serves as a source of knowledge and a model to be imitated by subordinates. It is employed in many subjects of combat training and usually begins with a brief explanation of the actions to be studied, their function, and a general description; for instance, the execution of drill, actions with and without weapons, use of sports equipment, methods of adjusting equipment, the techniques of driving combat vehicles, and so on.

A method or action is first demonstrated as a whole and at a normal rate and pace—that is, it is demonstrated just as it should be carried out in practice. This enables the soldiers and sergeants to gain a visual idea of the study method or action in general form. In order to accord the trainees the opportunity to master the correct procedure for carrying out the method (or action) and its structure, the illustration is subsequently carried out in parts, at a slower rate. Usually illustration by parts is accompanied by a brief explanation, so that the soldiers accurately perceive and correctly master the method and focus their attention on the main, essential features and on the structure and combination of individual parts.

After illustrating a method it is extremely useful to ask the trainees to go through it themselves, explaining it as they go. This ensures faster and more permanent memorization of the material under study.

Sometimes after an illustration by parts one should again perform the method (or action) as a whole. It is wise to do this especially in cases when complex actions are being studied.

In order to ensure greater graphicness of the illustration, the method of comparing correct and incorrect actions is often resorted to. True, not all methodologists approve of this method. Some of them believe that illustrating an incorrect action may have a negative effect on the assimilation of the correct techniques of execution by the soldiers—for instance, in drill, physical exercises, and actions involving combat equipment and weapons. Indeed, this danger does exist. But here it should be kept in mind that the negative consequences of comparison occur usually only when the trainees have a still inadequately developed ability to analyze, a short attention span, and a weak ability to shift focus, and when the explanation accompanying the illustration is incorrectly constructed.

On the whole, however, an illustration of this type is not only possible, but in a number of cases exceedingly necessary. For instance, in teaching soldiers to carry out regular work on a radar set it is important to show not only the correct form of the tested signal on the oscilloscope, but also the signals which might appear during abnormal operation of the equipment.

In addition to personal illustration, many commanders resort to *the illustration of actions by using well-trained soldiers*—in drill, for instance. A person competent at drill may be called up to demonstrate some method for an entire group of soldiers or for one or two of them. The same method is employed to demonstrate actions with weapons, combat equipment, and apparatus.

Illustrative studies as a variety of the illustration method may be of two types: purely illustrative or methodological. One type of these studies has the goal of showing exemplary actions by a subunit, the other of showing an exemplary method of instruction.

The difference in goals also defines the difference in the preparations for these activities. The former must necessarily be preceded by intensive preparation of personnel for exemplary actions. During this activity the degree of training of the soldiers and their ability to carry out specific missions are demonstrated.

The latter type of illustrative studies, however, sets a different goal—that of demonstrating an exemplary method of conducting studies. Here attention should be turned mainly to comprehensive preliminary methodological preparation by the leader. Unfortunately this fact is sometimes allowed to slip from view. The leaders of illustrative methodological exercises often train the subunit as well. As a result of this, the officers or sergeants at such a methodological activity do not see the main thing—the method of training as yet untrained men.

One of the main criteria for the successful application of the illustrative method is *thorough knowledge of the training material and the ability skillfully to perform the methods and actions under study*. In order to demonstrate well, one must first know the subject to perfection. But this is still not enough. Sometimes soldiers master training material only with difficulty, although the leader of the activity has brilliantly demonstrated his personal skill. In this case, methodological mistakes hinder the successful progress of the training. They are often manifested by the fact that a commander is unable to find the proper place for himself, as a result of which not all trainees see what is demonstrated or else they fail to observe the main things.

The angle of view from which the trainees see a method or action is essential to the correct perception of demonstrated actions. Therefore, it is useful to change the viewing angle. For instance, in demonstrating how to turn in place with and without a weapon, the leader of the activity should conduct the move facing the formation, then sideways, and finally from the rear. This helps the trainees better to see such details as the position of the hands and heels and the movement of the legs.

The pace of the demonstration is also of great importance. Too rapid motions on the part of the leader prevent the trainees from observing the most essential aspects, and too slow actions may create an incorrect idea of the method under study. Nor should one encumber a demonstration with unnecessary details which complicate the main things and prevent the trainees from concentrating thereon.

Practice. By the method of practice is meant the repeated, conscious,

and increasingly complicated repetition of certain methods and actions in order to develop and improve the skills and abilities of the soldiers.

During practice, soldiers master the practical methods of utilizing and maintaining combat equipment and weapons; conducting tactical, fire, and technical assignments; and fulfilling drill and gymnastic procedures and actions in dismounted formations, vehicles, tanks, and combat vehicles.

Training activities are a variety of practice. They serve to reinforce and improve skills and abilities already formed. For instance, small-arms, artillery, tank gunnery, physical, and other training exercises usually begin when the soldiers have already developed the necessary actions and procedures at previous activities and when, in the course of practice, they have learned the rules and sequence for meeting certain standards.

Nothing new is studied in training practice. Of course, this does not mean that what is already known is simply repeated during training practice. Training practice serves not only to maintain skills and abilities at the necessary level, but also to improve them. Thus, practice and training activities should not be confused or compared with each other.

The role of practice as a method of instruction is determined by the specific weight which the development of skills and abilities occupies in the training process. "... No school, no university, is worth anything," said V. I. Lenin, "if there is no practical knowledge."⁴

Military activities, like no others, require a very large number of the most diverse skills and abilities raised to the highest degree of perfection. This is because of the complexity of combat equipment and weapons, the rapid pace of combat operations, and abrupt changes in the situation on the battlefield.

Practice is one of the most important means to form high morale and combat efficiency in soldiers. During practice soldiers and sergeants acquire such attributes as attentiveness, imagination, initiative, boldness, and persistence. Practice develops combat skills on whose basis the soldiers gain confidence in their weapons. And this confidence is one of the most important prerequisites in the psychological training of soldiers to achieve victory in battle.

Three main stages may be singled out in any practice: *the initial stage*, characterized by a large number of mistakes and often by the fact that instead of anticipated improvements in the trainees' actions the number of mistakes increases as the procedure is repeated; *the transition stage*, when productivity increases rapidly; and *the final stage*, which is distinguished by high and steady productivity.

From a methodological standpoint the organization of the first stage

of practice, when instruction in the methods of carrying out various motions and the fulfillment of practical tasks begins, is especially complicated. The initial stage includes the development of a procedure according to elements, in integrated operation, at slower and normal rates, under the observation of the leader of the activity, in pairs, and independently.

Let us examine some of the conditions whose observance ensures the successful handling of any practice.

One such condition is the soldier's *understanding of the goal of the practice*. When soldiers and sergeants know well the practical function of the procedures that they are working on and their role in battle and when they have a clear idea of the results toward which they should aspire, they act consciously and with initiative, interest, and creative enthusiasm.

The soldiers' *mastery of the contents and the strict sequence for fulfilling the actions under instruction is also of great importance*. The more complex such actions and the more they influence the work of other soldiers, the more the need for strict observance of the sequence increases.

For instance, in order for the launch team of a missile subunit to learn in a short period of time how to execute their combat work correctly, it is important not only to demonstrate to each member of the crew the nature of his action, but also to work for the permanent memorization and strict observance of the sequence of actions which ensures the coordinated work of the entire team.

At the initial stage of the practice a significant role belongs to so-called *testing of the procedure*. Indeed, the practice begins with this. The essence of testing consists in the fact that after the leader has shown the action the soldiers and sergeants try to reproduce it independently. Testing helps them to concentrate on the actions under study and to overcome their constraint, lack of confidence, and sense of timidity and alarm ("everyone will manage to do everything, but I won't"). This is why after a demonstration one should not move immediately to practice supervised by the leader. It is better to give the trainee an opportunity to work alone with a procedure new to him and to adapt to it.

In preparing for a practice study session, a leader should divide a complex action into its components in such a way as to ensure adequate simplicity of each "step" of the exercise and at the same time to maintain the full contents of the action that is being worked on. Here the division should not convert the exercise into very small, isolated steps whose meaning cannot be grasped by the trainees. Too fine a division of actions generally complicates their mastery and leads to rapid fatigue in the soldiers.

In order for instruction to proceed successfully one must first work to

achieve correct actions during the practice and then to increase the speed. Otherwise a soldier may in his haste learn incorrect actions, and sooner or later he will have to be reinstructed. This is much more difficult than to teach afresh.

It is also important to keep in mind the fact that the beginning and end of an action are usually mastered more quickly and with a smaller number of mistakes. This is why more time should be allotted to working on methods which constitute the core of the action and to cover a smaller number of points. Moreover, this portion [the core] should first be worked out at a slower pace.

The execution of an entire action should not be delayed until the individual elements are finally polished. Delay in working out individual elements may become an obstacle to the mastery of the whole action.

It has been established by special psychological studies that for the successful management of an exercise it is important to pay attention not only to how the trainees perform an action on the whole, insofar as on the whole they fall into the existing standards, but constantly to analyze the degree of precision and speed with which individual elements of the action are executed. By identifying weak links and concentrating attention on them, the leader of the activity thus contributes to the further improvement of the trainees' skills.

Observance of a definite pace and of the proper sequence of actions, which require on the part of the trainee various degrees of strain on his physical and moral strength, is a mandatory condition for the successful progression of any exercise. For instance, in order successfully to work out individual drill procedures it is more useful to plan drill activities one hour a day than two hours every other day. There are some subjects of instruction in which practice is better conducted every day, without a prolonged break (for instance, swimming instruction).

In these cases each succeeding exercise will follow the fresh tracks of what preceded, thus deepening and reinforcing it. When there are long intervals between practice sessions, on each occasion the track should be laid anew, since after 2-3 days it is largely obliterated.

For successful progress in practice sessions it is important to *maintain the trainees' interest* in it and a conscious attitude toward multiple repetitions, and not to allow the appearance of boredom and indifference. In instruction, as M. V. Frunze advised, one should pay attention to eliminating all phenomena which might give rise in a trainee to the idea that he is spending his time uselessly. Instruction should be set up in such a way as to interest the soldiers and to stimulate and develop in them a love of military affairs and a desire to improve themselves. This can be accomplished in various ways. One such way is to give initial data, which the leader of

the exercise provides in order to generate interest in practice sessions among the soldiers and to introduce a competitive element.

To the same ends the instructor tries in each activity to introduce new elements into the polishing of methods, to complicate the conditions of the exercises, to reduce the time required to carry out the procedure, and so on. For instance, in the gunnery practice in which tank cannon draw "envelopes" and "spirals," from time to time it is useful to carry out the assignment in reverse order. This creates a definite interest in the trainees and contributes to the development of more advanced skills.

The leader of an activity must remember that any practice should be utilized not only to develop appropriate abilities and skills, but also psychologically to prepare the soldiers for combat. For this purpose the compilation of special inputs aimed at developing in the trainees rapid reaction, at increasing their attention, and at developing emotional stability under complex conditions is practiced in some units. For instance, during practice firing and during training exercises in missile and radar subunits the operators are given unexpected inputs on an equipment malfunction, various sounds characteristic of the flight of an aircraft or of bomb explosions are reproduced by tape recorders and commands are issued.

In combat and political training of soldiers *independent work* on mastering the training material is acquiring increasingly great significance. It is the most important training method for all of our personnel.

In the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress L. I. Brezhnev stated: "... Independent work has been and remains, of course, the main training method. In order not to lag behind current developments, all our personnel must constantly study, raise their ideological and theoretical level, and master the achievements of science and advanced practice."⁵

The method of the independent study of material is the aggregate of the procedures and methods with whose aid soldiers reinforce previously acquired knowledge, skills, and abilities and master new ones without the direct participation of officers or sergeants.

Independent study of training material is of vast importance to the formation of the thoughts and convictions of soldiers. "Only when you learn independently to analyze the problem," said V. I. Lenin, addressing students of Sverdlovsk University, "can you begin to consider yourselves sufficiently firm in your convictions and only then can you begin successfully to defend them to anyone and at any time."⁶

Depending on the character of the training material on which the soldiers are working, there are also varieties of independent work.

Work with printed sources is one of the most widely encountered varieties of independent study of training material. Independent work with a book is of exceptionally great importance to the thorough and long-lasting mastery of knowledge. This is due to the fact that in the process of independent reading a person has an opportunity to perceive the training material at the rate which best corresponds to his individual capabilities, to reflect upon certain passages, to return to what he has read, to turn to various reference works, and so on.

In independent work on a book the following training goals may be set: reinforcing (repeating) the material under study, acquiring new knowledge, and preparing to take in new material at a forthcoming session. The attainment of these goals always requires great will power on the part of the trainees, creative ability, independence, and a definite system.

The study of material in a book usually begins with a reading of the section, chapter, or paragraph as a whole, enabling a person to create an integral concept of the content and to understand what the subject is. Further, it is recommended to read the material by parts, singling out the main ideas and the sequence of arguments and formulating a brief outline in the mind of what has been read.

The most important condition for the rapid and long-lasting mastery of training material in the course of independent reading is the active joint participation of the visual and aural organs and the speech and motor apparatus. Therefore, in addition to reading "to oneself," it is extremely useful to utter certain passages which are particularly difficult, to write out (if allowed) numbers, tactical specification, the names of parts, the sequence of work, difficult words, and incomprehensible terms, and finally in many cases it is necessary to draw up a brief outline or summary of what has been read. When the material is studied according to diagrams, blueprints, or tables, it is wise to copy them.

In independent reading soldiers often have to deal with material which must be firmly memorized in the form in which it is presented—for instance, in a regulation, manual, or instruction. In order to ensure the solid memorization of material it is necessary to thoroughly comprehend it as a whole, to trace the sequence and relations among its individual parts, and to explain its practical significance to the fulfillment of one's own official duties and to the subunit as a whole. Moreover, in this work purposefulness, concentration, persistence, and the ability to control oneself are needed.

In independent work on a book particular attention should be paid to ensuring that the material under study is memorized logically, and by meaning. The desire simply to memorize, to cram individual passages leads to a great loss of time and effort.

In the course of independent reading soldiers and sergeants often try first to master the easier parts of the material, and only then undertake

the more difficult. This method is not always very productive since it often may occur that less time remains for a difficult section of material, not to mention the fact that the work on it will have to be done when the brain is already tired.

Summarization of what has already been read is one of the most important conditions for high productivity in the independent study of printed sources. It makes it possible better to comprehend and memorize the material under study. Summarization is important not only in the sense that it supplements visual memory with motor memory, but is also a form of active creative participation of the reader in the author's reasoning, in uncovering facts, comprehending phenomena, and formulating conclusions. Note taking helps to form the trainees' own thoughts.

Unfortunately, at first not all servicemen know how to take notes and recapitulate what has been read. Sometimes summaries are either verbatim transcriptions from training aids (and the questions and subquestions are not singled out) or they contain only a list of the training problems of the subject.

What notes can be made in independent reading? They may be in the form of a *brief outline* (when only the problems presented in a given printed source are enumerated in sequence), or in the form of an *expanded outline* (in which the problems are not only enumerated, but a brief description of their contents is given in the form of subquestions). In the course of reading *excerpts* may be made (in the form of quotations, numbers, diagrams, tables, or the restatement of certain facts). The *summary* is the most thorough form of note-taking. It is a brief presentation of the material under study.

All these forms of notes may be used both in preparing for political activities and in the study of the technical and special literature, regulations, and manuals. In giving assignments for independent work, the leader of an activity may also suggest a form of notes which is best suited to the particular material.

In order for a summary to be graphic and convenient to use, various methods of singling out certain important passages, phrases, or words are used: the size of the letter or their slope may be changed, a line may be marked in the margin, or colored pencils may be used. Writing a summary, like any other work, requires a certain amount of know-how and skill.

"It is good to take notes from memory," advises N. K. Krupskaya, "and then to compare them with the text and once again to jot down from memory the now accurate text. This develops the skill of accurately conveying the thoughts of others, and this is very important.

"One should also write down in a notebook everything that must be

memorized: years, events, figures, explanations of incomprehensible words and expressions, and the names of cities. One should even reread one's own notes. One should take notes precisely and clearly so that later time does not have to be spent on deciphering what has been written." 7

The study leader should teach his soldiers the ability to work with printed sources and in particular to summarize the material covered.

The independent study of combat equipment and weapons is carried out by means of disassembly and assembly of the weapon and through the use of mock-ups, cutaway models, and functioning circuits. It is usually combined with repetition of the manuals, instructions, and directions and with the use of reference aids.

Here various types of diagrams which demonstrate the operating principles of a block or unit and which show the pathways of an electrical current, combustible fluid, lubricant, or signals and their transformation are of especially great importance. Work with diagrams helps in understanding the essence of the physical processes which transpire in equipment and apparatus, contributes to faster detection and elimination of malfunctions, and helps to master the skills of adjusting and tuning mechanisms and equipment.

The independent study of combat equipment, weapons, and apparatus is often accompanied by *independent training exercises*. A communications man, for instance, may train in a special classroom on a printer or with a telegraph key, a tank driver may work on a combat vehicle trainer, an operator may work with a radar screen, and so on.

These training activities may also be conducted in other subjects of combat training—drill, physical, fire, and tactical training, for instance. In this case it is better to construct independent training activities in such a way that the soldiers are divided into pairs. This enables the better trained soldier to extend practical assistance to a lagging comrade and to teach him subject-by-subject to carry out some procedure (on gymnastic apparatus, a gun mount, or other equipment).

One of the most promising methods of independent study and reinforcement of training material is *the watching of topical television broadcasts and filmslides*. Central and local programs provide many opportunities for this. It is important only that the leader of a political activities group or the commander provide in advance for the viewing of those broadcasts which may be used for independent work on various subjects of combat and political training. It is not hard to do this, since television schedules are published well ahead of time.

As television is further developed obviously it will become possible not only to adapt to appropriate broadcasts, but also to order certain television films connected with the expansion and deepening of soldiers'

knowledge not only in the field of political training, but also in the sphere of scientific and technical achievements. For the same purpose slides may be widely used during independent training hours.

It is understandable that all these facilities and opportunities for independent work should not replace, but should supplement one another and thus contribute to the repetition, reinforcement, and deepening of knowledge and skills.

What are the *criteria for success* in independent work?

The productivity of independent work depends largely on the level of the trainees' training, abilities, and skills and on the competence of the commander and political worker in organizing it. The following are necessary for correct organization of the independent work of soldiers:

- 1) Determination of the amount of work for self-preparation;
- 2) Necessary methodological advice on repeating what has been studied or in polishing up procedures in practice;
- 3) Attention must be paid to ensure that each group of soldiers has a training place and the necessary amount of literature, visual aids, or models of weapons and combat equipment;
- 4) Division of the servicemen into groups in which both rapidly progressing soldiers and lagging soldiers are present and in which comradely mutual aid can be extended;
- 5) Monitoring and aid.

Determination of a self-training assignment is not so simple as it may seem at first glance. This requires considerable work on the part of the leader of the activity. The assignment must correspond to the amount of time allotted for self-training, to the character of the training material, its complexity, and the soldiers' level of training. It should be taken into consideration that in working on new material (that is, in reading and summarizing it) a trainee expends an average of 15 minutes per page, but when repeating material already studied 3–5 minutes. Moreover, thoughtful analysis of the contents of the training material and establishment of its relation to previous and subsequent activities are required.

In order for trainees to utilize self-training time more productively, it is also important for the commander and political worker to thoroughly explain to the soldiers in what sequence and how the material should be studied, and to point out what special attention should be paid, which methods contribute to more durable memorization, what should be noted or rewritten and how, and how to monitor one's own work in learning. Such methodological advice is especially important in the first months of instruction.

The posing of questions which the soldiers and sergeants must answer

in the course of independent reading of regulations, manuals, textbooks, and other literature is of great benefit to the in-depth understanding and sound assimilation of training material.

The preparation of the training site has considerable influence on the productivity of independent work. Above all it should correspond to the number of people in the group so that the soldiers can take their places without crowding each other. The necessary literature, training units, mock-ups, diagrams, and other material support for the activity should be present at the training site. Concern for the training site is one of the main tasks of both the commander and the staff supervising the organization of the training process.

The question of how to break a group down for independent work is answered on the basis of the type and character of the training material, the subject, the availability of training sites, and other conditions.

As experience shows, individual reading is most productive in work with printed sources. It enables soldiers thoroughly to comprehend material by employing the methods which are most convenient for them. But when there is an insufficient amount of literature or when the soldiers have poor knowledge of the Russian language it is necessary to resort to collective reading with concomitant explanation of individual words, concepts, or whole sections of text.

The study of weapons and combat equipment and the improvement of actions in trainers are best conducted in a small group (of two to four persons), and training on gymnastic apparatus in pairs. This makes it possible to utilize material to maximum density and at the same time accords each trainee the opportunity of working for a rather long period of time, and also ensures good mutual monitoring and mutual aid.

Monitoring holds a tremendous role in improving the quality of independent work. It should be constant and topical. From time to time the commander or political worker checks to see how the soldiers of his group are doing, how self-training is proceeding, what is interfering with the study productivity, which soldiers are experiencing difficulties in what, and who needs assistance most of all. A lack of supervision may give rise to an incorrect attitude on the part of the soldiers toward independent work and may lead to unproductive expenditure of training time.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 21, p 21.
2. V. G. Belinskiy, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 6, Moscow, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1955, p 524.
3. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, p 579.
4. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 42, p 77.
5. *Materially XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 101.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 39, p 65.
7. N. K. Krupskaya, *Ped. soch.*, Moscow, Izd-vo APN RSFSR, 1960, pp 767-768.

Chapter 9. Forms of Training Personnel of Subunits. Testing and Evaluation of Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

1. The Concept of Forms of Training and Their Characteristics

Training tasks are carried out in certain forms of educational and on-the-job activities which characterize primarily the organizational aspect of combat and political training. *The grouping of trainees, the place, time, and conditions of an activity (training session), the character of the relation between instructors and trainees, and the correlation between the collective and individual cognitive activity of the soldiers* are expressed in the forms of training.

In characterizing each individual activity principally from the standpoint of its organization, the forms of training in large measure depend on the contents of combat and political instruction and are clearly connected with didactic principles and methods.

Like any military pedagogic process, the forms of training are constantly being improved. This is due to changes in training tasks, the level of development, and the training of personnel, authorized organization, the specifics of combat duties and of various branches and services of the Armed Forces, and the features of combat equipment.

At the present time the question of forms of training is assuming particular significance. The further saturation of the Armed Forces with increasingly complex combat equipment and weapons necessitates the accelerated training of a large number of specialists of diverse profiles. Even in a motorized infantry company there are as many as 10 specialists, whose training requires the formation of individual, numerically small training groups in each subunit and hence the application of various forms of training.

Specific forms of training are employed in each branch and service of the Armed Forces. In the process of training any specialist, however, many general training tasks are carried out in addition to the specific tasks. Because of this, forms of training common to the Armed Forces

as a whole have been set forth. Of course, the general forms may also be distinctively employed in aviation, the navy, the National Air Defense Forces, and so on.

Knowledge, skills, and abilities are acquired not only in training activities. Planned work on the maintenance of combat equipment and weapons and the fulfillment of a combat mission on guard duty, combat duty, or elsewhere play a great role in reinforcing and improving them. Moreover, in connection with the reduction of the period of service the need for quite extensive use of various forms of extracurricular and off-duty work in the interests of combat and political training is increasing.

With consideration for all these factors, the general forms of the training of individual soldiers and subunits may be combined into several kindred groups. It is accepted practice in Soviet military pedagogy to consider the following to be such groups:

- 1) Planned training (theoretical activities, practical activities, training exercises, practice firings and missile launches, and studies);
- 2) Planned on-the-job forms (practical work on the maintenance of equipment and weapons, administrative maintenance days, scheduled maintenance days);
- 3) Various types of off-duty work (technical discussion groups and lecture series, schools of advanced studies, contests, competitions, and so on).

Each of these groups provides for, although not to an equal extent, the conduct of activities both on a uniform basis, according to a unified plan for the entire subunit, and according to individual plans with individual soldiers or with a group of identically trained soldiers.

What is the content of the main forms of training?

Theoretical activities ensure the assimilation of socio-political knowledge, the theoretical principles of modern combat, and the physical foundations and working principles of combat equipment and weapons. In carrying out the task primarily of the theoretical training of personnel, at the same time they accord the opportunity of forming certain practical skills, primarily mental and sensory. As a rule, these are lesson-type classroom activities. Movies and slides, sound recordings, all forms of visual aids, and models of weapons and combat equipment may be extensively utilized in them.

The careful breakdown of training material by content, good organization, and well-planned methods of conducting theoretical activities provide the possibility of specifically realizing in the course of instruction the principle of teaching the soldiers that which is needed in war and of carrying out the task of moral-political and psychological training.

Concern for ensuring that all theoretical activities conducted with personnel are of ideological content, Party-oriented, and closely connected with real life is an important duty of the subunit commander or political worker.

Theoretical activities may in principle be conducted in all types of military training, but hardly to the same extent. In political training this is the predominant form of activities. Here such forms of training as excursions and speeches to the soldiers by veterans of the revolution, Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Socialist Labor, foremost industrial and agricultural workers, and representatives of local soviet and Party organs are successfully utilized in addition to lesson-type classroom activities.

Theoretical activities may also be used in studying weapons of mass destruction and the theory of firing and of the materiel portion of weapons, and in certain types of special training. But there are training subjects in which theoretical activities with soldiers and sailors are hardly ever conducted (drill, physical training, and some others).

Practical activities play a leading role in the combat training of soldiers and sergeants. The group of practical activities also comprises such forms of instruction as tactical-drill and tactical activities, activities at launch and fire positions, firing ranges, tank parks, motor pools, garages, the drill field, guard and engineer posts, and elsewhere.

The main goal of practical activities is to improve the field skills of soldiers, to develop abilities, and to coordinate detachments (teams, crews), platoons, or a company. During practical activities the soldiers master weapons and combat equipment and work on the solution of tactical, fire, and other special missions in various types of combat. The practical actions of the trainees here are the main source for the multiplication of knowledge and the acquisition of practical skills. The organization and methods of any practical activity depend on the contents of the material under study, the training goal, and the profiles of the trainees. The diversity of the forms of this type of activity accords much room for the creativity of commanders and political workers in the training and indoctrination of personnel.

Tactical activities in formation are conducted against a definite tactical background which requires vigorous and strenuous actions on the part of personnel. The training problems of the subject (for instance, moving in pre-combat and combat formation, crossing sectors of terrain with a high radiation level or war gas contamination, the repulsing of counterattacks) are worked out by elements. Each element is repeated until the trainees acquire the skills needed for confident execution. Then all actions falling into the training problem are fused into a whole. Individual analysis is conducted for each problem. When there are

shortcomings, the execution of individual elements or of the entire complex is repeated.

In contrast to a *tactical activity* in formation, a tactical activity is conducted continuously until all training problems are worked out. The mistakes of trainees are corrected by means of presenting input on the actions of the enemy or on losses inflicted. It is important that the solution of inputs by individual soldiers, detachment (team, crew) commanders, and platoon leaders entail not only physical, but also intellectual and mental challenge. This is achieved through the active resistance of the "enemy," the prolonged wearing of means of individual protection by personnel, the use of various types of simulation, and the conduct of activities under any weather conditions in the daytime and at night. Tactical activities create a favorable situation for training under conditions close to combat conditions and for bringing together the main types of military training.

Training activities, among which are physical, drill, small-arms, tank gunnery and artillery training exercises, radio training, exercises, and training exercises in protection against weapons of mass destruction and in response to the "alert" signal, comprise a variety of practical activities in the subunit. They are conducted for the purpose of maintaining and improving general and special skills, with special trainers or directly with combat equipment. Training exercises with combat equipment are preceded by work with trainers. In any case the conditions of training exercises must correspond to the requirements of modern combat. During training exercises the fulfillment and overfulfillment of established standards are worked for and conditions close to combat conditions are created.

In order to increase the effectiveness of training activities, subunit commanders and political workers set up a socialist competition on the tasks and standards, introduce the competitive element into the training process, inform subordinates of the results of training exercises, and popularize the achievements of the best personnel.

Training exercises and theoretical and practical activities accord extensive opportunity for training soldiers according to *individual plans*. This form presupposes the organization of the training process with consideration for the level of training and the cognitive capabilities of individual soldiers or a group of soldiers, and thus ensures high individual rates of assimilation of training material and opens up room for the independent mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities and for the manifestation of initiative and the extension of mutual aid.

The form of instruction according to individual plans has been used most often in subjects of technical training. Recently it has become increasingly widespread in political activities as well. In many subunits

the political training of soldiers and sergeants who have higher and incomplete secondary educations has been set up according to individual plans. In working according to general training plans, these soldiers receive from the deputy company commander for political affairs the individual assignments of studying and summarizing the works of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the Communist Party, and other sources which are necessary for thorough assimilation of the program material. The progress of the fulfillment of individual assignments is monitored. When need be, the trainees receive consultation from a political worker or the leader of the political activities group. At seminars such soldiers deliver reports or information on the independently studied materials.

At a certain stage theoretical and practical activities in the study of materiel and the theory of firing, and training exercises with trainers and combat equipment are concluded with field firing and field missile launchings.

Field firings and missile launches constitute a special group of training forms, a group which combines small-arms fire (practice, field or within subunits), artillery, aerial, and ship firing, live grenade throwing, and missile launches. In addition to effectively testing the level of training of soldiers and subunits, they accord great opportunity for the combat solidification of subunits and the formation of the skills of working with various types of ammunition, fuel components, and combat missiles, and because of this are destined to play a very important role in the psychological training of soldiers for actions in a combat situation.

Field firing and missile launches require particularly careful preparation on the part of commanders and political workers. Comprehensive coverage of the procedures and methods of the forthcoming firing, including the use of practice ammunition, is conducted during the preparatory work, the conditions of the exercises, and the safety measure to be enforced are studied, and measures for the psychological preparation of the soldiers are implemented. Party and Komsomol organizations ensure the exemplary behavior of communists and Komsomol members in training and in work. The preparatory period concludes with a check of the readiness of personnel to carry out fire and tactical missions. An examination is used to determine the readiness of specialists for missile launches.

Firings and missile launches are conducted in accordance with the requirements of firing courses and special instructions. The efforts of the subunit commander and political worker are directed toward the precise fulfillment of firing safety rules and at preventing the slightest violations of safety measures. By creating a complex tactical situation, changing the order in which targets are presented, and according a maximum of independence in the choice of targets and in the correction of malfunctions, the leaders of firing exercises and the control officers

not only teach the soldiers to have confidence in a combat situation, but also instill in them high morale and combat efficiency.

Studies, which combine the higher methods of training enlisted men, sergeants, and officers, possess the greatest possibilities for carrying out the tasks of the field training of soldiers and subunits. These *studies* include *tactical, specialized-tactical studies, as well as those conducted under combat fire*. A particular feature of these forms of instruction is that in them servicemen carry out in practice the entire body of their functional duties in a situation as close as possible to combat. Here not only is the combat coordination of the subunit worked out, but the foundations of the interactions of soldiers of various specialties and different branches of arms are laid and the psychological tempering of personnel is accomplished. In a tactical training exercise with field firing, soldiers gain a more or less realistic idea of the character of modern combat and of the requirements imposed on personnel.

Even in working out the idea behind a training exercise it is important to foresee that the knowledge, skills, and abilities which the personnel have in all types of combat training are brought together under field conditions and that the conditions of the exercise are made as close as possible to combat. For this purpose the actions of personnel in dangerous situations are planned, various types of simulation are employed, and great physical and mental challenges are created. The effectiveness of training and indoctrination in exercises greatly increases when the trainees are faced with a strong, active "enemy." Therefore, a majority of training exercises are conducted as two-party events.

In modern combat skillful and resolute actions on the part of small subunits, small groups of soldiers, and individual specialists are becoming exceedingly important. In addition to training exercises within a company (or battery), subunits are drawn into battalion, regimental, and divisional training exercises and also into large-scale military maneuvers. But no matter what the scale of a training exercise, the commanders and political workers of subunits must never let slip from view the problems of individual training, must work with each specialist individually, and must improve the skills of sergeants and officers in controlling their subordinates. Whenever this is forgotten a soldier may gain an incorrect opinion of the nature of modern combat and of his role in combat operations.

One of the most important tasks of Party political work in training exercises is to draw all soldiers and sailors into active participation and to ensure the accomplishment of the mission by every specialist, team, crew, and detachment. At the analysis of the training exercise within the subunit, the actions of each soldier and of each combat vehicle crew are analyzed in detail and evaluated. The results of the training exercise are

discussed separately with officers and sergeants (or senior NCOs). Moreover, the subunit political worker conducts a special analysis with active Party and Komsomol members and, when need be, recommends that the work of communists and Komsomol members during the training exercise be discussed at meetings or sessions of the bureau.

The acquisition of modern combat equipment greatly increases maintenance time and time needed to conduct preventive and periodic checks. Special days are set aside to carry out this work.

Administrative maintenance days and regular maintenance days possess great possibilities for carrying out training tasks in addition to the maintenance of combat equipment and the execution of preventive and regularly scheduled work, and therefore, are considered planned, on-the-job forms of training. During regular maintenance work equipment is adjusted and tuned and then tested with monitoring devices. During the preventive measures many mechanisms are broken down. All this provides an opportunity to understand more deeply the working principles of the equipment and the features of its operation and to master better the layout and interaction of parts.

It should not be assumed, however, that enrichment with knowledge and skills during the maintenance of combat equipment is accomplished spontaneously, without the leadership of commanders and political workers. In order to convert administrative maintenance days and regular maintenance days into an active form of instruction, it is necessary to set special training goals in advance, to give them appropriate orientation, and to utilize various methods of instruction.

Depending on the volume and character of the work carried out, the following may be training goals: to study one or several topics of technical training, to repeat the most complicated or poorly mastered program material, to acquire practical skills in correcting malfunctions and making adjustments, and so on. The general training goal is made specific in the form of definite assignments for each soldier and specialist.

The correct distribution of soldiers by groups is an important condition for successful instruction during the maintenance of combat equipment. It is important that each young soldier have by his side an experienced specialist who will simultaneously perform the role of manual and teacher during practical work.

In addition to the forms of instruction called for by combat and political training plans and programs, by combat equipment maintenance plans, and by regular maintenance plans, various *competitive forms of improving technical military knowledge and abilities* (competitions, contests, technical "battles"), *technical study groups, branches of schools of advanced know-how, and lecture series*, all of which are conducted during nontraining time, have become widespread in subunits. Primarily

the hours of mass political work and the soldiers' free time are used for these forms of training. The success of these forms is largely determined by how engaging and emotionally colored they are. Together with the subunit commander, his deputy for political and technical affairs and active Party and Komsomol members play a large role in attaining this goal.

Komsomol bureaus are often the initiators of the competitive forms of mastering technical military knowledge in subunits. It is important to support their initiative and to assign those officers and sergeants who are best trained in a technical regard to assist in them.

Supplementary activities are conducted during nontraining time in subunits for the purpose of covering gaps in the training of individual servicemen, detachments, teams, or crews or to satisfy the particular interest of the soldiers in a subject under study. Work, according to individual assignments, and consultations are set up in the process. Stand-outs in combat and political training and rated specialists help those who lag. In political training supplementary activities with soldiers and sergeants who are lagging or who did not attend a lesson are conducted by the assistant group leader. The subunit political affairs officer organizes supplementary activities, personally holds consultations, and supervises the work of active Party and Komsomol members toward extending aid to those who are lagging in training.

These forms of instruction do not, of course, exhaust all the possibilities for the mastery of combat skills. The knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired during training are reinforced and improved during service: on combat duty, on guard, on watch, and so on. The organization of the training process requires creative inquiry and the bold introduction of new, more effective forms of instruction on the part of officers.

2. Programmed Instruction and Its Place in the Training Process

By programmed instruction is meant *a controlled system for mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities*. Its main distinguishing feature is that control of the formation of knowledge, skills, and abilities is accomplished in accordance with the previously modeled optimal version of this process.

Programmed instruction is carried out primarily on the basis of careful analysis of training material and presupposes the determination of the most efficient sequence for studying subjects, sections, topics, and individual problems on the basis of comprehensive logical, psychological, and pedagogic analysis. Also of great importance is the division of training material into small, logically complete portions, or steps, which accord the opportunity to master it in the shortest possible time and at a rate which best corresponds to the individual needs of the trainees.

One of the main features of programmed instruction is the fact that facilities, methods, and procedures are employed here which make it possible to monitor not only the results of all instruction, but also each step and each operation toward mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities. This creates the possibility of forewarning trainees about mistakes and of preventing them from moving on to subsequent material until they have mastered the material at hand.

A positive aspect of programmed instruction is the fact that it has feedback—that is, it ensures the conveyance of information from the trainee to the instructor or the training aid concerning the fulfillment of commands received through the direct communications channel. Feedback makes it possible to take into account the results of the mastery of training material, to monitor the progress of trainees, and to make necessary corrections for more effective attainment of the goal.

Under traditional instruction, the transmission of reports through feedback channels—that is, the transmission of information as to how each of the trainees has mastered the material—takes place after a long delay. We learn of this through quizzes, tests, and examinations, while programmed instruction ensures rapid transmission. This fact forces the instructor to set up the conveyance of each succeeding portion of training material with consideration for the results of the mastery of the previous portion.

Programmed instruction is a system of measures which encompass all aspects of the training process. It includes:

- 1) Determination of the logical structures of the training process as a whole and by individual subject (the establishment of a sequence of study and of interrelations between objects and subjects);
- 2) The development of methodological algorithms—that is, determination of the sequence of actions which ensures optimal results in the presentation and assimilation of training material;
- 3) Preparation of training programs (systems of questions and answers for monitoring the assimilation of training materials);
- 4) The development of programmed training materials and technical means of programmed instruction.

The development of *methodological algorithms*, on whose basis the development of the means programmed instruction (training aids and technical devices) may also be carried out, should be the central link in the execution of programmed instruction.

Until quite recently only in mathematics was the concept of algorithm used as an exact prescription for carrying out a certain system of operations in a definite order to resolve all tasks of a given type. The rules of multiplication, division, addition, and subtraction are the simplest ex-

amples of algorithms. The system of operations which we execute when using a pay telephone is also an example. In order for the conversation to transpire, we must perform only those actions which are written on the metal plate on the telephone, and only in the order specified.

A methodological algorithm differs from an algorithm used to solve arithmetic problems in that it constantly changes. On each occasion it must be discovered anew according to the specific, concrete conditions of the training process and the general psychological and pedagogic provisions which reflect the internal principles governing some given link of the process of instruction (perception, assimilation with comprehension, the development of abilities and skills). In other words, when speaking of the development of methodological algorithms one should have in mind not so much the compilation of a system of unambiguous rules for the leader of the activity or for the teaching machine, as of a system of rules for seeking procedures and methods which best correspond to the given conditions.

A system of general methodological rules should set forth the main steps which are employed in the study of each portion of training material in a given subject. This system serves as a sort of tool with whose aid the training material acquires the form best suited to assimilation.

The following are among the general methodological rules:

- 1) The presentation of new materials should be started by posing a cognitive problem and creating a problem situation for the trainees;
- 2) It is best to offer the training material in the form of an argument in such a way that the trainees do not receive the knowledge in finished form, but arrive at it after traversing a complicated path of "discoveries" and after overcoming difficulties;
- 3) In giving factual material it is important that it be accompanied with instructions in which what should be done and how and what operations should be carried out are indicated. This assists in the mastering of the most efficient methods of mental activity;
- 4) Make the fullest possible use of various types of illustrative material (diagrams, figures, blueprints), ensuring that the trainees actively work on it.

Although the programing of training material cannot be reduced solely to the definition of a system of control questions, it does not at all signify rejection of the role which belongs to well-composed control questions in programed instruction. They ensure the most exact consideration of the level of assimilation of the training material and of the typical mistakes of the soldiers, and purposeful supervision toward eliminating these mistakes.

The difficulty here is found mainly in the fact that it must be foreseen in advance, and as accurately as possible, what sort of answers may be forthcoming. It is also extremely important to outline correctly the methods and ways of reacting to erroneous answers.

In working out a system of control questions a number of didactic and psychological requirements must be fully taken into consideration. In particular it is important to keep in mind the great significance of logical sequence in the posing of questions and the existence of an interrelation among them. When questions posed to the trainees are like links of a single chain, then this ensures the strictly logical development of their thoughts, teaches them consistency, and helps them to master the internal logic of the training material.

It is also important that each question ensure to the maximum degree the active thought of the soldiers and help develop initiative and independence. To this end the questions should be composed in such a way that they are not overly difficult, do not suggest the answer, and do not allow the soldiers to limit themselves solely to monosyllabic "yes" or "no."

The introduction of programmed instruction presupposes the use of those means which best correspond to the specific features of the given system controlling the training process. The programming of training material is realized in practice in instructional means.

Existing means of programmed instruction may be divided into two main groups: *programmed training aids* (textbooks, cards, assignments) and *technical means* (machines).

Programmed textbooks are the main type of programmed training material. They differ from ordinary textbooks in that not only the contents of training material, but also detailed and precise methodological instructions on the procedure in which they should be studied are given. This enables soldiers to master the material independently and fully, and to evaluate their own knowledge. In other words, a programmed textbook incorporates what is now divided between the training aid and the leader of the study activity.

Technical means for programmed instruction are devices which perform certain functions of the leader of the activity (in accordance with a program fed to them), and simulate the external situation and the complicated processes which transpire in machinery and mechanisms in accordance with the trainee's specific actions. Most commonly they are called training machines, automatic devices, automatic controllers, cybernetic devices, monitoring and training devices, training and testing machines, and so on.

Technical means are used to test the degree of assimilation of training material, to record grades on the use of weapons and combat

equipment, and to check the knowledge of enemy technical facilities, the order and sequence of actions with equipment (switching on, switching off, and searching for and eliminating malfunctions), knowledge of theoretical provisions (prior to laboratory work), driving rules, and so on.

Depending on the number of trainees to whom the technical devices are capable of providing training information, they may be *subdivided into individual, group, mixed, and continuous instruction devices*.

In utilizing machines of the first type each trainee is supplied with a device for receiving information and giving answers and works entirely independently. In group instruction the training information device—a film projector, for instance—is common to all trainees, as a result of which each of the soldiers receives a portion of training material which is identical in content and form and has the same control questions, answers to which are of course given individually. In mixed instruction the soldiers receive identical training information, but different control questions—on individual consoles. In continuous instruction the simultaneous instruction of large groups of people in different topics or subjects is possible by using technical devices.

Group instruction, which is carried out in special classes of programmed instruction with the aid of simple mechanical-electronic, optical, and electronic devices, is the most economical. In these classes the simultaneous testing of the readiness of large groups of trainees (up to 30) for laboratory work and the giving of tests are carried out, independent work is conducted, and lectures are read.

Usually such classes have a console for the leader of the study activity, the purpose of which is to monitor and control the progress of training, a slide projector for reproducing training information on a screen, uniform, individual consoles for the trainees which serve for inputting answers and control questions, and a lighted wall panel indicator for reproducing the answers and hence for immediately informing the trainees of the correctness of their answers (the lights on the indicator opposite the numbers corresponding to the numbers of the trainees' consoles come on only when the answers are correct). There may also be various types of reference material in the classrooms, for instance tables for encoding answers.

Attachments for presenting information through the visual channel of the trainees are used most often in technical means of programmed instruction. Films and microfilms, paper tapes or cards with imprinted text, and closed-circuit television systems are used for this purpose. As experience attests, slides made on color film are the most economical, reliable, information-intensive, and psychologically "bearable." Moreover, it should be taken into account that a person is capable of simultaneously perceiving no more than five to nine different and distinct ob-

jects, and in order for him to master conceptual material more quickly it must be given against a certain emotional background.

Explanations by the leader which are recorded on magnetic tapes, as well as charts and diagrams on black and white film, rapidly fatigue the trainees (much more quickly than listening to live speech or perceiving diagrams and charts in their "natural" form).

As far as the input of information through feedback channels (the trainees' answers) is concerned, the technical means of programmed instruction which currently exist make it possible to do this in the following ways:

- 1) Select an answer from several answers previously composed by the leader of the activity (the multiple-choice method);
- 2) Give numerical expression of the answer or formulate an answer by selecting the necessary words, symbols, and numbers from those offered (the so-called logical or resultant method);
- 3) Independently formulate a complete answer in free form, subsequently comparing it with the proposed answer (resultant-multiple-choice).

The trainees may give their answers either in handwriting, or by placing the arrows of the switches opposite the numbers corresponding to the numbers of the answers, by dialing the letters and numbers on a telephone dial, by pressing the keyboard of a telegraphic printer, or by selecting (by means of toggle switches) a combination of numbers which corresponds to their answer.

Not all of these methods of intercourse between the trainee and the machine can be considered adequately effective, however. This is due to the fact that the underlying principles of controlling the trainees' actions duplicate the principles and methods used to control technical devices and do not always take into account human specifics. In this regard, for instance, the posing of questions, the answers to which the trainees receive in finished form and from which only the one that seems most correct must be chosen, generates considerable doubt. This methodological procedure may lead to the trainees' gradually growing out of the habit of thinking independently. The pedagogic lack of justification for selecting ready answers of which only one is correct and all others are erroneous lies in the fact that inaccurate answers may become a sort of hint to a soldier who has mastered the material poorly.

Experience shows that not so much the presence of training machines as the presence of well-composed program materials and training programs is the main condition for introducing programmed instruction.

Programmed instruction does not eliminate traditional methods and

does not replace the existing methods of organizing training work. Its introduction into the process of combat training does, however, presuppose the development of specific methods which would best correspond to the specific features of programmed instruction.

It is common knowledge that the independent work of the trainees underlies programmed instruction. Here their assimilation of the training material and the formation of practical skills and abilities are accomplished in the process of the transmission of this material, and not afterwards, as is the case under the existing system of educational work. Therefore, programmed instruction relies on other methods of conveying and assimilating training material. These methods are: the linear method, the branched method, and the linear-branched method.

The main features of the *linear method* consist in the following:

- 1) Portions of training material and the control questions corresponding to them are placed in one straight line, as it were, as a result of which only one way of assimilation is prescribed for all trainees: seeking the omitted word, selecting the one correct answer, and so on; upon making a mistake the trainee simply returns for repeated coverage of the material until he finds the correct answer;
- 2) The training material is designed for soldiers with a low level of training. This is done so that all soldiers learn without making mistakes which require additional explanation;
- 3) The individualization of instruction under the linear method consists only in the fact that the better prepared soldiers may cover the program more quickly;
- 4) Under the linear method the training material is broken down into very small portions, or steps (there may be several tens of thousands of such steps since each studied proposition is repeated many times in various versions);
- 5) After carrying out a certain number of training assignments, the soldiers receive a control assignment which is now given without ready answers.

The linear method is applicable in the study of material which contains formulas, verbal rules, and definitions, but it may not be used in instruction in the control of machines, sports exercises, and so on.

The method of branched programming provides first of all for various ways of assimilating training material depending on the level of preparation of the soldiers. Those who have prepared well may move directly from question to question. Additional questions and explanations (the second, third, and subsequent "levels" of presenting the material depending on the character of the mistake committed) are provided for the less

well prepared. Here, no matter how far the additional questions diverge from the main question, the trainee must traverse the "reverse" route—that is, by giving the correct answer to the supplementary question he must return to and answer the previous question.

The branched method differs from the linear in that:

1) Here the training material is divided into larger portions, in each of which a compact presentation of the question or of a portion of the question is given, but without any omissions;

2) Each portion concludes with an assignment to test how the trainee has mastered what has been explained to him (in one case this may be a question with multiple answers, from among which the trainee must select the correct one, in another the correctness of some conclusion is to be evaluated);

3) The process of instruction according to the branched method consists in the fact that the trainee carefully reads the next portion of material, and then chooses an appropriate answer to the questions asked. If his answer is correct he moves on to the next portion, but if it is incorrect he returns once again to the portion which he mastered poorly and chooses a new answer or receives an additional explanation which concludes with the new assignment.

The branched method of programmed instruction thus accords the opportunity to take into account the individual features of the trainees to a greater extent.

The essence of the *linear-branched* (combined) *method* is that two groups of questions are worked out for each portion of training material: one to reinforce the received information in the memory, and the other for more thorough understanding.

The skillful application of these methods on the basis of training programs increases the effectiveness of programmed instruction.

3. The Officer's Preparations for Conducting Study Activities

Painstaking general and specific preparation for conducting study activities is an important element in the pedagogic work of the officer, an element which ensures the competent fulfillment of the tasks of training and indoctrination. Without earnest preparation even an experienced officer cannot count on success in the complicated activities of the military pedagog.

General preparation includes the study of directive documents which define the tasks, content, and organization of the training process. Knowledge of orders, directives, organizational and methodological instructions, and combat and political training programs and plans gives the

officer an opportunity to see the ultimate goal of instruction, to imagine the overall volume of knowledge, skills, and abilities, to single out the main items, and thus to ensure that the training process is purposeful. A great role in the general preparation of officers rests with methodological sessions conducted with platoon leaders, company commanders, and the leaders of political activities groups. In a year's time, for instance, two 3-4 day sessions (just before the start of each training period) and two or three 4-hour seminars are conducted monthly with the leaders of political activities groups. Experienced leaders of political activities groups additionally study independently the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy concerning the political training of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as the content of training plans for political studies involving soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and senior NCO's, and become acquainted with available training and visual aids. Such preliminary work enables commanders and political workers to present the material under study in a meaningful and consistent way, to establish relations between subjects, and to avoid unjustified repetition.

Direct preparation is started well ahead of time, depending on the content of the activities and the forms used to conduct them. Experience shows that at least 2-3 days of preparations are needed to conduct a simple activity. Many commanders and political workers begin to prepare 5-10 days in advance for firings and training exercises. The leaders of political activities groups are allotted at least 4 hours of training time per week for direct preparation for their activities. The quality of instruction depends mainly on how well a subunit commander and his deputy for political affairs are able to organize the preparation of the commanders, leaders of political activities groups, sergeants, and instructors. It has been established that to prepare a 6-hour session a leader must be given an average of at least 3 hours of preparation time.

A number of main stages may be singled out in direct preparations for an activity.

First of all it is necessary to *determine the contents of the forthcoming activity, to determine its place in personnel training, and to analyze the results of the previous activity in this subject*. The appropriate sections of programs, regulations, manuals, and available training aids are studied at this stage, it is established to what extent the material of the previous activity is known to various categories of personnel, the relations among subjects are established, and the purpose of the activity and the educational tasks are formulated.

Determining the methods of instruction for individual structural parts of the activity, the number and composition of the training groups, the organization of work at training sites, and preliminary calculation of the

time required are an important stage in the preparations. During the activities the leader resorts to various methods and procedures of instruction and changes the grouping of the trainees. Therefore, it is important to determine in advance when instruction will be carried out within a platoon, by squad, which of the soldiers should be given individual assignments for independent work, and which sergeants or senior enlisted men should be used as instructors. If the necessity of teaching through personal demonstration arises in an activity, at this stage the officer not only thinks out the methods of demonstration, but improves his own skills and abilities and works for exemplary execution.

Support plays a significant role in preparations for activities. The educational goals of an activity are often not achieved because of either the lack of, or poor preparation of visual aids, technical and simulation facilities, needed equipment, instruments, and weapons. Therefore, the leader of the activity must determine in advance the requirement for physical training materials, check their availability and make sure they are in good working order, place orders, obtain missing items, and arrange to have them made through his own effort. The contents of visual aids made for political study activities are examined by the company political affairs officer.

The preparations of sergeants, instructors, and assistants from among senior enlisted personnel are of considerable importance. In connection with the need for the differentiated instruction of young and senior soldiers and of specialists of various classes, the role of assistant leaders and the responsibility for their preparation increases. The leader of the activities conducts the preparation of his assistants. He instructs them in the contents and methods of the activities, supervises practice sessions for carrying out the necessary procedures, and recommends the additional study of appropriate training literature. The subunit political affairs officer works with the assistant leaders of political activities groups together with the leaders.

The compilation of an outline is the final stage of preparation for studies. This is the working document of the leader of the activities and each leader draws up this document in a form convenient to himself. It is important that the preparatory work be expressed in the outline and that all elements of the organization of the activities be reflected. Here the subject of the activities, the total time, the main training and educational goals, the breakdown of activities, the calculation of time by structural parts, the main problems with a brief presentation of contents, support, and the independent work assignment for the soldiers are usually contained in the outline. The content and volume of the outline depend on the experience of the instructor and the complexity of the subject under study. A more detailed plan is drawn up for demonstrative activities and activities which are complex in content and organization. The

presence of a meaningful outline largely determines the success of studies.

An outline of the lecture, a plan for conducting independent study of the subject, and a plan for conducting the seminar are drawn up separately when political activities are conducted by the lecture-seminar method. In checking the readiness of the leader to conduct political studies, the subunit political affairs officer familiarizes himself with the outline and, if need be, accords him aid.

The subunit commander together with his political affairs officer organizes and supervises the preparation of officers and sergeants for the activities.

4. Testing and Evaluating Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

The testing and evaluation of knowledge, skills, and abilities is an integral component of the process of instructing soldiers. Testing is carried out for the purpose of establishing the degree of preparedness of soldiers, sergeants, and officers to carry out their functional duties and to determine the level of the combat capability and combat readiness of subunits and units. In the process of testing knowledge, skills, and abilities, the commander evaluates the results of the educational work of officers and sergeants with unit (subunit) personnel, ascertains the advanced experience of subordinates, and evaluates the style of his own activity.

The results of testing make it possible to provide timely aid in eliminating gaps in combat and political training and to recommend the most effective procedures and methods for instructing personnel. Testing and evaluation thus perform two functions: control and educational. Testing should be systematic, in-depth, and comprehensive, while evaluation should be objective.

The main types of testing in our army and navy are: preliminary, current, control, final, and inspection.

Preliminary testing is carried out in order to determine the level of a soldier's preparedness to master program material in a specific specialty. It makes it possible to draw up specific measures for eliminating gaps in the general educational training of soldiers which might inhibit mastery of the military specialty.

The preliminary *testing* of knowledge and abilities is carried out by means of individual interviews between the subunit commander and each newly arriving soldier and by means of goal-directed observation of the actions of servicemen during the first days of training.

Current testing of knowledge, skills, and abilities is carried out on a daily basis, in the course of all activities conducted with personnel. It

stimulates the soldiers' systematic work on the study of program material and ensures timely mastery and reinforcement in each subject, as well as the transition to the studying of a new subject.

Current testing prevents the forgetting of material and the loss of skills and helps to ascertain in good time gaps in the knowledge of the trainees and in the work of the instructor, thus contributing to the successful fulfillment of the tasks of preparing soldiers to fulfill their functional duties. By constantly testing the knowledge of his subordinates, an officer (or sergeant) thus instills in them a sense of personal responsibility for mastering knowledge of their specialty and moves them to systematic independent work.

Control testing is carried out in the form of control activities and exercises which, in accordance with the requirements of the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, is supposed to be conducted by regimental or battalion commanders and by corresponding chiefs and commanders.

Control activities and exercises are conducted for the purpose of determining the degree of preparedness of personnel and the coordination of subunits after they have covered certain sections of the program of tactical, special tactical, and other types of combat training. Drill inspections fall into the category of control activities.

In conducting control activities or exercises it is wise to inform the subunits in advance on which problems the soldiers, sergeants, officers, and subunits as a whole will be tested. Some control activities (or exercises) may be conducted unexpectedly and begin with sounding the alarm.

Final testing is carried out in training subunits and schools for junior specialists upon completion of the term of instruction, and in units and subunits at the end of the training year. The rating examination and tests for authority to undertake independent maintenance of equipment also fall into the category of final tests. The date of a final test is planned in advance and is made known to personnel well ahead of time. This enables commanders to schedule training work with personnel with consideration for timely preparation for the final test.

Party and Komsomol organizations do a great deal of work to motivate personnel to carry out thorough preparations for final tests. The tasks of communists (or Komsomol members) in preparing for the tests are discussed at meetings of the bureau and at Party (Komsomol) meetings. Exchange of the work experience of standouts in combat and political training and of rated specialists is carried out, and aid is extended to those lagging behind. All this work helps increase the personal responsibility of the soldiers for the quality of training and for the state of affairs in the subunit. It does not come to a halt, but is intensified still more during the test.

In this extremely crucial period it is important to correctly assign active Party and Komsomol members and to direct their work on a daily basis. At the end of each day the subunit commander and his political affairs officer sum up the results of the test for the day, analyzing the positive aspects and shortcomings both in the actions of the personnel who took the test and in the work of the aktiv. With consideration for the day's test results the tasks of working with personnel on the next day are set for active Party and Komsomol members.

Throughout the entire period of a final test the commander and political worker must ensure a calm, businesslike atmosphere in the subunit.

The results of a final test are comprehensively studied together with all officers and sergeants, and specific measures for eliminating the shortcomings found in the preparedness of personnel and in educational work are drawn up.

Inspection testing is carried out on the order of superior commanders by a specially designated commission. The program for inspection testing is transmitted to the unit commander several days before its start. The inspection commission runs the subunit through an in-depth and comprehensive test of individual training and actions within the subunit, the state of military discipline, the duties of the troops, the contents of combat equipment and weapons, and other topics.

Upon the conclusion of an inspection test the commission draws up a document in which the positive aspects in the training of the inspected subunits as well as the shortcomings are observed and the deadlines for eliminating the deficiencies observed are specified. The inspection test report is the guiding document. Concrete measures for eliminating detected shortcomings and for improving the quality of educational work are drawn up in the unit and subunit on its basis.

The knowledge, skills, and abilities of soldiers are tested by various methods: current observation and oral, written, and practical testing.

Current observation is carried out by the instructor during all phases of the training process. It enables an officer (or sergeant) to study the specific features of the cognitive processes of subordinates (perception, memory, attention, thought, and speech), to ascertain the character traits which either further or hinder the successful assimilation of training material and to determine what difficulties they are experiencing in mastering knowledge, skills, and abilities.

It is wise to record the data of current observation in a notebook in the form of textual entries, graphs, or various types of cards. For instance, cards on all exercises of tank drivers are kept for each driver-mechanic in many tank subunits. A card on the crossing of some obstacle, for instance, includes the columns: elapsed time from starting line to obstacle; time

for crossing obstacle; mistakes made; and total time expended en route. Such cards give the instructor the opportunity to see the nature of his trainees' mistakes and the dynamics by which they are surmounted, as well as the qualitative growth of the skills and abilities of the driver-mechanic.

Oral testing is carried out in every activity: at the start of the activity in order to repeat previously covered material and to prepare the trainees for new material, and during the activity in order to reinforce the material under study and heighten the activity of the soldiers.

Oral testing may be carried out in the form of individual testing or in the form of a discussion between the instructor and the entire group. Individual questioning makes it possible to determine more deeply and comprehensively the knowledge of the persons questioned since their answers bear the character of a thorough, logically coherent presentation of the problem. During a discussion between the instructor and the entire audience the trainees' answers will be brief, almost fragmentary, which prevents determining sufficiently the degree of assimilation of the material by the trainees. But in this form of inquiry the entire group is drawn into active work, while in the first form a large number of soldiers may display passivity.

Insofar as the fractionality of the answers is the main shortcoming in testing knowledge by means of a discussion between the instructor and the entire group, during such testing it is necessary, after hearing several answers, to make generalizations and briefly to combine the answers given into a unified whole. But in order to increase the activity of the group during individual questioning, the soldiers themselves should be included in the analysis of the answers of their comrades and should pose specific questions to the entire group.

Written testing provides the possibility of determining not only the quality of knowledge with respect to a number of problems, but also the presence of practical skills and abilities of applying knowledge in a given subject to solve practical problems. Written testing may be carried out both in theoretical branches of instruction (the description of physical processes, the definition of laws, the description of events) and in problems of practical instruction (the sketching of diagrams, the construction of graphs, problem-solving). Written testing makes it possible to obtain data on the quality of knowledge, skills, and abilities from a large number of trainees in a short period of time, and herein lies its advantage over oral testing.

Written work should be checked as quickly as possible. When returning the papers to the trainees, the officer analyzes the mistakes that they contain and makes recommendations for correcting them.

Practical testing is conducted in all branches of training connected

with the execution of practical work in the operation of combat equipment and weapons and with the execution of actions on the battlefield, especially standardized work. The practical testing of the abilities and skills of soldiers is carried out in a situation as close to combat conditions as possible. Avoiding oversimplification is the most important criterion for carrying out a practical test.

In testing the knowledge of personnel, *technical monitoring facilities* may be employed. One of the simplest testing control aids is a metal or cardboard sheet with punched holes, the vertical row of which designates the numbers of the questions and the horizontal row of which designates the numbers of the answer. Upon receiving a card with questions and several answers to each (there is but one correct answer), the trainee places a piece of clean paper beneath the sheet and, after selecting the answer which he believes to be correct, places an X in the appropriate hole. To check the answers of the trainees the instructor places on the sheets of paper a template which has holes only opposite the correct answers.

Various types of machines—"testers"—are used in giving tests of the material portion of weapons and combat equipment to check knowledge of the order and sequence of actions involving equipment (initiating and preparing for work, switch-on, changing to different modes, searching for malfunctions, and switch-off), to test knowledge of driving rules and so on.

The use of monitoring devices makes it possible to test the knowledge of a large number of soldiers in a short period of time. Testing knowledge by means of technical monitoring facilities has an essential shortcoming, however. Here the soldier himself does not compose the answer asked, but only recognizes the correct answer from among several. Therefore, the use of monitoring devices should not be excessively relied upon.

In testing the individual training of specialists and the preparedness of teams, crews, and subunits, ratings in each subject of instruction are made on the basis of the results of the fulfillment of standards and of the knowledge of the theoretical problems of the program. The individual rating of a trainee for his knowledge of theoretical problems and the fulfillment of practical work is:

1) "EXCELLENT" if the trainee has thoroughly studied the material and consistently and exhaustively answers the questions asked, and, in the performance of practical work, if the assignment is carried out correctly and in the standard amount of time (when there is no standard it must be carried out confidently and quickly);

2) "GOOD" if the trainee has sound knowledge of the material and

answers without leading questions, or, in the execution of practical work, if the assignment is carried out correctly;

3) "SATISFACTORY" if the trainee knows only the main material but answers questions with insufficient clarity and completeness, or, in the performance of practical work, if the assignment is carried out but mistakes were made which were not reflected in the quality of the performed work (failure to observe the rules for using a tool or equipment, breaking the sequence for carrying out individual operations followed by subsequent re-execution);

4) "UNSATISFACTORY" if the trainee is unable to answer the questions with sufficient completeness and correctness or, in the performance of practical work, if the assignment is not carried out or mistakes which affect the quality of the performed work are made.

The individual rating of a trainee for several standards and of a subunit for fulfilling standards within the subunit in a training subject is determined according to the ratings received or the fulfillment of each standard, and is:

1) "EXCELLENT" if at least 60 percent of the standards were met with an "excellent" rating and the others with a rating of at least "good";

2) "GOOD" if at least 60 percent of the standards were met with ratings of "excellent" and "good" and the remainder with a "satisfactory" rating;

3) "SATISFACTORY" if at least 70 percent of the standards are fulfilled or, in giving a rating for three standards, if two are met.

In testing subunit and individual standards, the overall evaluation for a subunit is:

1) "EXCELLENT," if the first evaluation is "excellent" and the second one not worse than "good";

2) "GOOD," if the first evaluation is "good" and the second one not worse than "satisfactory";

3) "SATISFACTORY," if both evaluations are "satisfactory."

A subunit evaluation for meeting individual standards or for knowledge of theoretical problems of the program is derived from evaluations received by the personnel.

An overall evaluation for the trainee and for the subunit in a given subject is:

1) "EXCELLENT," if evaluations for meeting standards and for knowledge of theoretical problems of the program are also excellent;

2) "GOOD," if neither evaluation is worse than "good";

3) "SATISFACTORY," if neither evaluation is worse than "satisfactory."

Evaluations must, in all cases, be valid and objective. Raising an evaluation gives rise to conceit among personnel and dampens their efforts in studies. Lowering an evaluation results in justifiable resentment and has a negative influence on the desire to study to the fullest extent of one's powers.

Thus, testing and evaluation of knowledge, abilities and skills is an important and responsible part of the educational process. Testing and evaluation that have been formulated in a pedagogically correct manner significantly facilitate the motivation of soldiers to achieve high results in both combat and political training.

SECTION III. THE THEORY OF INDOCTRINATION (THE INDOCTRINATION OF SERVICEMEN AND MILITARY COLLECTIVES)

Chapter 10. The Essence, Content, and Specifics of the Process of Indoctrinating Personnel of Subunits

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Essence of Communist Indoctrination

The successful fulfillment of the tasks of communist construction and of increasing the combat strength of our Armed Forces is inseparably bound to the communist indoctrination of the Soviet people and the elevation of their political consciousness.

The goal of communist indoctrination is to train well-rounded citizens capable of constructing and defending communist society. The Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress emphasized: "A great cause, the building of communism, cannot be advanced without the comprehensive development of the individual. Without a high level of culture, education, social awareness, and the internal maturity of the people communism is impossible, just as it would be impossible without a corresponding material and technical base."¹

V. I. Lenin considered the building of communism a comprehensive task in which the solution of economic and sociopolitical problems is connected with the formation of the new man and with the indoctrination and training of "*comprehensively developed and comprehensively trained people, people who know how to do all.*"² Relying on the statements of Marx and Engels concerning the comprehensive development of the individual under the conditions of triumphant socialism, V. I. Lenin laid the groundwork for *an expanded program for the communist indoctrination of youth* and for their active participation in the revolutionary struggle and building of a new society. He indicated that communist indoctrination represents the process of the formation of the new man, who harmoniously combines spiritual wealth, moral purity, and physical perfection.

In a speech to the Third All-Russian Congress of the RKSM,* V. I. Lenin emphasized that the most important task of communist indoctrina-

*RKSM—Russian Communist Youth League.

tion must be to "learn communism"—that is, to develop the ability "to take upon oneself the totality of human knowledge and to do so in such a way that communism is not . . . something learned, but something that . . . the people themselves have thought up, that [communism] be those conclusions which are inevitable from the standpoint of modern education."³ Here he stated that mastery of knowledge is a necessary condition for *the formation of a communist outlook in youth*. In mastering the scientific outlook people learn the objective laws of natural and social development and become active participants in revolutionary transformations. Even during the preparations for the Second Party Congress, while drafting a resolution concerning student youth, V. I. Lenin proposed for all student groups and circles "to move to the forefront of their activity the development of an integral and consistent revolutionary outlook among their own members. . . ." ⁴

The formation of a scientific outlook in Soviet soldiers presupposes a thorough understanding of their class interests and the just nature of wars in defense of the socialist Homeland. V. I. Lenin often observed that the masses must understand that they are truly fighting for their own cause: for the socialist republic. Belief in the justness of a war and awareness of the need to sacrifice one's own life for the good of one's brothers, he explained, uplifts the spirit of soldiers and makes them endure unprecedented difficulties.

Vladimir Il'ich taught that truly communist indoctrination consists in *giving one's work and one's efforts to the common cause* on the basis of knowledge of scientific communism. "Herein," said V. I. Lenin, "lies communist indoctrination. Only in such work is a young man or woman converted into a true communist. Only if through this work they are able to achieve practical success do they become communists."⁵

Direct participation in socialist instruction helps youth to *convert knowledge into convictions* by subordinating each step they take to the interests of society and developing in them a new, communist attitude toward labor.

The inculcation of a spirit of communist morality also holds an important place in the formation of man in the new society. "The entire undertaking of the upbringing, education, and training of modern youth," said V. I. Lenin, "must be the inculcation of communist morality."⁶

The formation of high moral attributes and of the character traits which are necessary to life and labor in communist society and the unflagging fulfillment of the standards and principles of communist morality are the goal of a moral education.

In examining the problems of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers, V. I. Lenin proceeded from the decisive role of the masses in history and saw in

armed men who possess the necessary political and moral-combat attributes the force which determines the outcome of a war.

V. I. Lenin also paid a great deal of attention to *the physical and aesthetic training of our youth and our soldiers*. He said that we need physically strong people, people of will, bravery, energy, and persistence.

V. I. Lenin saw the fulfillment of the tasks of aesthetic education in the organization and conduct of comprehensive work toward *cultural education* with purpose of familiarizing the masses with art and developing aesthetic traits in man.⁷ He was personally interested in the activities of cultural and educational institutions and insistently demanded the skillful use of diverse means and forms of work to raise the educational level of workers and Soviet soldiers.

V. I. Lenin highly esteemed the importance of cultural and educational work in increasing awareness and the combat capability of our soldiers. Evaluating the reasons for the victory on the Don River in 1918, he wrote that these triumphs "became possible exclusively through intensified Party and cultural activities in the ranks of the Red Army,"⁸ which brought about the necessary psychological shift among the troops.

V. I. Lenin inseparably linked the fulfillment of the tasks of communist indoctrination to *the implacable campaign against bourgeois ideology and the class approach to problems of indoctrination*. He called for "an unflagging struggle against any bourgeois ideology, no matter what fashionable and brilliant garb it may don."⁹

V. I. Lenin considered the ideological struggle a form of the class struggle, and therefore, he did not reduce criticism of hostile theories to the revelation of the delusions of individuals, but taught how to see the interests of various classes behind any statements and phrases. Whoever deviates from the principle of class analysis, whoever speaks of non-class policy, wrote Vladimir Il'ich, "should simply be placed in a cage and displayed together with some Australian kangaroo."¹⁰ There can be no peaceful coexistence between communist and bourgeois ideologies, compromise and agreement are impossible. The ideological struggle against the forces of the old world is the uncompromising struggle for man, his dignity, and his freedom, and to strengthen the positions of socialism and communism.

Lenin's theses on communist indoctrination as the process of the comprehensive, harmonious development of the new man were further developed in the decisions of the CPSU.

"The transition to communism," as is stated in the CPSU Program, "presupposes the indoctrination and training of communistically conscious and highly educated people capable of both physical and mental

labor and of active participation in various spheres of social and state affairs and in the field of science and culture.”¹¹

The 24th CPSU Congress outlined further paths to the fulfillment of the program requirements of the Party in the field of building communism and indoctrinating workers. It emphasized that the formation of the new man is one of the Party's main tasks in building communism.

A truly scientific, communist outlook is the main spiritual resource of man. It was emphasized in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress that “the core of all ideological indoctrinational Party work is *the formation of a communist outlook in the broadest layers of workers* and their indoctrination in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.”¹²

A communist outlook defines a truly creative approach to reality and social activity and clearness of purpose of the individual, without which creative labor to the benefit of society and labor in the name of communism are impossible. The communist ideological approach and communist conviction are developed on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist outlook.

The successful formation of a scientific outlook determines the spiritual aspect of Soviet man and defines the unflagging fulfillment of the standards of communist morality and the development of moral political traits in each person. This process transpires in the constant uncompromising struggle against vestiges of the past. “There can be no triumph of communist morality,” stated L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, “without a resolute struggle against antipodes as money-grubbing, bribery, parasitism, slander, anonymous letters, drunkenness, and so on. The struggle against that which we call vestiges of the past in the consciousness and deeds of the people is an undertaking which requires the constant attention of the Party and of all conscious advanced forces in our society.”¹³

Commenting on the particular importance of communist indoctrination of Soviet youth, the 24th CPSU Congress once again emphasized the pertinence of Lenin's well-known thesis to the effect that the entire undertaking of the education and upbringing of youth should serve the formation of convictions, communist morality, and boundless devotion to the socialist Homeland in new generations.

The 24th CPSU Congress, in defining the tasks of communist indoctrination, took note of the particular urgency of forming *a communist attitude toward labor* in the Soviet people. This task is viewed as one of the most important in Party ideological work under current conditions. The following is stated in the Resolution of the 24th Party Congress on the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC: “The most important com-

ponent of ideological and political work is the inculcation of a communist attitude toward labor and social property, the development of creative activity on the part of workers, and the strengthening of conscious discipline and organization." 14

The elevation of the role of labor indoctrination is defined by the rapid pace of scientific-technical progress, which more and more requires exceptionally well-coordinated work by a host of people and by large production collectives.

The comprehensive development of the creative initiative of the Soviet people, of socialist competition, and of the mass movement for a communist attitude toward labor is of great importance in labor indoctrination.

The formation of a Marxist-Leninist outlook and of communist convictions and moralities is taking place under current conditions in the atmosphere of the sharply aggravated class struggle between socialism and imperialism. Imperialist states are waging a fierce ideological war against socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, and attempting to undermine socialism from within by diverse ideological means.

Bourgeois ideologists primarily stress the ideological disarmament of youth and strive to weaken their revolutionary enthusiasm, to blunt class self-consciousness, to contrast them with the older generation, and to sow apolitical attitudes and the worship of bourgeois mores and morality.

The 24th CPSU Congress pointed out the necessity of *waging an implacable, aggressive campaign against bourgeois and revisionist ideology*. The resolute unmasking of the intrigues of imperialism and of any manifestation of views alien to us requires "the consistent implementation of the class line in problems of indoctrination, preciseness, and clarity of ideological positions, a further increase in revolutionary vigilance, and a consistent campaign against apolitical attitudes, vestiges of private ownership and narrow-minded sentiments, manifestations of a nihilistic attitude toward the achievements of socialism, and the penetration of bourgeois and revisionist views." 15

The inculcation in Soviet people of ardent patriotism, a sense of pride in their Homeland and their nation, high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism play an important role in fulfilling the tasks of forming the new man. The 24th CPSU Congress required strengthening the indoctrination of Soviet people on the basis of the experience of Lenin's party and the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the people, of inculcation of a spirit of indestructible fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR and of pride in the tremendous successes in communist construction in our country. The training of youth to defend the Homeland and the formation of a readi-

ness to defend the achievements of the October Revolution with weapons in hand occupy a special place in patriotic military indoctrination.

Raising the level of general and vocational knowledge and improving the qualifications and cultural level of all members of society are necessary conditions for the communist indoctrination and comprehensive development of workers and for the successful building of communism. This is an objective requirement for future progress and for the development of productive forces under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution which is now taking place.

Communist indoctrination forms the personality and the high moral-political traits of Soviet man which are now being developed primarily through the process of active participation in production and socio-political affairs. The leading role in the formation and development of the communist individual indisputably belongs to indoctrination. But this is not the only factor in individual development. This process is also affected by such factors as the social environment, heredity, and so on.

Above all, note should be made of the influence of the *social environment*. Various idealistic currents—neo-Thomism, personalism, and others—deny the role of society in the formation of the individual and set human life in dependence on supernatural forces, on some higher being, or on what man makes of himself. Marxist-Leninist theory has revealed the essence of man as the aggregate of social relations and has inseparably linked his physical and spiritual development to the specific historical conditions of life and to the social order.

In the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, a social environment is the diverse social relations among people and the collectives in which they act in their labor and social affairs. Man is the product of social relations, and he cannot become an individual without the influence of the social environment, or without intercourse with people.

The social environment in a society divided into antagonistic classes engenders class inequality in human development and has a negative influence on the development of the individual.

Only in a country of triumphant socialism does the social environment exert a positive influence on man and create the conditions for comprehensive individual development.

At the same time Marxism-Leninism does not deny the role of *biological factors*, including *heredity*, in individual development.

Man is a part of nature and from birth he receives a definite biological make-up and inherits a specific type of nervous system and natural rudiments. The reproduction of a biological similarity to the parents in the progeny is commonly called heredity. The natural qualities of man and heredity play an important role in his development.

Rudiments, the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the nervous system and body, underlie capabilities. Various capabilities are developed in life on the basis of rudiments. But rudiments do not always become capabilities. Depending on what a person does and how he lives, and on what the conditions of his life are, given the same set of rudiments various capabilities can be developed.

Soviet pedagogy rejects the idealistic understanding of capabilities as innate attributes of man, since capabilities themselves are always the result of development in a certain activity.

Man is not born an individual but becomes one within a definite system of social relations by means of goal-directed indoctrination which bears a class character. Soviet pedagogy recognizes the leading and decisive role of indoctrination in forming an individual under the conditions of a socialist order.

2. The Characteristics of the Process of Indoctrinating Soviet Soldiers

Communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is an integral and inseparable part of all activities of the CPSU in indoctrinating our people.

A two-fold task has invariably been carried out in the Soviet Armed Forces since their inception: the process of indoctrinating the conscious builder of the new society continues, and the traits which Soviet people need as armed defenders of the Homeland are developed at the same time. This determines the tremendous superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of imperialist states.

The indoctrination of Soviet soldiers has its own specific features, which are defined by the specifics of military organization and by the tasks of the army and navy in the armed defense of the socialist Homeland. The following is stated in the CPSU Program: "Defense of the Homeland and service in the Soviet Armed Forces are the high and honorable duties of a Soviet citizen. . . . All Soviet soldiers must be indoctrinated in a spirit of boundless faith in their people and the communist cause and must be ready to give all their effort, and their life if necessary, to protect the socialist Homeland."¹⁶

The following *main features* are characteristic of the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers:

- 1) A military orientation—the preparation of men for battle and for surmounting tremendous related difficulties;
- 2) The accomplishment of moral-political and psychological training for actions under conditions of modern warfare in the course of indoctrination;
- 3) Adults who already have their own opinions and habits are the

objects of indoctrination. In the process of indoctrination it is sometimes necessary not only to indoctrinate, but also to reindoctrinate people;

4) The indoctrination of soldiers is carried out by the commander and the political worker, who are accorded extensive rights and authority;

5) Indoctrination constantly takes place in the military collective, which has a special organization, interrelations defined by regulations, a distinctive type of everyday life, and so on.

These features largely determine the orientation of the process of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers, a process which calls for the formation in the serviceman of in-depth understanding of the historical function and noble tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces and the development of constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism skillfully, selflessly, and to the last breath. In other words, the process of indoctrination presupposes raising the ideological and political level of Soviet soldiers, forming communist conviction and a conscious attitude toward selfless labor, converting the standards of communist morality into rules of behavior, waging a resolute struggle against any manifestations of bourgeois ideology, and comprehensively developing the soldiers in a cultural and physical sense.

The requirements for the formation of communist conviction and high moral-combat traits in Soviet soldiers have been set forth in the military oath and military regulations as the most important condition for the indoctrination of army and navy personnel.

Consequently, *communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is the goal-directed process of the formation in the servicemen of communist convictions and of personality traits needed for combat and regular service.*

The indoctrination of personnel of the Armed Forces is a multifaceted and complex process whose successful fulfillment requires great effort on the part of all educators. It is inseparably linked to the training of soldiers and has a great similarity to it. This similarity consists first in how the soldiers are armed with knowledge and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in both training and indoctrination. Second, in both training and indoctrination the soldier's mind is acted upon (his feelings, perceptions, attention, memory, thought, speech, will, and so on).

But at the same time, indoctrination and training are not the same thing. It is much more difficult to indoctrinate than to train or educate. "Indoctrination" remarked V. I. Lenin, "is a prolonged and difficult undertaking. Here one cannot make do with a decree, one must approach the matter patiently and skillfully. . . . It requires that we be very cautious, but firm." ¹⁷

Despite its close relation to training, indoctrination has relative independence and specific features. What are these features?

First, as a result of training soldiers are armed with knowledge, skills, and abilities which enable them to master combat equipment and weapons and to use them skillfully. During indoctrination communist conviction and high combat efficiency and morale and political traits are developed in the soldier. These traits give a Party orientation to knowledge and multiply its strength and efficacy.

Second, a soldier generally has a positive attitude towards training, for the knowledge he acquires enables him to act and evaluate the results of his efforts in training. A considerable role is also played by the soldier's interest in obtaining an appropriate document of education. A soldier may not always have a positive attitude toward indoctrination, especially if it is directed at overcoming his incorrect views, mistakes, negative habits, and so on. It is more difficult for the soldier to recognize the concrete results of indoctrination.

Third, training is planned quite clearly and specifically by hours, months, and periods. There may be breaks in it. It is impossible to concretely plan the inculcation of some specific traits since the personality traits of a soldier are formed in unity. Moreover, indoctrination is a continuous process and can have no breaks.

Fourth, the results of training can easily be tested in examinations and in controlled studies. Life itself and the soldier's actions and deeds are the test of indoctrination.

Fifth, previously acquired knowledge, skills, and abilities are generally utilized in training in the army and navy and can be easily determined. It is virtually impossible to determine immediately the moral and ethical qualities and the character traits of a newly arrived youth. And not all traits of a young soldier are positive. Some young people with incorrect views and negative habits must not only be indoctrinated, but reindoctrinated, and this is much more difficult.

The indoctrination of soldiers, like training, is a *two-sided process* which takes place in active interaction between the instructor and the trainees.

The instructor (commander or political worker) is the organizer and leader of the indoctrinational process. The trainees (soldiers, sailors, sergeants, or senior NCO's) are the object of indoctrination. The main role rests with the instructor, who determines the content of the measures exerted on the trainees and the order and systematization of these measures, and who creates the conditions necessary for successful indoctrination. Party and Komsomol organizations and military collectives also have indoctrinational responsibilities. The soldier's position as a trainee is not passive, however. A soldier has a conscious and active attitude to-

ward indoctrinational measures if he has formed a positive internal attitude toward them, toward the example of the instructor, toward his bearing, speech, and so on. Indoctrination does not yield results if the soldier is passive or inactive or, still worse, if he resists indoctrinational measures. Therefore, the success of indoctrination is inseparably bound to self-education.

The process of indoctrination is primarily a combination of direct and indirect pedagogic influence on soldiers.

Direct pedagogic influence is the instructor's direct influence on the basis of personal example, word, encouragement, and punishment.

An *indirect influence* is influence on the soldier through the collective and Party and Komsomol organizations, the inclusion of the student in active, social work, and the establishment of certain conditions of activity and everyday life, and of daily schedule. The most important role in indirect influence once again belongs to the instructor, who directs the work of Party and Komsomol organizations and the activities of the collective and creates specific everyday conditions.

Under the conditions of the Armed Forces indoctrination encompasses the entire life and activity of Soviet soldiers and transpires as an organized process. It is carried out in the course of training (during all studies and on all subjects of instruction) during all service by soldiers, during the hours of political indoctrinational work, during leisure time, and in a combat situation. Hence, indoctrinational influences are not only organized, but also all-encompassing in character and are exerted systematically, constantly, and under various conditions.

The *micro-environment* (micro-groups, acquaintances, comrades outside the unit, and so on) may, in addition to organized influence, also affect the soldier's consciousness. Such unplanned and unanticipated influence may have different orientations. For instance, a soldier on leave in a city may fall under the negative influence of acquaintances, hostilely attuned elements, or people with an ideology and views alien to us. Servicemen with low political and moral tempering yield more quickly to a negative influence. Some micro-group of a military collective may also exert a negative influence on a soldier if unhealthy views have taken shape within it.

It is an important task of the commander and political worker to know how to counteract the negative influence of a micro-environment with organized indoctrination. In order to prevent a negative effect on the soldier, one must know everything about him: with whom and how he spends his free time outside the unit, who are his friends, comrades and acquaintances, and what views prevail in the micro-group which is affecting him.

The process of indoctrination includes the mastery of knowledge by soldiers and the formation on this basis of communist convictions, and also of strong positive behavioral habits.

The mastery of *knowledge*, the formation of *convictions*, and the development of *behavioral habits* are the main stages of the indoctrinational process. Let us examine the contents of these stages.

Each serviceman's mastery of the concepts of the duty and obligations of the Soviet soldier and of the requirements of the military oath and military regulations for developing high political traits, morale and combat efficiency are a necessary element in the initial stage of the indoctrinational process.

In order to behave correctly it is necessary to know precisely how to behave and why one should behave one way and not another. For instance, in order to form such a trait as discipline it is necessary first of all to tell and explain to the soldier what Soviet military discipline is, what requirements it imposes on the serviceman, how these requirements should be satisfied, and why the role and importance of discipline are increasing even more under current conditions.

The formation of political traits, morale and combat efficiency in a soldier requires in-depth explanatory work, and the instructor must carefully prepare to conduct any indoctrinational measure.

The process of mastering knowledge in the course of indoctrination has much in common with the process of mastering knowledge in training. In the formation of ethical concepts and outlooks, however, the spoken word of the instructor, examples, and comparisons play a much greater role. Also of much greater importance is the living example—meetings with veterans of the Party and Armed Forces, heroes of the Great Patriotic War, participants in the communist labor movement, and other people who embody high patriotic and moral traits.

Arming soldiers with knowledge is the most important condition for increasing their consciousness, forming a Marxist-Leninist outlook in them, and ensuring correct understanding of their duty to the Homeland. The better educated and more politically literate a soldier is, the more successfully his communist consciousness and moral-combat traits are formed.

The comprehensive development of a soldier's consciousness is the most important feature of the Soviet indoctrination system. It also defines the basic differences between our indoctrination and the indoctrinational system of the armies of imperialistic states, where the main efforts are directed at inhibiting the development of the consciousness and mental capabilities of the common soldier and of developing blind obedience to the power of capital.

The behavior of a Soviet soldier is a function not only of the degree of development of his consciousness but also of his feelings and will. This creates a unique psychological fusion of mental, emotional, and volitional elements on whose basis the soldier's knowledge is transformed into personal conviction.

In the process of mastering scientific knowledge and in the serviceman's practical activity his *emotional sphere is affected*. This effect moves the soldier to experience, feel, and internally accept various knowledge, ideas and standards of behavior. For instance, if the topic is honesty or truthfulness, he should experience a feeling of indignation toward those who act dishonestly. Explaining to the soldiers the aggressive nature of imperialism and the plunderous character of its armies should naturally generate a feeling of burning hatred of imperialists.

The fusion of knowledge and feelings leads to qualitative changes in the soldier's consciousness, character, and behavior and contributes to the development of a proper attitude toward assimilated knowledge and standards of behavior. This attitude becomes the foundation for moral conviction.

Once communist ideas and knowledge have been fused with the soldier's feelings, certain *volitional efforts*—the soldier's ability to control his own behavior and surmount any difficulties and obstacles—are needed to apply them in practice. Without volitional traits there can be no conviction. Only a strong-willed soldier is capable of implementing communist ideas and giving all his effort and, if need be, his life to ensure the triumph of these ideas. A soldier with strong convictions always acts in accordance with his knowledge. His knowledge and ideas are never at odds with his actions and deeds.

Hence, *convictions* are knowledge permeated with elements of will and feeling. "Conviction and knowledge," wrote N. A. Dobrolyubov, "may only be considered valid when they penetrate within a person, become one with his feelings and will, and are constantly present in him."¹⁸ Therefore, in order for knowledge to be converted into convictions it is necessary to influence not only the consciousness but also the feelings and will of the soldier.

In addition to the formation of convictions, the indoctrinational process presupposes *the development of durable positive habits* in every soldier.

A habit is a practical skill which has become a need. Correct habits are of great importance in human life and activities. Evaluating the importance of habits, A. S. Makarenko stated: ". . . It is not enough to regard one's own behavior sensibly. The habit of acting correctly is necessary. Our task is not only to inculcate in ourselves a correct, intelligent attitude toward problems of behavior, but also to instill correct

habits—that is, habits which force us to act correctly not because we have sat down and thought it out, but because we cannot do otherwise, because we have become accustomed to them.”¹⁹

Habits give behavior a stable character, for a person who is accustomed to always acting in accordance with his own knowledge and convictions converts correct actions and deeds in character traits. The habits of disciplined behavior, the ability to endure prolonged physical and moral strain, and many other habits play a great role in the activities of every soldier.

The presence of the skills and habits of correct behavior and their stability in a soldier are an important indicator of his level of indoctrination. It is no coincidence that V. I. Lenin emphasized that in indoctrinational work “only that which has entered culture, everyday life, and habits, should be considered attained.”²⁰

The inculcation of conviction of the unity of word and deed and the accumulation of experience in moral behavior play an essential role in the formation of a soldier's positive habits. In organizing the training and service of soldiers, commanders and political workers should create a system of exercises which would contribute to the development of positive habits.

The inculcation of necessary attributes in soldiers acts in unison with the reindoctrination of some servicemen. This takes place when it is necessary to overcome the incorrect views and ideas of certain soldiers, to surmount vestiges of the past in their consciousness, and to reconvert them on the basis of communist morality. In reindoctrination harmful habits are often destroyed by means of demonstrating and proving their negative value and persistently developing new, positive habits.

The success of indoctrination and reindoctrination are also ensured by the personal efforts of soldiers in self-improvement and self-education. A soldier's correct assessment of his own behavior and his efforts aimed at eliminating his own negative traits and developing positive ones will largely contribute to the reinforcement of the results of indoctrinational work.

Thus, the unity of indoctrination, reindoctrination, and self-education is the most important condition for the formation of communist convictions and high moral-combat traits in soldiers.

3. The Components of Indoctrination of Soviet Soldiers

The indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the program and decisions of the CPSU, the military oath, and military regulations and is defined by the tasks of communist indoctrination of the Soviet people. The most important components

in the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers are political, military, moral, aesthetic, physical, and legal indoctrination. They are all interconnected aspects of indoctrination work in the Armed Forces, work which has the role of fulfilling the tasks of training soldiers who are ideologically convinced, boundlessly dedicated to the communist cause, skillful, brave, bold, and physically well-tempered.

Political indoctrination is the leading and decisive aspect of personnel indoctrination. This is due above all to the fact that in contrast to imperialist armies, in which the soldier is converted into the mechanical executor of the will of the ruling classes, the Soviet soldier is an ideologically convinced patriot and internationalist. Characteristic of him is a deep understanding of Party policy and of the goals for whose sake he is prepared selflessly to defend his Homeland and the achievements of socialism.

As V. I. Lenin indicated, indoctrinating soldiers in the ideas of socialism, in a spirit of selfless faith to the cause of the Communist Party, and in a readiness to defend their revitalized socialist Homeland to the last drop of their own blood is the main goal in ideological and political indoctrination.²¹ The working masses must understand, said Vladimir Il'ich, "that they are going to die truly for their own cause: for the workers' and peasants' Soviets and for the socialist republic."²² Therefore, the central position in indoctrinational work in the Armed Forces is held by the problems of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism, and implacability toward any manifestations of inimical ideology. The dissemination and in-depth study of the materials and decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress and the active motivation of personnel for the successful implementation of the decisions of the Congress occupy the most important place in the ideological and political indoctrination of Soviet soldiers.

Military indoctrination is carried out in inseparable unity with political indoctrination. Political and military indoctrination are indivisible, insofar as the formation of a soldier's specific qualities has a political orientation and is defined by political goals. Military indoctrination presupposes the formation in servicemen of traits which result from the specifics of military service and are necessary for the successful execution of military duty under any conditions.

The following main aspects should be singled out in military indoctrination:

- 1) Propaganda—the study of Lenin's works and of the decisions and documents of the CPSU on the problems of defending the socialist Homeland—and the role of the Armed Forces. The deep interconnection between political and military indoctrination is especially manifested here;
- 2) Explanation by personnel of the political goals, character, and

features of war and of the requirements which it places on Soviet soldiers, and also the formation of traits which meet these requirements;

3) Indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of unflagging fulfillment of the requirements of the military oath, military regulations, and orders of commanders and chiefs, and the comprehensive development in soldiers of the desire to master to perfection combat equipment and continually developing military affairs.

Military indoctrination is inseparably bound to moral-political and psychological training and, in unison with it, forms the necessary political and moral-combat traits in combat personnel.

The significance of military indoctrination is increasing even more under current conditions. This is due primarily to the fact that the current scientific-technical revolution and its influence on the advancement of all aspects of military affairs and on the character and specifics of modern warfare have greatly elevated the requirements placed on servicemen and hence have made the entire process of their training and indoctrination more complex. Moreover, in accordance with the Compulsory Military Service Law the period of service in the ranks of the Armed Forces has been reduced. This means that more complicated tasks of personnel training, including military indoctrination, must be carried out in shorter time frames.

All work in military indoctrination is concentrated on the main and decisive factors toward which personnel endeavor—increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy. In the process, the new aspects which have been introduced into the concept of combat readiness and the danger of a missile-borne nuclear attack on our Homeland and on fraternal socialist countries by imperialist powers is taken into consideration. Therefore, the thorough explanation to each serviceman of the need for constant readiness at any hour, even at any minute, to rebuff an enemy attack and inflict a crushing defeat occupies an important position in military indoctrination.

The problem of instilling in personnel discipline, the significance of which is continually growing, is naturally closely connected with this. High discipline on the part of servicemen is a mandatory condition for the functioning of the army and for its combat capability. Hence, it is necessary to improve the indoctrination of all categories of servicemen in a spirit of personal responsibility for the defense of their Homeland, for discipline is the most concentrated manifestation of servicemen's in-depth awareness of their military duty.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, observes that soldiers should be indoctrinated "in a spirit of high industriousness and unflagging observance of the requirements of the military oath,

regulations, and orders, and work to ensure that the requirements of the military oath, regulations, and manuals firmly enter the consciousness of every serviceman so that the entire daily life and service of soldiers are constructed on their basis." 23

Military indoctrination is also closely connected with the *moral education* of servicemen—primarily through the category of morality known as military duty. The tasks of affirming in the life and activity of soldiers the standards of communist morality and of forming the moral traits of the man of a communist society are carried out in moral education.

The efforts of instructors are directed at instilling in soldiers such traits as conscious fulfillment of their military duty, collectivism and military camaraderie, honesty, truthfulness, a conscientious attitude toward the study of military affairs, and others. Attention is paid to the soldiers' observance of the rules of military courtesy and saluting, respect for superiors and seniors, and so on.

Moral development is aimed at the resolute struggle against any manifestations in individual servicemen of alien ideology, against any vestiges of the past in their consciousness, and at eradicating such shameful behavior as drunkenness, hooliganism, and crudeness.

Aesthetic education ensures the spiritual growth of soldiers, raises their general educational and cultural level on the basis of the mastery of all achievements of science, literature, and art, and forms correct aesthetic views and feelings and the ability to understand the true beauty of life, labor, and military service.

The use of works of literature and works of art, scientific achievements, and technical means of propaganda (the movies, radio, television, photography, and so on) in the indoctrinational process makes it possible to explain more resourcefully and more clearly, on the basis of artistic images, the decisions of the Party and government, the achievements of the Soviet people in communist construction, and the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces, to point out their glorious combat traditions, and to motivate personnel to excellent studies and exemplary service. All this helps to form an aesthetically developed soldier who knows how to appreciate true beauty and to wage a resolute struggle against banality, phenomena alien to us, and any manifestation of bourgeois views and tastes.

Physical education is aimed at the comprehensive development of physical strength, endurance, agility, and the ability to withstand large physical strain, and also at tempering the body and strengthening health. Such development should contribute as much as possible to the training of physically strong, hardy soldiers capable of surmounting any of the difficulties of modern combat.

Physical development is carried out in the course of planned physical training activities in combination with various measures of mass sports work.

Under current conditions, as has been repeatedly emphasized in the decrees of the Party and government, the *legal indoctrination* of workers remains an important state task. In the service, legal indoctrination closely borders on military and moral indoctrination and contributes to the more thorough awareness of moral and legal standards of behavior in the army and to the formation of a high sense of responsibility for fulfilling their military duty.

These components of the indoctrination of the Soviet soldier are inseparably connected to each other and are implemented in the unified process of forming high political and moral-combat traits in soldiers.

Footnotes

1. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 83.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 33.
3. *Ibid.*, Vol 41, p 306.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol 7, p 253.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol 41, p 316.
6. *Ibid.*, Vol 41, p 309.
7. See *Vospominaniya o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine*, Part 2, pp 456, 458.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 38, pp 35-36.
9. *Ibid.*, Vol 6, p 269.
10. *Ibid.*, Vol 23, p 4.
11. *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*a (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 122-123.
12. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 83.
13. *Ibid.*, p 84.
14. *Ibid.*, p 205.
15. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, p 84.
16. *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*a, pp 111-112.
17. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 40, p 267.
18. N. A. Dobrolyubov, *Izbr. filosofsk. soch.* (Selected Philosophical Works), Vol 2, 1946, p 250.
19. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 445.
20. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol. 45, p 390.
21. See *Ibid.*, Vol 40, p 182.
22. *Ibid.*, Vol 37, p 146.
23. *Communist of the Armed Forces*, No 22, 1971.

Chapter 11. Principles of Indoctrination of Soviet Soldiers

1. The Concept of the Principles of Indoctrination

The successful fulfillment of the tasks of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers depends largely on in-depth knowledge and skillful application of the principles of indoctrination by commanders and political workers.

The principles of indoctrination are the main guiding propositions which reflect the objective principles governing the process of the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers. The requirements which define the contents, methods, and organizational forms of personnel indoctrination in the army and navy are reflected in these principles.

The *indoctrinational* principles employed in the Soviet Armed Forces derive from the very essence of communist indoctrination and its goals and tasks. The scientific summarization of the vast amount of experience accumulated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in indoctrinating the Soviet people, especially the adolescent generation, and many years of experience in indoctrinating soldiers of the army and navy are embodied in these principles.

The basic requirements for the principles of indoctrination were set forth in the works of V. I. Lenin, in decisions of the Party and government, and in the military oath and regulations. A number of the guiding propositions for raising the level of indoctrinational work in the army and navy under current conditions were defined in the decree of the CPSU CC dated 21 January 1967 and titled "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy."

The system of principles used to indoctrinate Soviet soldiers includes: communist purposefulness and Party spirit; the indoctrination of soldiers in the course of military activities; indoctrination in and through the collective; the individual approach in indoctrinating soldiers; stressing the positive in the indoctrinational process; combining high exactingness toward subordinates with respect for their personal dignity and concern for them; and unity, coordination, and continuity in the indoctrination of soldiers.

Each of these principles reflect some individual aspects of the complex and variegated indoctrinational process. Therefore, all principles act in close interrelationship, strengthen and enrich each other, and constitute a unified system. Each of these principles is employed in the indoctrinational process, not in isolation from the others, but in inseparable unity with them.

Knowledge and strict supervision of scientific principles in practice ensures the indoctrination of soldiers in accordance with CPSU policy and the requirements of the military oath and regulations, and accords the possibility of selecting the most effective forms and methods of influence. The scientific organization of political indoctrinational work is carried out on the basis of the principles of education.

The principles used in indoctrinating Soviet soldiers are defined by the character of our social and state order and by the specific features of the Armed Forces, which are closely connected with the people and execute their will. The moral and political unity of our society, the friendship among the peoples of the USSR, the community of their goals and tasks in the building of communism, proletarian internationalism, and the truly popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces are clearly embodied in the contents and requirements of indoctrinational principles.

The principles *reflect the dependence of indoctrination on the goals and tasks set by the Communist Party*. This dependence was clearly stated by M. I. Kalinin: "Communist indoctrination is in our understanding always specifically construed. Under our conditions it must be subordinated to the tasks facing the Party and the Soviet state. . . . If our indoctrination is externally magnificent but abstract—that is, if it is not objectively and materially related to the campaign for the further growth of the socialist state . . .—then it will be a parody of indoctrination."¹

The principles of indoctrination determine the contents of the activities of every military pedagogue as an implementor of CPSU ideas and policy among the soldiers, and also define the orientation of all its work.

The principles of the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers fundamentally differ from the principles used in the indoctrination of personnel of the armies of imperialist states.

In the Soviet Armed Forces the principles of indoctrination are aimed at comprehensive development of the soldiers' consciousness and at the formation of ideological motivation and communist standards of behavior. In imperialist armies indoctrinational principles have the goal of suppressing the class self-consciousness of soldiers and sailors, of concealing from them the imperialist essence of wars, and of concealing the class character of the army and the antagonism in relationships between officers and enlisted men.

In imperialist armies indoctrination is directed on the basis of the suppression of consciousness, toward instilling in personnel fierceness, sadism, coercion, a thirst for profit, and other attributes of a mindless murderer—an obedient tool of bloody imperialism. Indoctrinating personnel in the spirit of hatred of communism has become a principle.

While reflecting and interpreting in practice the regularities inherent in communist indoctrination, the principles used in the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers are of objective character. Their requirements are binding upon all categories of instructors. At the same time they do not limit creativity in the choice of the forms and methods of acting upon the trainees.

2. Characteristics of Main Principles of the Indoctrination of Soviet Soldiers

Communist Purposefulness and the Party Approach. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the organizer, leader, and educator of the Soviet Armed Forces. It defines the goals and tasks of educating a military patriot who is boundlessly dedicated to the communist cause, staunch, brave, skillful, and ready to give all his effort, and his life if necessary, to defeat an imperialist aggressor.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, said in a speech at the 24th CPSU Congress: "Our Army, which was created and educated by the Communist Party . . . through all its successes and victories over the enemy . . . , is indebted to the firm leadership of the Party and the Party Central Committee. Through the concern and effort of the Party scientifically substantiated ideological, theoretical, and organizational principles for the development of the Armed Forces have been created here. . . ." ²

The education of Army and Navy personnel regularly depends on CPSU policy. The need for subordinating this process to the interests of the construction of communism and the defense of the socialist Homeland is expressed in the principle of communist purposefulness and a Party approach.

Purposefulness and the Party approach fill the content of the entire indoctrinational process with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a spirit of implacability toward any manifestations of bourgeois ideology and morality.

In defining the most important requirements placed on the content, orientation, and methods of political educational work with soldiers, this principle holds a leading place in the system of indoctrinational principles.

Communist purposefulness and the Party approach permeate the indoctrinational work of all categories of commanders and political workers and of all Party and Komsomol organizations. They are of particular im-

portance to the activities of the political worker, who is an active implementor of the policy and decisions of the CPSU among the soldiers. His most important duty is to fuse personnel around the Communist Party, to explain in depth its directing and leading role, and to indoctrinate servicemen in a spirit of devotion to the Soviet Homeland and the ideas of communism.

What requirements stem from the principle of communist purposefulness and the Party approach in the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers?

First, the observance of the main provisions of this principle requires that commanders and political workers have *a clear and precise understanding of the indoctrinational goals and tasks* set by the Party. Only on this basis can an instructor correctly determine the content, forms, and methods of his work of forming in every soldier communist conviction, high political and moral-combat traits, definite character traits, habits, and so on.

In the indoctrinational process commanders and political workers, directed by the requirements of the CPSU, the military oath, and regulations, form in their subordinates concrete political, moral-combat and psychological traits and educate ardent patriots capable of making any sacrifice in order to achieve victory over the enemy. These qualities are developed in a unified process of combat and political training of personnel under the leading role of ideological and political indoctrination.

Second, the realization of this principal requires that *a high Party spirit be ensured in all indoctrinational measures and that the class line be unfailingly implemented in indoctrination*. This means that in conducting any indoctrinational measures it is necessary constantly to be directed by CPSU policy and decisions and to explain to the soldiers systematically and in depth the essence and significance of the decisions of the Party and government and the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in fulfilling the task of protecting our Homeland's state interests.

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized once again and with all due vigor the necessity of unfailingly implementing the Leninist principle of Party spirit in all ideological and educational work. The following is stated in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the Party Congress: "The Central Committee considers it necessary to intensify our ideological work and above all to make the dissemination of communist ideals and the concrete tasks of our development more active and more purposeful."³

On the basis of the requirement of Party spirit all forms of political educational work are directed at raising the level of the political knowledge of personnel, the study of Lenin's theoretical heritage and Party documents. The high ideological and theoretical level of implemented

measures largely ensures their efficacy and the successful fulfillment of the tasks of combat and of political training, increasing combat readiness, and forming political, moral-combat, and psychological traits.

Party spirit is inseparably connected with the consistent implementation of the class line in problems of political education. The pressing nature of this requirement is due to the fact that under current conditions an ideological struggle of unprecedented scope and ferocity is underway between socialism and imperialism. The 24th CPSU Congress observed that in the ideological war against our country and the socialist world imperialist propaganda utilizes the most refined methods and powerful technical facilities.⁴ It endeavors to introduce bourgeois ideology into the consciousness of the Soviet people and to disarm them in an ideological sense.

Anti-communism, which reflects an ideology of hatred and fear of the omnipotent strength of communist ideas, is the main ideological and political weapon of imperialism. In setting the dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda as the main task, bourgeois ideologists attempt to belittle the outstanding achievements of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community and to slander our social and state order and the activities of the CPSU.

General Secretary of the CPSU CC L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech at an international forum of communists that victory in the struggle against imperialism "is impossible without unleashing a most active offensive against bourgeois ideology."⁵

Under these conditions no instructor can fulfill his role if he is not an active ideological champion of the Party and if he does not clearly understand in whose interests and in the interests of what class he is carrying out his tasks and on what ideological and theoretical positions he relies in so doing.

Communist purposefulness and Party spirit require that an instructor have precise and clear ideological positions and implacability toward any manifestations of hostile ideology, toward an apolitical attitude, or toward the lack of principles and ideals. This principle requires all instructors to display high revolutionary vigilance and consistently to work against the penetration of bourgeois views, mores, and morality into our environment, against vestiges of private ownership and narrow-minded sentiments, and against manifestations of a nihilistic attitude toward the achievements of socialism.

In supervising the ideological work of subunit instructors, the political worker teaches them thoroughly to master the weapons of the ideological struggle, to wage it aggressively and on a daily basis, and to direct themselves toward developing unshakeable communist convictions in their soldiers.

Third, implementation of the principle of communist purposefulness and Party spirit defines the *close relation between education and life and the specific tasks of soldiers*. Commenting on the organic relation between education and training and life, V. I. Lenin said: "We would not believe teaching, upbringing, and education if they were driven solely into the school and separated from turbulent real life."⁶

Nor should the education of Soviet soldiers be separated from the practice of communist construction or from the concrete tasks carried out by personnel. Therefore, in the educational process it is necessary constantly to cover the pressing problems of the country's domestic and international position and of the construction and development of the Armed Forces, to disseminate successes in communist construction, and to conduct political educational work with the purpose of strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and increasing the combat readiness of units and subunits.

The ideological level and Party spirit of work carried out in subunits cannot be judged only on the basis of formal indications. Communist purposefulness and Party spirit in education are inseparably linked to effectiveness. Among the main criteria for effective, purposeful work are the concrete results of educational factors: the high consciousness and social activity of soldiers, exemplary execution of duties, excellent and good indicators in combat and political training, and firm discipline. It is impossible to achieve such results through abstract education which is separated from real life. Political educational work in the subunit is always aimed at carrying out concrete tasks of combat readiness and at executing the orders of commanders and supervisors.

Fourth, communist purposefulness and Party spirit presuppose a *scientific approach in the indoctrination* of soldiers.

Purposeful indoctrinational work would be inconceivable without a well-conceived plan and clear organization and without the ability to single out the main task in a host of tasks, to determine prospects for the development of soldiers, and to predict their behavior. The experience of many subunit political workers demonstrates that one can count on success in education only on the basis of an in-depth analysis and objective evaluation of the state of affairs and the results of work done, and only if there is comprehensive study and knowledge of the specific features of subordinates and consideration for the pedagogic expediency of methods, means, and forms of education. Any educational measure should be carefully prepared and skillfully organized.

Also of positive value to the activities of company political workers is the fact that they rely on the achievements of a scientific approach to communist education, utilize the data of both concrete military socio-

logical research and the latest advance experience in Party political work among the troops, and react quickly to changing conditions.

Fifth, successful realization of the principle of communist purposefulness and Party spirit depends largely on *perseverance and persistence* in work toward developing necessary traits both on the part of the instructor and on the part of the trainee. The formation of high political and moral-combat traits is a prolonged process which entails the surmounting of many difficulties and requires stubborn and intensive educational work. Only an instructor who will spare no effort or energy and who will display persistence and patience in attaining the assigned goals will achieve success.

Educating Soldiers in the Course of Military Service. Socially useful labor possesses tremendous pedagogic possibilities in proportion to the amount of influence exerted on the individual, and may be rightfully called a talented pedagogic device capable of doing that which cannot be achieved through the finest methods of education. In our country labor performs an historical role in the formation and flourishing of the individual.

The 24th CPSU Congress, in defining the tasks of Party ideological and educational work, paid particular attention to instilling a new, communist attitude toward labor in the Soviet people. The following was stated in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the Party Congress: "... Even the most advanced ideology becomes a real force only when, by taking over the masses, it moves them to vigorous actions and defines the standards of their everyday behavior. *The inculcation of a new communist attitude toward labor in the Soviet people* holds one of the leading positions in the ideological work which the Party is conducting." ⁷

At the same time communist labor is a *school of education*. The personality traits of the new man are objectively formed most quickly in the course of activities which themselves pose the need for the manifestation of these attributes. V. I. Lenin, commenting on the decisive role of creative labor in communist education, emphasized in a speech at the Third Komsomol Congress: "Only in labor together with workers and peasants can we become true communists." ⁸

Military labor of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces is a specific type of socially useful labor, which is the most important factor for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of communist construction. Like any labor in our country, military service is a matter of honor and a distinguished duty.

The service of soldiers includes an intricate complex of the most diverse types of military labor: combat alert duty, intensive combat and political training, the maintenance of internal order according to

regulations, the maintenance of complex combat equipment, and garrison and guard duty. All these types of labor exert a tremendous influence on the formation of the soldier's personality, especially when personnel training is carried out under conditions as close as possible to combat reality.

Military activities have a number of advantages with respect to their pedagogic possibilities. By demanding great and diverse loads on the part of individual soldiers and military collectives, they develop mental capabilities, teach industriousness and collectivism, temper the will, and make a person hardy and persistent. Distinguished by great difficulties and complexity, the military activities of soldiers and sergeants have no material incentives, as moral incentives are placed at the fore. This ascribes to them even greater pedagogic significance.

At the same time it should be kept in mind that labor is only an objective prerequisite for the development of the individual. Labor does not in itself educate a person. The simple expenditure of a person's physical and mental efforts is a mechanical process. Labor which is connected with communist education educates in the name of noble goals. In this regard A. S. Makarenko observed: "You can force a person to work as much as you want, but if at the same time you do not educate him politically and morally and if he does not participate in social and political affairs, this labor will simply be a neutral process which does not produce a positive result."⁹

Under what conditions does military labor play an educational role?

Of primary significance here is the *combination of military labor with well-organized and systematically implemented Party political work*. A soldier's labor should be inspired by the high ideals of serving society. Military activities acquire educational significance in connection with the social goals in whose name they are accomplished, through awareness of their social significance. In military activities, observed M. V. Frunze, "particular attention should be paid to eliminating all phenomena which might give rise in the trainee to the idea that he is spending his time uselessly."¹⁰

The principle of educating soldiers in the course of their military activities presupposes constant concern for the ideological and theoretical growth of personnel and soldiers' awareness of the social significance of service in the Soviet Armed Forces. The effectiveness of this principle also lies in the fact that it ensures a unity of consciousness and behavior, of communist ideas and practical deeds. Therefore, in the course of combat and political training activities, combat duty, guard and internal service and the maintenance of combat weapons and equipment, daily Party political work is organized.

The subunit commander and political worker constantly explain to

personnel the importance and significance of military labor toward defending the state interests of our Homeland, as well as the necessity of increasing combat readiness. They direct Party political work toward the high-quality execution of all types of military labor and the successful fulfillment of combat training tasks, and, in the course of military activities, form in personnel assiduousness, discipline, persistence in carrying out assigned tasks and surmounting any difficulties, and a communist attitude toward labor.

Ensuring the educational role of every type of military labor and a relation between indoctrination and training is the object of particular concern on the part of the subunit political worker.

The most favorable conditions for the formation of high political, moral-combat, and psychological traits are created in the process of complex, intensive types of combat activities, field exercises, and tactical studies. The experience of conducted tactical studies and exercises shows that success is always achieved by those subunits in which purposeful Party political work is carried out.

The educational role of military labor is especially notable when it is *reasonably and precisely organized*. In organizing service and combat and political training, the subunit commander and political worker carefully plan military activities and outline concrete measures for the successful execution of all types of military labor. The proper distribution of forces, precise determination of the volume, allotted time, and sequence in which assignments are carried out, and the establishment of personal responsibility for the assigned work are provided for in the organization of service and training. Measures for systematically monitoring the quantity and the quality of labor and for evaluating completed assignments are drawn up.

The organization of military labor also provides for accurate consideration of the capabilities of soldiers and the creation of conditions for the fulfillment of assignments. The tasks set for personnel should be within their abilities and well-supported. Requirements made without consideration for specific conditions or for the real possibilities of execution cause great damage to morale. On the one hand they undermine faith in the unqualified character of orders issued by the commander and on the other they exert a negative influence on the formation of confidence in the soldiers' own capabilities. This may impede the mastery of combat skills by soldiers.

As the moral and physical tempering of soldiers is strengthened the tasks which they carry out gradually increase and become more complex. After all, that which just yesterday was beyond one's means may today become fully attainable. Standing in place will immediately have an effect on the state of discipline and retard the educational process.

Skillful planning and organization of service and the educational process open up the prospects of growth for soldiers and develop industriousness, discipline, belief in their own strength and capabilities, and persistence in carrying out assigned tasks.

The sound organization of military labor is inseparably bound to such an educational factor as *socialist competition*.

In comprehensively working out the problems of organizing socialist competition, V. I. Lenin stated that it has tremendous educational possibilities in the formation of the new man and in mobilizing creative efforts of the people in the building of socialism.¹¹

Socialist competition in the army and navy is a patriotic movement of soldiers founded on their creative initiative and directed toward comprehensively increasing combat readiness of troops, improving the military skills of personnel, and of instilling in them high political and moral-combat traits. It develops a spirit of collectivism and a sense of military camaraderie, instills in the soldiers a sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the subunit, and moves them to mutual assistance in their studies and on the job.

The effectiveness and pedagogic significance of competition depends on the level of leadership and organization. The commander is in charge of socialist competition in the subunit. Organizational measures are carried out directly by the subunit deputy commander for political affairs. He helps to select individual and collective duties which stimulate the development of the collective and of individual soldiers of the subunit.

In organizing the competition, the commander and political worker draw up and develop patriotic initiatives connected with the campaign to improve ratings, rapidly introduce young soldiers into combat teams, master related specialties and all standard weapons of the subunit, and ensure complete interchangeability in crews, teams, and detachments. They encourage in every way possible the desire of leading soldiers competently to work out combat training missions under field conditions, in the air, and at sea with maximum economy of material and technical resources, and extension of between-repair periods of combat equipment.

The subunit commander and political worker direct the educational force of socialist competition toward the attainment of new levels of combat skills and improvement of the soldiers' best traits.

Combining military labor with well-organized leisure time and mass cultural work is the most important condition for increasing the effectiveness of education.

By using the richest potentials of science, literature, art, movies, radio, television, and the press, mass cultural work has a strong influence on the consciousness and feelings of soldiers and is an important means of motivating personnel to the exemplary performance of all types of military labor.

The daily fulfillment of the complex and difficult tasks of military activities requires that personnel make significant expenditures of physical and spiritual effort. The combination of training and service with relaxation and meaningful leisure time is an important condition for the correct functioning of the psyche and the nervous system, for the intensive recuperation of their strength, and hence for the successful fulfillment of assigned tasks by soldiers.

In organizing the leisure time of subunit personnel, the political worker plans various measures with consideration for the soldiers' needs and the available possibilities. Soldiers have great interest in evening sessions on current events, reading conferences, excursions to museums, group trips to the theater, chess tournaments, sports competitions, discussions of films, plays, television broadcasts, and so on.

The organization of cultural leisure time on the days before days off, days off, and holidays is of special importance. The subunit political worker, taking into consideration planned measures in the unit, thoughtfully organizes the relaxation and leisure time of personnel on these days, covering all soldiers without exception. Experience shows that in subunits where the relaxation and cultural leisure time of personnel are poorly planned and organized, cases of infractions of military discipline generally occur. Therefore, in addition to sports competitions, movie screenings, and other measures conducted on the unit scale, excursions, competitions, the viewing of television broadcasts, and other measures are organized for personnel of the subunit.

Realization of conditions which define the educational potential of military labor also greatly increase the educational role of the subunit commander and political worker as organizers and leaders of the military activities of personnel.

Education in and through the Collective. The rôle of the military collective in personnel education is great. Under current conditions this rôle has been elevated in connection with the fundamental changes which have taken place in the Armed Forces. In particular, the reduction of periods of active service for soldiers and sailors, sergeants, and senior NCO's, as a result of which as many as half of the personnel in subunits are replaced each year, raises in a particularly acute way the problem of uniting military collectives and creating and replacing active personnel.

The most favorable opportunities for education in and through the collective are created in a company where the soldiers know each other well and are directly connected through their joint endeavors.

The educational potential of the collective consists above all in the *strength of its group opinion*. The opinion of the collective possesses the property of indisputability; it is difficult to "protest," since a healthy collective seldom errs. Therefore, every soldier always bears moral responsibility to the collective and conforms his behavior to its requirements. The collective is also responsible for the actions of each of its members.

A person becomes known more quickly and comprehensively in a collective. A strong, healthy military collective is capable of preventing the misdeeds of soldiers and of abating infractions of military discipline. Moreover, a collective exerts a continual *educational influence* on all soldiers under any conditions of military activity.

The successful realization of the educational potential of a military collective¹² is accomplished on the basis of certain requirements.

Of great importance are *the establishment and strict observance of statutory interrelationships in a military collective*. One of the main means of forming such interrelationships is the practical organization of military service in strict accordance with the requirements of military regulations. Statutory interrelationships in a military collective are a mandatory condition for the formation in soldiers of such traits as unquestioning obedience, industriousness, and readiness to work for mutual training and to save the commander's life.

Raising the pedagogic standards of officers and sergeants, forming pedagogic tactfulness, and thoroughly explaining to all servicemen statutory requirements play an essential role in the formation of statutory relationships.

Increasing the responsibility of the collective for each soldier and for the state of affairs in the subunit as a whole occupies an important place in the activities of a military collective as educator. In a good collective an atmosphere of mutual exactingness and a sense of collective responsibility always reign. Here not only personal discipline but also responsibility for the discipline of others are required on the part of the soldier. At the same time, the personal responsibility of the educator and of each member of the collective is not eliminated.

The subunit commander and political worker, in forming group opinion of the collective, develop in it a highly principled approach and exactingness toward the actions and deeds of every soldier and intolerance of violations of military discipline, and instills in the personnel the desire always to proceed on the basis of the collective's interests, to

subordinate personal interests to social interests, and to apply all their effort to the solution of common tasks.

Increasing the responsibility of the collective is inseparably linked to the *accumulation of the subunit's traditions* and to the formation in each soldier of *interest in the successes of the collective and a love of his company and platoon*. Positive traditions, in which the desire to secure the achievements of the best soldiers and the entire collective in combat and political training, the thorough mastery of weapons and combat equipment, and mass sports work is reflected, are always accumulated in a friendly and united collective.

The commander and political worker promote existing traditions in every way possible, instill in their men the desire to multiply the achieved successes, and on this basis develop in personnel a love of their subunit and a sense of pride in its deeds.

Such fundamental requirements as the *constant supervision of educational activities of the collective and a reliance on active Party and Komsomol members* also play a significant role.

The principle of educating soldiers in and through the collective is implemented most completely and most consistently through the Party and Komsomol organizations of the subunit. The subunit commander, a communist, not only relies on the Party and Komsomol organizations but also directs their activities toward the successful execution of combat missions, the fulfillment of combat and political training plans, and the strengthening of military discipline. The subunit political affairs officer organizes Party political work in the subunit and is directly responsible for its state and for the activities of the Party and Komsomol organizations.

High activity and military spirit on the part of subunit Party and Komsomol organizations are ensured chiefly through the active Party and Komsomol members. Only where the active members are fortuitously selected, where their work is systematically supervised, is the collective capable of carrying out complex educational tasks. The political affairs officer personally handles the selection, instruction, and education of the aktiv.*

General meetings of the servicemen of a subunit play a major role in the education of soldiers. At these meetings a community of views is formed and the collective's requirements toward each member are defined. The educational value of a general meeting is largely a function of how well a commander and his political affairs officer succeed in ensuring that it truly becomes a meeting of subunit personnel and not a meeting for the personnel. It is bad for a meeting to be converted solely into a means of making the commander's opinions known to the soldiers. A

*aktiv—(collective) The most active members of an organization.

meeting should work out the healthy generalized opinion of the collective. This depends on the level of preparations for the meeting and on work with the aktiv.

The subunit commander and political worker, relying on the aktiv and guided by the activities of the collective, constantly set clear and precise tasks and outline the collective prospects for advancing toward the attainment of new levels of military skills and heightening organization and discipline.

The Individual Approach in the Education of Soldiers. In orienting oneself toward the collective and the creation of a coordinated and combat-capable subunit in educational work, one must not forget the fact that education ultimately has the goal of forming high political and moral-combat traits in every soldier. Consequently, work with the collective also presupposes the educational influence on the individual with consideration for the individual features of each soldier. This is reflected in the principle of the individual approach in personnel education.

This principle requires the educator *to know each soldier comprehensively as an individual and, on this basis, to take a differentiated approach to the education of subordinates.*

The implementation of the individual approach in the education of soldiers is of primary significance in the activities of every military pedagogue. Speaking of the necessity of paying particular attention to the individual approach in education and training, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, advised: "Look attentively at your subunit and you will see that each soldier has his own personality: each has different life and work experience, his own needs, his own interests, and a frame of character inherent to him.

"Life itself and experience teach that one cannot be a good officer-educator without knowing and taking into account the attributes of subordinates. . . ." ¹³

The in-depth and comprehensive knowledge of every serviceman and of his personal traits, thoughts, feelings, aspirations, and strong and weak points is the foundation for *the individual approach in education.*

The characteristics of individual features of a soldier as an individual include:

- 1) Specific personality traits (orientation, character, temperament, capabilities);
- 2) The typical attributes of mental cognitive processes, feelings, and will;
- 3) Successes and shortcomings in combat and political training and attitudes toward one's military specialty and service on the whole;

- 4) His state of health and physical development;
- 5) His participation in social and mass sports work;
- 6) His position held in the collective, and his circle of comrades, friends, and acquaintances.

Comprehensive consideration for character traits and the study of the soldier's system of attitudes toward the world around him, military activities and its results, the people around him, and toward himself are of particular importance in the knowledge of individual features.

The main method of studying soldiers is observing their activities and behavior both on duty and during off-duty time. The results of the observation are supplemented with the data of other methods: individual heart-to-heart talks with subordinates and the study of documents describing the soldiers. The taking of regular notes, the keeping of diaries, and analysis of them is of great assistance to the educator in studying the individual attributes of soldiers.

The idea of the differentiated approach in the education of servicemen is contained in the principle of the individual approach.

Through the individual approach cases of conceit and complacency are eliminated in work with soldiers distinguished by bright positive qualities, and the sense of perspective is not lost. In a majority of subunits much attention is rightly paid to such soldiers and sergeants.

As experience shows, some commanders and political workers let slip from view servicemen who do not stand out by virtue of successes in training and activity in social affairs. As a rule these soldiers do not at first cause any particular alarm, but they themselves go without the influence of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. Their work is not duly evaluated, their successes not always observed, and their shortcomings not always corrected. Not perceiving any attention being paid to themselves, such soldiers are only nominally concerned with the fulfillment of their official duties and fail to observe discipline.

Meriting particular attention are soldiers who display a lack of discipline and who show a careless attitude toward training and the fulfillment of their duties. Among them one encounters people of increased nervousness, with negative habits, and with such vices as stubbornness, negativism, and so on. The presence of such servicemen is due to shortcomings in educational work with them prior to their service in the army or even within the subunit. The education and reeducation of such soldiers undoubtedly requires great effort, considerable expenditure of time, patience and creativity on the part of the military pedagog.

Experience indicates that the study of personality traits is very dif-

difficult. One cannot immediately find the key to the heart of a given soldier, learn the very complicated internal world of the man, and act upon his consciousness. It is difficult to reach the point where the soldier shares his innermost thoughts with the educator.

Comprehensive knowledge of personality traits is of benefit only when it is skillfully employed in the process of educational work in order to determine *the soldier's line of behavior* and when it extends comprehensive aid to subordinates in strengthening and developing their own positive traits and eliminating shortcomings. This is accomplished through the skillful use of such a principle as *the substantiated selection of methods of pedagogic influence and the anticipation of the consequences*.

In studying subordinates the educators select those methods which are most effective for a given individual, on the basis of the specific features of their intellect, emotions, will, orientation, temperament, capabilities, and character. Knowledge of a soldier's individual features accords the subunit commander and political worker an opportunity clearly to define and coordinate with the Party and Komsomol organizations the general line of educational work with him, to predict changes in his behavior, and to outline the prospects for growth.

Implementation of the principle of the individual approach requires *comprehensive analysis of the results of educational work*. The selection of the most effective paths of education is possible only when the true reasons underlying deeds which require pedagogic intervention have been elucidated.

Failures in work with servicemen who have committed a disciplinary misdeed are due not only to the fact that his individual attributes were not taken into account when the method of influence was selected, but also to the fact that the true reasons for the misdeed have not been established. Outwardly identical behavior may result from different motives and hence requires a different approach on the part of the educator. Constant analysis of the results of educational work in the subunit and study of the causes which give rise to cases of undisciplined behavior are mandatory for every political worker.

Even an experienced educator makes mistakes in the complex process of education. Perhaps the pedagogic mistakes themselves are not the greatest evil. Where the habit of critically analyzing one's own work has been developed, mistakes are quickly ascertained and corrected without any damage. It is dangerous when mistakes are not noticed or an attempt is made to justify them, when the educator does not possess sufficient flexibility to reject in time as yet unproven methods of influencing the trainees.

The principle of the individual approach requires that a commander

or political worker always completely comprehend and, when need be, critically reexamine educational work in the subunit and make appropriate corrections.

The requirements of the principle of individual approach fully apply to the educational process as a whole and to the pedagogic activities of officers, sergeants, Party and Komsomol organizations, and military collectives. With the possibility of making the most objective evaluation of an individual and of comprehensively analyzing the attributes of a soldier, the collective is also capable of selecting the most effective means of pedagogic action.

Stressing the Positive in the Education of Soldiers. The principle of the individual approach has already stressed the necessity of knowing a subordinate in a more than just a general way, whereby certain qualities can be singled out and used successfully to solve the problems of improving the personality. Here the close relation between the individual approach and the principle of stressing the positive is reflected.

The desire for something good and better is always inherent in people. Only through the positive can one demonstrate to a soldier what he should strive toward and what can be accomplished through honest and conscientious labor.

The essence of the principle of stressing the positive in education consists in *using and relying upon the best, positive traits of a person.*

In a socialist society, given correct upbringing, the traits of a builder of communism can be developed in any individual. The art of the military pedagog consists in finding the good in any soldier in the course of education, and relying upon it in developing in every way possible positive traits and eliminating the negative.

What are the main requirements of the principle of stressing the positive in the education of soldiers?

First of all, a military pedagog must deeply *believe in the strength of communist education and approach his soldiers from an optimistic standpoint.* The entire content and character of communist education are permeated with optimism which rests not on illusions but on knowledge of the laws of social development which lead to the triumph of communism. Resting upon Marxist-Lenin methodology, Soviet pedagogy proceeds from the fact that the personality is in constant development and every day certain changes take place in it, and that positive traits are formed and improved in the course of this development.

In his activities an educator must often deal with soldiers who have many negative traits and attributes. Sometimes young educators rush to conclusions and say: "There is nothing positive in this person, he can-

not be educated." Of course, such soldiers must not only be educated, but reeducated, entailing additional difficulties. In approaching education from an optimistic standpoint, however, it should be kept in mind that there are no naturally spoiled persons. A person is not born bad. He becomes what he is in the course of life and education. As already indicated, the existence of so-called difficult, hard-to-educate soldiers is explained by negligence in educational work with them in the past (in the family, school, production, and so on) or the present.

The great humanist A. M. Gor'kiy advised: "Never approach a person thinking there is more bad than good in him—think that there is more good in him and so it will be! People give what is asked of them." ¹⁴

An educator always projects the soldier's personality and development on the basis of the "optimistic hypothesis," with faith in the good in the soldier and in what might yet develop.

Communist education cannot be carried out only by concentrating attention on the negative and in surmounting shortcomings in the trainee. In order to educate a new man it is not enough to tell him what shortcomings must be eliminated. This is essentially a rejection of education, in which nothing except for restraint from the undesirable is demanded of a person. The education of a person who is to be a carrier of communist traits and a brave and skillful defender of the communist Homeland is possible on the basis of *actively invading the soldiers' consciousness, demonstrating their prospects, and handling with care the shoots of the new and positive aspects in their personality.*

It is not always simple to see and find what is good in a person. The educator does not immediately notice the sprouts of something positive in the thistle of negative attributes in some soldiers. But they can and must be found and relied upon in order to provide the conditions for growth and sort out the weeds of negative traits. Painstaking labor always yields results: the small shoots of the positive will grow stronger, grow in profusion, and then bear fruit.

In order to find the good in people, it is necessary to know in depth not only their present but also their past, to study their orientation, and to see them in life and at work. Drawing a soldier into types of activity which enable him to show his better side often provides the educator with very valuable material for the development of positive traits, and results in the soldier's confidence and respect for the educator, and faith in his own strength and capabilities.

The principle of stressing the positive fully applies not only to individual soldiers, but also to military collectives. Even upon the appointment of a new commander to a lagging subunit in order to educate the personnel, he should strive first of all to single out the successes of the

collective, to rely on positive traditions, and to demonstrate the possibility of putting an end to the lagging and moving into the ranks of the advanced. To begin work in a new collective by emphasizing only weak spots is not only a sign of a foolish approach but a glaring pedagogic mistake. Belief in the better side of a person and a collective and in the noble forces hidden in them invariably yields positive results.

A sense of moderation and a combination of a sound approach and tact in criticizing shortcomings are important requirements of this principle. In developing positive traits in soldiers, commanders and political workers should wage a fundamental struggle against the shortcomings in their behavior and training. The instructor's skill consists in moving a person to evaluate his own shortcomings subjectively while relying on the best in him, and then in correcting them and convincing him that he is not utilizing his best qualities in the interests of his work. In this undertaking it is exceedingly important to observe a sense of moderation and to proceed tactfully.

Failure to be tactful in criticizing a soldier's shortcomings often leads to serious mistakes in educational work. Emphasizing only the negative in a person and frequently reminding him of past misdeeds is especially antipedagogic. Moderation and tact should be observed in criticizing shortcomings of soldiers in the unit press, especially in satirical newspapers. Sometimes a caricature of some soldiers is insulting in character and generates a legitimate feeling of protest.

Constant stressing of shortcomings and failure to comment upon positive aspects may lead to a soldier's losing faith in himself and beginning to believe that he has nothing good, that he is incorrigible.

The principle of stressing the positive presupposes the *skillful use of the force of example*, the experience of the best soldiers and excellent subunits, and the heroic feats of the Soviet people during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. Education through positive examples and facts, especially combat feats, largely contribute to the development of high political and moral-combat traits.

Mastering the main requirements of stressing the positive in education makes it possible to ascertain all of a person's potential and creates the conditions needed to form and develop better traits in soldiers.

Combining High Exactingness Toward Subordinates With Respect for Their Personal Dignity and Concern for Them. In relying on the positive traits of soldiers and placing high requirements upon them in combination with respect for their personal dignity and concern for them, the educator not only moves subordinates to the conscientious fulfillment of their duties, but also directs the development of their better aspects and enables all of a person's capabilities to be revealed.

Without high exactingness toward the individual there can be no goal-directed education, especially in the army and navy, where the exactingness of commanders and chiefs, being their statutory duty, is the most important condition for the successful fulfillment of combat and political training tasks, for strengthening military discipline, and for forming political and moral-combat traits in soldiers. The high exactingness applied to subordinates helps them to reinforce positive traits, overcome shortcomings, temper their will, and acquire the necessary character traits and socially useful behavioral habits.

In imposing requirements on subordinates and making various decisions, commanders and political workers should never forget the educational aspects of these requirements and decisions. Commenting on the essence of the organization and education of people in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, L. I. Erezhnev observed: "Even if a leader is empowered to exercise the principle of unity of command, he still cannot rely solely on the force of an order. . . . Our Party . . . requires that leading workers constantly think about the educational consequences of those . . . decisions which they make." ¹⁵

Exactingness constitutes only one aspect of the educational process and is organically fused with another—confidence in and respect and concern for the person. Only in this combination can educational goals be realized. If exactingness is separated from respect for the personal dignity of people and concern for them, it loses its educational force.

The high responsibility of the commander and political worker to the people and the Communist Party for the combat and political training of personnel and the maintenance of constant combat readiness is reflected in their exactingness. By working to achieve faultless execution of official duties by soldiers, the officer-instructor is primarily concerned with strengthening military discipline, improving the combat training of personnel, and forming high moral-combat traits in subordinates.

Such attributes as a basic Party approach and implacability toward shortcomings, persistence and resoluteness in implementing one's own requirements, the establishment of personal responsibility of servicemen for work assigned to them, and strict monitoring of execution are characteristic of the high statutory exactingness of the officer-instructor.

The basic Party approach and implacability toward shortcomings are directed against everything that interferes with the establishment of firm military order, the strengthening of discipline, and increased combat readiness. Whether the educator's approach is principled or not is judged primarily by how he regards his official duties, the shortcomings of subordinates, and deviations from the statutory requirements.

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the need for increasing exactingness toward workers and their responsibility for work assigned to them, and for taking steps against those who violate discipline and behave improperly.¹⁶

Party principles are a reliable guarantee against eyewash and lack of interest in work. They help a person achieve high results in his work and prevent him from being content with temporary success.

The basic Party approach and implacability toward shortcomings define *persistence and resoluteness* in implementing one's own requirements. If a commander or political worker adheres to Party principles, is fair, and is demanding in the interests of work, he must act persistently and resolutely. This concerns all aspects of the life, training, and service of a military collective: the fulfillment of combat and political training plans, the maintenance of statutory order in the subunit, the improvement of the combat training of personnel, and so on.

An overwhelming majority of our commanders and political workers persistently and resolutely work for high combat readiness, organization, and smoothness in combat training and for strong military discipline. Upon noticing some shortcoming they do not rest until it is corrected. Thus, success in personnel instruction always accompanies commanders and political workers. On the other hand, whoever is not resolute and persistent in carrying out assigned tasks, implementing his own requirements or struggling against shortcomings cannot count on high results in his work with his subordinates.

V. I. Lenin often underscored the necessity of establishing "the very precise *responsibility of each . . . for fulfilling specific*, clearly and unambiguously outlined assignments and *practical projects*."¹⁷ Guided by this statement made by Lenin, experienced commanders and political workers always begin the fulfillment of tasks and the implementation of adopted decisions by establishing the *personal responsibility* of each subordinate for the work assigned to him and by determining the specific individuals responsible. They always clearly indicate what should be done, by whom, where, and when. This is the primary assurance that the assignment will be carried out accurately and on time.

Personal responsibility for assigned work is inconceivable without the *control of execution*. To make a demand of a person and then not to verify how he has coped with the task means to deprive exactingness of its educational force. A perfunctory attitude toward how a subordinate has carried out an assignment usually gives rise to indifference, laxity, and irresponsibility.

Control has the goal not only of checking execution, but also of preventing a gap between word and deed. V. I. Lenin scorned those

leaders who "give the most magnificent advice and directives left and right, but who prove to be 'awkward' to the point of being hilarious, absurd, and shameful; who prove to be incapable of implementing this advice and these directives, and exercising *practical control* to ensure that word becomes deed." ¹⁸

Poor control is the most widespread cause of nonperformance. People who are used to working under conditions where their activities are inadequately monitored react oversensitively to the exactingness of their commanders.

If a requirement which defines a service routine is once made of a subordinate, its fulfillment must be worked for constantly and unflaggingly. When a young soldier does everything precisely today, tomorrow, within a week, or within a month, the fulfillment of regulations and the execution of orders will become customary to him and will be retained throughout his entire service in the army. A commander's requirements sometimes generate resistance in a soldier who has not been taught daily precision. "Even the low requirements of a person who is exacting only from time to time or at random," said M. I. Dragomirov, "elicit grumbling about strictness. This phenomenon occurs not because of the absolute difficulty of executing what is required, but because of the abruptness of the transition from an ordinary careless attitude toward work to immediate strictness and precision." ¹⁹

The more a situation in which subordinates find themselves is predisposed toward deviation from established order, the more strictly demands and tests must be made. For instance, execution of a mission by a subunit apart from its own unit, extreme fatigue of the men, actions by personnel at night, having combat alert duty before being replaced, and so on, may be such circumstances.

The examined features of the exactingness of commander-instructors and political workers acquire great educational force when *certain conditions* are observed. Among them are:

1) The soldiers' understanding of the meaning of requirements imposed on them and an awareness of their expediency. In revealing the role of this condition for strengthening military discipline, M. V. Frunze said that revolutionary discipline is a heavy yoke only for a person who does not understand its goals and importance. A serviceman can fully comprehend the meaning and spirit of the rules of military order and of issued directives. Hence, first, all issued orders must be legitimate and second, when need be, their importance and meaning should be explained; ²⁰

2) The impermissibility of familiarity, connivance, and persuasion in exactingness;

3) The incompatibility of exactingness with crudeness, insult, or belittling of the personal dignity of the soldier;

4) The lack of perfunctoriness, callousness toward people, and petty faultfinding in exactingness;

5) In exactingness, a poor attitude, irritation on the part of the instructor, and antipathy or partiality toward some soldiers must not be manifested;

6) Mastery of the techniques of making demands and constant observance of pedagogic tact;

7) Combination of exactingness toward subordinates with exactingness toward oneself.

The practical fulfillment of these conditions ensures a correct combination of high exactingness with respect for the personal dignity of the soldiers.

Respect for dignity of the soldier is manifested in the educator's concern for *observing the rights and satisfying the needs of a subordinate*. The rights accorded soldiers by laws and regulations and the types of allowances established for them should be strictly ensured and correspond to those requirements which commanders impose on subordinates in the execution of official duties.

It is important for the subunit commander and political worker to remember that at the present time concern for satisfying the growing spiritual and material requirements of soldiers is assuming even greater importance. The elevated general educational and cultural level of personnel raises the problem with particular acuity of satisfying spiritual needs and organizing relaxation, cultural, and mass sports activities. Concern for the diet, health, and everyday living conditions of personnel is an important obligation of every instructor.

In the combination between high exactingness and respect and concern for the soldier's personal dignity, the features of a Leninist work style are clearly expressed. General Secretary of the CPSU CC L. I. Brezhnev said in a report at the ceremony dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: "Modesty and simplicity, true humaneness, respect for and belief in people, and personal participation in their fates were in Lenin combined with strong principles and with exactingness toward himself and others . . ." ²¹

It is the duty of every officer-instructor persistently to master a Leninist style in his work.

Unity, Coordination, and Continuity in the Indoctrination of Soldiers. The success of indoctrinating soldiers is directly dependent upon the unity, coordination, and continuity of the indoctrinational measures of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. The necessity for friendly joint work among commanders, political workers,

and Party and Komsomol organizations in carrying out the tasks of combat and political training and in indoctrinating soldiers is emphasized in the decree of the CPSU CC dated 21 January 1967 and titled: "On Measures for Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," the Regulation on Political Organs, the Instruction to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and in military regulations.

To achieve coordination in work with people means to *make unified statutory requirements of them, to employ the principles and methods of indoctrination correctly, and to exert influence on the soldiers through the joint efforts of officers, sergeants, and Party and Komsomol organizations.*

Violation of the unity and coordination of indoctrinational measures inevitably leads to serious gaps in work. If one instructor, striving to seem "kind" to his subordinates, manifests liberalism and inexactness toward them and another imposes statutory exactingness, the servicemen will feel this immediately and draw appropriate conclusions. It is even worse when the indoctrinational measures of commanders and political workers are contradictory. Such violations undermine the authority of instructors, give rise to nonproductiveness and questioning of orders and instructions, and interfere with the establishment of statutory interrelationships within the collective,

The subunit commander and his deputy for political affairs, as leaders of the collective of instructors, ensure *a unified line of pedagogic influence* on personnel on the part of platoon leaders, sergeants, and the Party and Komsomol organizations and they direct common, coordinated efforts toward the fulfillment of specific tasks. The process of the formation of the political and moral-combat traits of soldiers and military collectives proceeds more rapidly in such an atmosphere.

The unity and coordination of indoctrinational measures presuppose the observance of *continuity* in work. All of the best that has been accumulated in the subunit is not only retained and reinforced if the commander, political worker, or aktiv is replaced, but also is developed and multiplied. This makes it possible to accumulate and develop positive experience in indoctrination and to rely on it in work involving soldiers.

What is the essence of the main requirements of the principle of unity, coordination, and continuity of educational measures?

Above all the implementation of this principle requires *firm knowledge and exact fulfillment of military regulations, manuals, orders and directives*. The organization of the training, service, everyday conditions, and entire life of army and navy personnel is carried out on the basis of unified directive documents. Sound knowledge and accurate fulfillment of them provides the possibility of approaching the rating of the behavior of subordinates with a unified yardstick, eliminates cases in which the

requirements of one commander contradict the requirements of another, and insures continuity in the education of soldiers upon replacement of commanders or upon transfer of a soldier from one subunit to another. Unified views on indoctrinational problems, disciplinary practice, the interrelationships between commanders and subordinates, and the organization of all service are formed in subunits and units on the basis of constant study and strict fulfillment of regulations, orders, and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

A coordinated line in political educational work in the subunit is possible on the basis of the correct *application of the principles and methods of education employed* with respect to soldiers, *unified objective evaluation of the state of affairs, knowledge of the tasks* of personnel, and a *general approach in the evaluation of the deeds of some soldier* by all categories of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol activists. All this makes it possible to concentrate the common efforts of instructors on those tasks and concrete objects (individual soldiers or collectives) which are most important in the given situation and thus insures the rapid attainment of the planned goal.

The skillful application of the principles and methods of political education and unified objective evaluation of the state of affairs and of soldiers' deeds also insure the *unity of the military pedagogic views of subunit instructors*, on whose basis the general plan, unified style, and tone of work for all sections which conduct the indoctrination of personnel and motivate them to the exemplary fulfillment of assigned tasks take shape.

The success of the unity and coordination of indoctrinational work largely depends on comprehensively strengthening *the unity of command*. The unified line of pedagogic measures is insured through the purposeful, planned, organized, and centralized management of all sections of the educational process by the sole commander. Sometimes in certain subunits a great deal of work is carried out independently by officers, sergeants, Party and Komsomol activists, but there are no major results. This often occurs because the specific object and methods of coordinated influence are not defined and the principle of unity of command is violated. Without strict implementation of unity of command the activities of a collective of instructors may resemble the work of a group of people some of whom are sowing a field while others are trampling it down.

In the communist indoctrination of soldiers the company commander relies above all on his deputy for political affairs. Therefore, mutual understanding and friendly and coordinated actions by the commander and the political worker are of very great importance to the implementation of the principle of unity, coordination, and continuity in indoctrination.

Their interrelationships should be permeated with Party principles and constructed on mutual respect and complete confidence.

Acting as the direct organizer of Party political work, the company political affairs officer directs the efforts of Party and Komsomol organizations toward the fulfillment of tasks set by the commander. In the interests of unity and coordination in political education the political worker strengthens the principle of unity of command on a Party basis in every way possible and supports exacting officers and sergeants. He motivates the efforts of Party and Komsomol organizations toward ensuring the personal exemplariness of communists and Komsomol members in strengthening military discipline and creating a consensus in order to support of the commanders' requirements.

The principle of unity, coordination, and continuity in political education requires *the skillful supervision of indoctrinational activities of officers, warrants, sergeants, and active Party and Komsomol members of the subunit.*

As leaders of the subunit's collective of instructors, the commander and political worker not only ensure common understanding of indoctrinational tasks, but also teach their officers, warrants, sergeants, and aktiv practical work skills.

A special role in the indoctrination of instructors belongs to the subunit political worker, who is concerned with raising their ideological and theoretical level, directs their efforts toward the attainment of a common goal, and arms them with advanced experience in Party political work. He teaches platoon leaders to set tasks for the aktiv and to rely on communists and Komsomol members, and organizes the study by instructors of the works of V. I. Lenin and CPSU decisions on problems of communist indoctrination. The political worker ensure the firm knowledge of military regulations and problems of military psychology and pedagogy on the part of officers and sergeants, and summarizes and disseminates positive experience in educating soldiers.

In selecting the Party and Komsomol aktiv of the subunit, the political worker teaches activists the practical skills of Party political work on a daily basis, regularly poses tasks for them in the education of soldiers, gives specific assignments, and supports their initiative. Relying on the aktiv, the subunit deputy commander for political affairs systematically obtains needed information, sensitively reacts to the feelings and requirements of personnel, and forms group opinion.

In-depth knowledge of the principles of political education by commanders and political workers, and the fulfillment of their requirements in practice are the most important criteria for forming high moral-combat

traits in personnel and for successfully fulfilling the tasks set for the Soviet Armed Forces by the Communist Party.

Footnotes

1. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, pp 429, 444.
2. *Pravda*, 3 April 1971.
3. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda, KPSS*, p 90.
4. See *Ibid.*, pp 90-91.
5. L. I. Brezhnev, *Za ukrepleniye splochnosti kommunistov, za novyy pod"yem antiimperialisticheskoy bor'by* (For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists and for a New Upsurge in the Anti-imperialist Struggle), Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 46.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 313.
7. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 83.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 317.
9. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 116.
10. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, Vol 2, p 87.
11. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 35, pp 195-205.
12. The problems of the formation of a military collective as educator are considered in detail in Chapter 12.
13. *Vysokoye prizvaniye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye molodykh ofitserov. Noyabr' 1969 g.*, p 19.
14. A. M. Gor'kiy, *Sobr. soch.*, Vol 10, Moscow, Izd-vo Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1951, p 62.
15. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 100.
16. See *Ibid.*, p 210.
17. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 37, p 365.
18. *Ibid.*, Vol 35, p 202.
19. M. I. Dragomirov, *Izbrannyye trudy*, p 611.
20. See M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, Vol 2, p 299.
21. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, p 117.

Chapter 12. The Military Collective as an Instructional Environment

1. Instructional Potential of the Soviet Military Collective

In translation from Latin the term "collective" means "assembled" or "united." A collective is a consciously created association of people for joint activity in the name of specific socially useful goals.

Socialist society includes a host of various collectives in which the Soviet people are united. The Soviet people are true collectivists who know how to combine personal and social interests correctly and who consciously subordinate their own efforts to common goals.

"The responsibility of each to the collective," as was noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, "and the responsibility of the collective for every worker are inalienable features of our way of life."¹ The result of many years of fruitful endeavor by our Party and the entire Soviet nation, who have succeeded in creating a true society—a monolith, a society of collectivists—is set forth in this thesis by the Congress. The consciousness of each and the sense of participation in the construction of a communist society, and a sense of solidarity and mutual aid are manifested in a particularly graphic way in labor collectives, which L. I. Brezhnev, speaking at the 24th CPSU Congress, called the main cells of socialist society.

Collectives are extremely variegated. They differ in the character of their activities, the forms of relations among people, and so on. Military collectives occupy a special place among them.

The concept of a military collective is very broad. It would be proper to call both the Armed Forces as a whole and any formation unit or subunit a collective. Here we single out *the primary collective*—that is, "a collective in which the individual members are in constant unity on a duty, friendship, everyday and ideological basis."² In the Armed Forces, platoons, companies, and equivalent subunits are the primary collectives. Subunits such as the detachment, team, or crew may be called *contact collectives*, where the soldiers are in continual duty, everyday, and other interaction and intercourse with each other.

As a social organism the primary collective is supposed to perform a twofold function: to be a *professional* (production, combat, and so on) *unit and an educator*. In other words, the collective is the subject of combat (labor) activities and education, and at the same time it is the object of education, development, and leadership.

Nor is the military collective an exception in this regard. Life incontrovertibly proves that the higher the combat (labor) capability of a collective, the better an educator it is, and the better an educator, the more effective its activities and the higher its combat readiness will be.

The collective conveys social influence to the individual. At the same time, as a relatively independent cell of the social organism, as the medium in which human activities take place and direct and indirect intercourse are accomplished, it constantly affects every person within it.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism often point out that the collective accords the greatest possibilities for the development and manifestation of an individual's specific capabilities. "Only in a collective," wrote Marx, "does the individual obtain the means which enable him to develop his own inclinations comprehensively, and hence only in a collective is personal freedom possible."³

The objective educational potential of the Soviet military collective is set forth in its very social nature, structure, and characteristic features. The Soviet military collective is essentially a socialist-type collective. Every subunit, as a living fragment of the Armed Forces, is inseparably linked to other military and non-military collectives. Inherent in a military collective are organic social and spiritual unity and moral, political, and psychological oneness with the socialist social and state order, a oneness founded on the community of basic interests of the Soviet people and their soldiers.

The USSR Armed Forces and every military unit and subunit are the embodiment of the social equality of soldiers and officers, of national equality, and of friendship among peoples. They are comprised of personnel who are ideologically convinced, boundlessly dedicated to the socialist Homeland, and highly educated.

Politically mature, highly cultured commanders and political workers who are competent in a military regard are in charge of military collectives. They implement Party policy in the army and navy and supervise collectives, directing their efforts toward an unflagging rise in the combat readiness of the troops, toward exemplary fulfillment of combat and political training tasks, and toward strengthening military discipline.

The Armed Forces and every unit (subunit) are bound together by the leading role of the CPSU, which is embodied in the vigorous activities of

political organs and Party and Komsomol organizations, which reach into all aspects of the training, service, and life of personnel.

By grouping the best and most advanced of the servicemen, the Party and Komsomol organizations become the leading force of the military collective. They unite personnel around the CPSU, educate the soldiers in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology and communist morality, and develop in them utter devotion to the Homeland, a sense of friendship among peoples, proletarian internationalism, and burning hatred of imperialist aggressors. They strengthen unity of command and military discipline, and motivate personnel to the exemplary fulfillment of assigned tasks, the maintenance of high vigilance and combat readiness, and the irreproachable fulfillment of their military duty. Through high ideological conviction and personal example in service and training, communists and Komsomol members lead all other soldiers and set the tone for the collective's group opinion.

The inexhaustible educational possibilities of the Soviet military collective are contained in *the high social significance of the goals and tasks of its practical activities*. The military collective is faced with a task inherent to it alone: the armed defense of the socialist Homeland and its state interests. In the current situation military labor is one of the primary factors of the creative labor of Soviet society.

Soviet soldiers make a tremendous contribution to the common cause of communist construction. They protect the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and stand guard over socialist achievements. A soldier's labor is specifically expressed in improved military skills, the mastery of formidable combat equipment, and increased military discipline, vigilance, and combat readiness.

Military activities give rise to a high sense of responsibility and moral dependence of each member on the collective and on his comrades. The interdependence of the soldier and the collective continually rises in proportion to the development and improvement of combat equipment and weapons. This objectively instills in the soldiers a sense of responsibility for the actions and deeds of their comrades and an interest in common success. The ideological and businesslike purposefulness of Soviet military collectives, which is the most important prerequisite for their solidarity and for the formation of collectivism, comradely mutual aid, and other character traits in the soldiers lies in military labor.

The entire life and combat training activities of our subunits and units are permeated with *a spirit of collectivism* and require the combination of social and personal interests. Joint combat training and the difficulties of service all heighten the responsibility of each to all and of all to each, and develop the requirement of acting according to a unified plan, in accordance with the common tasks of the collective, and on the basis of

the requirements of regulations and the orders and instructions of commanders.

A military collective unites people not only in a common goal and in common labor, but also in the common organization of this labor on the basis of the principles of subordination, responsibility, and coordination. *Inherent in it is a strict organizational structure* which is thought out in detail and which corresponds to combat equipment and weapons and the means of their employment in battle. The official activities and behavior of soldiers and their interrelationships are governed by military regulations, manuals, and the orders and instructions of commanders. "Military organization," said M. V. Frunze, "is a specific organization which requires on the part of its members particular clarity, precision, industriousness, endurance, and speed in the fulfillment of all orders. . . ." ⁴

Within the organizational structure of a military collective there is also a definite educational responsibility. It provides for the distribution of the main duty and combat roles, presupposes strict coordination and the obligation to observe the standards of a military community, and makes it possible to implement the principle "Every commander trains and indoctrinates his own subordinates," thus motivating commanders and political workers to constant self-improvement, and so on.

The precision of the organization of a military collective is heightened by the fact that *a single commander is in charge of each subunit, unit and formation*. The organization of a military collective and the defined character of the standards and rules of the community contribute to the development of discipline and accuracy in every soldier, strengthen will and character, and develop coordination and the habits of collective actions. All this makes the subunit or unit a controlled, smoothly functioning organism.

A specific feature of the military collective is the fact that *in battle it fulfills its tasks by means of weapons, combat equipment, and force* applied against the enemy. This requires every soldier to develop bravery, boldness, endurance, and hatred of the enemy and persistently to master military knowledge. Without possessing these traits a soldier cannot feel that he is a full-fledged member of the military collective, since at a difficult moment he might unintentionally let down his comrades.

The relative stability, duration, and continuity of an individual's service in one collective may be considered one of the specific features of a military collective which has educational significance. A soldier's work, everyday life, and leisure time are all spent among one group of comrades.

Like other Soviet collectives, a military collective is *heterogeneous* in composition, but this heterogeneity is specific. A subunit (unit) con-

sists of a permanent staff (officers, warrants, and ensigns) and impermanent segment (soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior NCO's). It unites people of various nationalities and vocations, with different experience in life, different family status, different education, who come from different parts of the country, and so on. In a collective every serviceman holds a definite position according to his official post and social activities.

The specificity of the military collective creates conditions favorable to constantly influencing the individual, to making soldiers interdependent, to solidarity, and to the effectiveness of mutual influence.

Mutual influence is very great among servicemen. Being in constant close contact, Soviet soldiers seemingly supplement each other with the best to be found in each. Friendship among the peoples of our country, its vastness and resources, and the scope of communist construction can actually be felt in the collective. Group opinion of a person and his traits takes shape most completely in a collective.

The objective educational potential of the military collective is not always fully manifested in and of itself, and is realized not automatically, but through internal, subjective conditions and through the activities of commanders, political workers, and Party Komsomol organizations.

Take, for instance, the intercourse among servicemen within a collective. As a rule it enriches a soldier and endows him with traits which he lacks. If, however, there are just one or two people in a collective who have not been morally educated and who are undisciplined, and who moreover are of strong will, they may have a negative influence on young soldiers.

The educational potential of a primary military collective is reduced by the gap sometimes observed between it and the sole commander. Some insufficiently mature leaders, especially young officers, may develop the illusion of exaggerated personal power and become fascinated with administration. Strict Party control of the observance of laws and strict fulfillment of the requirements of the oath and regulations and of the orders of commanders and chiefs are reliable barriers to such phenomena.

The *psychology of the collective* is an important factor which affects the education of soldiers. Various sociopsychological processes and phenomena arise in the joint activities and community of people under the influence of ideology, living conditions, and specific features of collectives. In turn, group mental phenomena largely motivate the deeds of the soldiers and "control" their behavior. *Group opinion*, which acts as a regulator of the deeds of each individual and of the collective as a whole, plays a large role here. The group opinion of the collective is not a set phenomenon but a constantly developing one which requires the constant attention of commanders and political workers. Highly ideological, unified, and active group opinion is instructive.

The educational strength of a collective is largely determined by the character of *interpersonal relations*. Experience shows that if interrelationships conforming to regulations have taken shape among servicemen within a collective, they will form positive character traits in the soldiers: collectivism, correct understanding of military camaraderie, integrity, honesty, and boldness. Conversely, if interrelations among servicemen are founded on mutual forgiveness of mistakes, indifference toward the fate of another, and clannishness, such negative traits as egoism and vanity, dishonesty, and the desire to bypass the difficulties of service may come to the fore.

Therefore, commanders and political workers must constantly take into account the specific features and character of interpersonal relations in the collective and form them on the basis of the requirements of military regulations and the standards of communist morality.

Group moods and feelings have a considerable influence on the educational process. The moods of a military collective are not simply the sum of the moods of its members. The essence of this phenomenon, as Marx pointed out, is that the cooperation of many people and the fusion of individual effort into one whole creates a new, loftier force which differs substantially from the sum of its components.

Any mood which has taken over a collective exerts a strong influence on the entire life and all activities of its members. Enthusiasm contributes to the success of the collective. Indifference and dissatisfaction reduce the results of its activities. Therefore, the campaign for a good mood within a collective is a campaign for its success and for increasing its educational potential.

Intra-collective traditions—that is, that which is conveyed from the old personnel of the collective to the new—play a major role in education. Among the best traditions which have a positive influence on the education of soldiers are: placing first in combat and political training, sports, and so on, exemplary actions in tactical exercises, warm greeting of young recruits, festive ceremonies for those discharged into the reserves, the maintenance of relations with former members of the collective, visiting historical sites, sponsoring monuments and fraternal graves of war heroes, the training of replacements by senior servicemen prior to their discharge into the reserves, honoring soldiers and sergeants on the days of events which are noteworthy to them, and so on.

Unfortunately, there are some cases of the manifestation of negative “traditions” which act upon the collective in an undesirable direction. Among them are: clannishness, insulting nicknames, the division of soldiers into “young” and “old,” and so on. This occurs because in some places phenomena which are harmful and not inherent in our military

collectives are not always prevented in a timely manner, and an atmosphere of intolerance of the carriers of such habits is not created.

The aggregate of the sociopsychological phenomena in a military collective creates a definite atmosphere which has a great influence on every soldier, on the collective as a whole, and on its educational potential. If emotional enthusiasm predominates in the collective, if a business-like mood reigns, if highly ideological public opinion has been formed and is maintained, and if the interrelations among servicemen conform to regulations, then we find high solidarity, discipline, and combat readiness. When conflicts arise in the collective and negative group moods rise to the surface, one cannot count on success in its activities.

Intrinsic in a majority of the subunits and units (ships) of our Armed Forces are a high level of military discipline and a moral and psychological atmosphere which is full of optimism and confidence, highly principled collective opinion, good moods, mutual comradely support and assistance, concern and sensitivity, a basic mutual exactingness, and the active desire to follow combat and revolutionary traditions and to multiply them through one's own military labor and socially useful activity.

The degree of a collective's positive influence on the individual and its solidarity depend largely on the commander's and political worker's correct understanding of the sociopsychological essence of various processes and phenomena found within a collective, of group opinions and moods, collective habits, customs, traditions, affections, sympathies and antipathies, imitation and self-assertion, and so on. They represent the immediate forces which in large measure motivate the deeds of soldiers and hence form their character traits and behavioral habits.

2. Main Features of the Collective as an Instructional Environment

In connection with the fact that the educational strength of a collective depends largely on the level of development of its spiritual, moral, and psychological atmosphere, distinction is drawn among a number of instructional features (attributes) of the collective. Chief among them are goal-directedness and purposefulness, combat coordination, solidarity, exactingness, and independence.

Short-and long-range goals of the subunit are reflected in *goal-directedness*. Not only the character of the subunit's daily actions, but also the social interests, ideology, and sociopolitical aspect of the collective are reflected here.

No matter what specific tasks the collective carries out, "it must always understand that the Communist Party is ahead . . ." ⁵ leading our people to the greatest and most cherished goal—the building of communism.

The orientation of any Soviet collective is objectively an educational force, and the greater the contribution of the collective to the national cause and the higher the significance of the tasks it carries out, the greater this force will be.

A military collective in which vitally necessary and important social activities insure the security of the Homeland, and in which the creative labor of the people is carried out forms in soldiers communist views and convictions, staunch character and the habits of correct, disciplined behavior.

The force of a collective's influence on the individual increases many times over when the goals and tasks are not only set, but also driven home to the consciousness of every soldier, when the goals are comprehensible to and accepted by them. The internal conviction of each soldier and hence of the entire collective that the tasks facing them must be fulfilled indicates the *purposefulness* of the military collective as a feature of its spiritual life.

Of course, here we have in mind the unity only of the main, socially necessitated goals of collective endeavor and not the standardization of all the individual's interests in life. After all, social and collective goals can be attained only when the individual capabilities, gifts, and talents of people are allowed to bloom fully.

The purposefulness of a collective should not be identified with its goal-directedness, although these concepts are close. Goal-directedness is characterized by a concrete task to whose fulfillment the efforts of the collective are subordinated. As far as purposefulness is concerned, it expresses the unity of the motives, activity, and efforts of people in carrying out the tasks facing them and is a sociopsychological characteristic of the collective. Purposefulness represents a fusion, a very close and inseparable bond of the social, the ideological, and the psychological in the collective. In it, social and ideological aspects are fused with personal aspects, transformed into the individual's psychology and act as a great motive force.

Purposefulness nourishes the vital capacity of a collective and defines its advancement, but a lack of purposefulness may lead to stagnation in the life of the collective and to a decline in its educational influence on the men.

Combat coordination and *teamwork* of a collective greatly increase its educational role. They give rise to a sense of unity, inseparability from the collective, and a high degree of comradely cohesion. Coordination and teamwork are born in the course of the joint activities of personnel and from the aggregate of collective efforts.

Exactness is one of the most important features of the collective as educator and is an essential attribute. It is no coincidence that A. S.

Makarenko defined the educational value of the collective in the development of requirements within the collective. He established the following stages in the development of the collective as an instructional environment which depend on requirements:

- 1) The leaders of the collective, as representatives of society, make requirements of people;
- 2) These requirements are supported by the aktiv;
- 3) The requirements of the aktiv become the unanimous opinion of all, and the collective may apply them to each individual person;
- 4) Under the influence of the collective requirements a person begins to make social requirements of himself.⁶

To a certain extent these provisions are also applicable to the assessment of the military collective as an instructional environment.

The *independence of the military collective* furthers the development of its exactingness and its increased educational activity. It is expressed in the right, possibility, and capability of the collective to carry out on its own a certain range of tasks, especially educational tasks. The independence of the collective intensifies the feeling of the individual's dependence on it, increases the effectiveness of the motivating, encouraging, and constraining stimuli which the collective possesses, and develops exactingness, educational activity, and initiative on the part of all personnel.

Sociopsychological solidarity is a general indicator of the educational strength of the collective and a prerequisite for its success. Fused in it are all traits and attributes of the collective: exactingness, independence, and purposefulness.

To a definitive degree it depends on combat coordination and teamwork, as well as on the character of interpersonal relationships (the degree to which they correspond to the requirements of regulations and the standards of our morality), the unity of collective opinion which is based on the highly ideological approach, and on the wealth and diversity of intra-collective, official and everyday traditions. Sociopsychological solidarity also presupposes a certain degree of social activity on the part of the personnel and the involvement of most soldiers in sociopolitical, cultural and sports activities.

This list of the features of the collective as an institutional environment is not exhaustive. These features, however, do impart authority upon the collective and ensure a positive attitude towards it on the part of the individual who is a member of it. And this in turn is favorable psychological ground for increasing the effectiveness of educational measures and contributes to the organic fusion of the education and self-improvement of the individual.

The characteristics of the collective, although stable, are less durable than individual characteristics. All this obligates the leaders of collectives constantly to keep them in their purview, to guard against destruction, and to observe continuity in this work.

The objective conditions under which Soviet military collectives exist accord extensive opportunities for the formation of positive traits in them. They are not formed automatically, in and of themselves, however, but with the aid of conscientious activity of the leaders and Party and Komsomol organizations. Experience shows that when events develop spontaneously, negative attributes are also sometimes manifested in the psychology of the collective. This is why it is important for commanders, political workers, and leaders of Party and Komsomol organizations constantly to study the collective and to direct its development. Here it should be kept in mind that the general features of the collective are specifically manifested in each subunit (unit, ship).

All this ascribes a uniqueness to the psychology of the collective and makes it "individual," unrepeatable. Every commander and political worker must constantly take into account the individual features of the collective in his activities. This is a mandatory condition for the success of educational work.

Let us examine the dynamics of the development of a military collective, especially a primary collective.

In structure, organization, psychology, and the development of general educational features, a primary collective passes through a number of steps (stages). The following stages may be conditionally singled out in the formation of a collective as an instructional environment: *formation, development, maturity*. Each stage is characterized by a definite state (level of development) of educational features which largely define the orientation and content of work toward making the collective an instructional environment.

Let us take as an example the stage of the formation of a collective. Its main content is: the problems of reaching full strength in accordance with prescribed levels; the assignment of key personnel and the distribution of combat and other duties; the acquisition of weapons and equipment; the establishment of Party and Komsomol organizations; and the selection and placement of the aktiv.

During the period of the formation of the collective, when its official organizational structure is just being created, the system of co-subordination and interaction has not yet been completely worked out. At the same time the unofficial structure, which often takes place more quickly (especially if the subunit is formed from the personnel of disbanded units and subunits), evolves. Here a number of sociopsychological and pedagogic problems crop up, such as the selection of men for small

subunits with consideration not only for their specialties and knowledge but also for psychological compatibility and influence on the process of self-affirmation. Other problems are the campaign against certain introduced forms of relations, statements of opinion, views, habits, and traditions which sometimes have a negative influence on personnel.

Experience shows that different problems which require preventive educational work arise at each stage of the development of a collective.

The degree of development of the educational attributes of a collective does not always coincide in life with the formally adopted stages of the collective's formation. For instance, when some of the noncommissioned and rank-and-file personnel are replaced twice a year, both weakness and maturity may be simultaneously observed in different structural elements of the organization and spiritual life of the subunit.

At the same time the conditional classification of periods of a collective's development contributes to the search for ways of influencing it in the interests of forming educational and combat features.

3. Conditions and Ways of Developing the Collective into an Instructional Environment

The formation of the collective as an instructional environment is an extremely complicated, dialectical process and is characterized by the combination and interpenetration of the objective and the subjective.

The objective educational factors of a Soviet military collective are the foundation and starting point in the activities of the commander and political worker. The better commanders and political workers are trained in a scientific, theoretical, and methodological regard, and the more completely and thoroughly they are armed with the ability to organize from Party positions the process of leadership, training, and indoctrination of personnel and with knowledge of the conditions and specific ways of influencing the moral and psychological atmosphere and structural elements of the collective, the more completely these factors are realized as objective possibilities. Complete consideration for and utilization of all objective possibilities, and comprehensive consideration for the subjective factors are required.

Success in the formation of a Soviet military collective is possible only when the real relations within it correspond to the standards of our way of life and to statutory requirements in the consistent implementation of the principles of the guiding role of the Community Party, unity of command on a Party basis and a comprehensive introduction of communist convictions, collectivism, and military camaraderie, into the consciousness of the soldiers.

The activities of the commander and the political worker toward forming the educative collective are realized in the following main orientations:

- 1) The creation and improvement of the organizational structure of the collective in accordance with the requirements of modern combat;
- 2) The formation of interrelationships within it on the basis of the requirements of regulations and standards of communist morality;
- 3) The control of intra-collective, sociopsychological phenomena and processes;
- 4) The influence on the relations between the soldier's personality and the military collective.

These orientations also define the corresponding conditions for the formation of the collective as an instructional environment.

The creation and improvement of the organizational structure of the collective presupposes, first, knowledge of this structure as a whole and of all its elements (official and unofficial groups, contact collectives) in the spheres of military labor, social affairs, and everyday life; second, the establishment of correct interrelationships between individual sections of the collective from the standpoint of ensuring high combat readiness and educative influence of the collective on the individual.

The following are the main elements of the organizational structure of a primary military collective (a company, battery, or equivalent subunit):

- 1) Functional combat sections—platoons or detachments (crews, teams, combat posts);
- 2) Sociopolitical organizations and groups;
- 3) Mass cultural and sports groups;
- 4) Control and internal-control organs (the collective of educators and the aktiv of the subunit).

In addition to official groups some spontaneously formed groups also exist.⁷

The tasks of forming the collective as an instructional environment, like the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of the management of the subunit, require knowledge of the specifics of the interconnection, interaction, and interrelationships within the framework of the existing structure of the collective in the spheres of military labor, and social and everyday life at various stages of the collective's development. This knowledge eases the search for specific ways of improving the organizational structure of the collective and increasing its educational influence on personnel.

Here experienced educators pay particular attention to the selection and placement of cadres of leaders in contact collectives and groups, to the organization of effective competition among groups and contact collectives of the same category, to the creation and strengthening of

a collective of educators and the subunit aktiv, and to the correct combination of the functions of control and internal control with consideration for the specifics of military organization.

The influence and authority of the aktiv are of primary significance in the development of the collective as an instructional environment. To form an educating military collective means above all to work *unflaggingly on the education of the aktiv*. It is an important task of the political worker correctly to select the Party and Komsomol nucleus on the basis of comprehensive consideration for the political, practical, and psychological features of the activists, and to distribute them more or less uniformly throughout all subunits and groups. Consideration should also be made for the individual features of activists when social duties and assignments are distributed among them.

The authority of the aktiv depends in large measure on with whom it is staffed. Even solitary cases of the acceptance into the Party and Komsomol of people who are unworthy and who count on some privileges reduce the authority of the aktiv and weaken the collective's influence. "... We do not award and we do not give any benefits for joining the Party," wrote V. I. Lenin. "We need new Party members not for advertisement, but for serious work."⁸

Lenin's principle of a strict individual approach to joining the Party was further developed in the decisions and materials of the 24th CPSU Congress. The following is stated in the Resolution of the Congress in the Accountability Report of the Party CC: "Improving the qualitative composition of our ranks and educating communists should remain the most important tasks of the Party. It is also necessary to continue to augment the ranks of the Party with worthy representatives of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelligentsia on the basis of strict individual selection."⁹

It should be noted that even selection of the aktiv which is successful in all regards is only the start of the work with it.

It is important for the commander and political worker to remember that the aktiv effectively exerts influence on the common soldier if it constantly grows organizationally stronger, improves itself, and sets the tone in the subunit, and if every activist is an example of service to the Homeland and fulfillment of his military duty and social assignments, and is also a model in discipline.

Experience shows that increasing the influence of the aktiv on soldiers can be insured through enduring ideological tempering and increased requirement on it. It is important constantly to expand and renew the aktiv through the influx of fresh men and to rid it of those who have lost their authority in the eyes of the collective and who have a perfunctory

attitude toward social obligation. The activists should be studied and the opinion of the collective and of co-workers on a given person should be heard out. Studying the aktiv only "from above" often leads to mistakes and excessive praise of individuals and to the divergence of opinion on them on the part of leaders and the collective.¹⁰

The establishment and maintenance of interpersonal relations which correspond to regulations are an important condition for the formation of a military collective as an instructional environment. The development of interrelations in a military collective is a dynamic and complex process, since it takes place in the course of the fulfillment of the diverse tasks of joint military labor. Moreover, military collectives are continually renewed and supplemented with young soldiers who lack experience in interacting with co-workers, ability in establishing correct relations with commanders and seniors, and sometimes even knowledge of the standards of military etiquette. At the same time not all young officers and sergeants have firmly fixed practical skills in proper interrelations with subordinates. Moreover, some of them handle these problems from case to case, usually in connection with conflict situations or crude infractions of military discipline and ethics.

Experienced commanders and political workers systematically regulate and control interrelations in the collective. To this end they implement active group and individual measures, which have a positive effect on the education of personnel, the state of military discipline, and the solidarity and combat capability of subunits.

Of great importance in the formation of correct interrelations in military collectives is goal-directed explanatory work. It arms soldiers with knowledge of the principles of communist morality and with a proper understanding of the principles of statutory interrelations and the ways of interpreting them under the various conditions of military activity. Explanatory work should encompass all servicemen, be based on comprehensive consideration for the specific features of each category of soldiers, and be distinguished by diversity.

The standards and principles of interrelations among soldiers are explained by various forms and methods. The subunit commander and political worker hold special conferences with officers, ensigns, sergeants, and soldiers (according to term of service) and analyze cases of deviations from statutory requirements, insubordination, patronization or replacement of subordinate officials, familiarity, connivance, haughtiness, and bias against co-workers. This makes it possible to direct the attention of all officials and the community to the problems of interrelations, to recognize their significance, and to prevent unhealthy phenomena.

Topical conferences for officers and sergeants play an important role

in forming statutory interrelationships. At such conferences the educators exchange their experience in influencing subordinates, analyze conflicts, ascertain their origins and causes, and analyze their own actions. This contributes to the development of a correct evaluation of existing interrelations in the subunit and to the elimination of false ideas of the educator's authority and makes it possible to find the correct ways and means of bolstering his authority.

The establishment of correct interrelations in a subunit largely depends on *the organization of life and activities in strict accordance with the requirements of regulations*. In military service there are no trifles: any deviations from regulations are reflected in interrelationships and may result in conflict. The personnel are closely bound by a chain of complex interdependencies, and if a conflict situation arises in one link of the chain it has a negative effect on the entire collective.

Prescribed order, by regulating all aspects of the affairs and everyday life of the soldiers, distributes the physical and moral-psychological responsibilities, ensures optimal allotment of them, and contributes to more productive activity on the part of the soldiers. Violation of prescribed order not only complicates the fulfillment of duty and training, however, but also creates grounds for the manifestation of the anti-collective, egoistic aspirations of some inadequately educated soldiers (or sailors) and often leads to a change in the established rhythm of life and to the unjustified reduction of the load on some and an excessive increase in the load on others.

An important condition for organizing prescribed order is the expediency and reasonability of all measures implemented in the subunit and the uniform distribution of details, social duties, work, and everyday services. Experienced commanders, understanding the importance of organizing military labor, work to ensure that, in the course of daily combat training, service, and in trying to fulfill common tasks, prescribed interrelations among soldiers are improved and strengthened.

Comprehensively increasing the authority of commanders and chiefs at all levels and instilling in the soldiers love and respect for them is of exceptionally great importance in establishing and maintaining prescribed interrelations in a collective. In this work an important position is occupied by the explanation to personnel of the essence of unity of command in the Soviet Armed Forces and of the role of officers and sergeants in increasing the combat readiness of the troops, fulfilling combat and political training tasks, and strengthening military discipline, order, and organization. It is also important to ensure that every commander and chief very strictly observe the prescribed standards in relations toward subordinates, respect their dignity, be concerned about them, and be fair and tactful.

Such an approach makes it possible to put in order direct interrelations between seniors and juniors and to prevent conflict situations. If they arise, however, it is necessary to have in-depth objective analysis by the senior commander and political worker of the factors which brought about the conflict. In the process particularly unflagging attention should be paid to studying the attitudes of officers and sergeants toward subordinates and to taking effective steps to cut off possible violations of regulations and law.

Officers and sergeants are people invested with power. V. I. Lenin considered the ability to employ power cautiously one of the main signs of not only the professional, but also the political maturity of a leader. The slightest deviations from prescribed standards in relations between officers and sergeants and their subordinates and among themselves have a negative effect on the authority of commanders and on the collective as a whole. Our military laws defend the rights and dignity of every serviceman by establishing strict responsibility on the part of those who, in a position of power, violate statutory requirements.

It is the duty of senior commanders and chiefs, and of political workers as well, to teach young officers and sergeants in every way possible the ability correctly to construct their relations with subordinates and among themselves, and to set a personal example here. It is important to insure that every officer and sergeant thoroughly recognize that the mutual relations of commanders and subordinates largely conform to the boomerang law: all that stems from the former to the latter sometimes returns to the former in amplified form.

Fair exactingness, good will, and tact on the part of the commander give rise to industriousness on the part of subordinates and return to him in the form of sincere respect and love. Crudeness, callousness, and unfairness evoke dislike, altercations, and often crudeness in reply. In connection with this, it may be recommended for any commander or chief to use the rule of putting yourself in the other's place. A precise, classic statement of this rule has been given by the Soviet General, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy: "If you want to know how to treat a subordinate put yourself in his place."

The formation of the collective of a subunit as an educator presupposes a *constant analysis of the interrelations among soldiers (sailors)*. In service and training one should strive to place the soldiers in a position of responsible dependence on each other, to develop mutual aid, respect, and exactingness, to create a spirit of military brotherhood in subunits, and to cut off the slightest cases of the belittling of personal dignity and attempts on the part of some undisciplined senior soldiers to assert false authority, to occupy a command position, and to place youth under their influence.

A differentiated approach to each category of serviceman and to each soldier is very important in the regulation of mutual relations. In connection with this, all work toward forming interrelations is carried out in a number of parallel directions: the influence is exerted simultaneously not only on the collective as a whole and not only on the individual, but also on the Party and Komsomol aktiv, certain categories of servicemen (officers, sergeants, soldiers), and small groups which are formed spontaneously. Here the individual is taken not in isolation, not in and of himself, but within a system of interrelations with the immediate environment. This makes it possible to act upon the entire complex of his interrelations within the collective.

Control of the psychological atmosphere plays a considerable role in the assertion of the collective as an instructional environment. The ideology of Soviet society completely prevails in the spiritual life of every Soviet military collective. All activities and the psychology of personnel are permeated with this. The consciousness, outlook, political, moral-combat and psychological traits of soldiers, and the combat and educational features of the collective are formed under the influence of communist ideas.

The dynamic nature of sociopsychological phenomena in a primary collective and their exposure to personal and group influence necessitates constant control on the part of commanders and political workers. The basis for such work is comprised of the constant improvement of the forms and methods of introducing communist morality and the requirements of the military oath and regulations into the consciousness, life, and everyday affairs of soldiers. The higher the political consciousness of Soviet soldiers, the more deeply they are aware of the importance of military camaraderie and friendship, mutual respect, and exactingness, the more fundamental the collective opinion will be, and the less tolerant attitudes toward violators of discipline and standards of communist morality will be.

The ideological conviction of soldiers defines the character of their daily interrelations, strengthens the internal moral and psychological bond between them, and cements the military collective.

The formation of a positive attitude in all soldiers toward an educative collective is of great significance. When this condition is met a fusion of personal and social interests takes place. A positive attitude toward the collective contributes toward the men's recognition of their moral duty to the Homeland and people, which in turn gives rise to the selflessness of the individual in the common struggle, and to heroism even to the point of self-sacrifice.

A positive attitude toward the collective is formed through demonstration of its successes and achievements in various spheres of life and activities and especially on the basis of the real contribution made to the

common task of increasing the combat readiness of the unit or subunit. At the same time recognition and publicity of the successes and merits of each person in the collective plays an essential role in the formation of a positive attitude toward it. The commander and political worker, in observing the achievements of the entire collective, should not forget that the soldiers are not faceless, that they have specific names. To take timely note of who was the first to earn his rating, who prevented some accident, who proposed that a device be improved, or that the collective stands out in sports events and so on means to do much in instilling love of the collective. Here it is very important to observe a sense of moderation: not to depersonalize the work of the men, not to overlook their merits, but at the same time not to exaggerate them.

The extensive social activities of all members of the collective are of great importance in the formation of a military collective as an instructional environment. Party and Komsomol work, sponsoring enterprises and schools, sports and artistic endeavor, and the efficiency and organization of daily life all increase the number of social representatives in the collective and contribute to increasing their activity and intensifying their interrelations and responsible dependence.

Active participation in social work ensures the soldier-activist of the respect of his co-workers and accords the opportunity to channel the personal interests of soldiers into collective, social interests.

Extensive social activities make it possible to see better the soldier's individuality and personality beyond his collective, to take his interests into consideration, and thus to influence him more effectively. The active participation of soldiers in social work develops in them initiative, independence, and belief in their own strength and the strength of the collective, and forms positive attitudes toward it.

Under current conditions the importance of the educational influence of the military collective on the soldier's personality is increasing even more. This is due to the following factors:

- 1) The further expansion of democracy and self-government in the life of our society. Because of this the role of the community in educating personnel is increased in the Soviet Armed Forces simultaneously with the further strengthening of the principle of unity of command;
- 2) The increased legal and moral responsibility and interdependence among all soldiers in a subunit (or unit), between the individual and the collective, and between the collective and each individual. Modern weapons and combat equipment are of markedly collective character and require that personnel possess not only coordination and interchangeability, but also high moral responsibility to their co-workers, true collectivism, camaraderie, and brotherhood in arms;

3) The change in the age characteristics of draftees. In connection with the Compulsory Military Service Law, the army and navy are constantly taking in 18-year-old youths who generally have not received tempering in labor and life and who have not developed the necessary independence, responsibility, endurance, and strength of character. Only a collective which possesses the strength of an educator can develop in such youth high political, moral-combat, and psychological traits in compressed periods of service.

A majority of subunit commanders and political workers understand the great importance of the psychological and pedagogic conditions for unifying the collective and increasing its role as educator, and take them into consideration. They link successes and the combat and political training of subordinates to the educational influence of the collective and see in it a reliable support.

At the same time some officers, especially those who are inadequately experienced, underestimate the role of the military collective as educator, considering only command activities to be an effective factor. It is indisputable that the commander organizes and directs in a proper path the process of the combat, political, moral, and psychological training and education of the personnel of a subunit, unit, or ship. But this does not at all reduce the importance of the collective as a great educative force. A good commander is one who, relying on the Party and Komsomol organizations and the community, multiplies the effectiveness of his activities by including the collective in educational work. A strong collective is an indicator of the maturity of the leader and a component of his official, practical characteristics.

Thus, the role of the military collective in educating military servicemen is exceedingly great. A united collective forms in soldiers the traits and habits of collectivism and camaraderie which are most important to battle and service, a feeling of fellowship and mutual responsibility, firm will, integrity, selflessness, and other traits of a citizen and soldier.

Footnotes

1. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 80.
2. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 164.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, Vol 3, p 75.
4. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1950, p 447.
5. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 356.
6. See A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, pp 151-152.
7. A detailed description of such groups, their orientation, and their educational process is given in the military psychology course.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 39, p 225.
9. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p 208.
10. The problems of working with the *aktiv* are examined in detail in Chapter 17.

Chapter 13. Methods of Indoctrinating Soviet Soldiers

1. The Concept of the Methods of Indoctrination

The complexity and diversity of the indoctrinational process requires the skillful employment of various methods of exerting a pedagogic influence on soldiers. An instructor's ability to select the most effective method for a given situation and to apply it creatively is a clear manifestation of the pedagogic expertise of the commander or political worker.

What are methods of indoctrination and what are their characteristic features?

A method of indoctrination is *the aggregate of means and ways of exerting a pedagogic influence on soldiers and military collectives in order to form high political, moral-combat, and psychological traits in them.*

The indoctrination of Soviet soldiers is carried out through the following methods: persuasion, example, practice, commendation, and constraint. While performing quite specific functions in the process of indoctrination toward developing the necessary traits in soldiers, at the same time the various methods carry out a common task: they influence the individual as a whole. In employing a given method the instructor must know its primary role in the formation of specific personality traits of the soldier.

For instance, the persuasion method ensures primarily the formation in servicemen of political consciousness and communist conviction. The example method has a tremendous influence on soldiers' behavior and the formation of their moral outlook. The practice method contributes to the development of various useful behavioral habits and to the development and improvement of the soldier's volitional traits—resoluteness, boldness, self-control, and so on. The commendation method, combining the methods and means of moral and material stimulation of the positive behavior of soldiers, develops assiduousness in their work. The evaluation of negative actions and deeds is reflected in the constraint method thus contributing to surmounting the lack of discipline and harmful habits in the behavior of servicemen.

A system of interconnected methods is employed in the indoctrinational process, and therefore, each of them when used in combination with the others may be viewed only as a part of this entire system.

The content and methods of indoctrination result primarily from the character of social relations and the goals which are set before indoctrination as a class phenomenon. "Communist indoctrination," said M. I. Kalinin, "is at root different from bourgeois indoctrination not only in its tasks, which would be understandable even without proof, but also in its methods."¹

Constraint is the main method of influencing the working masses in all antagonistic groups. This is especially characteristic of the imperialist era, when reaction along all lines is becoming deeper and the ruling circles, in implementing the will of the monopolies, pursue an antipopular, aggressive policy on a broad scale and in the crudest form. Under such conditions coercion is inevitably moved to the fore in combination with deceit and demagoguery.

This is manifested most distinctly and most subtly in imperialist armies, where the attempt is made to train representatives of the workers into the mindless executors of the policy of monopolistic circles by means of direct suppression of the individual.

In the present situation, when class contradictions are becoming increasingly aggravated and the struggle between the two systems is intensifying, the imperialists have had to make certain corrections both in the content and in the methods of training the common soldier by more extensively supplementing direct constraint with methods of brainwashing. The ruling circles have had to sow ever more actively their own political ideas and morality into the consciousness of the soldiers. But insofar as the moral and political concepts of the bourgeoisie are in contradiction with the interests of the workers and of those whom they sent into the army, a special place is allotted to the brainwashing of troops. It is directed at indoctrinating servicemen in a spirit of faith to the ruling imperialist circles and hatred of the USSR and other socialist countries. Anti-communism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes the foundation of brainwashing.

The methods used to indoctrinate personnel of capitalist armies are aimed at the ideological corruption and belittling of the consciousness of the common soldier and the arousing of base instincts.

In imperialist armies ideological training is supplemented with psychological training, which has the function of inflaming anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiments in personnel.

Soviet military pedagogy employs methods which contribute to the comprehensive development of the consciousness and activity of servicemen and to the development of firm convictions, skills, and the habits

of communist behavior. In essence these methods differ fundamentally from the methods used to indoctrinate personnel in imperialist armies. What is the difference?

First, the methods of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers are due to the very nature of our order and are characterized by a communist orientation. They are supposed to ensure the indoctrination of a conscious, convinced, skillful, and comprehensively developed builder and defender of a new society who is ready selflessly to fulfill his military duty at the call of the Party and government.

"High moral and political traits," as is stated in the theses of the CPSU CC titled *On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin*, "and the humanistic principles and standards of morality of Soviet man are formed by the entire socialist order. . . and depend on the content and scope of the ideological activities of Party organizations."²

Second, the methods of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers are based on socialist humanism and deep respect for the personal dignity and civil rights of the soldiers.

The methods of indoctrination in the armies of imperialist states are based mainly on punishment in its various forms: arrests, fines, trials, physical humiliation, and so on. According to the newspaper *Army Times* about 70 percent of all punishment in US ground forces in Europe in 1969 were arrests, reductions in ranks, trials, duty demotions, and monetary fines.

Class, national, and other contradictions in the US Army and in other imperialist armies give rise to crudeness, callousness, and cruelty on the part of commanders toward their subordinates.

In the Soviet Army indoctrination and all indoctrinational methods are aimed at comprehensively developing the soldier's personality with stress on the positive and respect for the rights of the soldier as a citizen of the USSR.

Third, characteristic of the methods of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers are new, fundamentally different combinations and correlations. In the USSR Armed Forces the method of persuasion is at the forefront. The Soviet state is strong by virtue of the awareness of the masses. This also defines the appropriateness of various methods of indoctrination. The role of persuasion will unfailingly grow as communist social relations develop and the new man is indoctrinated. This is one of the principles governing the regular development of our society along the path toward communism.

Concern for the man, a comprehensive increase in his awareness, and high exactingness toward him are characteristic features of Soviet pedagogy, features expressed in the methods of indoctrination.

The methods are inseparably bound to the principles of communist

indoctrination. These principles determine the methods of indoctrination. It must not be assumed, however, that this relation is unambiguous; let us say that a strictly defined indoctrinational method corresponds to each of the principles. This relation is more complicated and multifaceted. On the one hand, various procedures and means of influence are employed in each method and at the same time the requirements of a number of principles of communist indoctrination are more or less realized. On the other, the achievement of some principle of indoctrination presupposes the use of the aggregate of various methods.

The diversity of conditions under which formation of the soldier's personality and his traits is accomplished requires *the skillful application of various methods*. Triteness, stereotype or some sort of a single formula are especially impermissible in indoctrination. A method successfully employed in one case seldom yields a positive result in another analogous case. In one situation some method may bring success while another will not produce good results. Moreover, specific progress in indoctrinational work cannot be attributed to some single method. It is necessary to take into account the aggregate of all utilized methods and means of influence.

Commenting on the creative character of the application of methods, A. S. Makarenko rightly emphasized: "No means should be considered from the standpoint of utility or harmfulness viewed in isolation from the entire system of means. And finally, no system of means can be recommended as a permanent system."³

The methods should satisfy those requirements which derive from the tasks of communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers under current conditions. The skillful application of methods, as observed in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, presupposes the necessity that they must correspond as completely as possible to the spirit of our times and to the great tasks which the 24th CPSU Congress posed.⁴

The creative application of the system of methods for indoctrinating Soviet soldiers rests on thorough knowledge of the essence and significance of each method and accords commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations the opportunity to exert comprehensive influence on soldiers and military collectives and successfully to carry out the tasks of indoctrinational work.

2. Essence and Main Conditions for the Effectiveness of Methods of Indoctrinating Soviet Soldiers

The Method of Persuasion. Indoctrination is above all persuasion—*influencing the consciousness of people in the required direction.* The particular role of the method of persuasion also derives from this.

The essence of this method lies in the purposeful formation of the most important personality trait—a *Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist conviction*, which express a soldier's thorough and clear awareness of the correctness of those ideas and provisions by which he is guided in carrying out practical tasks. A person of strong convictions is the embodiment of a unity of idea, feelings, and will. Stable principles, skills, and habits are characteristic of him.

Convincing a person means making communist ideas, ideology, CPSU policy, the standards of communist behavior, and the requirements of the military oath and regulations one's own personal attributes and converting them into the main factors behind behavior and into the soldier's actions and deeds.

In their psychological make-up convictions are knowledge which is fused with the emotional sphere and is saturated with volitional aspirations. The fusion of the soldier's cognitive activities with his feelings and will results in the introduced ideas being internally perceived by the trainee and becoming the strongest stimulus and ideological motivation for his actions. They begin to determine his entire behavior.

It is important to observe that in the Armed Forces the need for extensive application of the method of persuasion and its significance are in a sense greater than in other spheres of state, economic, and cultural and educational activities. This statement does not at all contradict the fact that the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs are the main means of organizing personnel activities in the army and navy; persuasion is not talking someone into something, but a method of forming highly ideological motivations for behavior and deep belief in the necessity of fulfilling the requirements of the military oath, regulations, and orders.

The role of persuasion in the sphere of military affairs is a function first of the specifics of military labor. Our soldiers carry out a crucial and honorable mission in defending the socialist Homeland on the basis of the Compulsory Military Service Law, and moral stimuli and awareness of the importance and necessity of selfless labor for the people and for the cause of communist construction are the definitive factors in their activities. Under these conditions persuasion acquires particular significance, and also with respect to the formation of high responsibility before the law and an understanding of the impermissibility of violating it.

The *second* factor which increases the importance of the method of persuasion in the military is the stricter regulation of the entire life and of all activities of the men and the necessity for strict observance of the requirements of military discipline. Great strain on moral and physical strength is undoubtedly necessary to fulfill these requirements in the course of training and duties. Without the deep conviction of young people who enter the ranks of the Armed Forces, the fulfillment of the

complex tasks facing troops would be inconceivable in view of the necessity for the very strict fulfillment of the requirements of military regulations, orders, and unflagging obedience.

The *third* factor which is important to take into account in comprehending the role of the method of persuasion in the Armed Forces is the fact that its application is connected with the formation of the moral, political, and psychological traits necessary for successful actions in an extremely limited field. In the army and navy a person is trained not simply for new, extremely complex work, but rather so that he is capable of participating in armed warfare and of selflessly defending the Homeland. Under wartime conditions a commander leads his subordinates to the performance of missions which require very high strain on moral and physical strength and at times life itself. It is obvious that all this presupposes the need for particular concern for increasing the moral strength of soldiers and their conviction in the greatness of the cause for which they are going to fight and shed their blood, and in the necessity of defending their native Homeland. The experience of past wars which our Soviet state has fought confirms this statement quite convincingly.

In the military the method of persuasion has its own specifics from the standpoint of its application as well. The Army is a highly centralized organism. The command and control of troops is accomplished mainly through orders. One of the specific features of the application of the method of persuasion is the fact that it is combined with the firmest form of command. An order contains a categorical requirement, and no matter how it is received by the serviceman, its fulfillment is strictly compulsory. But for all this it should not be viewed as a form of constraint, although it does contain the means of constraint.

An order actually serves as a means of constraint in the armies of capitalist states, where an officer personifies the will of the ruling class. His actions run counter to the basic interests of the soldiers who are for the most part representatives of the workers. By means of orders he implements the monopolists' policy, which is inimical to the people, and compels his subordinates to act for interests that are wholly alien to them. Under such social conditions an order can be only a means of constraint and suppression.

In the Soviet Armed Forces an order has a different function and a different political import. It is a specific form of troop command and control. An order given by our commander, who is a representative of the Soviet state in the Army, is an order of the people and also coincides with the serviceman's interests. Therefore, it does not bear the character of constraint with respect to the common soldier.

The strength of an order issued by a Soviet commander rests on the awareness of the masses which execute it. The more ideologically

tempered and convinced servicemen are, the more successfully an order will be carried out. Experience shows that the more completely commanders and chiefs combine administrative and educational activity, the more successful their activities in directing units, ships, and subunits will be.

The method of persuasion in its concrete manifestations signifies the body of methods and means of influencing the consciousness, feelings, and will of servicemen. This method presupposes systematic activity in developing in soldiers a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world view and high communist ideological spirit. These are the foundation on which soldiers are convinced of the importance and expediency of the specific measures of the Party and government toward strengthening national security and of their requirements on armed defenders of the Homeland, and of the need for unhesitatingly fulfilling the provisions of the oath and regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs.

The persuasion of soldiers is accomplished in the course of everyday training and indoctrinational work, and it is an extremely complex and prolonged process, during which the skillful selection of the means, procedures, and forms of influence plays a great role.

Two main directions may be singled out in the application of the method of persuasion: persuasion by word and persuasion by deed.

Persuasion by word is an effective means of influencing the consciousness, feelings, and will of soldiers. "A word," stated I. P. Pavlov, "is a real stimulus like any other . . . , but at the same time it is more all-encompassing than any other. . . ." ⁵

Speech and words are powerful weapons for indoctrination and training. Fervent Party words summon and lead soldiers into battle and inspire them to glorious deeds in peacetime. Addressing a person sincerely and resourcefully creates an atmosphere of mutual trust and furthers the establishment of personal closeness with the soldiers. An emotional, demanding word contributes to imposing order and discipline. Clear, convincing, and logical speech is an important means of arming soldiers with scientific knowledge.

A large role in convincing soldiers in the course of political educational work belongs to the propagandist's speech. In it deep ideological content should be skillfully combined with the vitality and imagery of the language.

An instructor who carries to the masses the upright and therefore omnipotent word of the Party, as V. I. Lenin reminded us, should speak "in a language accessible to the masses by resolutely discarding the heavy artillery of arcane terms, foreign words, slogans, definitions, and con-

clusions which are ready-made and have been memorized, but are incomprehensible and unfamiliar to the masses." 6

Success in convincing soldiers depends largely on the ability of the military pedagog to apply *rational means of influence*. Characteristic means of persuasion by word are: explanation, proof, and refutation.

Explanation is widely used in the indoctrinational process, especially in the presentation of new knowledge, theoretical principles, or service requirements. In the course of explanation the instructor works to ensure the soldier's thorough understanding of the essence and correct evaluation of the problems and requirements presented. Explanatory work is especially necessary in indoctrinating young soldiers, who have not yet mastered the order and rules governing military service. For instance, in presenting statutory requirements a military pedagog not only restates the contents of each article, but explains its essence and demonstrates its importance through examples taken from the everyday life of soldiers.

Explanation is combined with *proof*, especially when the soldier doubts the correctness of the provisions or requirements which have been presented and explained. To prove the correctness of explained problems it is important to make logical arguments and cite convincing examples and facts which would eliminate the soldier's doubt.

Proof in turn is closely connected with the *refutation* of incorrect, erroneous views. In this case the instructor not only proves the incorrectness of the soldier's views and dissuades him, but reconvinces him and clears a path for the introduction of new, correct views and ideas into his consciousness.

In skillfully implementing the ways of convincing by word, the instructor employs various *procedures*. Among them are: stressing the statements of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense, military regulations, and other documents; the clearest and most characteristic facts, examples, and figures; the showing of visual aids; comparison (contrast, analogy); polemics, and others. All these procedures are interconnected and employed in various versions.

Convincing by word is organically combined with *convincing by deed and by practice*. Such a combination is the foundation for the successful implementation of the method of persuasion and of all indoctrinational work, and embodies the most important requirement which our Party places on the fulfillment of the tasks of communist construction.

The 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the need for a close tie between word and deed in the work of every communist. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the Party Congress, L. I. Brezhnev sharply criticized those Party members who allow a gap to develop between

word and deed in their activities. He observed: "One also encounters people whose activity is of demonstrative character and is intended for outward effect. They more than others speak of the need to undertake some work, are always teaching everyone something, and appealing for something to be done. But as soon as the time comes to undertake the work in practice, they contrive to remain somewhere aside in the shadows."⁷

The gap and contradiction between word and deed inflict great damage upon indoctrination and lead to the undermining of the very essence of conviction.

Unity of word and deed is of particular importance in the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers. High personal conviction and the examples of the bravery and heroism of commanders, political workers, communists, and Komsomol members were a strong means of mobilizing soldiers to selfless battle against enemies on the fronts of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. Communist ideological spirit and the personal example of instructors even now are the most important conditions for the successful fulfillment of combat and political training tasks, for increasing the combat readiness of subunits, and units, and for strengthening military discipline.

Convincing by deed and practice plays an important role in the indoctrination of men. In order for knowledge to become a person's conviction, it must be independently comprehended and perceived not only by his reason but also by his heart and must be tested through real-life cases and confirmed by comparison with objective reality. Emphasizing the role of convincing by deed, V. I. Lenin said that one should teach "not only by word, but also by deed, by *work* . . ."⁸ that "a majority of people draw their convictions, from life. . . ."⁹

Persuading soldiers by deed consists in organizing indoctrination in such a way that they arrive at correct conclusions on the basis of their personal work experience and confirm their own views by evaluating the experience of the activities of others. Here, particular attention is paid to the active involvement of the soldier in the fulfillment of the tasks facing the subunit and in sociopolitical activities, to the formation of a sense of collectivism and friendly and coordinated work in the collective, and to the organization of the purposeful joint activity on the part of all soldiers.

Using the entire diversity of methods of persuading soldiers, the military pedagog creatively applies each on the basis of the concrete indoctrinational tasks and individual features of the soldiers.

Implementation of the method of persuasion in the organic unity of word and deed is accomplished continually in the everyday activities of

commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations of the subunit toward indoctrinating and training the soldiers.

In organizing political and indoctrinational work the subunit commander and political worker direct all of its diverse forms—political activities, political information, lectures, reports, discussions, readings of Lenin's works, assemblies, and so on—at forming in personnel a scientific outlook, communist conviction, and high morale and combat efficiency.

The tasks of persuasion are also fulfilled through various forms of individual indoctrinational work, in the training process, and in the course of combat, guard, and routine garrison duties. The clear-cut organization and successful conduct of training activities, field firing, and tactical exercises and the very strict observance of the requirements of regulations and manuals largely contribute to the formation of high morale and combat efficiency in soldiers.

An important role in convincing soldiers belongs to the collective and to the Party and Komsomol organizations of the subunit. A military collective exerts comprehensive influence on servicemen. The effectiveness of its influence on the consciousness of the individual is very high. Therefore, an instructor, if he wishes to attain success, must utilize this force more completely. But this presupposes persistent work toward uniting military collectives on a fundamental, Marxist-Leninist base.

In addition to the correct selection and realization of appropriate paths, procedures, and forms, the effectiveness of the method of persuasion depends largely on the moral and political traits and preparedness of the instructor.

Above all the success of persuasion is determined by the personal conviction and ideological orientation of the instructor. K. D. Ushinskiy emphasized that "convictions can be influenced only by persuasion."¹⁰

This means that an instructor can convince others only if he himself has deep convictions.

The Soviet officer is the implementer of Party policy among the common soldiers. He is deeply convinced of the triumph of the ideas of communism and boundlessly devoted to the cause of Lenin's Party and the Soviet people. His communist conviction, devotion to the CPSU, profound implacability toward bourgeois ideology and enemies of socialism, and personal example in implementing Party ideas exert a tremendous influence on the consciousness, feelings, and will of the soldiers and develop their convictions. A gap between proclaimed ideas and personal practice convert the instructor into a person whose convictions, in the words of V. I. Lenin, rest no deeper than the tip of the tongue.¹¹

The lack of firm convictions in an instructor or a change in convictions toward some incorrect opinion undermine his authority and evoke mistrust of his words and deeds.

The level of the instructor's scientific training and pedagogic expertise plays a significant role in the process of persuasion. In-depth knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the problems of domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU, military science, psychology, and pedagogy ensure correct understanding by the commander and political worker of the tasks of communist indoctrination of soldiers and help them to explain more thoroughly the importance of the method of persuasion and the modes of indoctrinational influences and to construct work with subordinates purposefully.

In-depth knowledge of and comprehensive consideration for the individual features of soldiers by the instructor is an important condition in the effectiveness of persuasion. The individual approach makes it possible correctly to find and employ those influential measures which best correspond to the specifics of a trainee's personality traits (orientation, character, temperament, capabilities) and produce the best results in work. Consideration for a soldier's individual features by the instructor accords the possibility of disposing him toward the instructor and conducting a Party discussion with him—basic and heart-to-heart, and to win the subordinate's trust, without which the instructor's efforts will not produce the necessary results.

Supervision of the self-education and self-training of soldiers is a mandatory condition for the development of convictions. This enables the commander and political worker constantly to direct efforts of the soldiers toward raising their ideological and political level, mastering Marxist-Leninist theory, and developing communist convictions.

The Example as a Method of Indoctrination. The example of the commander, political worker, and best soldiers in the indoctrinational process is an important method which exerts a great influence on the consciousness, feelings, and will of soldiers.

There is a valid assertion that example is the best teacher. A positive example has great graphicness and convincingness. It results in the need for imitation and influences the growth of consciousness and the formation of necessary feelings, volitional traits, and proper behavioral habits.

An example not only calls on a person to fulfill his military duty, but also to lead the way. The indoctrinational influence of a positive example is founded on the psychological inclination of people to conscious imitation.

The personal example of the instructor has an especially great influence. K. D. Ushinskiy wrote that the influence of the instructor's personality is

an indoctrinational force which cannot be replaced with textbooks, moral preaching, or a system of punishment and commendation.¹²

The sphere of the officer-instructor's activities is extraordinarily complicated and diverse. He conveys his knowledge, experience, and spiritual warmth to his soldiers and develops in them high political and moral-combat traits. But only a person who manifests Party fervor in his work and is able to inspire subordinates to great patriotic deeds is capable of leading soldiers. The personal example of selfless fulfillment of military duty has the best influence on subordinates.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense, emphasized in a report at the All-Army Conference of Young Officers that the instructor's personal example is his main weapon and the most important condition for successfully fulfilling his duties and influencing his men. He stated: "The results of an officer's work depend to a decisive degree on how well the officer personally knows his duties, behaves, and approaches the fulfillment of requirements, regulations and orders."¹³

The instructor's personal example is of particular importance in a situation connected with the surmounting of great difficulties and which requires the mobilization of the soldiers' physical and spiritual strength. For instance, in tactical exercises and activities, during combat duty, and in field firings and missile launches the officer's example inspires personnel to surmount any difficulties and to fulfill complicated tasks successfully.

Our military regulations obligate every commander to set an example of strict and precise fulfillment of the requirements of laws, the military oath, regulations, orders, directives, and standards of communist morality.

Communist conviction, boldness, bravery, discipline, endurance, thorough knowledge of military affairs, and impeccable behavior of the commander and political worker determine their authority.

Certain conditions are necessary for the successful realization of the possibilities of indoctrinating through positive example.

First, a positive example acquires the force of indoctrinational influence if it is organically connected with the high personality traits of the commander or political worker and is manifested constantly, rather than from case to case.

Second, the more deeply the soldiers are aware of the social value of a positive example, the closer and more comprehensible it is to them, and the greater the similarity between them and the example, the greater its influence will be.

Third, an instructor should be an example to the soldiers in absolutely

everything, from the most elementary (outward appearance, manners) to high moral traits.

Convincing soldiers through their own personal example and experience and forming in them conscious imitation of the best examples of the activities of others are extremely effective.

This is manifested most of all in the course of socialist competition, when aiming for the standards of advanced personnel is a considerable stimulus in attaining high indicators in combat and political training and in strengthening military discipline.

Thus, this method of indoctrination includes a system of influences on the awareness, feelings, and will of the soldier through the educator's personal example and through other types of positive examples which are models to be imitated. The positive example thus intensifies the method of persuasion and gives it great effectiveness.

The Method of Practice. The formation of positive habits in a person which impart a stable character on his behavior and link his convictions to his deeds and actions is of great importance in indoctrination.

Habits play an important role in a person's activities. A soldier who has grown accustomed to acting in accordance with his own knowledge and convictions will never commit improper actions and deeds or deviations from duty requirements. The habits of disciplined behavior, endurance, staunchness, the ability to surmount any difficulties, and many others are of great importance to the successful fulfillment of the complex tasks of combat and political training by soldiers.

The habits which are required of a soldier are developed and improved by the method of practice. This is a system of organizing service, training, and the entire life of soldiers which makes it possible to form in them positive habits, to develop volitional traits, and to accumulate behavioral experience which corresponds to their convictions.

If in training, practice is the process of the repetition of procedures and actions over and over with the purpose of developing skills and abilities, *in indoctrination, practice pursues the goal of forming correct habits which have become a requirement for the soldier.* Such practice is not simple training: it is accomplished by posing and carrying out vitally important tasks and by overcoming difficulty.

In forming and developing positive habits in a soldier it is important regularly to give him practice in the strict fulfillment of statutory requirements and repeatedly to place him in conditions which predetermine the manifestations of certain qualities.

For instance, to work out and develop the habits of disciplined behavior, constant and strict observance of prescribed order, accurate execution

of the order of the day, and the repetition of the difficulties of combat training over and over, especially under complex conditions, are necessary. Here even the slightest deviations from the requirements of regulations and rules of behavior should be eliminated. Any sloppiness in observing uniform regulations or hygiene or in addressing in a manner that does not conform to regulations is no trifle. When repeated from day to day, they lead to the formation of negative habits which undermine the soldier's discipline.

Of great importance to the formation of positive habits is the precise procedure for inspections and reviews, the posting of the guard, the changing of post, the granting of passes to go into the city, and so on. This procedure bears elements of multiple educational repetition (practice), which reinforces the habits of obedience and strict fulfillment of statutory requirements. The daily morning inspection, for instance, is not simply a formality, but systematic practice for the soldiers in acquiring the habits of always being dressed in uniform, looking sharp, alert, and ready to take immediate action.

Combat training is the best school for indoctrination, a school which provides the possibility of helping soldiers most effectively acquire needed habits and qualities. During activities and training exercises, the maintenance of weapons and equipment, and the serving of combat duty, soldiers are tempered morally and physically, accumulate and reinforce the experience of disciplined behavior, and develop such moral-combat traits as resoluteness, persistence, boldness, and initiative.

Use of the method of practice requires that the instructor observe the following *main pedagogic criteria*:

1) *Constant combination of practice with inculcation in the soldiers of high consciousness, deep conviction*, the aspiration to fulfill precisely the requirements of the military oath and regulations, and an understanding of the necessity for the actions demanded of them, reinforced by personal example. If this combination is violated, practice may be converted into drill and the mechanical execution of various actions;

2) *The systematic and sequential character of practice*. This makes it possible to develop in soldiers the habits of precisely carrying out directives of the military pedagog on a daily basis as well as requirements of the oath and regulations, and of successfully fulfilling combat and political training tasks. Here the habits are formed on the basis of increasing complexity of the situation and a gradual increase in the work load;

3) *Persistence and endurance in working out the habits of soldiers and in imposing constant demands on them*. The instructor's persistence provides the possibility of always attaining the goal in the difficult and painstaking work of forming habits in soldiers, and in surmounting all of its difficulties. In teaching habits one should never rush or be hasty;

4) *Comprehensive consideration for the individual features and capabilities of the soldiers, and supporting their efforts to develop positive traits.* This enables the instructor to achieve significant results in a short period of time in his work with subordinates and contributes to the acquisition of permanent habits by the soldiers.

In employing the method of practice the instructor always relies on the constant support of group opinion and of the collective, which condemns negative habits and approves positive ones. The method of commendation is used to reinforce the positive habits and the best traits of the soldier.

The Method of Commendation. Expressed here is the positive evaluation by the commander and political worker of the deeds and actions of servicemen, as well as approval of their successes in fulfilling their military duty. Commendation stimulates the improvement and reinforcement of a soldier's positive deeds and actions. The Disciplinary Charter of the USSR Armed Forces obligates every commander to commend the worthy soldiers for intelligent initiative, assiduousness, and excellence in their work.

Such extremely important principles of communist indoctrination as the combination of high exactingness toward subordinates with deep respect for their dignity, with concern for them, and stressing positive traits are embodied in commendation. Commendation is of great importance in the development of a soldier's political and moral-combat traits. It inspires a person, helps him to evaluate his own strength and capabilities correctly, develops a sense of personal worthiness, and because he is outstanding, increases his authority in the eyes of his comrades. Commendation inspires a person to further successes in combat and political training and in strengthening military discipline. A soldier sees in commendation trust of himself on the part of his commander.

Commendation has a positive effect not only on the person who has earned it, but also on the entire collective. Soldiers strive to take in what is good, to follow an example, to achieve the same sort of success as the outstanding soldier.

Commendation is an effective means of indoctrination. But it should be used skillfully and thoughtfully. The influence of commendation depends largely on how well the instructors *observe the pedagogic requirements* for applying the method. What is the essence of these requirements?

First of all, commendation should be *well-founded and expedient*. This means that commendation will play a positive indoctrinational role if the soldier is aware that he has truly earned it for considerable progress in service and training. Nothing has such a negative effect on subordinates as unjustified commendation, the lack of moral grounds for it, and overestimation of a soldier's merits. Undeserved commendation robs

it of its psychological influence, discredits this means in the eyes of subordinates, undermines the commander's authority, and develops such negative traits in the soldiers are laziness, selfish ambition, and dishonesty.

Therefore, soldiers are commended for truly great diligence in service and especially for successes in combat and political training and in increasing combat readiness. Those commanders and political workers who employ commendation for the successful actions of soldiers in tactical exercises, the excellent fulfillment of field firing and missile launching missions and combat duty, for vigilance displayed while on duty, for the mastering of combat equipment in short periods of time, and so on, act correctly.

Unfortunately there are frequent cases in which such commendations as "for conscientious work in the kitchen," "for cleaning the area," "for participating in the chess tournament," and so on are frequently entered in the soldier's service records, but commendations earned by the soldiers for progress in combat and political training and in increasing combat readiness are absent.

It is unwise to commend servicemen for carrying out elementary duties—for instance, for making their beds well, for keeping their lockers clean, for a conscientious attitude toward cleaning the premises, and so on, since commendation thus loses its indoctrinational force. In some cases soldiers begin to think that any well-performed action merits a commendation and will view it as a sort of payment for what they have done.

The effectiveness of this method presupposes a *correct combination of the types of commendation*. It is wise to use them with consideration for the consistency of their use by appropriate commanders. It is important that the first commendations be issued to soldiers by their immediate commanders.

The repeated awarding of a single commendation (appreciation) ultimately loses its motivating influence. Enthusiasm for such awards as short-term leave or the awarding of valuable gifts or monetary bonuses reduces the significance of other types of commendation. The moral and material forms of commendation must be skillfully combined.

Nor should such an important type of commendation as the lifting of a previously imposed sanction be underestimated. It sometimes occurs that a commander will punish a soldier and then forget about it. The subordinate suffers and strives to right his mistake, but the commander seemingly does not see any of this. The soldier loses faith in his own abilities and develops a feeling of disappointment and offense.

The effectiveness of a commendation is increased if it is *timely and publicized*. A proclaimed commendation should be realized in a short period of time. Otherwise with time it will lose its pertinence. Constant concern to ensure that such awards as a certificate, a photograph under

the unfurled unit banner, the "Outstanding Soldiers of the Soviet Army" emblem, and others are awarded to outstanding soldiers on a timely basis is the direct duty of the commander and political worker.

Every commendation presupposes publicity. As a rule all commendations are officially announced before a formation of the subunit or at a meeting of personnel. The subunit political worker arranges for outstanding personnel to be extensively popularized in reports, conversations, the bulletin board, and local radio. And all this attracts the attention of personnel, generates a feeling of excitement, and moves them to be more exacting toward their own behavior.

In addition to the commendation of individual soldiers, *the commendation of military collectives* is of great indoctrinational significance. The commendation of detachments, crews, platoons, and companies for high marks in combat and political training and in strengthening military discipline by such means as awarding streamers, honorary certificates, traveling trophies, memorial banners, and so on, has proven itself. This motivates the personnel and entire military collective to attain new levels of combat expertise.

The Method of Constraint. The indoctrination of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces is based on the method of persuasion, which is combined with example, practice, and commendation. However, constraint, which is an auxiliary method in the system of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers, is not precluded. It is applied to individual servicemen whose deeds contradict the requirements of regulations and the orders of commanders.

V. I. Lenin stated that the struggle against violation of Soviet laws and discipline "cannot be waged solely through propaganda and agitation, organization of competition, or selection of organizers—the struggle must also be waged through constraint."¹⁴

By the method of constraint is meant the aggregate of procedures and means which move a soldier to fulfill the requirements of military discipline and orders against his desire.

In the army, where high discipline and precision in the actions of every soldier and the entire collective are so essential, even the slightest confusion, irresponsibility, or lack of organization is intolerable. Here everything must be subordinated to a single will, to a single goal, and the fulfillment of statutory standards, orders, and directives is unquestioning and compulsory for all. In official interests the commander is obligated to use his authority and, if necessary, constraint to ensure fulfillment of the requirements of discipline and of his own orders. Failure to punish those who violate discipline and military order has a negative effect on the activities of the entire military collective and ultimately leads to a decline in the subunit's combat readiness. It is precisely for this reason that the

Disciplinary Charter requires commanders to demand resolutely and firmly the observance of military discipline and order, not to let any misdeed go unpunished, and to employ strict sanctions against those who are remiss in their duties.

In our army constraint is applied primarily in combination with, and on the basis of, the method of persuasion. It does not suppress the trainee's will, nor does it belittle their human dignity, as is characteristic of the armies of imperialist states. The effectiveness of constraint is determined by the fact that it forces the guilty party to suffer his deeds in a psychologically profound way and to reexamine his own behavior. Constraint contributes to the eradication of a soldier's negative traits and has a favorable effect on the orientation of his further behavior and deeds.

The method of constraint is employed after all other methods of influencing the soldier have been exhausted and have not yielded the desired results. M. V. Frunze stated: "Of course, you cannot get along without any elements of constraint, but very narrow limits should be set on their application."¹⁵

Constraint is an extremely broad concept and cannot be reduced solely to punishment or to various types of disciplinary sanctions. It includes the following forms and means of indoctrinational actions: reminders, warnings, prohibition, condemnation by the community, and disciplinary sanction. Consequently, sanction is an extreme measure of indoctrinational action which is applied to certain remiss, undisciplined soldiers. Experienced educators, before employing it, utilize all preceding forms of influence, especially such a strong means as a discussion of the serviceman's deed by the military collective.

The Disciplinary Charter empowers commanders to employ various types of sanctions against servicemen for violations of military discipline: the comment, the reprimand, refusal to grant a pass, extra-duty assignment to details, and others. The correct employment of various types of sanctions also has important indoctrinational significance. The sanction is a warning to the soldier that he must seriously think over his own deeds. It moves him deeply to feel his guilt, develops the desire to correct himself, and tempers his will.

"A reasonable system of sanctions," wrote A. S. Makarenko, "is not only legal but necessary. It helps to form strong human character, instills a sense of responsibility, and trains the will, human dignity and the ability to resist and surmount temptation."¹⁶

What are the pedagogic requirements whose observance is a mandatory condition for the correct use of sanctions as a means of indoctrination?

First of all, the punishment of a serviceman for a deed he has committed will exert a positive influence only when it is applied on the basis

of comprehensive *consideration for the nature of the deed and the individual features of the guilty party.*

The Disciplinary Charter requires that any disciplinary sanction correspond to the degree of guilt and the severity of the committed misdeed. In determining the type of sanction one takes into account the nature of the deed, the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it was committed, the previous behavior of the guilty party, the length of service, the degree of knowledge of official procedures, character traits, temperament, and the serviceman's orientation. Only when all this is taken into account can the misdeed be correctly evaluated and the measure of punishment determined. Therefore, for an identical misdeed one soldier may be issued a mild reprimand, another a warning, a third may be put up for discussion by the community, and a fourth might be strictly punished.

The imposition of a serviceman's first sanction which is promulgated in an extreme case after all other methods of indoctrination have been employed, should be approached with particular caution. Nor should one be too enthusiastic for imposing sanctions. If they follow one after another, the serviceman grows accustomed to them and becomes indifferent to their imposition.

The decision to punish a subordinate may be made after *the reasons for the misdeed have been thoroughly ascertained and the soldier has deeply recognized his guilt.* This means that appropriate indoctrinational work is carried out on the person who committed the misdeed, primarily in the form of a personal interview with the commander or political worker, discussion of the misdeed at a meeting of the Komsomol bureau or an assembly of personnel, and so on. The soldier is given time to think over his misdeed, to recognize his guilt, and correctly to evaluate his behavior.

A sanction should not be imposed in a state of anger, since it might prove to be incorrect or erroneous. There is good reason for the saying that anger is a poor adviser. It is difficult to correct this sort of mistake.

A sanction should be timely and publicized. Any sanction imposed after a delay loses its significance and does not attain the goal. Time irons out the trace of the committed misdeed in the memory, and then its gravity is not experienced with sufficient profundity. This is why the Disciplinary Charter requires that a sanction be imposed within 10 days.

An imposed sanction is announced personally to the soldier and generally in front of a formation. It should be entered on the personnel record and put in force within one month from the date of proclamation. Otherwise, sanctions are superficial in character and do not attain indoctrinational goals.

The abuse of extreme measures of punishment such as arrests inflicts

great damage upon the cause of indoctrination. This runs in contradiction to the conscious character of Soviet military discipline, evokes a negative reaction, and sometimes orients subordinates against the commander and undermines his authority. In employing a sanction it is useful to adhere to the rule: "The extreme measure of punishment should always be the last."

The imposition of a sanction on all personnel of a subunit instead of punishing the person directly responsible is impermissible, since this practice creates a negative mood and distrust in the collective and may lead to mutual protection.

After punishing the serviceman one should intensify indoctrinational work, attentively observe his behavior, stress positive traits, draw up ways of correcting negative ones, and support the desire of the guilty party to become a disciplined soldier. And if a serviceman has recognized his error and corrected himself, he should not be reminded of what he has done or be reproached for it.

In analyzing the state of military discipline in a subunit, the commander and political worker pay particular attention to the observance by all instructors of the pedagogic requirement for applying the method of constraint. They direct political educational work toward preventing disciplinary misdeeds and mobilize the efforts of communists and Komsomol members to strengthen military discipline in every way possible.

Thus, the skillful use of constraint in combination with other methods, and especially persuasion, contributes to the success of indoctrinational work with the soldiers.

Conventionalism and formalism should be avoided in applying various methods and procedures of indoctrination. It is important always to remember the statement of V. I. Lenin to the effect that diverse methods, procedures, and means of attaining the goal "should be experienced, compared, and studied systematically, unflaggingly, repeatedly, and over and over again."¹⁷

Footnotes

1. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, p 428.
2. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, p 84.
3. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 117.
4. See *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 92.
5. I. P. Pavlov, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 3, p 215.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 14, p 92.
7. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p 96.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 31, p 43.
9. *Ibid.*, Vol 37, p 381.

10. K. D. Ushinskiy, *Izbr. ped. soch.* (Selected Pedagogic Works), Vol 1, p 150.
11. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 16, p 65.
12. See K. D. Ushinskiy, *Izbr. ped. soch.*, Vol 1, p 150.
13. *Vysokoye prizvaniye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye molodykh ofitserov.* November 1969 g., p 20.
14. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 36, p 197.
15. M. V. Frunze, *Ibrannyye proizvedeniya*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1951, p 159.
16. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 399.
17. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 43, p 282.

Chapter 14. The Pedagogic Principles of Instilling High Moral-Combat Traits in Personnel

1. Requirements of Modern Combat on the Moral-Combat Traits of Soldiers

The morale of the army has always held an important place in achieving victory in war. In analyzing the objective and subjective factors which determine the course and outcome of an armed conflict, V. I. Lenin stated that "in any war victory is ultimately due to the morale of the masses who shed their blood on the battlefield."¹

This principle of Lenin has been convincingly confirmed in the armed conflicts between the Soviet people and imperialist aggressors and in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their socialist Homeland. The especially high morale of our army and navy was manifested during the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars.

Should a new world war be unleashed by imperialists, it will impose higher requirements on the morale factor and the moral-combat traits of troops. This is because of the character of the war itself, which will unfold as the decisive battle between socialism and imperialism on a global scale. The latest means of armed warfare and various types of weapons and combat equipment will be extensively employed in it.

To attain victory in such a war it is necessary that each Soviet soldier represent a very strong fusion of moral-political tempering, combat expertise, physical endurance, bravery, and heroism.

In modern combat, which is characterized by the exceptionally dynamic and intensive character of combat operations and the dual-edged struggle for the initiative, the troops will have to redirect their efforts frequently and in extremely short periods of time, maneuver energetically, and deliver surprise and crushing strikes against the enemy. Under these conditions the readiness of personnel to act resolutely, skillfully, and with initiative acquires particular importance. Therefore, now as never before it is exceedingly important to form in soldiers high combat activeness,

an aggressive spirit, and the desire to fulfill the commander's order, and crush the enemy no matter what.

The extensive scope of combat operations, long marches by troops, and the need to endure great loads requires high physical endurance and training on the part of personnel. These traits can be acquired only through intensive labor in peacetime, through the effective use of the potential of physical training and mass sports activities.

The rapidity of combat operations and the abrupt changes in the situation presuppose very strict consideration for the time factor, for every minute and second. Of great importance here is flexibility of thought. The thought of the soldiers and especially of the commander should be agile, purposeful, and energetic. It is organically combined with firm will, resoluteness, boldness, and independence in evaluating the situation, making decisions, and analyzing events, phenomena, and various data.

Modern weapons will not only inflict material damage, but also exert a tremendous psychological influence on personnel, resulting in complex mental experiences. The necessity of taking into account the psychological effect of new combat equipment and weapons on troops was pointed out by M. V. Frunze. "The fact must be taken into account," he wrote, "that the significance of equipment cannot at all be determined solely by the dimension of the physical loss inflicted by it or weapons of extermination. . . . It should be assessed by adding to the physical loss the tremendous mental damage which is caused by the use of new means unknown to us. The dimension of this mental damage is not accountable, and under certain conditions it may greatly exceed the physical loss caused by these weapons of extermination."²

For instance, the influence of nuclear weapons on the human psyche increases primarily because of the greater threat to human life and the continual presence of this threat on the battlefield. Even after exposure to such damaging factors as the shockwave and light radiation, the threat to life remains in the form of radioactive contamination. The soldiers may develop alarm, a sense of tense anticipation, and fear or even panic in the face of real danger. The actions of personnel in crossing radioactively contaminated zones and eliminating the consequences of an enemy nuclear attack will require tremendous moral strain.

Under such conditions the high political consciousness, communist ideological approach, and permanent moral-combat traits of the soldier will ensure the stability of his psyche and enable him to direct his efforts toward the precise fulfillment of assigned missions and to overcome the negative influence of the damaging factors of modern weapons.

The enemy will strive to increase the psychological influence of modern

weapons on personnel by means of "psychological warfare." In imperialist armies much attention is now being paid to the development of special means and methods of influencing the awareness, feelings, and will of servicemen during combat operations in order to reduce their combat activity and suppress their will to resist and attain victory. Soviet soldiers must always be ready to counteract these means and must possess moral staunchness.

The increased requirements on moral-combat traits of soldiers are also due to the character of modern combat equipment and weapons and to the specific features of their use in combat. In the course of the combat application and maintenance of equipment, personnel will have to act with exceptional rapidity and precision, at the limit of their mental and physical capabilities, and with insufficient time and information. All this requires that soldiers have extraordinary presence of mind, attentiveness, discipline, self-control, and the ability to react quickly to changes in the situation and to find correct solutions as the situation grows more complicated.

The role of the moral-combat traits of soldiers, the collective character of the maintenance of modern equipment and weapons, and the increased significance of individual actions in the execution of combat missions by the collective as a whole is increasing. Group weapons require that soldiers know not only their own specialties, but also the general layout of the equipment being maintained and the specifics of the actions of the entire collective. Success in the fulfillment of a combat mission depends on the coordination of crews and teams, the precise fulfillment of duties by each member, and the ability of each to replace a comrade or come to his aid. Imprecision in actions, forgetfulness on the part of just one member of a combat team or crew may reduce to nought the efforts of the entire collective and complicate or cause a failure of the combat mission.

While imposing high demands on the moral-combat traits of soldiers, at the same time modern combat necessitates the further improvement of the process of personnel training and indoctrination and the introduction of all that is new, advanced, and characteristic of the current stage of development of our Armed Forces.

2. The Essence and Content of Moral-Combat Traits of Soviet Soldiers

The moral-combat traits which define the personality of the Soviet soldier and his behavior in peacetime and in a combat situation may be divided into four main groups: moral-political, professional military, psychological, and physical. They are all interconnected and supplement one another. At the same time each group of traits has its characteristic features.

Moral-political traits define the moral-political orientation of the individual and the moral character traits of the soldier—that is, his outlook, ideals, socially useful interests, moral-political feelings, a sense of duty, Soviet patriotism, hatred of the enemy, feelings of proletarian internationalism and personal responsibility for defending the Homeland and the achievements of socialism, a sense of honor, collectivism, mutual aid, and so on.

Professional military traits reflect the level of soldiers' preparedness for the successful conduct of modern combat and the skillful use of combat equipment and weapons. In other words, this group of traits presupposes the formation in personnel of high military expertise and combat skills, the acquisition of in-depth knowledge of equipment and weapons, the development of tactical and technical thought, and the inculcation of combat activity, an aggressive spirit, discipline, pride and love of their vocation, and love of military affairs, combat equipment, and weapons.

Psychological traits define the psychological preparedness of personnel for combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare. The development of psychological traits contributes to the creation of the positive subjective prerequisites and conditions for the fullest possible manifestation of the professional military and physical traits of the soldiers—that is, their knowledge, abilities, and skills under various conditions of modern combat, even the most complex. This group of traits is comprised of: the level of development of perception, attention, thought, memory, speech, the rapidity and precision of reactions, and emotional-volitional stability. In turn, the formation of high emotional-volitional stability presupposes the inculcation in soldiers of bravery, staunchness, self-control, resoluteness, willingness to make self-sacrifices, initiative, purposefulness, and so on.

Physical traits characterize the level of physical development and training of the soldiers and their ability to endure the large physical stress that might arise in modern warfare.

As already observed, all moral-combat traits are manifested in the activities of soldiers in interconnected form, supplementing one another. Thus, high political awareness, the desire to fulfill one's military duty in an exemplary manner, persistence, enthusiasm in training, and others help soldiers to master weapons and combat equipment to perfection, to develop firm skills and abilities in controlling corresponding devices and mechanisms, to deepen their knowledge in the field of the tactics of modern combat, and successfully fulfill any combat missions.

On the other hand, the better a soldier has mastered combat equipment and weapons and the methods of effectively employing them, the more boldly, resolutely, persistently, and confidently he acts and the less his

behavior is influenced by the negative factors of a combat situation. Thorough knowledge of equipment and its capabilities and confidence in it increase the boldness, staunchness, self-control, and activity of soldiers in battle. Conversely, inadequate mastery of combat equipment gives rise, even in comparatively simple situations, to a lack of confidence in action and to confusion, which in turn lead to the fact that even a bold person loses his self-restraint and makes mistakes.

In structure, moral-combat traits represent a complex fusion of ideological, professional-combat, psychological, and biological components which are in dialectical interconnection and interpenetration. Therefore, none of them may be viewed in isolation from the others. Underestimating just one of these components in indoctrinational work may lead to a break in the chain of the entire structure and hence to a reduction in the effectiveness of the formation of these traits.

The leading role in the structure of moral-combat traits *belongs to the ideological component*, which defines the orientation and content of the other components. Its foundation is comprised of the political consciousness and communist conviction of the soldiers.

Communist conviction is the definitive personality trait of the Soviet soldier, a feature in which the active strength of all elements of consciousness is embodied. It imparts purposefulness upon the soldier's activities and gives rise to confidence in his own abilities and readiness to surmount any difficulties on the way to attaining a socially significant goal. V. I. Lenin emphasized that people with convictions "struggle with selfless valor against all that stands in their way. . . ." ³

While defining the orientation of consciousness, political maturity and conviction are the decisive motivational force behind all of the soldier's actions and deeds and in the formation of high moral-combat traits. "The ideological approach and political maturity are the foundations of all other traits which a true soldier requires," ⁴ states Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense.

A soldier's ideas and views which have become his personal convictions intensify the psychological component, and moreover define the content of the entire mental makeup of the individual and especially its orientation. Ideological and moral convictions are the most important regulators of a person's needs, exerting a decisive influence on their content, breadth, and orientation.

Convictions also define the content of a person's interests. When his activities are motivated by a great idea, his interests are diverse and have a social orientation. The absence of such an idea gives rise to egoism and an extreme narrowness in the person's interests.

The ideal man is formed on the basis of ideological and moral convictions.

Ideological and moral convictions also exert an influence on the formation of feelings and volitional traits. High moral-political feelings such as patriotism, love of work, and others, as well as such volitional attributes as purposefulness, discipline, bravery, persistence, and so on, are formed under the influence of a Marxist-Lenin outlook and communist convictions. For instance, under the influence of a world outlook, discipline as a moral-combat trait in a soldier acquires deep recognition, communist orientation, activity, and effectiveness and attests to a soldier's readiness to fulfill successfully tasks under combat conditions.

A person's ideas, views, and convictions also have a significant influence on inherited traits by neutralizing undesirable manifestations of inborn predispositions or even by changing them through indoctrination and self-education.

A soldier for whom the ideas of communism have become personal convictions is capable of defending these ideas under any real circumstances. Consciousness of the rightness and justness of the cause for which he is fighting gives him confidence of his own strength and success and helps him to surmount any difficulties of a combat situation.

As far as the *professional-combat component* is concerned, it is mainly connected with instruction and combat training and therefore, was considered in the previous section of the book. Indoctrination, especially the inculcation in soldiers of discipline, love of combat equipment and weapons, the desire to master military affairs to perfection, and so on, also indisputably plays a considerable role in the formation in this group of moral-combat traits.

Of great importance in the structure of moral-combat traits is the *psychological component*, which includes a diverse world of mental phenomena and especially those mental personality traits which account for the socially significant behavior and activities of a person.

The system of motives and tasks which a person sets for himself is of particular importance in human endeavor and behavior. Motives represent the main motivational forces which characterize not only what a given soldier does or how he acts, but also for what reason he does or acts one way and not another. Motives may be socially significant (broad) or partial (narrow). For instance, if a soldier's conscientious attitude toward his official duties is based on a sense of duty and personal responsibility to the Party and people for defense of the socialist Homeland, all his actions and deeds will stem from the interests of society and be motivated by socially significant factors.

If, however, a soldier's attitude toward his duties is determined by personal interests—that is, is motivated by particular factors—his actions

and deeds will be largely defined by the specific situation. For instance, in front of commanders and comrades he will try to fulfill the requirements of military order and discipline, but when he is alone he may violate them.

Hence, the leading role in regulating the activities and behavior of the Soviet soldier belongs to socially significant motives, which impart on the activities ideological meaning and deep recognition of their goals and tasks. Therefore, in the indoctrination of moral-combat traits in soldiers it is necessary to form stable, socially significant motives which are manifested in high political consciousness and deep understanding of his duty and responsibility for defending the interests of the Homeland.

In the indoctrination of soldiers it is also important to take into account the fact that certain inherited human traits (*the biological component*) have a certain effect on the formation of moral-combat traits. For instance, the traits of temperament which rest on the inherited basis of some given type of nervous system have a significant effect on the manifestation of moral-combat traits, imparting a certain emotional coloring to them.

The rapidity of formation and reinforcement of various traits also depends on specifics of the nervous system. All other conditions being equal, resoluteness is instilled and reinforced in a sanguine and choleric person more readily than in a phlegmatic or melancholic, while self-control is formed more quickly in phlegmatic and sanguine persons than in a choleric.

In speaking of the influence of the biological component on the inculcation of moral-combat traits in soldiers we should not, however, exaggerate its significance. First, it is important to keep in mind that inherited features of the nervous system are not invariable. They develop and change under the influence of the conditions of activity and of goal-directed educational factors. Consequently, the formation and reinforcement of various moral-combat traits will have a favorable influence on changing a person's inherited traits. Second, it should not be forgotten that inborn features of the nervous system and body characterize only the dynamic aspect of a soldier's activities and behavior, while the content aspect is determined by the soldier's ideological and moral convictions, with whose aid he can "harness" negative inherited traits and prevent manifestation of them.

Thus, in the formation of moral-combat traits of Soviet soldiers, the leading role belongs to the ideological component which defines the communist ideological approach and conviction of Soviet soldiers and is the main regulator of their behavior and activity. Also of considerable importance are other components which ensure the comprehensive training of personnel for the successful conduct of combat operations in modern warfare.

3. The Ways and Means of Instilling High Moral-Combat Traits in Soviet Soldiers

High moral-combat traits are instilled in Soviet soldiers in the course of combat and political training, military indoctrination, the fulfillment of the tasks of troop combat readiness, and the entire service and life of personnel through the friendly and coordinated efforts of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. These efforts are directed at forming the entire complex of traits necessary for the successful conduct of combat operations, and provide for purposeful and comprehensive influencing of soldiers throughout their term of service in the army and navy.

The most favorable conditions for the inculcation of high moral-combat traits in personnel have been created in the Soviet Armed Forces. "Military service in our country," as was emphasized in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, "is not only a school of combat expertise. At the same time it is a good school for ideological and physical tempering, discipline, and organization."⁵

The formation of high moral-combat traits in Soviet soldiers is accomplished by various ways and means.

The most important way of instilling moral-combat traits in personnel is goal-directed *ideological indoctrinational work*. Disclosing the sources for the formation of the moral-political traits of Soviet people, L. I. Brezhnev commented at the 24th CPSU Congress: "The moral-political traits of the Soviet people are formed by the entire socialist way of our life, by the entire course of events in society, but above all by the goal-directed, persistent ideological indoctrinational work of the Party and all its organizations."⁶

Ideological indoctrinational work in the subunit is directed primarily at forming a Marxist-Leninist communist outlook in soldiers and in developing communist conviction on this basis.

In developing communist conviction in soldiers, commanders and political workers thoroughly explain to personnel Lenin's precepts to armed defenders of the socialist Homeland and the goals and tasks of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and develop in the soldiers a clear understanding of their personal responsibility for defending our great Homeland and all countries of the socialist community. This work is the most important source for the formation of patriotism, internationalism, a sense of military duty, heroism, and other moral-combat traits. M. I. Kalinin, commenting on the influence of awareness of the rightness and clarity of the goals of a war on the behavior of Soviet soldiers said: "The Red Army or Red Navy man above all must know well that he is preparing for the struggle for vast

human resources, for his own great socialist Homeland, for the life and happiness of his people, and for the freedom and good of millions of his class brothers. Only these ideological goals, only belief in the justness of our cause can instill in Red Army and Navy men the ability to display that which we call heroism." ⁷

The explanation to soldiers of the essence, content, and ways of forming moral-combat traits and of the necessity of acquiring them for the successful conduct of combat operations occupies a significant place in ideological indoctrinational work. Understanding these problems, in combination with thorough knowledge of the specific features of modern combat, the specifics of the states of the human mind in a combat situation, and the methods of surmounting the negative influences of modern weapons of war, is one of the main conditions which intensifies the activities of soldiers toward improving moral-combat traits.

The dissemination of revolutionary, labor, and combat traditions is an important means of ideological indoctrinational work toward forming high moral-combat traits in personnel. The bravery and staunchness of professional revolutionaries and the legendary feats of the Soviet people during the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars give rise to noble feelings in soldiers and to the desire to imitate the remarkable models of service to the Homeland.

The glorious traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are the most valuable spiritual property which our Party passes on to the younger generation. The strength of the example of selfless fulfillment of revolutionary and military duty, which calls for heroism and bravery to become the standards of behavior of every soldier, lies in traditions.

In work toward disseminating revolutionary and combat traditions, specificity in revealing the essence and importance of the feats of heroes is of great consequence. In this regard M. I. Kalinin advised: "... You cite some historical episode in which ... the soldiers displayed their heroism and bravery, in which they selflessly defended the Homeland, and only then do you say why they fought so. Then your idea will be invested with concreteness. ... " ⁸

The effectiveness of the dissemination of traditions depends largely on the skillful application of the forms and methods of political educational work. Meetings between soldiers and veterans of the Party, army, and navy, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor, and leading production workers are extensively utilized in subunits. Topical evenings, lectures, reports, conversations on the heroic feats of Soviet soldiers, debates on the importance of heroism and staunchness, and other forms regularly take place.

The aesthetical education of soldiers is of great importance in the formation of moral-combat traits. Familiarity with the outstanding works of

literature, the fine arts, and music, which reveal the greatness and strength of our Homeland, the heroic path of Lenin's Party, and the combat and labor feats of the Soviet people, give rise to high patriotic feelings in soldiers.

Various forms and methods for the aesthetic education of soldiers are used in subunits, of which discussions of the works of belles lettres, military memoirs, painting, sculpture, and the cinema, as well as excursions to sites of combat glory, museums, exhibits, and so on are employed in subunits.

The unmasking of the aggressive essence of imperialism and of the plunderous character of its armies and the development in Soviet soldiers of a burning hatred of the enemies of our Homeland and of a desire for peace and progress are the most important directions of ideological indoctrinational work. The campaign against bourgeois and revisionist ideology and mores and tastes alien to us is also acquiring immediate importance.

The formation of the ideological selectivity of each individual and the development in him of reliable "ideological filters"—a scientific outlook and communist conviction—holds an important place in the inculcation of deep implacability toward bourgeois ideology in Soviet soldiers.

Intensive military labor and the diverse practical activities of personnel in combination with goal-directed work in military indoctrination are one of the main ways of instilling moral-combat traits in personnel.

Daily activities, tactical exercises, naval voyages and flights, field firings and missile launchings, the serving of combat and guard duty, and other types of combat training which are conducted in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare create the most favorable conditions for the formation and improvement of high moral-combat traits in soldiers. The process of combat training and service not only arms personnel with skills, knowledge, and abilities, but also increases the functional capabilities of the soldiers' minds and directs their cognitive processes, feelings, and will to the successful fulfillment of tasks in modern combat. The entire framework of military service, life, everyday affairs, and military labor also has an effective influence on the development of moral-combat traits. Exemplary prescribed order, a strict schedule, and the correct organization of life and everyday affairs of soldiers form the habit of always being precise, collected, accurate, and constantly ready to take immediate action.

In the system of combat training in the army and navy the study of each subject contributes to the inculcation of moral-combat traits in soldiers. By mastering tactical knowledge, skills, and abilities soldiers develop boldness, resourcefulness, initiative, and the ability to endure the adversities and deprivations of life on the march and in combat. Weap-

ons, special, and technical training develop faith in the strength and reliability of weapons and combat equipment and instill love of them. The study of the means of defense against weapons of mass destruction increases confidence in these means, spiritual staunchness, and readiness to surmount any difficulties of modern war. Drill contributes to the development of discipline, organization, persistence, activity, and collectivism in action in soldiers. A comprehensive influence on the formation of a soldier's moral-combat traits is exerted by the serving of combat duty, guard duty, routine garrison duty, and other types of military labor.

In the interests of successfully forming moral-combat traits it is important precisely to define the indoctrinational tasks in combat training activities. If the officer-instructor plans in advance which traits he will instill in his subordinates by means of the very content of the training material and by means of inputs, and which elements of indoctrination could well be employed in the activities, then his work will be extremely goal-directed, concrete, and hence, effective as well.

The most favorable conditions for forming moral-combat traits are created when combat personnel act in a situation as close as possible to real combat and overcome significant difficulties. In this regard field activities conducted in daytime and at night, in any weather, on unfamiliar terrain, and with real resistance by the "enemy" have great potential. Their effectiveness increases if no indulgence or oversimplification is allowed and if the elements of surprise are introduced and situations are created which require the soldiers to display independence, resoluteness, initiative, and boldness.

When conducting training under conditions as close as possible to combat, it is important to take into consideration that certain soldiers, upon encountering elements of danger and risk, may display timidity and indecisiveness, and sometimes may altogether refuse to take action. In such cases the military pedagog must have patience, good will, and must help the soldier in overcoming his timidity, lack of confidence in his own abilities, and the sense of alarm that he develops. Lack of restraint and crudeness in such a situation will result only in harm and inhibit the process of instilling necessary traits in the soldiers.

The physical training of soldiers occupies a significant place in the formation of moral-combat traits. Physical tempering, endurance, and the ability to surmount any difficulties are the most important conditions for the successful action of personnel in modern combat. Therefore, significant physical exertion is required in the course of combat training. For this purpose prolonged and accelerated movements with full field gear, the movement of combat equipment over the terrain by hand, work with personal protective equipment, the overcoming of various obstacles and obstructions, and the conduct of studies under complex conditions are practiced.

In physical training activities the soldiers comprehensively develop themselves physically and acquire such traits as endurance, self-control, agility, the rapidity and precision of action, the ability to endure large physical loads, and the ability to concentrate their own efforts in a complex situation.

The subunit commander and political worker exhibit constant concern for raising the pedagogic levels and effectiveness of physical training. They pay primary attention to improving the methods of conducting activities, ensuring the military orientation of these activities, and making maximum use of the potential of the forms and methods for physically developing soldiers.

Purposeful mass sports activities in the subunit, in which development of applied military types of sports and training of qualifiers in the military sports complex and of rated sportsmen hold a special place, contribute to improving the physical preparedness of personnel.

The formation of moral-combat traits in soldiers is also accomplished in the process of *psychological training*. Being closely connected with moral-political training and supplementing it with its own specific forms and methods, it has the goal of forming in the soldier mental processes, formations, and personality traits which in a combat situation enable him to display staunchness, internal readiness to make self-sacrifices, the ability to counteract fear and panic and to move actively, bravely, and with initiative, and to use his weapons to their full strength.

The most important task of psychological training is the comprehensive development of the stability of the soldier's mental makeup. Favorable conditions for this are created in tactical activities, training exercises, maneuvers, field firings, and missile launches.

Of great importance in the process of combat training is the simulation of the external appearance of the results of an "enemy" nuclear strike (centers of the fire, damage to combat equipment, destroyed defensive structures, and so on), and accomplishing a series of actions necessary in battle (determination of the radiation levels and of the boundaries of radioactive contamination, saving the crews of damaged vehicles, extinguishing fires, evacuating and repairing combat equipment, and so on).

Simulation of "enemy" fire by means of dummy charges and TNT charges and the recreation of the sounds of battle (the droning of airplanes, tank sounds, the whistles of bombs in the air, and so on) recorded on magnetic tape and amplified by special dynamic speakers are widely used in field firings and missile launches. These means contribute to the adaptation of the human psyche to the strong and unexpected irritants of modern battle.

The rolling over of personnel by tanks, the throwing of live grenades, fighting incendiary devices, and other procedures are also used for the purposes of psychological training.

One of the means of forming moral-combat traits is the *development of the soldiers' desire for self-improvement*.

Moral-combat traits, like other personality traits, are successfully formed if the soldier is aware of the necessity of acquiring these traits, objectively evaluates the results of his own activities and his own deeds, and strives to conquer his weaknesses and correct his shortcomings. Therefore, in indoctrinational work with personnel, commanders and political workers demonstrate the importance of moral-combat traits to the successful fulfillment of military duty through specific examples and help each soldier to understand and then correct his own shortcomings.

The personal example of the officer plays a large role in the formation of moral-combat traits in soldiers, as well as in the indoctrinational process as a whole. The high moral-combat traits of the commander and the political worker help them correctly to construct the indoctrinational process and to supervise the activities of subordinates, have a tremendous influence on the soldiers, and generate in them the desire to imitate and develop these traits in themselves.

The personal example has a particularly great effect on the behavior and deeds of soldiers in a combat situation and in situations which are critical and dangerous to life. The experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly demonstrates that the high moral-combat traits of commanders and political workers have always been the most important factor for achieving victory over the enemy.

The examined ways and means of developing moral-combat traits in soldiers do not, of course, exhaust the diversity of the forms and methods of work. This is a complex and prolonged process which requires on the part of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations purposeful and persistent efforts in training and indoctrination, a search for more effective forms and methods of influencing personnel, and the constant motivation of every soldier to instill in himself the traits which an armed defender of the Soviet Homeland needs.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol. 41, p. 121.
2. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, p. 413.
3. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol. 19, p. 422.
4. A. A. Grechko, *On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism*, p. 65.
5. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 81.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
7. M. I. Kalinin, *On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty*, p. 418.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 621.

Chapter 15. The Self-Improvement of Servicemen and Its Management

1. Self-Improvement and Its Essence

Under current conditions, when the role of moral principles in social affairs and the role of the organization and discipline of the Soviet people are constantly increasing, the problems of self-improvement are becoming especially urgent in the formation of the new man.

Self-improvement is the conscious and purposeful efforts of a person directed toward the development and improvement of his political, moral, aesthetic and physical traits, strong will and character.

Self-improvement is a purely social phenomenon inherent only in man. It is accomplished through the influence of the social necessity of possessing certain traits which make it possible successfully to carry out the tasks which life poses. This requirement is developed in the course of labor and intercourse among people. In taking part in various types of activity, a person not only becomes aware of his own personal requirements and interests, but also correlates them with social interests by assimilating behavioral standards and selecting the necessary way of life. While assimilating the requirements of society he begins to impose them upon himself and to develop traits which correspond to social requirements, the character of his endeavor, and its successful fulfillment.

Self-improvement should not be identified with education, although these phenomena are organically connected. Self-consciousness is developed under the influence of education, interests and a life ideal (the image of a perfected individual) are formed, and the need for self-improvement is aroused. But while education presupposes influencing the personality of the trainee, self-improvement derives from the personality itself. In the course of self-improvement a person develops his own convictions, character traits, feelings, will, habits, and deeds and makes them the object of his own cognition and development.

It should be noted that self-improvement begins later than education. A person's education begins at the moment of his birth, but the time for

self-improvement occurs when the level of self-consciousness, life experience, and will enable a person to set definite goals and to work for their realization.

Of course, it is necessary to strive to ensure that self-improvement be accomplished even in school. Definite experience in the self-improvement of school children, especially in the upper classes, has been accumulated in our schools. In the self-improvement of adolescents, however, there is still much that is spontaneous and unknown. Their activity toward changing personality traits is often defined by the immediate situation. For instance, under the influence of a movie that he has seen an adolescent may begin to develop volitional traits by means of risky deeds and unreasonable actions.

Experience shows that a person begins to work fruitfully on self-improvement usually after the age of 17-18, especially after he has gained an education and chosen his life's work.

By the time they are drafted, youth reach a level of development which ensures a conscious attitude toward self-improvement of their own personality traits.

The circumstances of life, education, and the active endeavor of a person create the internal prerequisites which move him to self-improvement. By developing the necessary political, moral, and physical traits, tempering his will, and working out communist character traits, a person concretely convinces himself that self-improvement largely contributes to the successful fulfillment of life's tasks.

Consequently, self-improvement is an important factor in the development of the personality. It is a function of material, political, and cultural conditions, education, and the efforts of the individual himself to develop certain traits.

The idea of self-improvement as an important condition for the formation of the traits of a revolutionary fighter was advanced by Marx and Engels. They emphasized that a person undergoes changes in the course of revolutionary activities. "In revolutionary activities," wrote Marx, "a change in oneself coincides with the transformation of circumstances."¹

V. I. Lenin, developing the Marxist idea of self-improvement, set a task for youth long before the victory of the Great October Revolution: that of independently developing *the qualities of convinced, staunch, and restrained communists, of forming a scientific outlook, and of tempering their will and character.*² For instance, he proposed to publish for youth a booklet with a biography of the revolutionary hero I. V. Babushkin. "Such a booklet," he wrote, "will be better reading for young workers, who will learn from it how any informed worker should live and act."³

After the victory of the October Revolution V. I. Lenin often emphasized the idea of the necessity of self-improvement, for which the most favorable opportunities are created under the conditions of socialism. Addressing youth, he stated: "You should make communists of yourselves. The task of the Komsomol is to set up practical activities in such a way that by learning, organizing, uniting, and fighting, its members would train both themselves and all those who look to it for leadership; it should train communists."⁴

The Leninist attributes of a revolutionary fighter have become a model for all communists and Soviet people and have found embodiment in the Leninist work style. In the report at the festive meeting devoted to the 100th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "The distinguishing features of Lenin's work style were high principles, directness, and truthfulness in all. He was an implacable foe of phrasemongering, 'revolutionary idle talk,' and communist pretentiousness. In any situation . . . Lenin maintained a clear and realistic approach to facts and events, the ability to recognize and ascertain in time mistakes that had been made, and resoluteness to ensure their correction. . . . This was a great, indefatigable worker and a man with an amazing capacity for work."⁵

Communist self-improvement has specific features of its own. Let us examine them.

In the process of communist self-improvement the harmonious *combination of the individual's personal interests with the interests of society and the formation of the traits necessary for fulfilling civil and military duty to the Homeland are carried out*. Herein lies the basic difference between communist and bourgeois self-improvement, as the latter pursues strictly personal, egoistic goals.

Bourgeois self-improvement, proceeding from the principles of capitalist morality, provides for the development of certain personality traits which help to attain goals in life by any means. Numerous bourgeois idealistic currents consider self-improvement in isolation from the material conditions of the life of the people, as a self-contained force which depends only on the subjective actions and will of people, and as the main means of achieving personal well-being in life.

A characteristic feature of communist self-improvement is the fact that *it takes place in a collective*, in the course of its development and improvement. In a collective, the most favorable conditions are created for the development in Soviet people of collective awareness and deep understanding of the interests of the collective and of society as a whole and for the struggle against bourgeois ideology and individualistic vestiges.

Communist self-improvement ensures *the comprehensive, harmonious improvement of the individual* and eliminates one-sided development of various traits.

All this defines the communist purposefulness of the self-improvement of Soviet soldiers.

Conditions under which the life and activities of our soldiers take place, and interesting military labor saturated with great difficulties create favorable opportunities for self-improvement and for each serviceman's improvement of such political and moral-combat traits as boundless dedication to the Homeland, the Party, the government, and the people, high communist awareness, discipline, bravery, the ability to surmount any difficulties, and so on.

Each year the idea of self-improvement becomes increasingly widespread in the life of Soviet soldiers. As the data of a special investigation conducted on the basis of a survey of a large number of soldiers and sergeants as well as the data of interviews with them demonstrate, a large number of soldiers engage in self-improvement. For instance, over 85 percent of those studied (out of 320) indicated they had begun to work on self-improvement in earnest only under army conditions, which had a very positive influence on the self-improvement of the individual and the development of his best traits.

Over half of the surveyed soldiers observed that army service had a significant influence toward *increasing their political awareness and developing communist morality* and taught them responsibility for their actions and deeds. Many soldiers and sergeants claimed that only in the army did they come to understand the essence and significance of discipline, learn to cherish time, and develop restraint and accuracy. Self-improvement helped them to eliminate a number of negative habits in their behavior and to develop industriousness and unquestioning obedience.

Soldiers and sergeants consider army service a good school for the self-improvement of *volitional traits*: bravery, staunchness, endurance, the ability to surmount great difficulties, and so on.

A significant place in the self-improvement of soldiers belongs to the improvement of *physical qualities*. Many soldiers and sergeants, commenting on the positive influence of army service on the development of physical tempering and endurance wrote roughly the following in their questionnaires: "In the army I became healthier, hardier, physically tempered, and developed strength and agility." Some soldiers (including cadets) began to engage systematically and purposefully in physical culture and sports for the first time in the army, achieved good results, and became rated sportsmen.

The efforts of soldiers toward the self-improvement of *aesthetic qualities* are no less important. Each year an ever larger number of young people who have musical, literary, artistic, and other abilities enter the army and navy. Under army conditions there is every opportunity to develop and improve aesthetic qualities.

Self-improvement is beginning to occupy an increasingly important position in the activities of cadets in military educational institutions, including higher military political schools. As experience shows, in the training process, especially from the second year, cadets begin to become ever more distinctly aware of the range of duties of a subunit political affairs officer and of the requirements imposed on him, and on this basis gain a clearer idea of the traits which they must develop in themselves. They begin purposefully to develop the necessary traits of a political officer.

Self-improvement plays a large role in the life of officers and warrants (ensigns). In the materials of "A Thousand Lieutenants,"⁶ published in *Red Star*, it was observed that about 90 percent of the surveyed young officers (out of 1000) replied that they worked on self-improvement, in the course of which they strove to develop the traits of a military pedagog.

The answer given by one officer is typical. He writes:

"1. How do I construe, or more accurately imagine, the process of self-improvement and how am I able to carry it out in practice?

"First, I study in the evening university of Marxism-Leninism. I study and summarize the works of V. I. Lenin. I try to raise my level by reading literature, newspapers, and magazines. When I have free time I independently study the English language. Sometimes I engage in sports and photography.

"2. What traits have I succeeded in developing in myself? Primarily these are businesslike traits. I have become more resourceful, collected, and more principled.

"3. How has my character changed? Perhaps I have become more balanced and self-critical and have made myself an even greater optimist."

The role of the self-improvement of an officer or warrant is determined primarily by the fact that in the great and variegated work with subordinates success depends largely on the level of training, professional expertise, personal example, and behavior in service and in daily life. A Soviet officer or warrant needs solid knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and the ability to be guided by it in his practical affairs and to collate his every step and deed with the requirements of the military oath and military regulations. The high political and moral-combat traits of an officer or warrant serve as the foundation for his personal example.

The work of an officer or warrant in improving himself and the desire to know more, become better, and develop a sense of duty, honor, personal worth, and volitional traits, are of great importance in his life and service. For this purpose it is necessary to utilize all opportunities available in the army and navy for professional growth and self-improvement.

*The most important prerequisite for self-improvement is the existence of a clearly recognized goal which is of lofty and noble character. Such a life goal has a positive influence on self-improvement, stimulating the desire to work on oneself and to acquire necessary traits by surmounting any difficulties. Marx, even as a youth, turned attention to the relation between a person's lofty goal and his own self-improvement. In his work on this subject, "Reflections of a Youth Upon Choosing a Vocation" in his final examination, he wrote: "... A person may achieve his own improvement only by working to improve his contemporaries welfare."*⁷

It is understandable that an egoistic goal in which personal interests are contrasted against social cannot contribute to the improvement of positive personality traits, but develops such negative features as self-interest, callousness, greed, servility, and so on.

Therefore, in the course of self-improvement it is necessary to set a life goal which has social significance.

The drafting of a high ideal and the *creation of an image of the ideal person toward which one should strive in his life are necessary conditions for self-improvement.* An ideal represents the internal force which activates and directs a person's desire to improve his political, moral, and physical qualities. Assessing the importance of the ideal in human life, A. M. Gor'kiy wrote "When nature deprived man of his ability to walk on all fours, it gave him an ideal in the form of a staff."

The images of Marx, Engels, and V. I. Lenin, who embodied the best human traits and who dedicated their entire lives to the struggle for the liberation of workers and for communism serve as the ideal of Soviet man. Many soldiers consider such outstanding Party figures as F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, M. I. Kalinin, and S. M. Kirov to be their own ideal in self-improvement.

Heroes of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, as well as such figures of literature as P. Korchagin, young members of the guard, and others are the ideal in the self-improvement of soldiers. Commissar D. Furmanov and political instructors Klochkov and Fil'chenkov are the ideal for many aspiring political workers.

Some soldiers select contemporaries as their ideal or model: hero cosmonauts or their own commanders and political workers.

Qualitative changes in all personality traits take place as a result of self-improvement.

2. The Ways and Methods of Self-Improvement

Successes in self-improvement depend largely on the paths a soldier follows to the outlined goal and the methods and procedures he uses to improve himself.

In the formation of high spiritual ideals the decisive role belongs to a person's outlook and conviction. A Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist convictions define the content of the entire spiritual framework of the person's personality. They have a decisive influence on the content of requirements, the orientation and breadth of interests, and the content of feelings and character traits.

Systematic study of Marxist-Leninist theory as the foundation of the scientific outlook is the primary condition which ensures a high level of self-improvement, and *the main way of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory is political self-improvement.*

The political self-improvement of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior NCO's, warrants, ensigns, and officers contributes to the deepening expansion and more permanent assimilation of the knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism which is attained in the process of political studies and Marxist-Leninist training.

Independent work toward studying the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the CPSU, and the materials of the international workers' and communist movement is the main method of political self-improvement. Speeches, reports, and abstracts on various problems of the theory and practice of communist construction are of great assistance to soldiers in improving the practical skills of independent work. Studies at evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, Party schools, and elsewhere contribute to the development of the practical skills of self-education.

Also of great importance to self-improvement is the independent mastery of military, technical, and general knowledge.

Self-improvement is the most important way of improving personality traits. In the course of the independent mastery of knowledge mental abilities, needs and interests are developed. Knowledge has an influence on the moral standards and qualities of a person's behavior, character, and will.

Under current conditions the role of self-improvement is increasing still more. This is due to the increased pace of the development of science and all its sectors and to the increasing flow of diverse information. The

rates of scientific development have led, however, to a reduction in the relative stability of knowledge acquired in school or a military educational institution. Whereas previously the knowledge acquired by a young specialist at an educational institution might serve him 10-15 years, this period has now been reduced by a factor of 50-67 percent.

Hence, the correlation between the education received in an educational institution and self-education is now abruptly changing. In order not to lag behind life and to stay in the level of current knowledge, it is necessary continually to supplement and renew one's knowledge by means of self-education.

It was noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress: "In our era such rapid development is taking place in all spheres that the education received during one's youth is only a base which requires constant augmentation of knowledge."⁸

Active practical work of the soldier is one of the main means of self-improvement. Tremendous possibilities for the development of the soldier's personality and spiritual and physical strength lie in military labor. Conscientious fulfillment of official duties, the persistent mastery of combat skills, and the overcoming of difficulties, largely contribute to the development of moral-combat traits, communist character traits, and a strong will.

The soldier's active participation in social work has a strong influence on the self-improvement of collective traits.

The soldier's correct evaluation of the results of his own work and behavior plays an essential role in developing the necessary traits. For this purpose such procedures as uncompromising analysis of one's own activities, character, actions, and deeds are employed. The desire honestly to fulfill one's duty and to win the respect of comrades and commanders is usually the grounds for such self-analysis. Self-analysis may be combined with self-criticism and self-condemnation of one's own shortcomings.

A self-critical attitude, constant self-control, and the ability to look at oneself as if from without, through the eyes of co-workers or subordinates, play a considerable role in the service of an officer or ensign (warrant). Not always does his activity occur in front of a commander who might be able to correct him or prevent him from making mistakes. Sometimes only the officer or ensign himself is capable of evaluating the factors which moved him to take some step. Hence, one should develop the requirement of self-analysis and the ability to evaluate one's own behavior and interrelationships within the collective. Self-analysis requires a certain amount of bravery—after all, it is necessary strictly to evaluate one's own deeds from the standpoint of duty, not from the standpoint of the personal "I". Self-analysis helps to reveal the

cause of a mistake, prevents possible failures, and moves a person to take active steps.

Realization of the main ways of self-improvement presupposes the necessity of using appropriate methods. Among them are: self-persuasion, auto-suggestion, self-practice, and self-constraint.

The leading role in self-improvement belongs to the method of *self-persuasion*. The process of self-persuasion is a discussion between the soldier and himself, the advancing of arguments "pro and con," and comparison for the purpose of finding the truth. To convince oneself means to prove to oneself the truth of a given statement or the correctness of a committed deed or of one's attitude toward the deed of another soldier, or the falseness of the position held and its possible consequences to oneself personally and to comrades in service. In the course of deepened thought and the search for the truth inaccurate views and concepts are discarded, personal motives are subordinated to social, and feelings of insult, anger, unhealthy pride, envy, and so on are rejected.

Self-persuasion should be based on the soldier's communist conviction and political maturity. It is directed mainly at developing high moral-combat traits. Of special importance is the inculcation of self-discipline and the desire to fulfill the requirements of laws, the oath, regulations, and the orders of commanders and chiefs out of one's own personal conviction.

V. I. Lenin set the concept of discipline side by side with the concept of self-discipline. He emphasized: "Create self-discipline, strict discipline," "take up self-discipline, subordinate yourself in everything so that there will be a model of order. . . ." ⁹

Self-persuasion produces the greatest success when a strong and positively oriented will is present. In turn, with the aid of self-persuasion it is possible to restructure not only consciousness, but also behavior and hence to change the orientation of volitional traits.

The method of *auto-suggestion* may also be successfully employed in self-improvement. Auto-suggestion is a soldier's influence on himself by means of word without a critical attitude. In contrast to self-persuasion, in the course of which the truth is established by means of logical proofs and refutations, in auto-suggestion the truth is accepted without counteraction or a critical attitude toward awareness of it. In auto-suggestion the word is mainly addressed to the emotional sphere and the imagination and makes it possible to uniquely influence the psyche. From a physiological point of view auto-suggestion is the concentrated focus of stimulation in the cerebral context, which the soldier himself creates by using words.

The research of a number of scientists demonstrates that auto-sugges-

tion yields best results upon relaxation of the entire musculature of the body. Hence the most favorable time for auto-suggestion is the period just before going to sleep or immediately after awakening.

The auto-suggestion formula (verbal text) should be brief, consisting of four or five phrases. The words should be pronounced in the first person, in affirmative form, and in the present tense. For instance: "My mood is balanced and good. I am calm and not irritated. I am in good control of myself." The phrases are pronounced two or three times and repeated again after 2-3 minutes. In pronouncing the phrases it is necessary to concentrate one's consciousness on the object of suggestion. The success of auto-suggestion is possible if the soldier develops a fervent desire to attain the necessary result.

Auto-suggestion as a method of self-improvement may be used to correct negative character traits, improve the memory and certain aspects of attention, and overcome a lack of confidence in one's own capabilities. It is also used in cases in which the soldier experiences internal and external difficulties, the surmounting of which causes fear and paralyzes the will.

The method of *self-practice* plays a considerable role in self-improvement. It has particular importance in the formation of correct behavioral habits and in strengthening the will. The essence of this method consists in the independent acquisition of experience in correct behavior and in the repeated surmounting of difficulties which are encountered.

Correct habits are of great importance in human life. An habitual action which becomes a requirement is accomplished easily and without any special volitional effort. Self-practice provides the possibility of accumulating experience in habitual behavior on the basis of the repetition of certain actions over and over again and the constant and precise fulfillment of statutory requirements and the order of the day.

Self-practice helps to achieve the elimination of many negative character traits and deficiencies in behavior. For instance, a hot temper, which often leads to altercations, and crudeness in addressing comrades and commanders are overcome by means of self-practice in restraint and self-control. A hot-tempered person should learn to calmly hear out the comments of commanders and the criticism of comrades, to suppress irritation, not to be crude, and to refrain from spur-of-the-moment actions. All this contributes to the development of the habits of being polite and disciplined.

Self-practice is always connected with volitional efforts toward surmounting daily difficulties which inevitably arise in the course of combat and political training, regular duty, and the performance of various work. Therefore, by overcoming various obstacles, fatigue, temptations,

laziness, and bad habits a soldier develops restraint, self-control, resoluteness, and other moral-combat traits.

The correct formulation of the goal plays an important role in self-practice. Above all it is important to determine what traits and habits must be acquired or what shortcomings must be corrected, and then to work out an appropriate system of self-practice.

The method of *self-constraint* and sometimes the method of *self-punishment* are used in the process of overcoming negative character and behavioral traits and in developing positive ones.

In carrying out official duties a soldier often has to force himself to act as he should and not as he would like at a given moment. In order to "uplift" himself to a useful undertaking for which they do not have strength of will, soldiers often resort to public *self-commitment*. For instance, some intentionally make pledges in the presence of their comrades: pledges to pass grading examinations, to master a second specialty, to pass the standards for a sports rating, and so on.

Awareness of responsibility to the collective, the monitoring of comrades, and their moral support contribute to the motivation of the will and thus facilitate the fulfillment of obligations. In cases in which failure occurs and a self-assignment is not fulfilled or a mistake is made, *self-punishment* is resorted to: trips to the movies, dances, pass, and so on are cancelled and the work is completed in the time scheduled for relaxation.

Experience shows that the self-improvement of soldiers contributes to the attainment of high ratings in combat and political training, to the strengthening of military discipline, and to formation of the traits of armed defenders of the Soviet Homeland.

3. Directing the Self-Improvement of Soldiers

Self-improvement should not be a spontaneous, uncontrolled process. It requires constant direction on the part of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. This is determined by the organic bond between the education and self-improvement of Soviet soldiers.

The essence of directing self-improvement consists in organizing the educational process in such a way that it develops in soldiers the requirement for self-improvement and the desire to improve their own knowledge and political and moral-combat traits. The assistance of commanders and political workers to soldiers in their self-improvement is an inalienable part of the supervision.

Commenting on the role of officers in the supervision of self-improve-

ment, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grecho, USSR Minister of Defense, pointed out the necessity of supporting productive initiative and independence of subordinates and of helping them in strengthening and developing positive traits in themselves and in eliminating shortcomings.¹⁰

The most important factor in directing self-improvement is a *comprehensive increase in the communist consciousness of soldiers and the purposeful inculcation of high political and moral-combat traits in them*. This is achieved through the constant concern of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations for raising the level of the educational process, for the in-depth mastery by soldiers of the system of political and technical military knowledge, and for the concentration of their efforts toward the development of communist conviction, high political consciousness, and moral-combat traits.

The organization of service in strict accordance with the requirements of military regulations and orders and *the constant maintenance of order and organization* in units and subunits have a great influence on self-improvement. The high exactingness of commanders and political workers toward the soldiers' fulfillment of their official duties, constant monitoring, and their objective evaluation of the combat training and spiritual and physical qualities of subordinates form in each serviceman a demanding attitude toward himself and teaches him self-control and critical evaluation of the results of his own work, actions, and deeds.

A mandatory condition for successful direction of self-improvement of soldiers is *the personal example set by commanders and political workers*. Their high political and moral-combat traits, strong will, and irreproachable behavior in service and daily life are a model for subordinates in the improvement of personality traits.

Of great importance in directing self-improvement are the activities of commanders and political workers toward *explaining to the soldiers the essence, significance, and concrete ways and methods of self-improvement, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the improvement of necessary qualities*. To these ends lectures, reports, debates, and reading conferences, which are directed at the development in soldiers of a conscious and persistent orientation toward the improvement of political, moral-combat and physical traits and strong will, are conducted. Extensive use is made of military memoirs and literature, of books from the "Lives of Outstanding People" series, and works of art.

Explaining the content and methods of self-improvement of Marx, Engels, V. I. Lenin, and their cohorts in the revolutionary struggle, as well as those of outstanding political and military figures has a particularly strong influence on soldiers.

Commanders and political workers *help* soldiers and sergeants to *draw up individual self-improvement plans* and teach them on a subject-by-subject basis correctly to direct their efforts toward the fulfillment of planned measures. A well-conceived and concrete individual plan, in which measures for improving knowledge, developing necessary traits, eliminating shortcomings, and so on are defined, imparts to a soldier's work a purposeful and effective character. Pledges made in the socialist competition and pledges of participants in the All-Union Leninist Examination may also be included in the plan.

It is an important task of the instructor constantly to monitor the fulfillment of individual plans by soldiers. Here it should be remembered that if a soldier does not fulfill what is outlined according to plan, ultimately the plan ceases to be an organizing factor and the serviceman's activities and behavior become disorganized. In turn, this leads to the reinforcement of negative traits in his character and the weakening of his will.

Various rules which the soldier himself works out and which define his general course of behavior and activity help in the fulfillment of the self-improvement program of planned measures for each day (or week or month). Of interest in this regard are the rules of behavior drawn up by K. D. Ushinskiy for his own self-improvement: total composure, at least outwardly; directness in words and deeds; the well-planned character of an action; resoluteness; not saying a word about oneself unless necessary; not spending time purposelessly; doing what you want and not waiting for something to happen; conscientiously taking account of one's deeds each evening; and never boasting of what has been, of what is, or what will be.¹¹ Every soldier can utilize such rules successfully in his self-improvement.

In addition to commanders and political workers, *Party and Komsomol organizations* extend effective aid to soldiers in self-improvement. Meetings on the problems of self-improvement are periodically held in subunits and the reports of communists and Komsomol members on work toward improving their political and moral-combat traits are delivered at meetings of bureaus. This provides the possibility of exchanging experience in self-improvement and of making extensive use of criticism and self-criticism to eliminate shortcomings.

Of great importance is the dissemination of the self-improvement experience of the best soldiers, which is accomplished by commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. This experience is made known in combat and political training activities, lectures, reports, conversations, visual agitation, the bulletin board, and the local radio.

Thus, correctly organized and constantly implemented self-improve-

ment of soldiers and its purposeful and concrete supervision by commanders and political workers are important conditions for the success of indoctrinational work and for attaining high indicators in the combat and political training of personnel.

Footnotes

1. Marx and Engels, *Soch.*, Vol 3, p 201.
2. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 7, p 66.
3. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 20, p 83.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol 41, pp 308-309.
5. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, pp 115-116.
6. See *Red Star*, 5 April 1969.
7. Marx and Engels, *Iz rannikh proizvedeniy* (From the Early Works), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p 5.
8. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, pp 85-86.
9. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 36, pp 21-22.
10. See *Vysokoye prizvaniye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye molodykh ofitserov*. November 1969 p 19.
11. K. D. Ushinskiy, *Sobr. soch.*, Vol 2, p 27.

SECTION IV. THE POLITICAL WORKER AS MILITARY PEDAGOG

Chapter 16: The Pedagogic Traits of a Subunit Political Worker and Ways of Improving Them

1. Specifics of Military Pedagogic Activities of the Subunit Political Affairs Officer

The political workers of the army and navy play a tremendous role in the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers. This is due to the historic function and peculiarities of our Armed Forces, whose entire activity is based on the high political awareness and communist conviction of soldiers who are called upon to defend the state interests of the land of the Great October Revolution and the achievements of socialism selflessly and to their last breath.

Political workers, as observed as early as the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on the Military Problem, are "above all carriers of the spirit of our Party, its discipline, and its firmness and bravery in the struggle to achieve the set goal."¹ Political workers have been and remain active implementers of the policy and decisions of the Communist Party among the soldiers, as well as organizers and leaders of Party political work in units, on ships, and in subunits.

Under current conditions the importance of Party political work in the army and navy and hence the role of political workers in its accomplishment are increasing still more. Our Party pledges to raise Party political work in the Armed Forces to the level of the requirements which stem from the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, and to carry it out with consideration for the complex international situation, the character of modern warfare, and the fundamental changes in the organization, armament, and personnel of the army and navy. Now too, as before, in the age of nuclear missiles the fate of a war will be decided by people who are infinitely devoted to their Homeland, Party, and people, who have mastered weapons and combat equipment to perfection, and who are morally, psychologically, and physically well-tempered.

Of particular importance under current conditions is the improvement of Party political work in the company, battery, or equivalent subunit—that is, wherever the tasks of combat and political training and strengthening military discipline are directly resolved. In a company, which is the center of ideological and indoctrination work, all conditions necessary for the comprehensive study of men, for exerting a daily influence on every serviceman, and for the successful formation of high political and moral-combat traits in soldiers have been created.

The introduction of the institution of company-level political workers has greatly expanded the possibilities for the further improvement of Party political work and for ensuring that it is carried out more purposefully, more concretely, and efficiently, and has increased the effectiveness of the indoctrination of soldiers, especially individual indoctrination.

The subunit political worker is faced with crucial, complex, and diverse tasks which define the range of his official duties. The subunit political affairs officer bears direct responsibility for the organization and state of Party political work and directs it toward uniting the personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, successfully fulfilling combat and political training tasks, increasing the combat readiness of the subunit, and strengthening the unity of command, military discipline, and the political-moral state of personnel. He has the function of organizing and personally conducting daily work aimed at indoctrinating every soldier in the spirit of high ideological conviction, boundless dedication to the socialist Homeland and the communist cause, and constant readiness to defend the state interests of the USSR under any conditions and at any cost. Regulations also place on the subunit political worker many other duties which become much more complex in connection with the Compulsory Military Service Law.

Commenting on the high responsibility of a political worker for the state of affairs, V. I. Lenin emphasized: "The political leader answers not only for that which he directs, but also for that which those under him do. Sometimes he is not aware of this, often he does not want to know, but the responsibility rests on him."²

By fulfilling these responsible tasks the political worker introduces a Party spirit, integrity, and a high sense of responsibility into the training, service, indoctrination work, and life of the collective.

In analyzing the diverse official duties of a subunit political affairs officer, we would observe that *the main direction of his activity is the indoctrination and training of soldiers*, in which he acts as teacher and educator. It is no coincidence that M. I. Kalinin, pointing out the essence of the activities of army and navy political workers, remarked: "A

political worker is an educator, teacher, pedagogue, and spiritual father of servicemen in the Red Army and Navy.”³

Hence, the activities of a subunit political worker are military pedagogic activities in content, activities which have their own specific features. Just what are they?

First of all, the pedagogic character of the activities of a political worker is clearly manifested in his *direction of political educational work* in the subunit. He plans all educational measures, determines the concrete forms, content, and methods for conducting them, and designates and prepares executors. The company political worker ensures that every form of ideological work is carried out at a high ideological level, has a thorough effect on the consciousness of each serviceman, and is effective.

In performing the role of teaching the instructors, the political worker organizes and directs the political educational work of officers, warrants, sergeants, and active Party and Komsomol members of the subunit, and teaches them, on a subject-by-subject basis, the correct application of the principles and methods for indoctrinating soldiers. He pays special attention to young officers in their development as instructors, assists them in their work with subordinates, and shows concern for improving their pedagogic knowledge and practical skills.

Directing the most important form of indoctrination—political activities of the soldiers and sergeants—holds a significant place in the activities of a company political worker. In this work he concentrates his efforts on the correct assembly of training groups, the comprehensive preparation of leaders for activities, and the conduct of studies at a high ideological, theoretical, and methodological level.

In taking part in conducting a seminar with the leaders of groups and political activities and their assistants, and in conducting instructional and methodological sessions with platoon agitators and lecturers, the political worker teaches them thoroughly and resourcefully to explain to their soldiers the decisions of the Party and government and the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces and how to correctly use the method of persuasion. He personally conducts political activities, political information sessions, and readings from Lenin, delivers lectures and reports, and so on. His pedagogic example in political educational work plays an important role in improving the quality of indoctrination on the whole.

Daily work in instructing the secretaries and members of bureaus of the Party and Komsomol organizations in the practice of Party political work requires great pedagogic efforts on the part of the subunit officer for political affairs. He teaches them correctly to plan Party and Komsomol work, to prepare for and conduct meetings, sessions of

the bureau, and other measures, to conduct a fundamental discussion of problems raised, and to plan and adopt specific decisions aimed at improving the quality of combat and political training and political educational work and at strengthening military discipline.

The specific features of the activities of a political worker as a military pedagog are graphically manifested in his *ability to effect the individual approach in indoctrination*. In deeply studying and comprehensively taking into account the features of each soldier as an individual, the subunit political affairs officer purposefully organizes individual indoctrinational work. He instructs officers, warrants, and sergeants in the complex art of taking comprehensive consideration of the mental traits of the individual (orientation, temperament, character, and abilities), mental cognitive processes, feelings, and will. Through specific examples the political worker convinces them that in working with the men it is necessary to rely on knowledge of a soldier's strong and weak points, to develop and reinforce positive traits in every way possible, and to correct shortcomings and mistakes painstakingly and resourcefully. In training instructors an important place is occupied by the explanation of the ways of strengthening military discipline on the basis of a combination of high exactingness toward the soldier with respect for his dignity and concern for him, and of establishing correct interrelationships among servicemen.

With consideration for the psychology of each soldier the political worker directs individual indoctrinational work toward the formation of high political consciousness, communist conviction, and moral-combat traits in personnel.

The subunit deputy commander is also a military pedagog in *the course of combat training*. Possessing in-depth knowledge of military affairs, the political worker deeply scrutinizes the tactical, weapons, special, physical, and drill training of personnel and the problems of safeguarding weapons and combat equipment and serving guard and routine garrison duty. He directs Party political work toward the exemplary fulfillment of the tasks of combat training and of increasing the combat readiness of the subunit, personally conducts combat training activities, and teaches officers and sergeants to instruct their subordinates with methodological competence.

The company political worker directs the efforts of communists and Komsomol members toward the attainment of high ratings in combat and political training, mobilizes personnel to the successful fulfillment of the pledges of socialist competition, and disseminates and introduces the experience of standouts and rated specialists.

Relying on knowledge of military psychology and pedagogy, the politi-

cal worker accomplishes the moral and psychological training of personnel in the course of studies, field firings, missile launches, training exercises, and marches.

Work toward strengthening and unifying the military collective and toward utilizing the strength of its indoctrinational influence on each soldier plays an important role in the military and pedagogic activities of the subunit political affairs officer. Of great importance in this work is the political worker's in-depth knowledge of the specifics of the psychology of the Soviet military collective and the ways and means of forming statutory interrelationships in the subunit and a unified opinion on the main problems of its life and activity, on the creation of a buoyant, joyful collective mood, and on the accumulation of positive traditions. The company political worker pays special attention to the selection and indoctrination of an authoritative nucleus of activists, supervises their work, and forms a sense of responsibility in the interests of the collective in soldiers on a daily basis.

The main features of military pedagogic activities of a subunit political worker insistently require the formation of traits which he needs for the successful indoctrination and training of soldiers.

2. Main Qualities of the Political Worker as a Teacher and Instructor of Subordinates

The presence in a political worker of the necessary traits of personnel teacher and instructor is the primary factor for the success of his activities in training and indoctrinating soldiers and in organizing and carrying out Party political work in the subunit.

Communist conviction and high Party principles are the most important traits of a subunit political affairs officer as a Party worker. These traits are based on wholehearted dedication to the cause of the CPSU, unshakable faith in the truth and invincibility of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the policy of our Party, and the readiness to give all their strength, and their life if necessary, for the triumph of communism.

Communist conviction would be inconceivable without in-depth knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and creative application of this knowledge in the resolution of the practical problems in the indoctrination and training of soldiers. It requires a broad political outlook, Party fervor in disseminating Lenin's ideas and Party decisions, and their persistent implementation. Emphasizing the importance of conviction in Party work, V. I. Lenin observed: ". . . For every political activity very serious scientific preparation and the 'development' of firm convictions are necessary. . . ." ⁴

The Marxist-Leninist conviction of the political worker is the pivot which defines the main goal and content of his activities in indoctrinating personnel, imparts an ideological orientation upon all measures conducted, and ensures Party influence on communists, Komsomol members, and all soldiers.

The profound communist conviction of the political worker is the main criterion for his effective ideological influence on the soldiers, for the successful inculcation of high political consciousness and devotion to the Party cause, and for the formation of moral-combat traits and a sense of responsibility for fulfilling their sacred duty to the Homeland.

High Party principles and the ability to defend communist ideas, to wage an implacable struggle against any manifestations of inimical ideology, and to solve all problems by always considering the interests of the Party and the people are manifestations of the political worker's Marxist-Leninist conviction.

The communist ideological and high Party principles accord the political worker the opportunity of directing the activities of Party and Komsomol organizations, the efforts of all communists and Komsomol members, and the aktiv of the subunit toward fulfilling combat and political training tasks, increasing combat readiness, and strengthening order, discipline, and organization.

In carrying out the tasks of indoctrinating and training soldiers under the direction of the commander, his political affairs officer strengthens the principle of unity of command in every way possible and instills in the personnel love and respect for the commander. Of course, the commander and political worker may have different opinions and different approaches to evaluating the men, their deeds, and various facts. There may also be comradely disputes. However, the interests of the cause, Party evaluation of facts and phenomena, and mutual respect for differing judgments and conclusions should always be placed at the fore.

Communist conviction and high Party principles define *an impeccable moral outlook and the moral purity of the soldiers' teacher and instructor*. The high moral make-up of the political worker, his selfless service to the Homeland, the people, and the Party, his honesty, uprightness, modesty, and worthy behavior in daily life serve as a model for the soldiers in the unswerving observance of the standards of communist morality and the requirements of the military oath and regulations and create the conditions necessary for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of communist indoctrination.

Such *traits of the political worker as high exactingness, respect and love of people, and a close bond to them* are also closely connected with communist conviction, high Party principles, and moral purity. In

instilling high moral-combat traits in personnel, the subunit political affairs officer is highly demanding of his subordinates. Here Party exactingness in his activities is inseparably linked to deep respect for the personal dignity of the soldiers and to love and concern for them.

In thoroughly studying the individual features, requirements, interests, deeds, and sentiments of servicemen, the company political worker sensitively reacts to all changes in their behavior and to problems of service and daily life which they may encounter, and establishes correct interrelationships with them on the basis of sincere comradeship. He thus earns the soldiers' trust, finds the road to their hearts, and becomes not only a commander, but a senior comrade and friend, with whom they can share their innermost feelings, knowing that they will always receive good counsel and aid.

The formation of this trait in a political officer is possible primarily on the basis of in-depth knowledge of military psychology and pedagogy and the skillful application of them in the course of personnel indoctrination.

In order successfully to fulfill his duties as teacher and instructor of subordinates, the political worker must *thoroughly know military affairs, be a master of a military specialty, and elevate his own technical military level in every way possible*. This trait is extremely necessary under current conditions, when the army and navy are continually being outfitted with new models of weapons and combat equipment, and military affairs are rapidly developing.

After receiving good military technical training in school, the political worker unflaggingly deepens his own military and technical knowledge, masters all models of weapons and combat equipment in the subunit's armament, and improves his own skills.

Experience attests that the best results in the indoctrination and training of soldiers are achieved by those political workers who have become highly rated specialists and masters of their own military professions. They are carriers of technical competence and pioneers in patriotic initiatives to master new equipment and weapons and to increase the ranks of rated specialists.

Of great importance in the training and indoctrination of soldiers is such a trait in the political worker as *a broad general cultural outlook*. In organizing cultural and educational work in the subunit, the political affairs officer directs all its forms toward the extensive dissemination of the best works of literature, music, art, the cinema, and the theater, teaches personnel to understand their ideological and aesthetic value and significance in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and for the triumph of communism, and develops in his men an understanding of beauty, including beauty in army life and service as well.

The success of activities of a subunit political affairs officer depends largely on the *pedagogic orientation and the purposefulness of the officer in mastering the skills of indoctrinating soldiers*. The pedagogic orientation defines the formation in the political worker of such traits as interest in, inclination toward, and love of his profession, devotion to his cause, a sense of pride in the fulfillment of his Party duty, and tremendous industriousness.

The profession of political worker is one of the complex professions which would be impossible without a calling, without conscious fulfillment of duty in the training of skillful soldiers who are infinitely devoted to the communist cause. This profession requires a great output of effort, energy, and spiritual warmth toward people.

Men become political workers by call of the heart and conscience. They serve this calling, like their duty, throughout their entire life, seeing in it tremendous social import and finding in labor the joy of satisfaction.

The profession of political worker requires especially great expertise in work with people. This means that he must not simply indoctrinate and train soldiers, but know his work to the finest detail and be a true engineer of the human soul.

Stable interests and inclinations play an important role in the formation of love of the profession of political worker. They contribute to the development of the desire to master the art of indoctrination to perfection, to expand his outlook, and to develop the necessary military pedagogic traits. Through stable interests and inclinations the political worker's activities acquire great significance and emotional coloring and never lose their attractiveness.

The political worker's love of his profession, pride in fulfilling his Party duty, tremendous diligence, and irreproachable actions and deeds have a strong influence on the psyche of the soldiers, become an example to be consciously imitated, and hence act as an important factor in the successful indoctrination of personnel.

Many difficulties, the surmounting of which requires *volitional traits* on the part of political workers (*obstinacy, resourcefulness, restraint, self-control, resoluteness, and initiative*) are encountered in the complex and multifaceted indoctrinational process. Indoctrination requires prolonged and persistent efforts on the part of a subunit political affairs officer, but they often do not immediately yield a positive result. A political worker frequently must deal not only with the indoctrination, but also the reindoctrination of certain servicemen, overcome negative views, character traits, and bad habits, and work against violators of military discipline. In solving complex problems and in considering real-life conflicts he must always display restraint, self-control and initiative, and resourcefully move toward the planned goal.

The firm will of the political worker increases his authority and heightens his influence on personnel of the subunit.

The activities of the political worker as teacher and instructor of subordinates requires *a creative type of thought*. In indoctrinational work conventionalism and the mechanical copying of the experience of other instructors are especially intolerable. A subunit political worker must work out and develop the ability to utilize his knowledge creatively in practical work, to draw up the prospects for growth and foresee the results of his efforts, constantly to seek the most effective methods and forms of indoctrination, and never to dwell on what has been achieved.

The formation of creative thought depends largely on the development of depth of mind (penetration into the essence of phenomena and foreseeing the development of events), flexibility of mind (the creative use of knowledge), purposefulness of mind (the orientation of thought toward a single goal and the search for the correct solution), and independence of thought.

The successful activities of a political worker are inseparably connected with his *organizational abilities*. Manifested in them are features of the activity of the political worker as the organizer and leader of political educational work in the subunit and the direct orientation of this work toward the efficient utilization of all efforts and means in solving indoctrinational problems.

The subunit political worker constantly develops the ability purposefully to plan political educational work and correctly to distribute his own efforts and the efforts of Party and Komsomol members in fulfilling planned measures.

In addition to the above-considered traits of the political worker as the teacher and instructor of subordinates, military pedagogic abilities are acquiring great importance in his activity. Both are organically connected and comprise a whole complex of traits in the teacher and instructor of soldiers.

3. Military Pedagogic Abilities of the Political Worker

By military pedagogic abilities are meant *the individual psychological traits of the political worker which determine the success of his activity in indoctrinating and training soldiers and assure the continued improvement of his pedagogic expertise*.

Military pedagogic abilities are inseparably bound to the mental personality traits of the political worker, to his cognitive features, and to his feelings and will, which are specifically reflected in his instructional activity.

Military pedagogic abilities are formed and developed in the process

of the mastery of the forms and methods of indoctrinating and training soldiers and in the course of the political worker's painstaking and persistent work. Their improvement is largely defined by the political worker's pedagogic orientation and by the development of his interests, inclinations, and love of profession.

The military pedagogic abilities of a political officer by structure include the following main components: the ability to study soldiers and their individual features in depth; the ability to convey knowledge to trainees and to develop the necessary practical skills in them⁵; pedagogic power of observation; pedagogic imagination; pedagogic tact; and the ability to organize the educational process. Let us examine the content of these components.

The ability to study soldiers and their individual features in depth expresses a political worker's ability to find, on the basis of comprehensive study of the psychology of the subunit collective and consideration for the personality traits, qualities, and strong and weak points of each soldier, procedures and methods of pedagogic influence which produce the best result in indoctrination and training.

In military pedagogic activity a political worker deals with people, each of whom represents a unique individual characterized only by inherent features of mental makeup, character traits, temperament, interests, habits, and abilities. The pedagogic abilities of a company-level political worker are manifested with particular clarity precisely in the instructor's ability to find the path to the mind and heart of every soldier on each occasion, to penetrate into his internal world, and to come to know him for the purposes of successful indoctrination and training.

The political worker's in-depth knowledge of his subordinates and their individual features helps him to determine the correct approach in indoctrination and training. Its essence lies not only in the passive adaptation of the officer to the specific features of the soldier, but in the active application of methods and means of indoctrinational influence which contribute to the strengthening of positive traits and the elimination of negative ones in servicemen and direct their efforts toward the exemplary fulfillment of military duty.

The ability to convey knowledge to trainees and to develop the necessary practical skills in them expresses the ability of the political worker to arm soldiers with thorough political and military knowledge in the best comprehensible form and to ensure a strong bond between this knowledge and practical actions.

A subunit political worker, in conducting political and combat training activities, delivering lectures and reports, and holding discussions, conveys his knowledge to the trainees by means of meaningful, consistent,

and interesting presentation of training material. Here he takes into account the level of training of the servicemen and the specifics of their thought and makes use of diverse means of heightening the trainees' attention for better perception and memorization of knowledge and better development of practical skills and abilities.

Speech—simple in form, specific in content, figurative, and convincing—is of great importance in conveying knowledge. Therefore, the primary task of the political worker is persistently to master the propagandist's art of speech.

The pedagogic power of observation of a political worker makes it possible to see from scarcely noticeable signs how subordinates are mastering knowledge and developing convictions, skills, and abilities; to understand changes and shifts in their character and behavior; and to observe in good time the symptoms of trouble in indoctrinational work.

As the experienced physician detects a disease from slight symptoms and plans ways of controlling it, so does the political worker relying on pedagogic power of observation, determines the main gaps in the soldiers' knowledge and in the formation of their moral aspect, directs his efforts toward eliminating the shortcomings found, and develops positive traits in every way possible.

In pedagogic observation a certain role belongs to the pedagog's ability to assess the manifestation of the internal world from external symptoms: the expression of the face or eyes, and so on.

Not a single trifle in a soldier's behavior, not a single line in his character which might sometimes be responsible for both the success and shortcomings of his subordinates will escape the eye of the observant political worker. This enables him to make appropriate corrections in his work and to take effective steps to extend aid to a subordinate.

Pedagogic imagination is the ability to project (imagine) the aspect of some soldier with his positive and negative traits, skills, abilities, and moral-combat potential.

Pedagogic imagination is inseparably linked to the creative thought of the instructor. Without this ability he falls under the domain of routine and loses perspective in his work. It is no coincidence that V. I. Lenin called a person's ability to imagine and fantasize his greatest asset.⁶

Imagination is needed in all professions. The fact that a sculptor mentally conceives a work before creating it is known to all, but the fact that a military pedagog in indoctrinating a soldier must "project" his personality is not known by everyone.

The entire indoctrinational process acquires a deeper, more effective character if the political worker thinks out what personality traits he must

form in each soldier and what levels the collective must attain as a whole before planning his own work accordingly.

Pedagogic imagination is closely connected with such a trait of a political worker as a sense of the new. "To master the sense of the new," as was emphasized in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, "means to see the prospect for development, to look into the future, and to find the most reliable ways of carrying out the tasks that arise. At present, when rapid and profound changes are transpiring in social affairs and production, this trait is becoming especially important."⁷

The main thing in pedagogic imagination is the ability of the military pedagog to foresee both the results of his work and the prospects for the development of individual soldiers and the collective of the subunit. By relying on his imagination the political worker is better able to anticipate difficulties and prevent them at each specific stage of training and indoctrination.

Pedagogic tact is displayed in establishing correct interrelationships between the political worker and soldiers on the basis of the statutory requirements, true camaraderie, and sensitivity, and in the ability to find a correct approach to each person while observing a sense of moderation in selecting and employing the ways and means of exerting indoctrinational influence. Reflected here are the pedagogic competence of the political worker, his in-depth knowledge of the individual features of the soldiers, his power of observation, imagination, restraint, and self-control. Pedagogic tact is an indicator of military pedagogic expertise and quality of an officer.

Tact presupposes sensitivity, a love of people, and the ability to understand a person's state, to foresee a possible reaction to steps which are taken, and to observe a sense of moderation under the most difficult conditions. A sense of moderation is especially important in manifesting exactingness, which should be combined with deep respect for the personal dignity of the soldier and with concern for him.

The 24th CPSU Congress, commenting on the specific features of Party work with cadres, emphasized that now "a practice has taken shape in which confidence and respect for people is combined with fundamental exactingness toward them."⁸ In imposing exactingness, crudeness and belittling of human dignity should never be allowed.

Sincerity precluding familiarity and egoistic and condescending manifestations is an inalienable part of pedagogic tact.

The external form of the manifestation of tact, which is closely connected with and largely a function of pedagogic techniques, is of great importance in educational practice.

Pedagogic techniques represent the aggregate of means and methods

with whose aid the political worker achieves the necessary educational effect. They include the form of address with an appropriate tone of voice, the ability to control oneself (posture, facial expression, position of the hands, gestures, mimicry) and an appropriate external appearance. A. S. Makarenko has emphasized: "An educator cannot be good if he is not a master of gestures and is unable to impart the necessary expression on his face or to restrain his sentiments. . . . An educator should behave in such a way that each of his motions teaches, and must always know what he wants at a given time and what he does not want."⁹ In the mastery of pedagogic techniques A. S. Makarenko paid no less attention to the correct tone of voice and the skillful use of the range of speech.

The ability to organize the educational process reflects the political workers' ability to carry out the indoctrination and training of subordinates purposefully and according to plan, to correctly take into account time and effort, and to create a friendly, unified military collective. All this is an indicator of the organizational abilities of the military pedagog, which are manifested in his diverse activity in directing Party political work.

The main elements of the ability to organize the educational process are: correct planning and organization of political educational work, the ability to distribute the efforts of active Party and Komsomol members, and the ability to create a strong, united military collective and to direct its activities.

The formation and development of military pedagogic abilities in combination with the improvement of the qualities of the political worker as teacher and instructor of subordinates are important conditions for attaining high results in the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers and for mastering pedagogic skills.

Pedagogic expertise is expressed in the readiness of a political worker to utilize his knowledge, skills, and abilities creatively in the indoctrination and training of personnel. The political worker's pedagogic giftedness and talent, an advanced level in the development of his abilities as a military pedagog, are expressed through pedagogic expertise.

Pedagogic expertise does not come at once. It is acquired as a result of intensive and painstaking labor by the political worker as he accumulates experience in the training and indoctrination of personnel. Here the assistance given officers by senior commanders, political workers, and the Party organization plays a large role.

4. Formation and Improvement of Pedagogic Traits of the Subunit Political Worker

The development of a political worker and the formation of his pedagogic traits begin back in the military educational institution. The

educational process and the entire way of life in school are directed at comprehensively preparing cadets for activity in the role of teacher and instructor of soldiers, at developing communist conviction and Party spirit, and at tempering the character and will of the Party worker.

What are the main directions of the formation of the pedagogic traits of cadets?

Above all we should take note of the role of *the educational process and of activities conducted in all training subjects*. Future political workers, in comprehensively and thoroughly studying Marxist-Leninist theory, Party political work, psychology, pedagogy, and military, technical, and general educational disciplines, accumulate and systematize their knowledge and learn creatively to apply it in practice. On this basis they fulfill the requirements which are imposed in the indoctrination and training of Soviet soldiers and acquire the traits and professional skills of a military pedagog. In turn all this contributes to the development in cadets of interests, inclination, and love of the honorable but difficult profession of political officer.

The most important role in the formation of the traits of teacher and instructor of soldiers—especially communist conviction, integrity and moral traits—belongs to *the work of cadets toward the in-depth study of Marxist-Leninist theory and the social sciences*. From the first days of their stay in school, cadets, under the supervision of instructors, master the practical skills of self-improvement and of systematic work on literature, especially the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and Party documents. At seminars they discuss theoretical problems with great interest, deliver reports, prepare abstracts and reports in military scientific circles, and take part in theoretical conferences.

The study of the life and activity of V. I. Lenin and his theoretical heritage is of particular importance in the formation of the traits of a political worker. "Lenin embodies the most outstanding traits of a proletarian revolutionary: a powerful mind, an omnipotent will, a solemn hatred of slavery and oppression, revolutionary fervor, consistent internationalism, boundless faith in the creative strength of the masses, and a tremendous organizational genius. Lenin's life and activity were fused with the struggle of the working class and the Communist Party."¹⁰ These traits of the great leader are a guiding star for every future political worker in developing the traits of a Leninist fighter.

Mastering Lenin's theoretical heritage not only forms a scientific outlook and deep communist conviction, but also develops in cadets a sense of pride in the profession of teacher and instructor of Soviet soldiers.

The preparation of cadets for joining the Party is an important step in the formation of the traits of a political worker. Without question,

no future political worker would think of serving outside of the Party ranks and, in the course of training, comprehensively prepares himself for joining the CPSU. Such training, which is inseparably linked to a rise in political awareness and the development of communist conviction, increases the cadets' responsibility for unswerving fulfillment of the requirements of the Party Program and Charter and the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress.

In the process of instruction much attention is paid to *the development in cadets of the military pedagogic orientation*—personal purposefulness in the formation of the traits of teacher and instructor. Here the activities conducted by instructors play an important role. To cadets they are a pedagogic example of manifestation of the ability to convey knowledge to trainees, and also of pedagogic keenness of observation, imagination, tact, and the ability to organize the educational process.

Of considerable importance in the course of instruction is the improvement of the quality of speech of future political workers. In class the instructors teach the cadets through specific examples how correctly to combine profound ideological content, precision, and clarity of thought with lively and figurative speech. Each speech made by a cadet is analyzed for content and form of presentation. This has a substantial influence on the development of the thought and speech of future political workers and forms in them the ability correctly to evaluate the role of the spoken word in educational work.

The political educational work conducted in the school with the extensive participation of cadets has a significant influence on the formation of pedagogic traits in future political workers. The main goal of this work is to form in cadets the professional skills of the political worker. Study of the course in Party political work and military psychology and pedagogy is combined with the cadets' active participation in the activities of Party and Komsomol organizations, in carrying out the duties of agitator and editor of the combat paper, in conducting individual and group discussions, reports, readings from Lenin within the platoon and in junior courses, at schools, and at enterprises in the city, political information sessions and political activities in the subunits of the garrison, and so on.

Cadets learn how to plan Party political work and are taught the features of the activities of a political worker and the Party and Komsomol subunit organizations in indoctrinating personnel, strengthening military discipline, and carrying out combat and political training tasks.

Of particular importance is the cadets' fulfillment of the duties of company political worker in tactical activities and exercises, weapons training, and special training activities. This contributes to the trainees' acquisition of concrete skills in the organization and conduct of Party political work.

The cadets' fulfillment of the duties of secretaries of the Party and Komsomol organizations and of members of the Party and Komsomol bureaus of the school has an active influence on the formation in cadets of the traits of a political worker.

The decisive role in the formation of pedagogic traits belongs to the *military on-the-job training (OJT) of cadets* in the positions of commander and political worker. It places the trainees in conditions which make it possible to test and reinforce acquired knowledge, skills, and abilities and to gain some experience in the indoctrination and training of soldiers.

In OJT the cadet directs all his energy and initiative toward developing the specific traits of teacher and instructor of soldiers. To some extent he independently carries out pedagogic tasks and learns to control his own behavior and mental processes. An essential aspect of a cadet on OJT is the possibility of directly seeing the results of his own work to a certain extent and evaluating his own abilities and capabilities.

Preparations for, and the practical conduct of, combat and political training activities, political information sessions, discussions, reports, and readings from Lenin, work with the leaders of political study groups, their assistants and agitators, participation in the activities of Party and Komsomol organizations, the study of personnel, and the fulfillment of other duties contribute to "adjusting" and "adapting" the mental properties of the cadets to the requirements of military pedagogic activity. A cadet on OJT intensively develops the elements of observation, pedagogic imagination, and tact and the ability to take into consideration the individual features of soldiers and sergeants, and also works out the practical skills of apportioning training materials, distributing time in activities, and determining the best procedures and methods for conveying knowledge. The traits of an organizer of the educational process are formed.

Experience shows that during OJT the cadets encounter the greatest difficulties in carrying out political educational work, especially in the study of personnel and in taking into account the individual features of soldiers and sergeants.

After the completion of OJT the cadets' careful analysis of their activities in indoctrinating and training personnel, the correct evaluation of their pedagogic traits, and the determination of ways of further improving them acquire primary importance.

The work of the political officer after graduating from school is the most important stage of the formation, development, and improvement of pedagogic traits. Despite the complexity of this process, the investigation of the characteristic features of the activity of many political

officers in indoctrinating and training personnel and the experience of the work conducted with them toward improving military pedagogic training provides the opportunity of singling out the main ways of developing and improving their pedagogic traits.

One such way is the *persistent and creative mastery of the educational process and of the requirements which are placed on a political officer as a military pedagog*. The efforts of a young political worker in overcoming the difficulties of his first independent steps in indoctrinating and training soldiers and in developing his own personal traits and military pedagogic capabilities acquire particular importance here.

In the initial period of service a young military pedagog experiences considerable difficulties due mainly to his insufficient experience and poor methodological skills in indoctrinating and training soldiers.

The in-depth and comprehensive study of the individual features of soldiers and sergeants is a most complex problem requiring maximum effort on the part of the political worker. This is because at the start of their independent military pedagogic activity young political workers underestimate the importance of studying people for the purpose of training and indoctrination, and conduct such work on a case-to-case basis. Therefore, mastery of the methods of studying the individual features of soldiers and of correctly taking into consideration their positive traits and shortcomings, and development of the ability to find reliable ways of influencing each subordinate, should hold a special place in the political worker's activity in the initial stage.

In the formation of pedagogic tact young political workers should learn to establish correct interrelations with subordinates and to observe a sense of moderation in their exactingness towards them on the basis of respect for their personal dignity. For this purpose it is important to develop a thoughtful approach to each educational phenomenon: not to rush to draw conclusions, not to make decisions without weighing all "pros and cons," and to develop self-control and the ability to maintain a bright, businesslike tone in work.

Pedagogic tact would be inconceivable without the personal example of the political worker in his behavior and in his fulfillment of the requirements of regulations and the standards of communist morality.

As experience is accumulated in educational work and as a result of the thoughtful comprehension of its positive aspects and shortcomings, the political officer also masters pedagogic techniques. He develops the necessary form of address, with an appropriate tone of voice and the ability to act in mimicry, gestures, appropriate external appearance, and other means which yield maximum educational impact.

The independent fulfillment of educational tasks by a subunit political

worker is carried out in inseparable connection to the mastery of the *requirements of the process of instruction*, during which such traits as the ability to convey knowledge to trainees, pedagogic keenness of observation, pedagogic imagination, and in-depth knowledge of military affairs are developed.

In the process of a young subunit political worker's mastery of the most important requirements of indoctrination and training his organizational abilities are also developed. By organizing Party political work he develops the ability to distribute time correctly and to concentrate his main effort on solving the main problems. This is reflected in the compilation of the plan for political educational work and in the skillful distribution of the efforts of the aktiv.

Of great importance to a young subunit political worker is the development of the ability to scrutinize the activity of Party and Komsomol organizations, systematically to instruct, train and indoctrinate the Party and Komsomol aktiv, and persistently to work toward fulfillment of the tasks and decisions facing Party and Komsomol organizations.

In the course of organizational work the political officer develops ability correctly to analyze and evaluate the state of military discipline in platoons and the company and to outline effective ways of strengthening it. In this important problem the company political worker pays special attention to intensifying individual educational work with soldiers and sergeants, to correctly combining the methods of persuasion and constraint, and to instructing officers and soldiers in how to control the behavior of their subordinates and prevent infractions of military discipline on the basis of the prediction of soldiers' behavior.

The skillful management of socialist competition contributes to the development of organizational traits of the subunit political affairs officer. In organizing the competition together with the commander, he develops the ability clearly to outline the prospects for the growth of each soldier and the entire collective, purposefully to direct the competition toward the fulfillment of combat and political training tasks, and thoughtfully to analyze its results and popularize its successes.

In addition to the personal efforts of young political workers, the goal-directed work of senior commanders and Party organizations toward extending them comprehensive aid plays an important role in the successful development of pedagogic traits. This assistance includes the organization of demonstrations and instructional-methodological studies, open lessons, mutual visits to activities, political information sessions, reports, and readings from Lenin, the holding of permanent seminars on the problems of indoctrination, the exchange of work experience, and the extensive dissemination of the successes of young instructors.

The officer's group of the subunit or unit has a significant influence on the development of the pedagogic traits of the political worker. It contributes to making the young officer a productive member very quickly, to his acquisition of the practical skills of working with subordinates, and to better utilization of the advanced experience in the training and indoctrination of soldiers.

Self-education and self improvement play an important role in the formation and improvement of a political worker's pedagogic traits. In the course of self-education and self-improvement an officer develops his positive traits and corrects shortcomings, tempers his will and character, expands his ideological and political, technical military, and cultural outlook, and masters the knowledge of military pedagogy and psychology. The political worker's desire to learn all that is new and advanced in the development of military affairs and in the theory and practice of the communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers acquires particular importance in this regard.

A political officer's study of *the advanced experience of indoctrination and training and his analysis of his own pedagogic practice* largely contribute to improving his pedagogic traits. The participation of officers in meetings, methodological conferences, and seminars for summarizing and disseminating advanced experience, and the holding of activities and political educational measures conducted by experienced pedagogs are of great importance in this work. Political workers learn correctly to evaluate their accumulated experience and creatively to utilize it in their work, with consideration for the specific features of the subordinates and the specific conditions existing in the subunit.

As political workers accumulate their own experience, the opportunity arises for comprehending in greater detail the results of their work and pedagogic practice. Employing this opportunity officers develop the practical skills of self-observation, self-control, and objective evaluation of their own progress and shortcomings and the ability to draw correct conclusions.

Thus, the formation and improvement of the pedagogic traits of a political officer is an extremely complex process which begins in the military educational institutions and continues throughout an officer's practical activity in training and indoctrinating soldiers. Success in this work is ensured through the efforts and persistence of the political worker and the effective aid extended him by senior commanders and Party organizations.

Footnotes

1. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK, Vol 2, p 65.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 42, p 218.

3. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge*, p 413.
 4. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 7, p 348.
 5. Defining these components in terms of ability does not mean reducing capabilities to abilities, but reflects the attained level of the actual manifestation of the capabilities.
 6. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 45, p 125.
 7. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, pp 99-100.
 8. *Ibid.*, p 99.
 9. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, pp 178-179.
 10. *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, pp 32-33.
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Chapter 17. Directing the Pedagogic Activity of Officers, Ensigns (Warrants), Sergeants (Senior NCOs), and the Party and Komsomol Aktiv of the Subunit

1. The Pedagogic Collective of the Subunit and Its Role in the Indoctrination and Training of Soldiers

The collective of a subunit exerts its influence on soldiers primarily through its aktiv, which is the main connecting link between the commander, political workers, and personnel.

The aktiv is composed of the leading and most active and authoritative soldiers who play a leading role in the life of the subunit collective: stand-outs in training, public spirited soldiers, communists, and Komsomol activists. Here many of the Party and Komsomol aktiv (secretaries and members of the bureaus of Party and Komsomol organizations, Komsomol group organizers, members of the editorial staff of the wall newspaper) are elected at meetings as the most authoritative members of the collective.

Relying on their authority activists exert an influence on all members of the collective and are active implementers of the requirements which the subunit commander and his political affairs officer place on personnel. This is accomplished on the basis of the exemplary personal standards of activists in fulfilling these requirements and on the basis of their application to every soldier.

In activists the commander and political worker acquire a large number of assistants who contribute to the successful fulfillment of combat and political training tasks and to increasing combat readiness.

Officers, warrants (ensigns), sergeants (Senior NCO's), and the Party and Komsomol aktiv comprise the distinctive *pedagogic collective* of the subunit, the collective of instructors of soldiers. The subunit commander and his political affairs officer, as the best trained and most experienced military pedagogs, are the direct leaders of his collective.

Reflecting the specific features of the structure of the subunit, the pedagogic collective incorporates various categories of instructors.

The officers of the subunit represent the best trained and most experienced category of military pedagogs, upon whom rests the leading role in the educational process.

"The officer is the decisive link, the main figure in the Armed Forces," states Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense. "The Party and government have greatly uplifted the importance of the officer, entrusted him to train and indoctrinate the men, and empowered them to order, to lead them to battle, and to fulfill the most difficult and complex tasks."¹

In response to the concern of the Communist Party and Soviet government, army and navy officers conscientiously fulfill their military duty. They persistently improve their political and military knowledge, skillfully train and indoctrinate subordinates, and achieve high results in increasing the combat readiness of the troops and carrying out combat and political training tasks.

The youth of the officer corps of our Armed Forces, especially in subunits, is a characteristic feature. Young officers possess such invaluable traits as ebullient energy, a fresh reserve of knowledge, and a great desire to master to perfection their profession and the art of military pedagogy. The difficulties which they encounter in their work are connected primarily with their lack of experience in organizing military labor and in training and indoctrinating personnel.

Subunits of the army and navy are continually augmented with officers who have graduated from military schools. At first significant shortcomings are found in their work, especially in the indoctrination of subordinates. Chief among them are:

- 1) Hastiness in solving complex indoctrinational problems and in evaluating the actions and deeds of subordinates;
- 2) Inability to establish correct interrelationships with soldiers and to find reliable ways of strengthening order and discipline, and lack of restraint in conflict situations;
- 3) Weak direction of the activity of the collective and insufficient reliance upon it in fulfilling the tasks of indoctrinating soldiers;
- 4) Lack of due purposefulness, flexibility, resourcefulness, and the ability to apply their knowledge in the planning and organization of indoctrinational work;
- 5) An inadequate ability in analyzing the results of the activity of the military collective and of one's own work.

As already emphasized, the comprehensive study of the individual features of soldiers is an extremely complex problem of indoctrination. Some young officers do not immediately draw the conclusion that such work is of primary importance and for this reason occasionally make serious miscalculations in indoctrinating subordinates.

Uncertainty in the indoctrination of so-called difficult soldiers, who are often classified as "incorrigible," is characteristic of some young officers, and they essentially cease to work with them. Here the inability to find positive traits in a person, to rely on them, and to overcome the negative in a subordinate's behavior on this basis have a telling effect.

Young officers' lack of necessary methodological experience and inability to apply acquired knowledge in practice give rise to difficulties in organizing their personal activities and in instructing personnel. Some of them do not at all have a clear idea of the final results of their work and cannot single out the main and chief factors in it. During activities they cannot properly link theoretical problems to the fulfillment of the practical tasks of combat training and let indoctrinational problems slip from view.

At first young officers have a poor mastery of pedagogic technique and experience difficulties in the correct application of visual aids and methods of instruction in various subjects.

These and other difficulties in the work of young officers require that the subunit commander, political worker and higher commanders constantly direct their activity and extend them meaningful assistance in improving their pedagogic expertise and in training and indoctrinating subordinates.

Warrant and ensigns are the closest assistants of officers in the training and indoctrination of personnel. The situation of warrant and ensigns was introduced by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1971 in lieu of the institution of servicemen serving voluntarily beyond the required period. This decision was necessitated by the fundamental changes which have transpired in our Armed Forces of late, by the increased requirements for the indoctrination and training of personnel, and for the training of professional military cadres in the army and navy, and by other factors.

Holding various positions in units and subunits of the Armed Forces, ensigns and warrants can do and are doing a great deal to increase the combat readiness of troops, improve the combat skills of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and Senior NCO's, and strengthen order, organization, and discipline among personnel. Assistance to ensigns and warrants on the part of commanders and political workers, and Kom-somo! organizations, and especially in problems of raising the ideological

and political level and improving methodological skills, is a mandatory requirement for the productive activity of ensigns and warrants.

The sergeants (Senior NCO's) of a subunit are the direct superiors of soldiers and sailors. As M. V. Frunze observed, they form the foundation on which all discipline, combat cohesion, and combat readiness of subunits and units are erected.²

Responsible tasks of the indoctrination and training of personnel are assigned to sergeants (Senior NCO's). They conduct training activities, instruct soldiers on an individual basis, and form high political and moral-combat traits in subordinates. Some perform the duties of assistant leaders of political activities. Sergeants (Senior NCO's) do a great deal of off-duty work. Many of them are secretaries or members of bureaus of Party and Komsomol organizations, agitators, and editors of wall newspapers, and perform other duties of subunit activists.

The system for the training of sergeants (senior NCO's) in training subunits basically ensures that they are armed with the necessary military pedagogic knowledge. A majority of sergeants and senior NCO's successfully carry out the tasks of indoctrinating and training soldiers and sailors.

The following features are characteristic of this category of instructors. First, sergeants (senior NCO's) have no age advantage over their subordinates and hence no advantages in life experience. Second, they exceed their subordinates only slightly in military (active) experience. Third, in comparison with an officer, ensign, or warrant a sergeant (senior NCO) is less well trained in a pedagogic regard and hence experiences more difficulties in indoctrinating and training personnel. Fourth, in the conditions of his military work and daily life a sergeant (senior NCO) differs but little from soldiers (sailors). He is always and everywhere with his subordinates, constantly in their sight, and exposed to the influence of group opinion more than any other commander. Any mistake or error that he makes immediately becomes known to the detachment or platoon.

These features leave a definite impression on the activity of sergeants (senior NCO's) and cause difficulties in their work. For instance, some sergeants (senior NCO's) do not immediately establish correct interrelations with subordinates, do not always display high command exactingness toward them, and passively employ disciplinary measures of commendation and punishment. And this has a negative effect on their activity, especially in matters of strengthening military discipline, order, and organization.

Some sergeants who are deputy platoon leaders are not properly exacting toward sergeants in charge of detachments and do not pay due

concern for the unity and coordination of the indoctrinational measures of this category of commander.

The lack of methodological experience in sergeants (senior NCO's) also results in a number of significant shortcomings in their work toward instructing subordinates. This is manifested above all in a weak ability to conduct activities with methodological competence, to apply training methods and procedures correctly, to present training material sequentially and systematically, and to develop the practical skills of subordinates.

Sergeants (senior NCO's) who have no subordinates hold a special place in the pedagogic collective. They are generally good specialists and many of them belong to the subunit aktiv. Therefore, they are effectively used to extend aid to lagging soldiers in training and in individual indoctrinational work.

In the best interests of the job the subunit commander, his political affairs officer, and platoon leaders pay constant attention to this category of instructors. Above all it is important to improve their political and military knowledge, advance their methodological expertise, and extend them effective aid in training and indoctrinating subordinates.

2. Directing the Activities of the Pedagogic Collective of a Subunit

The successful work of the pedagogic collective of a subunit toward indoctrinating and training soldiers depends largely on the skillful direction of its activity by the most experienced military pedagogs—the commander and political worker.

Certain orientations and corresponding forms and methods of work may be singled out in the direction of the pedagogic activities of officers, warrants (ensigns), and sergeants (senior NCO's) in a subunit.

An important orientation in direction is to *ensure the unity, coordination, and continuity of the educational influence* of all links of a pedagogic collective on personnel. A. S. Makarenko has emphasized: "... Wherever instructors are not united into a collective and the collective has no unified work plan, no unified tone, no unified and precise approach ..., there can be no educational process."³ He considered the consolidation of a pedagogic collective by common opinion and common conviction to be a mandatory condition for successful educational work.

The necessity for achieving the unity and coordination of educational measures is also due to the fact that the pedagogic collective of a subunit includes instructors who have different life experience and different levels of pedagogic training. The instructional functions of officers, warrants (ensigns), sergeants (senior NCO's), and the Party and Komsomol aktiv are also different.

The unity and coordination of educational measures is achieved on the basis of the daily work of the leaders of a pedagogic collective toward forming unified views on all problems of indoctrination, training, and the strengthening of military discipline in officers, warrants (ensigns), sergeants (senior NCO's), and the Party and Komosomol aktiv.

In conducting conferences and meetings and in conversing with officers, ensigns, sergeants, and activists, the subunit commander and his deputy for political affairs explain the goals of the educational process, the tasks of combat and political training and of strengthening military discipline, and the essence of the principles and methods of indoctrination and training. In summarizing the opinions of instructors the leaders of the pedagogic collective strive to develop a unified understanding of educational phenomena and tasks and a unified assessment of the deeds and actions of soldiers. All this makes it possible to organize the friendly and coordinated work of the pedagogic collective.

In implementing the unified positions and requirements which are worked out, activists form the group opinion of the collective. They explain to personnel the assigned tasks and motivate them to fulfill these tasks in an exemplary manner and to eliminate shortcomings.

The unity and coordination of indoctrinational measures ensures *continuity* in indoctrinational work. When there are any changes in the composition of the subunit, all that is best and most advanced is retained and developed, becoming a tradition of indoctrinational work.

The unity, coordination, and continuity of indoctrinational measures are inseparably linked to *improving the pedagogic skills* of all categories of instructors.

Officers improve their psychological and pedagogic knowledge on the basis of their studies in the command training system and evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, the attendance at lecture series on military psychology and pedagogy in the unit, independent study of literature, and participation in pedagogic seminars in the subunit. The leaders of the pedagogic collective constantly monitor the studies of officers, paying special attention to their independent work.

Pedagogic seminars within the subunit are an important means of increasing pedagogic knowledge. At them the following problems are discussed: the methods of studying the individual features of soldiers, the ways of developing discipline in soldiers (sailors), the commander's work toward creating a unified collective in the platoon, the requirements of pedagogic tact and their application in indoctrinational work, ways of applying the methods of training, and so on. The materials of periodicals on psychology and pedagogy and the advanced experience in the indoctrination and training of soldiers may also be discussed at seminars. The

leading role in organizing these seminars belongs to the subunit political worker.

The creation of a pedagogic library which includes books, pamphlets on psychology and pedagogy, and selected topical materials from periodicals on the problems of personnel indoctrination and training largely contribute to the independent work of officers.

The commander and political worker teach young officers correctly to apply their knowledge in practical activities. To this end they utilize demonstrations, open lessons for young officers, mutual visits to activities, individual work with instructors, methodological instructional activities, and so on.

Demonstrations conducted by the commander and political worker have the greatest impact on young officers. Carefully planned and well organized, such activities are a pedagogic example to the officers and help them to master the art of indoctrinating and training subordinates. Demonstrations are devoted not only to the problems of combat and political training, but also to the methods of conducting political information sessions, readings from Lenin, discussions, and other measures of indoctrinational work.

Open lessons, which are attended by all officers of the subunit, also result in great benefit. After a lesson is concluded its positive aspects and shortcomings are discussed. In summing up the results of the lesson, the subunit commander turns the attention of the officers to the specifics of the methods used to conduct the activities and to its effectiveness.

During the mutual attendance of activities officers exchange positive experiences and learn how to evaluate the degree of effectiveness of the forms and methods of training and indoctrination and to analyze their own activities critically.

Concern for ensigns and warrants, especially those recently appointed to their posts, assumes primary importance. It is important for the commander and political worker to help them find their places in the collective of the subunit, to establish correct interrelations with co-workers, and to acquire the necessary pedagogic knowledge and the skills of working with subordinates.

Work with sergeants (senior NCO's) also requires daily effort. In this work the subunit commander and his political affairs officer are guided by the statement of the CPSU CC to the effect that "the role and responsibility of young commanders for the training and indoctrination of subordinates should be elevated, their training improved, and more confidence accorded them."⁴

In addition to the study of the principles of military psychology and pedagogy, the independent work of sergeants on appropriate training

aids, books, pamphlets, and articles from periodicals which shed light on the experience of indoctrinating and training soldiers plays an essential role in improving their pedagogic knowledge in the system of political activities. The commander and political worker direct the independent work of sergeants and create favorable conditions for it. Worthy of attention are the monthly reviews and discussions of articles from the journal *Starshina-Serzhant*. Sergeants' lecture series and the exchange of their work experience are also important forms of improving the pedagogic knowledge of young commanders.

In directing the pedagogic activity of sergeants (senior NCO's) on a daily basis, the commander and political worker systematically conduct methodological instructional activities and instruction sessions, analyze the results of their work, and organize the exchange of experience. In the process they pay particular attention to the problems of the sergeants' study of the individual features of subordinates and of the ways of strengthening military discipline, correctly combining high exactingness with respect for subordinates, and mastering the methods of instructing soldiers.

Improving the pedagogic skills of officers, ensigns (warrants), and sergeants (senior NCO's) would be inconceivable unless *comprehensive aid* were extended to them by the leaders of the pedagogic collective and unless *systematic monitoring of the work of all categories of instructors is carried out*.

The commander and political worker, by comprehensively taking into account the features of each military pedagog and his positive aspects and shortcomings, extend effective aid in practical activities. The foundation for this work is *individual aid* in specific problems of the indoctrination and training of soldiers, especially problems which can cause the greatest difficulties. In extending such assistance one should not deprive the young pedagog of his independence, nit-pick, or substitute for him. Every officer, warrant, and sergeant must always feel a responsibility for the work assigned to him, display independence and initiative, and strengthen his belief in his own abilities.

It is important for the leaders of the pedagogic collective to evaluate correctly the work of young pedagogs, especially in the initial period of their service. Upon assuming a position, some young officers, warrants, and sergeants at first work timidly and unconfidently and generally make mistakes and commit oversights. Some commanders and political workers, instead of attentively analyzing shortcomings, determining the causes of the mistakes, and helping to eliminate them, punish young instructors for every error and "dress them down," forgetting that "cursing is the reasoning of a person who has no argument."⁵ Such violations of peda-

gogic tact undermine the faith of the young officer, warrant, and sergeant in his own abilities and the possibility of achieving high results in the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

As experience shows, in the initial stages of service some mistakes and miscalculations are not terribly bad if the young instructor displays diligence and persistence. It is the duty of seniors to help him evaluate his mistakes and help him to correct shortcomings.

Systematic monitoring of the work of young instructors enables the commander and political worker to be current in pedagogic practice, to direct the efforts of officers, ensigns (warrants), and sergeants (senior NCO's) to the fulfillment of the main tasks of personnel training and indoctrination, to come to their aid in a timely manner, and to support them in difficult times. Analysis of conducted activities and educational measures is a form of monitoring that has been tested in practice. In analysis it is important to observe pedagogic tact and a tone of good will and objectively to evaluate positive aspects and shortcomings. This stimulates the instructor's activity, increases his sense of responsibility and confidence in himself, and contributes to the attainment of success in work.

The correct use of the forms and methods of directing the activities of all categories of instructors by the subunit commander and political worker unites and strengthens a pedagogic collective and directs its efforts toward the exemplary fulfillment of the tasks of training and indoctrinating soldiers.

3. The Subunit Political Worker and the Party and Komsomol Aktiv. Elements of Pedagogy in Party and Komsomol Work

The success of the complicated and multifaceted educational work in a subunit largely depends on the smooth, purposeful work of the Party and Komsomol aktiv, which includes rank-and-file soldiers in addition to officers, ensigns (warrants) and sergeants (senior NCO's). In drawing the aktiv into the fulfillment of educational tasks, the subunit commander and political worker thus rely on the Party and Komsomol organizations.

The Party and Komsomol aktiv of the subunit, as the support of the commander and his political affairs officer, carries out extensive work toward disseminating the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government on a daily basis, and instills in personnel political consciousness, communist conviction, and high moral-combat traits. They motivate soldiers to study military affairs, strengthen military discipline, and increase combat readiness, contribute to the comprehensive strengthening of unity of command and

the authority of commanders and political workers, and work for the unswerving fulfillment of their orders and requirements by every soldier.

The Party and Komsomol activists of the subunit are the leaders of various initiatives in the service and training of soldiers and in the conduct of mass cultural and sports activities.

The Party and Komsomol aktiv carries out its educational function and exerts its influence on the course of the educational process through communists and Komsomol members by their personal example in combat and political training, in service, and in strengthening order, organization and military discipline.

As experience shows, the indoctrinational functions of the aktiv are successfully fulfilled only when their selection is taken seriously and the subunit commander and political worker constantly work with their activists.

A soldier becomes a true activist in the course of his practical work under the direct supervision of the commander and political worker. "In practical work," said M. I. Kalinin, "a person is educated, grows, becomes a stronger organizer, and is ideologically uplifted."⁶

In directing the efforts of activists toward the fulfillment of educational tasks, the political workers strive to ensure that they always set the tone in off-duty work, set a personal example in the fulfillment of Party, Komsomol, and official duties, display initiative and independence, and that they themselves solve the many problems of the life, daily affairs, and leisure time of soldiers.

In the process of daily intercourse with activists the subunit political worker teaches them correctly to conduct political educational measures and helps them master the forms and methods of Party political work. He shows constant concern for strengthening the aktiv and coordinating its work, informs activists on all problems of life and service, and draws them into off-duty work.

An important condition for the successful indoctrination of the aktiv is the imposition of high exactingness upon it on the part of the leaders of the pedagogic collective. At the same time they must take into account the opinions of the activists, constantly consult with them, have an attentive attitude toward their needs and requirements, and scrutinize all aspects of their activities.

Such forms as *the instruction of activists in evening Party schools, seminars* for each category of the aktiv, *instructional activities, conferences, discussions, the exchange of work experience*, and painstaking daily individual study are extensively used in work with the aktiv.

The extension of practical aid to secretaries and members of the

Bureaus of Party and Komsomol organization holds a special place in the activities of the subunit political worker in instructing and indoctrinating the Party and Komsomol aktiv.

A "Library for the Party and Komsomol Activist," which includes the works of V. I. Lenin, his biography, the history of the CPSU, collections of Party decisions, materials of the 24th CPSU Congress, the history of the Leninist Komsomol, and other sources is set up in the subunit for the purpose of advancing the knowledge of the aktiv.

As experience shows, the effectiveness of Party Komsomol work largely depends on how well the *pedagogic and psychological patterns and principles* and the individual features of soldiers are taken into account. Here the leading role indisputably belongs to the subunit political worker, who has the function of teaching the aktiv to organize its work in the spirit of current requirements and to introduce purposeful and practical elements of pedagogy into it.

Party and Komsomol meetings, assignments, the reports of communists and Komsomol members, mass agitation, individual work, and so on are effective means, forms, and methods in indoctrinating communists and Komsomol members.

Party and Komsomol meetings hold an important place in the indoctrination of communists and Komsomol members and in raising their ideological and political level and off-duty activity. The collective discussion of pressing problems of social development, the exchange of opinions and know-how in matters of vital importance to the military collective, and basic, comradely criticism at meetings instill in communists and Komsomol members such important traits as Party exactingness, high responsibility, implacability toward shortcomings, self-criticism, collectivism, persistence, activity, a fundamental approach in evaluating facts, events, and phenomena, and so on.

The preparation and conduct of Party and Komsomol meetings requires on the one hand that the political worker personally and actively take part in this work and on the other assist the aktiv in solving practical problems.

Preparations for a meeting begin long before it is held. The subunit political worker helps the secretary of the Party and Komsomol organizations to determine the meeting agenda and the candidates for speaker, and to plan on which activists will prepare the draft decision and study various problems to be introduced for discussion at the meeting. Often all members of the bureau participate in the preparation of the report, and it is preliminarily discussed at a meeting of the bureau. Careful preparations for the meeting are the primary condition for its high effectiveness and the active participation of communists and Komsomol members in the discussion of the agenda.

Experience shows that in a majority of Party and Komsomol organizations meetings are a true school of communist indoctrination and a powerful means of motivating communists and Komsomol members to the exemplary fulfillment of combat and political training tasks. At them, the most important problems of the life and activity of the military collective are discussed and decisions aimed at further improving the educational process and intra-Party and intra-Komsomol work are made. The meetings are conducted in a businesslike, active way and are distinguished by high effectiveness.

At the same time it should be noted that Party and Komsomol meetings are sometimes conducted monotonously, in a boring manner, and the problems discussed at them are stated in a stereotyped manner and do not generate high activity on the part of those who are present. It also may occur that the same people speak at the meetings over and over, mainly activists and leaders, while the voice of most communists and Komsomol members is not heard. All this indisputably reduces the indoctrinational role of meetings.

The secretaries and members of bureaus of Party and Komsomol organizations have at their disposal considerable opportunity and means to ensure the high indoctrinational role and effectiveness of meetings. It is important to utilize these possibilities to the fullest in the preparation and conduct of meetings.

The pedagogically substantiated practice of Party and Komsomol service possesses great force as an educational factor. Their service is an important means of drawing the soldier into off-duty work, forming a person's personality, and raising his ideological, general educational, and cultural level. Therefore, it must be ensured that every communist and Komsomol member constantly perform these services.

In the service method, a number of pedagogic distinctions of this means of indoctrination should be taken into account. Service work should be given to communists and Komsomol members in accordance with their level of ideological and theoretical training and professional expertise, individual psychological traits, spiritual requirements, and inclinations and then, on this basis, the complexity of service work should gradually be increased.

Note should be taken of the special educational role of *collective, group services*. Their significance is determined by the collective character of military labor and daily life. The fulfillment of such service contributes to the strengthening of the collective, improvement of the skills of collective actions during combat use and maintenance of equipment and weapons, the development of mutual aid, friendship, and military camaraderie, and an increased sense of responsibility for the common cause on the part of soldiers. In distributing group services

there should be no undefined responsibilities and it is important that each member of the collective be responsible for a specific sector.

In giving soldiers service work, the secretaries of Party and Komsomol organizations should not act as administrators or managers. Proof, conviction of the necessity and usefulness of the assignment, and interest in its fulfillment are reliable guarantees of the successful use of this means of indoctrination.

Monitoring the fulfillment of service work and assistance in the realization of assignments hold an important place in the activities of the secretaries of Party and Komsomol organizations. It should always be kept in mind that confidence, assistance, and strict demand are the best means of developing the activity and initiative of communists and Komsomol members. Understanding this, experienced secretaries keep track of service work and regularly inform communists and Komsomol members on how work plans, adopted decisions, and service work are being fulfilled. In information reports it is very valuable not only to report what has been done, but to show in what ways and through what methods communists and Komsomol members have achieved success.

Of great educational importance are the *personal reports of communists and Komsomol members* on the fulfillment of assigned work, which are usually delivered at meetings and sessions of the bureaus. Reports become an effective means of education only when they are conducted in a fundamental, comradely situation, when the soldier's activity is objectively evaluated, and when he is given businesslike counsel for the future. Such reports contribute to increasing the responsibility of a communist and Komsomol member and develop persistence and initiative in work and the desire constantly to improve himself.

The work style of Party and Komsomol activists plays an important role in the education of communists and Komsomol members. This style is characterized by an attentive attitude toward people, by the ability to see real people with their needs, requirements, and interests behind deeds and facts, and by the desire to always set a personal example in everything.

A mandatory condition for a Party work style is a thoughtful, rational approach to the drafting and implementation of decisions. Decisions have great educational impact only when they are goal-directed, businesslike, and concrete, are completely fulfilled, and when communists and Komsomol members are informed of this.

In-depth knowledge of the life and state of affairs in the subunit, the ability to see the new and advanced, and the ability to raise a question before the collective in a timely and bold manner are inalienable features of the work style of a Party and Komsomol leader.

The Party work style presupposes the combination of high exactingness with concern for the men, their needs and requirements, and the development of persistence and initiative in work by communists and Komsomol members.

Thus, the leaders of Party and Komsomol organizations are not simply the organizers of work, but the educators of communists, Komsomol members, and all soldiers. The productivity of their work increases if the requirements and recommendations of military pedagogy and psychology, and the individual features of the soldiers, are constantly taken into account.

The subunit political worker is the direct teacher of the secretaries of Party and Komsomol organizations and activists, and also the inculcator of necessary traits. On a daily basis he converses with the aktiv and knows well its capabilities, interests, needs, and requirements. The stronger the bond between the political worker and the aktiv, the more effective his influence on the men and the higher his authority in the military collective.

Continual, concrete, and purposeful direction of the pedagogic activities of officers, ensigns (warrants), sergeants and the Party and Komsomol aktiv of the subunit is an important condition for the successful work of the commander and political worker toward training and indoctrinating personnel and carrying out combat and political training tasks.

Footnotes

1. *Vysokoye prizvaniye. V voennoy armeyeskoyshe soveshchaniye molodykh ofitserov*. November 1969 p 13.
2. See M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, Vol 2, p 376.
3. A. S. Makarenko, *Soch.*, Vol 5, p 179.
4. *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz*, p 417.
5. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 11, p 144.
6. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voynskoy dolge*, p 515.

Chapter 18. The Methods of Studying, Summarizing, and Disseminating Progressive Methods in the Training and Indoctrination of Subunit Personnel

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party have always ascribed great importance to the study and introduction of progressive methods.

Even during the first years of Soviet rule Vladimir Il'ich Lenin required that the "shoots of the new be carefully studied, treated very attentively, and helped to grow in every way possible."¹ In the article "The Invaluable Declarations of Pitirim Sorokin" he wrote: "The entire problem is not to be content with the knowledge which our previous experience has developed in us, but *to go further without fail, to achieve more without fail*, and to move without fail from easier tasks to more difficult ones."²

Lenin's ideas on the importance of studying and introducing progressive methods have been further developed in the decisions of the Communist Party. The 24th CPSU Congress set forth a demanding requirement—that of carefully studying the methods of leading workers, disseminating this valuable experience, and mastering the achievements of science and progressive methods.³ This requirement also fully applies to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Very rich experience in the training and indoctrination of personnel, the study, summarization, and dissemination of which is the primary task of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations, has been accumulated in the Soviet Armed Forces. Here we should especially emphasize the importance of the study and summarization of progressive methods in subunits of the army and navy—that is, in the places where these methods are actually developed.

The study, summarization, and introduction of advanced military pedagogic practice are mandatory conditions for further increasing the combat readiness of troops, improving the quality of combat and political training, and indoctrinating personnel. Analysis of the creative use of the methods of training and indoctrination and new procedures and means, scientific summarization of them, and their testing in practical work provide military

pedagogic theory with the initial factual material without which further development would be inconceivable.

In studying and summarizing progressive methods in training and indoctrination, the subunit political affairs officer acts as an investigator of military pedagogic practice. In this work he is guided by certain scientific requirements and conducts the work systematically, purposefully, and by using vastly different procedures and methods.

1. The Main Methods of Studying and Summarizing Military Pedagogic Practice

The study and summarization of military pedagogic practice is the testing and use in educational work of new methods, means, and procedures which improve the system of training, indoctrination, and psychological preparation of soldiers for successful actions in modern warfare.

The ability of the commander or political worker to be guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and the scientific method of cognition is a necessary condition for investigating the complex problems of training and indoctrination. In work on the study and summarization of progressive methods it is important to meet the following methodological requirements:

- 1) Study pedagogic phenomena not in isolation from other phenomena of social affairs, but in close connection and interaction with them;
- 2) Consider any pedagogic experience to be in development, motion, and change, and take into account the conditions, place, and time;
- 3) Penetrate to the innermost essence of pedagogic phenomena and facts, ascertaining the essential connections and relations among them. Study the new, rely on a system of facts, and do not seize upon individual facts and make generalizations from them;
- 4) Always remember that military pedagogic theory should proceed from practice, serve practice, and be tested by practice, but should not be reduced to a narrow interpretation or ready formulas.

The *purposefulness* and ability of a political officer correctly to define the goal and concrete problems of studying and summarizing educational work are of great importance in the course of military pedagogic investigation. It is obvious that the choice of the goal and specific problems of research will be defined by such factors as the urgency of the problems under study in the fulfillment of the tasks of training and indoctrination, the presence of accumulated positive experience in educational work in the subunit and how this experience will help eliminate shortcomings in combat and political training, personnel indoctrination, and the strengthening of military discipline.

After determining the specific problems of the study and summarization of progressive pedagogic methods, the political worker studies the appropriate psychological and pedagogic literature, drafts his own work plan, and consistently accumulates factual material.

Military pedagogic investigation is above all the accumulation of scientific material and experience in educational work which produces a good result and contains something new in comparison with the activity of other military pedagogs. The accumulation of diverse factual material, however, is only the start of the research. The analysis of facts, correct generalizations, and conclusions are the most crucial stage.

It is important always to remember V. I. Lenin's statement of the necessity for the conscientious and painstaking study of facts in their connection and in contrast to each other and of the impermissibility of seizing upon individual facts and playing with examples.⁴ He emphasized that "it is necessary to select not individual facts, but *the entire aggregate* of facts appertaining to the problem under consideration without a single exception, *for otherwise* there will inevitably arise the suspicion, a fully legitimate suspicion, that the facts were chosen or selected arbitrarily, that instead of the objective connection and interdependence of historical phenomena as a whole a 'subjective' concoction is being offered up. . . ."⁵

Therefore, each conclusion of the research is based on the most typical, characteristic, and interconnected facts concerning the problem under study. The conclusion is a logical consequence of the analysis and summarization of the facts of the investigation and in generalized form synthesizes the essence of the pedagogic phenomenon under study.

The success of work toward studying and summarizing progressive methods depends largely on the skillful application of various procedures and methods for conducting it directly within the subunit. Let us consider the main ones.

Observation is the most accessible and easily employed method. The main task of observation is to accumulate facts and record essential aspects and features.

In contrast to everyday, ordinary observation, pedagogic observation presupposes the clear definition of purpose and is carried out according to a previously drafted plan. The objective, tasks, and character of the observation are set forth in the plan.

Observation is conducted in a real situation: in a training class, in the field, on the range—wherever the educational process is conducted. For instance, while regularly attending Komsomol meetings the political worker observes and evaluates the degree of reaction of Komsomol members to the problems under discussion, their fundamental approach and businesslike attitude in fulfilling assigned tasks, and their readiness to make every effort to fulfill them.

By constantly dealing with the Party and Komsomol aktiv, the subunit political affairs officer comprehensively tests and evaluates the political and businesslike traits of activists on the basis of their fulfillment of various assignments and missions.

Any pedagogic observation requires skillful, accurate, and objective recording of the phenomena and facts under study. For this purpose it is expedient to keep an observation notebook and to make diary-like notes or records of conducted activities and educational measures. In all cases it is important not to omit the most essential, the most interesting, and the most valuable in one's notes.

The observation data are greatly enhanced by the use of technical devices: photography, movies, tape recordings, and so on. For instance, in some subunits tape recordings of activities are used to analyze the experience of the best leaders of political activities groups and the procedures as performed are photographed in order to study advanced instructional methods. This makes it possible to record more accurately the phenomena under study and to retain the material of observations for a prolonged period; it also facilitates the scientific analysis of materials.

The observation data are supplemented and refined by the discussion method.

A pedagogic discussion is conducted by posing certain questions to various categories of instructors for the purpose of ascertaining their personal attitudes toward the investigated aspects of the training and indoctrination of soldiers.

Individual discussions have the greatest effect, although group discussion may also be used. When combined with the method of observation, discussion augments the observation data with essential features and aspects.

The successful conduct of discussions requires careful preparation and well-planned primary questions. The questions should not only reveal certain aspects of the experience of educational work, but also stimulate in the partner activeness and a desire to conduct the discussion.

For instance, one experienced military pedagog, in investigating the work practice of subunit officers and sergeants in instilling discipline in young soldiers, formulated the following main questions for a discussion: in what ways can soldiers be studied most successfully? On the basis of what data and by what methods can the degree of a soldier's discipline be most objectively determined? What system of educational measures do you outline on the basis of the ascertained individual features of the behavior of soldiers? Among your subordinates are there any who are hard to train, how do you construct relations with them, and what educational work do you do? What are the peculiarities of instilling

discipline in soldiers? How do you prevent disciplinary misdeeds? With what pedagogic literature on the problem of instilling discipline in soldiers are you familiar?

These concrete and goal-directed questions prepared for a discussion largely help the military pedagog to study thoroughly the work of subunit officers and sergeants in instilling discipline in their young soldiers.

In the course of a discussion the questions are based on concrete material which reflects the particulars of the experience of instructing and educating the discussant. These particulars are presented by the officer (or sergeant) himself and compared with the data of the person conducting the discussion. Here, in the course of the exchange of opinions, the political worker helps the discussant better to understand and comprehend specific aspects of educational work and the essence of the most effective methods and procedures of training and indoctrination.

A discussion on certain questions may be conducted both with the officer (sergeant) himself or with those who are familiar with his military pedagogic experience. During the discussion it is determined how the officer (sergeant) evaluates his own experience in training and indoctrination, his positive aspects, and his shortcomings, and how they are evaluated by people who know the given instructor.

Success in discussion depends largely on the tact of the political worker. It is important to establish an unconstrained situation, to impart the character of a lively exchange of opinions to the discussion, and to eliminate elements of an official atmosphere. It is not at all mandatory immediately to establish the essence of military pedagogic experience in a discussion, and it may be started with a discussion of the pressing problems of training and indoctrination which are of the greatest interest to the discussant. Against this background it is easier to conduct a discussion on planned questions.

It is unwise to take notes during a discussion. In a majority of cases this has a negative effect on the discussant's answers. The contents of a discussion are not hard to reproduce afterwards. A discussion may be recorded on magnetic tape, of course, the discussant does not object. Upon listening to the recording it is easy to determine the entire course of the discussion.

The results of the discussion are carefully analyzed and the most important and essential aspects of the officer's (sergeant's) progressive methods are singled out for summarization.

In combination with the methods of observation and discussion the *study of results of military pedagogic activities* of officers (sergeants) who have achieved the best marks in educational work is widely practiced. This method enables the political worker to check on a subject-

by-subject basis the results of observation and discussions, and to evaluate objectively the accumulated military pedagogic experience and the effectiveness of the methods and procedures of training and indoctrination used by instructors.

The study of the results of progressive methods is carried out directly in the course of the diverse military pedagogic activities of the officer (sergeant): at various activities, on combat duty, during routine service, and during the conduct of political educational measures. Here the political worker carefully studies what new and advanced elements the military pedagog introduces to the fulfillment of the concrete tasks of training and indoctrinating soldiers.

Analysis of the formation of the military pedagogic capabilities of an officer (sergeant) is of great importance in the study of the results of progressive methods. On the basis the political worker can also draw certain conclusions on the development of such components of military pedagogic skills as the ability to convey knowledge to trainees and to develop the necessary practical skills in them; the ability to study soldiers and their individual features in depth; pedagogic observation; pedagogic imagination; tact; and so on.

The study of the results of activities may be supplemented with the method of *summarizing independent characteristics*. Characteristics of various aspects of the progressive method in educational work of an officer (sergeant) are made by a number of commanders and Party activists in the subunit independently of one another. The study, comparison, and summarization of such characteristics increases to some extent the objectivity of the evaluation of activities of the military pedagog and enriches the data on progressive methods obtained on the basis of previous methods with new supplementary facts and statements.

The study of documents which reflect the concrete aspects and indicators of the educational activities of an officer (sergeant) is of considerable importance in summarizing progressive pedagogic methods. Both official and personal documents may be the object of study.

Among official documents are the personnel files and ratings of officers, ratings of sergeants, training journals, journals of duty involving combat equipment, weapons firing scores, official personnel files, post documents, various reports on combat and political training and the disciplinary practice of the subunit, and other sources which cover specific problems of an officer's (sergeant's) work. These documents provide important factual material on the educational activities of a military pedagog which make it possible to compare the results of personal investigations with official ratings.

Thus, by studying the personnel files of a person the political worker

can judge how skillfully a commander uses the rights accorded him, whether he is correctly applying the methods of commendation and constraint, how he directs the disciplinary practice of platoon sergeants, and so on.

Personal documents—summaries of activities conducted, diaries, letters, and so on—provide the investigator with interesting material on the officer's (sergeant's) self-evaluation of his own work in training and indoctrinating personnel and with concrete facts on the methods used to prepare for and conduct educational measures. Of course, the data of personal documents may be used by the political worker with the permission of the officer (sergeant) himself.

The study of documents is supplemented with data from other sources such as printed leaflets, pamphlets, and articles from periodicals which cover the progressive methods of the officer's (sergeant's) work in training and indoctrinating soldiers.

These methods produce positive results only when they are employed in inseparable unity and in combination with each other. This makes it possible correctly to organize the study of progressive methods and to gather objective factual material for summarization and conclusion.

The processing and scientific summarization of collected factual material are a crucial stage in the research of progressive pedagogic methods.

Factual material, no matter how valuable it may be, does not in itself reveal the essence of pedagogic experience. "A fact," wrote A. M. Gor'kiy, "is still not the whole truth. It is only raw material. . . . You cannot cook a chicken with feathers, and worshipping a fact leads precisely to a situation in which the random and insignificant are mixed with the fundamental and typical. One should learn to pluck out the insignificant plumage of a fact and to know how to extract meaning from it."⁶

The researcher must know how to see the internal essence behind the external appearance of facts and phenomena, to detect the common and typical in the isolated, and to penetrate into the pedagogic essence of accumulated facts.

For the purpose of more graphically determining principles and tendencies, for some collected materials it is useful to compile tables and diagrams which make it possible graphically to trace the course and development of some process.

The skillful use of such methods as comparison, analysis, synthesis, abstraction, and generalization plays an important role in the processing of factual material. Only on this basis are definite pedagogic conclusions on the experience under study drawn and the new and

advanced factors which contribute to the further improvement of educational work revealed.

In completing his work on studying and summarizing progressive methods, the political worker draws up well-reasoned practical *recommendations* for introducing these methods into the practice of other military pedagogs. Here concrete recommendations should not be converted into ready formulas suited to all cases. As a rule, recommendations aim toward the creative application of experience with consideration for the specifics of the work of the given military pedagog.

Thus, the study of progressive methods in the training and indoctrination of the personnel of a subunit requires on the part of the investigator a scientific approach, purposefulness, consistency, and the skillful use of various methods of summarizing military pedagogic practice and processing the collated material in order to draft well-reasoned recommendations.

2. Ways of Disseminating and Introducing Progressive Methods in the Training and Indoctrination of Subunit Personnel

The up-to-date military pedagogic method which has been studied is of value only if its results contribute to the development of military pedagogic theory and the improvement of the process of personnel training and indoctrination.

The correctness of the conclusions of the methods studied is tested primarily in the practice and activities of many educators. Therefore, the results of an investigation of up-to-date methods should be widely disseminated and incorporated in the everyday educational process.

The dissemination and incorporation of the latest methods in educational work generally includes such elements as explaining the conclusions and recommendations of the research to officers (sergeants) of the subunit; teaching military instructors how to use new methods and procedures of personnel training and indoctrination; and incorporating these procedures and methods into everyday educational work.

What are the main ways of disseminating and introducing the latest methods of educational work?

The political worker's skillful use of various forms of propaganda is of great importance in the dissemination of the latest methods. Among them a special place is held by lectures, reports, seminars, conferences of officers and sergeants, visual agitation, and technical propaganda means.

The political worker comprehensively disseminates the latest methods learned in training and indoctrinating soldiers not only among the officers and sergeants of his own subunit, but also at the unit level. He takes

active part in *the work of lecture series on military psychology and pedagogy and the sergeants' lecture series, and in the conduct of lessons in schools having the latest methods, delivers reports, and so on.*

The latest methods in preparations for the conduct of political activities is disseminated at meetings and seminars of group leaders. Here not only are the reports of political workers on the essence of the latest methods in conducting political activities heard, but the problems of using these methods in practice are discussed.

Such measures, organized by the political worker, as listening to magnetic recordings of past activities, the showing of newspaper slides and of specially prepared filmstrips, the use of visual aids in activities, and so on help increase the effectiveness of the dissemination of the latest methods.

By disseminating the latest pedagogic methods the political worker teaches officers and sergeants how new methods and procedures of training and indoctrinating soldiers should be used in practical work.

The latest methods of educational work in the subunit may be successfully disseminated at *conferences of officers and sergeants* (senior NCO's), especially when the results of combat and political training and of the tasks of political exercises and tactical activities are summed up.

In many subunits *visual agitation* is extensively utilized to disseminate the latest pedagogic methods. Specific problems encountered in the work of the best officers and sergeants are covered at specially prepared stands. New methods and procedures are demonstrated by photographs and figures with a brief presentation of the essence of the latest methods.

Printed information plays an important role in the dissemination of the latest methods of educational work. Many subunit political affairs officers regularly publish articles in our military journals and newspapers on the problems of improving the methods of the training and indoctrination of soldiers. Some political workers have authored pamphlets published in military districts (fleets) and units. Pamphlets which illuminate the work experience of the best officers and sergeants are extensively disseminated among various categories of instructors and used in their practical activities.

The dissemination of the latest pedagogic methods is inseparably connected with work in introducing them into the educational activity of subunit officers and sergeants. *For this purpose visual and methodological-instructional studies, open lessons, mutual class visits, and other forms are organized.* For instance, demonstrations and open lessons conducted by officers graphically point out the advantages of new methods, means, and procedures and exert a great influence through the strength of positive example, especially on young military pedagogs.

The results of demonstrations and open lessons are comprehensively discussed by all participants. In the process, the commander and political worker give specific indications and recommendations for the use of the latest methods in educational activities.

The subunit political worker also takes active part in the conduct of methodological instructional activities with the leaders of political activities groups and their assistants in seminars within the unit.

Mutual class visits (educational measures) accord officers and sergeants the opportunity to exchange opinions on the problems of their content and methods, to exchange all of the best information that other military pedagogs have, and then to incorporate it in the training and indoctrination of their own subordinates.

Of considerable importance to the introduction of the latest methods is the *individual work* of the commander and political worker with officers and sergeants in combination with *regular monitoring* of their educational work. While visiting classes and educational activities, the political worker comprehensively analyzes their content and methods and gives concrete recommendations and advice on practical problems, especially the use of new procedures and means, to officers and sergeants. Individual work with instructors and constant monitoring of it require that the commander and political worker constantly pay attention to each officer and sergeant and display persistence in conveying the latest methods as well as pedagogic tact.

The *Party and Komsomol organizations of the subunit* have a great role in the dissemination and introduction of up-to-date methods in educational work. Problems of the incorporation of all that is new and advanced are regularly discussed at meetings and sessions of the bureaus, and specific measures for improving the educational process are worked out.

The use of diverse forms and methods of disseminating and introducing the latest methods in educational work require purposefulness, persistence, and a creative approach on the part of the commander and political worker. Above all it is important to comprehend the value of accrued experience and to think out ways of introducing it into practice. The latest methods cannot be mechanically transferred from one subunit to another or blindly copied. Creative processing of the method is necessary, with consideration for the specific features of the particular subunit and for the specific working conditions.

In this regard M. I. Kalinin said: "We have magnificent military units which stand at a very high level. You ask how can their experience be applied to other units and how can these units be made like them? I shall answer with an example. A magnificent picture has been painted.

Copies, very good copies at that, are made of it. And nevertheless, the copies will always remain nothing more than copies; they will be appraised at a much lower value. Similarly, the education of men does not brook a pattern, even if it be good. Of course, the experience of others should be used, but one cannot transplant finished experience without consideration for the uniqueness of the situation, the people, and the tasks. Any experience should be gained through much suffering and taken from battle, so that it becomes part of flesh and blood.”⁷

The Communist Party warmly supports and creatively introduces into practice the patriotic initiatives of the Soviet people and all that is new and advanced in communist construction. It persistently implements Lenin's requirement that accumulated work experience be studied: “The main principle . . . of education *for us ourselves* . . . is that we ourselves must undertake and others must learn to undertake the very attentive and detailed study of our own experience according to the rule: ‘Measure seven times, cut once.’”⁸

The new and higher requirements imposed by the Communist Party on the training and indoctrination of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces under current conditions define the necessity of further improving work toward studying, summarizing, and disseminating up-to-date military pedagogic methods and including a broader range of scientific workers, commanders, and political workers from among the troops in this work.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 39, p 20.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol 37, p 196.
3. See *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, pp 205, 210.
4. See V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 30, p 350.
5. *Ibid.*, p 351.
6. *M. Gor'kiy o literature* (M. Gor'kiy on Literature), Moscow, 1937, p 109.
7. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskoi dolge*, p 626.
8. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 42, p 285.

Chapter 19. Contemporary Bourgeois Military Pedagogy and Its Reactionary Essence

Attempting to impede the historical onslaught of the forces of socialism and to maintain their own basic positions, the imperialists are persistently readying a new world war. Under current conditions preparations for the war are being carried out in an atmosphere of a fierce struggle between the two ideologies—communist and bourgeois. Therefore, the imperialist war machine is doing everything possible to lower the class self-consciousness of its soldiers, sailors, and noncommissioned officers and to breathe strength into them which is capable of resisting the spiritual energy of the soldiers of armies of socialist countries.

In addition to suppressive actions, the imperialists have been forced to make great efforts to condition the common soldier and sailor ideologically and psychologically. "The specific features of contemporary capitalism," as noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress, "are largely explained by the fact that it is adapting to the new situation in the world. Under conditions of the struggle against socialism, the ruling cliques of capitalist countries now fear, more than ever before, that the class struggle will grow into a mass revolutionary movement. Hence derives the desire of the bourgeoisie to employ better camouflaged forms for exploiting and oppressing the workers and their readiness to make partial reforms in a number of cases in order to keep the masses under their own ideological and political control, if possible."¹

A bourgeois army, said V. I. Lenin, is an "implement of reactionary forces, a servant of capital in the struggle against labor, an executioner of popular will."² In training armed forces for aggressive warfare and striving to force workers to fight for interests alien to their own, the imperialist war machine does everything possible to conceal the reactionary essence of their armies and to lower the class self-consciousness of the common soldier and sailor. To this end it constantly resorts to the recommendations of modern social sciences, including military pedagogy.

Therefore, it seems necessary to examine the essence of bourgeois military pedagogy and its role in the aggressive goals of imperialism.

1. The Goals and Tasks of Contemporary Bourgeois Military Pedagogy

At the present time, the main efforts of bourgeois military pedagogy are aimed at developing the contents and methods of personnel training and indoctrination which correspond to the current level of development of the armed forces and to the character of combat operations involving the use of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of bourgeois military theoreticians, much more stringent demands are imposed on military pedagogy than ever before because of revolutionary changes in military affairs.

The imperialist war machine, realistically evaluating the qualitative changes in military affairs, has raised the question of revitalizing "decrepit pedagogic traditions" and of reorganizing the methods of personnel training. The task of forming traits in a soldier which ensure the high effectiveness of his combat actions has been placed at the forefront in all armies of imperialist states.

Bourgeois military pedagogy ensures the realization of this goal in the plan for professional training and moral and psychological preparation. The officer corps of imperialist armies are oriented toward this by the provisions of military doctrines which, in addition to the general problems of national military policy, contain statements which define the main direction in training the armed forces. On the basis of the goals and content of the military doctrines, bourgeois military pedagogy draws up specific ways and means of training and indoctrinating personnel.

Military doctrines have been integrated in the imperialist camp. Bourgeois military theoreticians speak of a unified doctrine suitable to all imperialist countries. According to its provisions, bourgeois military pedagogy concentrates its efforts on training personnel to conduct combat operations both under the conditions of a nuclear, as well as conventional war. Here not only the general positions characteristic of the present day, but also the historical experience and trends of development in the main principles of military affairs, are taken into account. It should be noted that in the last 100 years surprise attack, offensive operations, and the massing of men and equipment have and still do constitute the main content of the military doctrines of capitalist countries.

At the same time, bourgeois military theoreticians recognize that under conditions of modern combat the content of the principle of massing has changed. Today the massing of nuclear strikes is most characteristic. Ground forces will constantly maneuver. Unlimited opportunities to display initiative are accorded individual small subunits, as noted in the

U.S. Army manual on the formation of the character of servicemen (FM 16-100). Moreover, each individual soldier may be faced with the necessity of acting in total independence of others.

Bourgeois military pedagogy concentrates its efforts on preparing for decisive offensive operations during a surprise attack on the enemy. Here, in the training of troops attention is turned both to the organization of large masses and to the training of small subunits and the individual soldier. Some representatives of Western Blocs even claim that in combat training, stress should be placed primarily on the independent actions of small groups.

In carrying out the tasks of troop training, bourgeois military pedagogy is based on the pedagogic positions of the past on the one hand, and on the conclusions of the latest research by bourgeois psychological and pedagogic sciences on the other. Adherence to old concepts facilitates the retention of traditional methods of suppressing the common soldier in the educational process. But turning to the conclusions of modern research provides the possibility of adapting these methods to conditions of the present day.

Thus, the main efforts of bourgeois military pedagogy at the present time are concentrated on developing the content and methods of moral training and at intensifying personnel training. Attention is paid mainly to the training of troops for decisive offensive operations during a surprise attack upon the enemy.

2. The Reactionary Essence of Theoretical Principles of Bourgeois Military Pedagogy

The doctrine of the German pedagog-idealist Johann Herbart (1776-1841), and in particular his three-part system—control, moral education, instruction—is one of the theoretical sources of bourgeois military pedagogy.

Ensuring immediate and unqualified obedience, which is accomplished primarily by constraint, is, according to Herbart, the main idea of control as applied to the practice of indoctrinating the soldiers of a bourgeois army. The idea of suppressing the trainee's personality, which is supported by threat, intimidation, strict supervision, prohibition, and punishment (withholding of food, isolation, corporal punishment) is the kingpin of control in this system.

In matters of moral education Herbart's pedagogy proceeds from the assumption that "there are subordinates and there are commanders," and that individualism should therefore be the foundation for inculcating morality, insofar as only it can ensure the stability of this dichotomy. In the training system this pedagogy propounds a didactic scheme of

rigid steps which are considered to be valid for all cases encountered in life, once and for all.

In addition to this theory, bourgeois military pedagogy is also based on the provisions of *pragmatic pedagogy*. One of the founders of this current was the American pedagogic philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952).

Dewey defines the essence of training and education as the unleashing of the instincts and impulses contained in a person even before his birth. Hence the content of training and education should, according to Dewey, correspond to people's instincts—the wealthy should be taught intellectually, but elementary skills are quite sufficient for the working masses, insofar as they purportedly manifest only purely practical aspirations. His didactic concepts were aimed at developing egoism and money-grubbing and at dissociating the working masses. The leitmotif of Dewey's pedagogy is the thesis "know how, but not why," which eliminates the intellect from the process of instruction and education and gives preference to training. Therefore, Dewey recognizes only the method of doing as a method of instruction. This universal method was realized in practice in the form of a laboratory plan (the Dalton plan), the project method, and so on.

Pragmatic pedagogy, which falsely proclaims the imagined freedom of the individual under the conditions of imperialism, attracted the attention of bourgeois military pedagogs, insofar as it impressed them with its spirit of utilitarianism and brazen pragmatism which overwhelmed bourgeois society from top to bottom. Its main provisions were perfectly suited to the initiation of a campaign for the ideological and psychological training of soldiers in an imperialist army.

Virtually the entire didactic foundation of the American and English military training systems was constructed on the ideas of pragmatic pedagogy. At the same time these ideas were severely criticized in the bourgeois world, especially the United States, after the launch of the first Soviet artificial earth satellite in 1957.

The pragmatists were accused of being unable to improve public education in the country. Bourgeois critics did not, however, want to eliminate completely pragmatic pedagogic assumptions. Therefore, various theories soon appeared which purported to develop pragmatic pedagogy in accordance with the spirit of the times. One such theory, to judge by the claim of the U.S. Air Force magazine *Instructor's Journal*, is "reconstructionism."³

The reconstructionists consider themselves successors of Dewey. The main representative of this orientation, T. Bramel, relying on the philosophical assumptions of Dewey, advances new pedagogic principles. He believes that effectiveness in the training and education of men

can be achieved only by relying on psychology. In this case, Bramel believes, "the posing of tasks for education becomes perfectly realistic in contrast to what existed 30-40 years ago. In other words behavioral science (bourgeois psychology—the editors) is beginning to prove, for the first time in history, that it is quite possible to formulate human goals without being guided by feelings, mysticism, and other arbitrary sentiments, but rather on the basis of true cultural experience and real human values."⁴ Essentially the reconstructionists defend the same reactionary ideas in pedagogy as the pragmatists: stressing the instincts, pragmatism in instruction, the inculcation of egoism and money-grubbing, and so on. The orientation toward psychology, however, increases their popularity in the bourgeois world and brings them closer to a number of widespread psychological and pedagogic schools, including Taylorism.

Frederick Taylor (1856-1915) did not specially work on pedagogic theory, but his methods of teaching workers the methods of economical motions and of creating an atmosphere of satisfaction, despite bestial exploitation, have been recognized throughout the entire capitalist world.

One of the main principles of Taylor's system is the idea of reward. The main thing that should be done in controlling people is to frequently reinforce the zeal to finish a lesson with dollars—that is, to convert the prize into an effective means of incentive. But to achieve this, Taylor believed, "the reward should ensue immediately upon completion of the work"⁵ and be combined with individualism. Therefore, in practice he always strove to affect the private-ownership instincts of people. His favorite method was to isolate people and to act on them separately. All these methods were transferred to the bourgeois army and incorporated in the system of training and indoctrination. In addition to the pedagogic theories mentioned above, bourgeois military pedagogy is also extensively guided by the ideas of the latest "philosophies of education." In a bourgeois army these "philosophies" directly link military pedagogy to its methodological foundation. In the era of the deepening crisis of capitalism and the intensification of reactionary forces, instruction and education in imperialist countries, including their armed forces, are coupled to the hypotheses of the most reactionary philosophical schools. Among them *positivism*, *neo-Thomism*, and *existentialism* have a particular influence on bourgeois military pedagogy.

Among the numerous representatives of pedagogic philosophies there is no unified understanding of even the very question of the subject of their theories. Pedagogic theoreticians do not deal with the practical side of the matter, but investigate only general problems of the theory of instruction and education. They also analyze the scientific works of experimentalists.

In order to gain an integral idea of the theoretical foundation of bourgeois military pedagogy it is necessary to understand its relationship with psychology. This is important because bourgeois military pedagogy is very closely interwoven with psychology. In a number of NATO countries many problems of military pedagogy, in particular the forms and methods of instruction, fall under the heading of the psychology of military skills. At the same time the military instruction theoreticians of some countries refer these problems directly to the field of military pedagogy. At the present time, bourgeois military pedagogy may be characterized as *psycho-pedagogy*.

Among the psychological currents which affect military pedagogy, behaviorism, depth theories, and various schools of social psychology should be singled out. Of all these theories we shall examine behaviorism, insofar as since World War I its ideas have been the main "motive force" of bourgeois military pedagogy.

Behaviorism (conduct) arose in the United States at the start of the 20th century. Its spread to the armed forces was connected with the name of Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949).

The essence of behaviorism reduces to an elementary formula (stimulus-response) which, in the opinion of the behaviorists, expresses all aspects of the behavior of any living organism, including man. This formula signifies a direct relation between an external force (stimulus) and the automatic response to it above and beyond the trainee's mental activity. The positions of behaviorism underlie coaching, which is the main method of training the soldiers of an imperialist army.

In practice the behaviorist idea of coaching is realized through selective instruction. For instance, a trainee may be given a question (stimulus) and several prepared answers, and usually only one is correct. Training reduces to selecting the proper answer. The trainee's activity in this case takes place with minimal use of the intellect.

There are, of course, rational aspects in this method. It may be used wherever rote memorization (of callwords, specifications, and so on) or the development of automatic skills is required. But reducing the entire training process to responsive reaction generally leads to mental limitation of the trainees. Aids which followed the recommendations of behaviorists caused a great stir in various countries as early as the 1920's. While claiming to conclude the revolution in didactics they were essentially a brake to the trainees' development and led only to the mental impoverishment of those who were trained according to them. As early as the 1930's Soviet scientists objected to the introduction of such aids in Soviet practice, and events have confirmed the correctness of these critical statements.

3. Bourgeois Military Pedagogy in the Service of Aggressive Policy

The training of personnel of imperialist armies is contradictory in character. At the present time this contradiction is observed between the inexorable high requirements of war on the moral-combat traits of the soldier and the main orientation of the bourgeois educational system—that of creating suitable slaves who, as V. I. Lenin said, “would be capable of giving them (the bourgeoisie—the editors) a profit and at the same time would not disturb their rest and inactivity.”⁶ On the one hand is the necessity of conveying to the soldiers a certain amount of information without which their professional training would be impossible, and on the other is the curtailment of this knowledge. This is the closed circle from which bourgeois military pedagogs seek an outlet by using all sorts of methods of training and indoctrination. These are divided into two groups: a) the methods of ideological training, and b) the methods of controlling the behavior of servicemen. In the practice of troop training these two methods overlap.

Ideological training in the form of interviews and discussions is now practiced in all imperialist armies, although in the recent past many military leaders were skeptical of them. In light of the extensive dissemination and popularity of communist ideas in the world and under the pressure of international democratic forces, the imperialist war machine has had to seek new means of influencing personnel without relying, as before, on suppression and political isolation. On the basis of the provisions of military pedagogy the inclusion of soldiers in political discussions on the most important aspects of life began to be practiced. These discussions soon assumed the most subtle form, and their content attracted the attention of soldiers with its intriguing “democracy.”

According to an American handbook on information problems, political discussions are intended “to instill in the soldier a sense of responsibility as a citizen of the United States . . . , to increase his understanding of American democracy, government policy, the nature of the constant danger, and the role of the Army, the military unit, and the individual soldier in modern warfare.”⁷ As stated in U.S. Army Directive AR 360-81, commanders at all levels are responsible for conducting discussions. “Every commander,” reads the directive, “must ensure that personnel under him understand the requirements of regulations and manuals and be current on national and world affairs.”⁸

In the U.S. system of information for personnel, political discussions are practiced during commander's call. Such discussions have also come to be widespread in the armed forces of other countries which belong to aggressive blocs.

In imperialist armies political discussions have been converted into

one of the main levers for the ideological training of troops. Their leit-motif is to justify the policy of the aggressive state and to propound anti-communism. In conducting the political training of personnel, the imperialist war machine turns to morality. For this purpose *ethical discussions* aimed at ensuring an alliance between policy and morality are practiced. During these discussions morality is proffered to the soldiers as a system of standards common to all and purportedly established by the history of mankind and by God. In particular this is repeatedly emphasized in U.S. Army FM 16-100.

The content of ethical discussions is selected with consideration for the needs of youth. ~~Here are some of the subjects: "bravery," "the integrity of the individual," "my house," "marriage," "truthfulness."~~ In taking part in the discussion of such questions the soldiers often do not observe the ideological net placed around them and sincerely accept much of what the discussion leader interprets for them.

The recommendations of psychological studies on the problems of motivation, propaganda, and advertising, all fused into a so-called unified "indoctrination system," underlie the pedagogic methods employed at discussions and talks. This system motivates a person to participate actively in discussions and talks. He himself does not subjectively feel external pressure and it seems to him that he is independently reaching the appropriate conclusions. He does not perceive the imposition of ideas. The control of the behavior of servicemen is thus accomplished with the aid of discussions and talks.

Among the methods of controlling the behavior of personnel, *coaching, suggestion, constraint, and bribery* stand out in present-day imperialist armies.

The very ideas of control largely stem from the theoretical postulates of Herbart, who created the theoretical foundation for suppressing the individual for bourgeois military pedagogy. The essence of control, "the educator's triumph," according to Herbart, is to ensure immediate and wholly voluntary obedience, which is achieved mainly by constraint through a system of "limiting measures or by means of military discipline."⁹ In the contemporary system of troop training this idea of Herbart has been arrayed in the more refined forms of inculcating habits and developing practical skills on the basis of training and instruction. Its evolution in contemporary bourgeois military pedagogy proceeds from the orientation of officers toward the unconcealed suppression of the individual soldier to veiled forms of constraint.

"Today," as is stated in a circular on the problems of managing people for U.S. officers, "the officer must know not only the strategy and tactics of battle and effectively control complex weapons, but also must

be able to give orders. He must ensure that his subordinates understand the mission, instill in them the confidence that they will achieve the mission, and inspire faith in his leadership."¹⁰

Coaching (drill) is the most widely used method of instructing and educating the servicemen of imperialist armies at the present time. Its theoretical foundation is the behaviorist concept of reactive instruction, discussed above. In the course of combat training, reactive instruction is used to develop automatic skills in soldiers, while in a system of moral education—habits. For the purpose of fulfilling these tasks drill exercises are intensively practiced in all imperialist armies.

Drill sessions begin from the first days of a recruit's service. They consist of elements of individual and group drill. The former case includes training the soldier (or sailor) to salute. The American general, Pershing, said in this regard: "Some of our men are not aware of the essence of saluting. But after all it consists in the aggressive pre-disposition of mind and body—that is, precisely what a real soldier needs. Strict observance of rules of saluting is the most important tool for instilling pride and military spirit in our soldiers."¹¹ This attitude toward saluting is connected with the fact that the procedure itself, the elements of which a soldier assimilates as something necessary, automatically lead to his acknowledgement of the commander's authority.

In group drill servicemen are trained to carry out procedures within subunits. These are not simply drill exercises as an element of training, but something more, connected with the formation of the serviceman's character. "We are confident," says one English officer, "that battle discipline originates primarily in drill exercises. If a person is taught immediately to fulfill an order, this leads to the development of the automatic habits of behavior. . . ." ¹²

Bourgeois military pedagog believe that this type of training activity has maximum impact when aesthetically handled. To this end it is often converted into ceremonies consisting of formations, changes in formations, and movements by large groups of troops, especially to the accompaniment of military bands. This gives rise, according to the soldier's handbook, U.S. Army FM 21-13, to a serviceman's sense of pride in himself and his honor. And pride in turn is expressed in excellent execution of commands.

The variation on the coaching method known as *role-playing*, in which aspects of ideological training and behavioral control are fused, is often used for more comprehensive influence on servicemen. The essence of role-playing is that during the execution of various exercises a situation is created which contributes to the development of certain standards of activity in the soldiers. While in combat training experience is mainly

directed toward fighting a sense of fear, in moral training activities it pursues the goal of forming standards of morality suitable to the imperialists.

In order to explain this method let us turn to the subject "a soldier's honor," which is practiced after the example of the U.S. Army in a number of NATO countries. At first the soldiers are told, as required by pedagogic demands, some episodes from military history, then asked to evaluate them, and then the instructor sums up the results. For instance, the soldiers may be told of two events in which the participants were the ~~commander of the expeditionary army in Mexico, General Scott, and~~ Colonel Arnold, who led American troops in one sector during the American Revolution. How are these two leaders noteworthy? In their behavior, as it turns out. General Scott, in Mexico City when it was occupied by his troops, purportedly refused the temptation of a bribe offered him. Moreover, when he learned that the U.S. Congress suspected him of treason, he immediately departed for Washington to appear before the court. Colonel Arnold acted differently. Because congress refused to award him the rank of general he surrendered to the English.

The soldiers are asked: what underlies the behavior of these two men? According to the methods for conducting this activity, the soldiers should understand that General Scott was guided by honor, which could not be said of Colonel Arnold. But what is honor when it is accepted by some and rejected by others? What is its main content?

The instructor tells the soldiers that honor is a system of rules adopted by men and that in the military it is manifested with respect to courage and faithfulness to duty. The main thing in the content of honor is faithfulness to duty, while courage serves as an intermediate stage. As was observed in the elaboration, "the fulfillment of duty in turn presupposes the observance of discipline. Discipline forms dedication to the law and will of the American people, expressed through the leaders."

The concept of honor thus makes it possible to guide servicemen through courage to faithfulness to duty. For the purpose of securing these "theoretical" postulates, some situation is created for the soldiers in which they can feel the statement of a soldier's honor conveyed to them. In such cases training films or television broadcasts are usually employed.

Here, for instance, is what the film "A Soldier's Honor" discusses. A corporal is faced with a dilemma: whether or not to report a friend who has decided not to return from leave by the designated time and who hopes his friend will conceal his absence. Turning from the screen to the audience the corpora! says that if he reports, he will not be acting

as a friend should. When at inspection time the soldier is not in his bed the corporal changes his mind: he must report, for concealment is making bargain with one's conscience. But then you lose your friend. The corporal was confused. To resolve the conflict situation the instructor was asked the question: what should the corporal do? With this the instructor ends.

Then the instructor comes in. He does not hurry the soldiers to give their answers, allows them time to think it over, and by unforced conversation leads them to the desired goal. He says that honor is an internal flame which nourishes a serviceman in all aspects of his life. Honor requires a person to be consistent, not to tolerate a half-way approach, and is inseparable from the dignity of the individual. But dignity, says the instructor, would not be dignity if it did not include such virtues as self-respect and respect for others. Honor recognizes only the whole character. A person has two choices: either honor and truthfulness, or dishonor and falsehood. In conclusion the instructor asks the question: "What should the corporal do?"

Before the soldier expresses his opinion as to what should be done, he will mentally trace the instructor's reasoning. As can be seen, this method of introducing ideas includes elements of indoctrination.

In the educational system *indoctrination* is understood as the process of a person's perception of some idea without critical comprehension. In imperialist armies indoctrination is very widely used. In the system of ideological training of troops it is accomplished through a number of procedures.

For the purpose of establishing a positive attitude toward the suggested idea or person (organization) in the soldiers, military instructors use so-called verbal "stock virtues," such as "a good fellow," "an old man," "the heritage of the good old days," and so on. In particular, the idea that a soldier of the U.S. Army is "the descendant of the original colonists, of hunters wearing deerskin who were raised in the march across the continent . . ." is suggested to him. Such "virtues" are used every time that the attempt is made to impose the idea that the soldier is working for the rights of mankind.

The method of "simplification" is used to divert the soldier's attention from undesirable reflections. Its essence lies in reducing a complicated problem to a number of garish slogans: "Remember Pearl Harbor," "Is Your Country Not Dear to You," "Who Will Defend Your Mother If Not You" and so on. It is assumed that under the pressure of such stock phrases the soldier will be predisposed to accept information of the content required by the imperialists.

The propaganda method of "parallels"—the juggling of concepts—closely borders upon simplification. Usually two concepts are selected.

Usually a negative attitude toward one should already have been developed in the soldiers. Several parallels are drawn so that this attitude is also extended to the other concept. For instance, in studies directed at fostering in U.S. servicemen feelings of prejudice, fascism—toward which a majority have a markedly negative attitude—is identified with communism in order to aggravate their anti-communist sentiments.

The use of this method is inseparably linked to the extensive dissemination of militaristic literature in capitalist armies. In the United States the troubador of nuclear war, H. Kahn, and military sociologists M. Janowitz, L. Rodway, and others are particularly active in this regard. In his sensational book *On Escalation*,¹³ Kahn asserts that militarism and aggression are only "an inevitable reaction to the existence of communism." He views the entire world as an arena for the operations of U.S. military forces, which are purportedly destined by history "to maintain freedom and civilization."

Among other methods used in indoctrination, mention should be made of "name-calling" (attaching insulting nicknames), "scapegoating" (setting a person against another person falsely accused of evil-doing), and "virtue-shifting" (transferring the authority of a respected person to the suggested idea). All these methods essentially constrain servicemen to adopt an image of behavior suitable to the imperialist war machine.

Constraint always has been and remains the basic foundation for keeping the common soldier obedient. The statement of the Prussian King Friedrich II to the effect that a soldier should fear a corporal's stick more than an enemy's bullet is guidance for the action of bourgeois officers. The essence of constraint in contemporary imperialist armies remains the same, but its forms have changed. The fist and the lash as unconcealed attributes of constraint have been replaced by veiled and hence even more tenacious instruments. Today a soldier is constrained not only by the corporal and the officer, but by the entire way of life. Under such constraint a soldier enters the service, carries out orders, and even dies on the battlefield. The tragedy of the soldier of an imperialist army is that under the influence of subtle pedagogic methods he is unaware of this constraint. Graft plays a significant role here.

In the armed forces of imperialist states *graft* has been elevated to the rank of official policy and is spoken of with cynical frankness. For instance, it is observed in a pamphlet of the U.S. Department of Defense titled *The Story of the Marine Corps* that service in the U.S. military is sale and purchase. Imperialists believe that a well-ordered system of graft has a positive effect on troop morale. What is significant, however, lies elsewhere.

Servicemen, wrote Engels, are bought for money to strengthen obedience in the army. But obedience bought for money is too unreliable

a thing, even in the opinion of bourgeois theoreticians themselves. Such obedience is effective only as long as the "proposals of the command ultimately prove to be logical and ensure success in battle. But when defeats and failures occur the protests and indignation rise to the surface through secret channels." ¹⁴

In order to prevent the demoralization of the troops and to increase their resistance to the sense of fear, bourgeois military pedagogs consider it extremely necessary to intensify the combat training of personnel. This is accomplished by various means. Official circulars on combat training turn the attention of instructors to the necessity of carefully selecting the methods of conducting activities. Underlying this selection is consideration for the level of training of the trainees in a given subject, their degree of general development, loyalty, discipline, and the interest of the soldiers in the subject being taught. If the servicemen are just undertaking to study the subject or their loyalty is rated lower than standard, lectures are conducted, followed by testing on questions which require monosyllabic answers. When, however, the activities are conducted with specialists or soldiers who have a high standard of loyalty, the conference method is used. If the training group consists of rated specialists and the degree of loyalty is high, the discussion method is employed.

The lecture is quite rarely conducted in pure form. It is used as an auxiliary method and is usually practiced before the start of the basic course. The main purpose of a lecture is to present material of large volume in a minimum amount of time. Contributing to this is the fact that on the day before the lecture the trainees receive a printed text and become familiar with its contents, and the fact that questions not understood are explained at the activities. During his address the speaker focuses the attention of those present on the main problem of the subject and conveys information not reflected in the text. A lecture with questions, in the course of which one-fourth of the time is allotted for the trainees' answers to the questions posed, is practiced much more often.

The conference also has specific features of its own. For each activity the instructor prepares special questions by means of which he motivates trainees to be active in the desired direction. Other methods of increasing interest in the subject under study are also used. In combat training activities this is done by means of examples. They are taken from collections specially prepared for the purposes of instruction by staffs of the service branches. Problem situations are used in the system of moral orientation. The method of training according to the topic "A Soldier's Honor," analyzed above, serves as an example of conducting studies by the conference method.

The project method is considered one of the most effective methods of instruction. It dates to the 1920's, when pragmatic pedagogy was

intensively introducing it into the system of public education. In essence this is an organized independent study on carrying out an assignment (project). The project method is extensively employed in the system for training officers and specialists.

Discussion, as already indicated, is used in conducting activities with highly skilled specialists and officers. In instruction by this method conclusions on the problem raised for discussion are not prepared in advance. Each participant speaks out with any point of view. This method is often practiced during retraining for new equipment.

Additionally, the *demonstration method* is used in all types of instruction. It is practiced both in combination with other methods of instruction and independently. This method has a number of varieties: the demonstration of models of weapons, equipment, gear, and so on in full scale or in the form of images; the showing of short films; and the illustration of narration (a lecture) by means of various training aids.

All training aids are divided into official and unofficial categories. This division is based on the role which they play in the training process. Insofar as instruction is a continuous process, as American military pedagogs believe, it should not be limited to the training classroom, workshop, or range. Instruction is considered effective only when it permeates the entire life of the serviceman. Therefore, while special aids—diagrams, posters, maps, and so on—are before the soldier in the training premises, outside the training classes unofficial aids situated in smoking areas, halls, and so on continue to exert an influence on him. These aids do not duplicate those in the classroom and usually contain elements of diversion or a puzzle on the subject of the activities. In the study of weapons, for instance, rebuses and crossword puzzles are posed, for whose solution knowledge of the parts of a rifle or automatic weapon is required.

In addition to specifically military aids, there are also ones saturated with political content—that is, elements of ideological influence. This influence on the trainees is heightened still more when the activities are conducted by the dramatization method.

The essence of *dramatization* is that a situation from which the trainees must find a way out is played out before them, or else some action to which they become witnesses, or in which they directly take part, unfolds. For instance, in instruction in “escaping from capture” every soldier acts as a sort of character in a play that is acted out under the guidance of the instructor-director. In working out survival exercises, each soldier is taught how to catch snakes, animals, and so on. ~~Dramatization is also extensively used in the psychological training system.~~

By means of dramatization the imperialist war machine tries to create

in the soldiers of its armies a realistic idea of the potential enemy. For this purpose the servicemen are taught in training sessions to act against a "real" enemy who is played by soldiers dressed in the uniforms of servicemen of socialist countries and armed with Soviet weapons.

In recent years movies and television have become widely used in the system for training the personnel of imperialist armies. In the U.S. Army, for instance, topical films are used in practically all subjects of the combat training of service branches, and military television is universally employed.

Programmed learning began to be introduced in 1958 in a number of armies of imperialist states. It has not yet become mass instruction, however. Experience has demonstrated that programmed learning brings about some increase in the effectiveness of the training process, which is connected with rote memorization or the development of motor skills, but does not yield the necessary impact in the study of subjects which require creative thought (operational-tactical disciplines, the social sciences).


In conclusion it should be noted that in revealing the reactionary essence and aggressive orientation of personnel training of the armies of imperialist states, our commanders and political workers should emphasize both the strong and weak points of this process. One should always keep in mind V. I. Lenin's statement to the effect that "the behavior of an army which does not train to master all types of weapons and all means and procedures of warfare which the enemy has or might have is unreasonable or even criminal."¹⁵ Knowledge of the system of personnel training in bourgeois armies, in combination with purposeful work toward instilling a hatred of imperialist aggressors, is a mandatory condition for ensuring the high combat readiness and combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces and for forming in soldiers the traits and practical skills necessary for the successful conduct of modern combat.

Footnotes

1. *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, pp 14-15.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 12, p 113.
3. See *Instructor's Journal*, July 1965, pp 38-48.
4. *School and Society*, Vol 87, No 2145, 17 January 1959, p 20.
5. F. W. Taylor, *Nauchnaya organizatsiya truda* (The Scientific Organization of Labor), translated from English, Moscow, Transpechat', 1925, p 76.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 303.
7. *DA PAM* 360-5, 1968, Article 31-1.
8. *AR* 360-81, 1964, p 4.
9. J. F. Herbart, *Izbr. ped. soch.* (Selected Pedagogic Works), translated from German, Moscow, Uchpedgiz, 1940, p 165.

10. DA PAM 360-300. *Officer's Call. The Challenge of Leadership*, Washington, 27 May 1969.
 11. T. J. Edwards, *Military Customs*, London, 1961, p 214.
 12. *Army Digest*, March 1970, p 27.
 13. See H. Kahn: *Ob eskalatsii* (On Escalation), translated from English, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966.
 14. D. Moreno, *Sotsiometriya* (Sociometry), translated from English, Moscow, IL, 1956, p 246.
 15. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.*, Vol 41, p 81.
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